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Abstract 
 
 
 
This thesis analyses French policies towards and perceptions of the British 
colony of Rhodesia, from the immediate aftermath of the Second World 
War up until the territory’s independence as Zimbabwe in 1980. Its main 
objective is to challenge notions of exceptionality associated with Franco-
African relations, by investigating French engagement with a region outside 
of its traditional sphere of African influence.  
 
The first two chapters explore the development of Franco-Rhodesian 
relations in the eighteen years following the establishment of a French 
Consulate in Salisbury in 1947. Chapter One examines the foreign policy 
mind-set that underpinned French engagement with Rhodesia at this time, 
whilst Chapter Two addresses how this mind-set operated in practice. The 
remaining three chapters explore the evolution of France’s presence in this 
British colony in the fourteen and a half years following the white settlers’ 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence. Chapter Three sets out the 
particularities of the post-1965 context, in terms of France’s foreign policy 
agenda and the situation on the ground in Central Southern Anglophone 
Africa. Chapter Four analyses how the policies of state and non-state French 
actors were implemented in Rhodesia after 1965, and Chapter Five assesses 
the impact of these policies for France’s relations with Africa, Britain and 
the United States, as well as for the end of European rule in Rhodesia.  
 
This thesis argues that France’s African vision began to expand to include 
Anglophone Africa, not in the post-colonial or post-Cold War eras, but 
immediately following the Second World War, thus challenging the view 
that France was solely concerned with its own African Empire at this time. 
Throughout, Rhodesia was intertwined with France’s policies towards 
Francophone Africa in terms of motivations, methods and men. This, in 
turn, had far reaching consequences for France’s presence on the African 
continent, its relationship with “les Anglo-Saxons” and the course of 
Rhodesian decolonisation.  
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 1 
Introduction 
 
France and Francophone Africa: an exceptional 
relationship?  
 
France’s relationship with Francophone Africa is frequently represented as 
exceptional. At the heart of this discourse of exceptionality lies an ingrained 
belief, which can be traced back to 1789, that France is predestined to Great 
Power status, simply because it is France (Chafer, 2008, p.38; Keiger, 2001, 
p.18). According to this view, the French language and culture, legal and 
administrative practices, and moral values are superior (Martin, 1985, 
pp.189-190). In light of this, it is France’s duty, its vocation, its mission, to 
spread French civilisation beyond the “Hexagone” (Bourmaud, 2000). This 
vision of France’s world role was expressed first during the Revolutionary 
era, seen for example in François Antoine de Boissy d’Anglas’s claim in 
1794 that “There can only be one right way of administering: and if we have 
found it for European countries, why should [the colonies] be deprived of 
it?” (cited in Cumming, 2005b, p.233). In the nineteenth century, Victor 
Hugo recapitulated this view when he claimed that, “Without France the 
world feels alone” (cited in Bourmaud, 2000).  
 
In the late nineteenth century, the second wave of European colonial 
expansion, and especially the “Scramble for Africa”, presented France with 
a particular opportunity to act upon these imperatives, as universalist 
 2 
Republican values intersected with the growing momentum for European 
expansionism. France’s presence on the African continent was founded, 
therefore, on an ingrained belief in the unparalleled superiority of France in 
moral, cultural, social and scientific spheres (Conklin, 1997, p.1-3). This, in 
turn, fuelled a uniquely French version of the European civilising mission, 
which, in contrast to France’s European counterparts, was elevated to the 
status of imperial discourse (Conklin, 1997, p.1) and became an entrenched 
strand of the collective French mentality (Keiger, 2001, p.19). The French 
mission civilisatrice was also distinctive due to its emphasis on 
revolutionary ideals, its advocacy (in official discourse at least) of the 
application of direct rule, its belief that the colonies should be assimilated 
into a Greater French Republic and, above all else, its staunch commitment 
to the diffusion of the French language and, more broadly, the rayonnement 
of France’s superior civilisation (Cumming, 2005b, p.234). The 
exceptionality of the French presence in Africa, therefore, was founded 
upon the belief that “la France est exceptionnelle par nature” (Guburt and 
Saint-Martin, 2003, p.162, cited in Drake, 2004).  
 
This discourse of uniqueness dominates scholarly accounts of Franco-
African relations in the post-colonial period. Adjectives commonly used to 
describe the interaction between France and its former colonies in Afrique 
Occidentale Française (AOF) and Afrique Equatoriale Française (AEF) after 
1960 include ‘exceptionalist’ (Bourmaud, 2003, p.14), ‘distinctive’ 
(Cumming, 2013, p.26), ‘particular’ (Médard, 1997, p.22), ‘special’ 
(Charbonneau, 2008, p.2) and ‘unique’ (Golan, 1981, p.3). These 
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characterisations centre on the enduring nature of France’s relations with its 
former African dependencies after decolonisation, where many institutional 
structures from the colonial period remained in place after the end of formal 
French rule. The franc zone, whereby the currency in Francophone Africa 
was tied to the French franc at a fixed rate, was maintained, thus permitting 
the French government to exercise considerable influence over economic 
and budgetary policies, whilst the Ministry of Cooperation was founded as a 
direct successor to the Ministry of Overseas France (MOF) and solely 
responsible for Francophone Africa. Numerous cultural, technical and 
military cooperation agreements served to reinforce the bond between 
Francophone Africa and its former colonial rulers in Paris, and acted as a 
prerequisite for France’s continued interventionism in the region. In 
addition, non-institutional apparatus, also established during the colonial 
period – notably the appropriation of Franco-African relations by the French 
President, who was advised by a cellule africaine, with little or no 
accountability to Parliament or civil society, and the close, personal 
friendships between the directors of France’s African policy at the Elysée 
and members of the Francophone African political élite – are also used to 
support arguments that stress the exceptionality of Franco-African relations 
after 1960 (Martin, 1995; Chafer, 2002a, p.346; Cumming, 2013, p.25). 
This system of relations is represented as a uniquely Francophone 
phenomenon, implemented by France solely in its former sub-Saharan 
colonies. As such, Médard (1997, p.23) has argued that relations between 
France and Francophone Africa were distinct from France’s relations with 
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the rest of the African continent, as well as France’s international relations 
as a whole.  
 
Recent revisionist scholarship has begun to challenge this discourse of 
exceptionality. Much of this new work has centred on the shifts that took 
place in France’s approach to the African continent after the end of the Cold 
War (Chafer, 1992, p.47), the death of Houphouët-Boigny in 1993 – 
described by Martin (1995, p.1) as ‘a major diplomatic turning point’ due to 
the Ivorian President’s status as the last Francophone African leader with 
close personal relations to the French policy making élite – and the highly 
criticised role played by France during the Rwandan genocide of 1994 
(Chafer, 2002a, pp.347-9). This, in turn, has led scholars to begin to apply 
‘concepts of normalization and even disengagement’ to the study of Franco-
African relations (Chafer, 2002a, p.343), emphasising, for example, the 
‘multilateralization’ of French military policy towards Africa, seen in the 
replacement of old style, direct military interventions with action led by 
Renforcement des Capacités Africaines au Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP) 
(Chafer, 2002a, p.349; Charbonneau, 2008, p.50). The reduction in 
developmental aid allocated to Francophone Africa is cited as proof that 
French policy was being brought in line with international norms (Chafer, 
2002a, p.352; Cumming, 2001, p.104), whilst the dissolution of the Ministry 
of Cooperation and the transfer of its responsibilities to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs is identified as a signal of change to France’s approach to 
the African continent (Chafer, 2002a, p.353).  
 5 
In addition, Chafer (2005, p.18) has described ‘a move away from the 
traditional pré carré as a privileged sphere of influence in Africa’ during the 
Chirac Presidency (1995-2007), evidenced by French interaction with non-
Francophone African countries during this period. This shift is evident in 
the cultural sphere, with successful initiatives to make French the second 
language taught in schools in Nigeria as well as a working language for the 
eleven member states of Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) (Cumming, 2005b, p.246). Changes are also apparent in economic 
strategy, with French trade and capital investment redirected from 
Francophone Africa to other countries, including Nigeria, Kenya, South 
Africa and Zimbabwe (Martin, 1995, p.1). In a similar vein, Majumdar 
(2007, p.241) has documented how France was ‘keen to stretch out a hand 
to the former African colonies of other European powers, notably those of 
Britain’, by sending invitations to Anglophone African countries to attend 
the Franco-African summits.  
 
Other scholars have proposed different timelines for France’s growing 
engagement with territories outside of its traditional sphere of influence. 
Torrent (2012, p.13), for example, identifies Louis de Guiringaud’s visit to 
Ghana in 1977 as marking ‘a radical change’ in France’s African policy, as 
the state actively began to promote contacts with Anglophone Africa. Alden 
(1996) and Bach (1980; 1982; 1990) have gone back further in time still. 
Bach’s studies of French policies towards Nigeria (1980; 1982) and South 
Africa (1990) begin in 1960 and 1963 respectively, indicating that France’s 
interest in these non-Francophone territories commenced almost 
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immediately after the independence of French West and Equatorial Africa. 
More generally, Alden (1996, p.12) has described France’s ambition to play 
a truly continental role in the years that followed the decolonisation of 
Francophone Africa by extending its influence into Anglophone and 
Lusophone Africa. The expansion of France’s African vision to include 
countries beyond France’s traditional sphere of influence is represented, 
therefore, as a post-colonial phenomenon.1   
 
However, over the past decade, a small number of historians have begun to 
explore France’s relations with non-French speaking Africa during the 
colonial period. Keese (2007b), for example, has explored French policies 
towards and perceptions of Lusophone Africa between 1930 and 1961, 
whilst Stanley (2004), Moukambi (2008) and Konieczna (2009) all examine 
Franco-South African relations in the post-war period, although the former 
two are unpublished doctoral theses, and the latter is only available in the 
French language. This, in turn, demonstrates French interest in and 
engagement with regions of Africa outside of the French colonial domain 
prior to the independence of AOF and AEF.  However, with the exception 
of the studies noted above, there remains very little work that explores 
France’s participation in parts of the African continent outside of its 
traditional sphere of influence in the late colonial period. This neglect is 
especially acute with regards to Anglophone Africa where, despite studies 
of Anglo-French relations in the context of West Africa (Michel, 1983; 
                                                
1 In this instance, the post-colonial period is taken to mean the years following the 
independence of Francophone sub-Saharan Africa in 1960. The term “post-colonial”, 
however, is highly problematic especially as, in contrast to French West and Equatorial 
Africa, the territory under investigation - Rhodesia - in this thesis remained a British colony 
throughout the period in question. 
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Kent, 1992), French North Africa (Thomas, 2000) and the Middle East 
(Barr, 2011), there has been no systematic analysis of France’s direct 
engagement with Britain’s African Empire. It is the aim of this research, 
therefore, to build upon this existing research and begin the task of filling in 
this gap in the historiography, by analysing French policies towards and 
perceptions of Southern Rhodesia from the immediate aftermath of the 
Second World War up until this British colony’s independence as 
Zimbabwe in 1980. In so doing, it will be possible to obtain a more nuanced 
understanding of France’s presence on the African continent during the late 
colonial era and throughout the period of decolonisation.  
 
Why Rhodesia?2  
 
This project was originally envisaged as a study of French relations with 
Anglophone Africa throughout the transition to independence on the 
African continent. However, it quickly became apparent that such an 
investigation was far too broad for a doctoral thesis of 80,000 words, 
particularly following the unanticipated discovery of vast quantities of 
archival material relating to Franco-Rhodesian relations prior to 1960 in the 
Archives Diplomatiques in Nantes and the Archives du Ministère des 
Affaires Etrangères at La Courneuve in Paris. Thus, the decision was made 
to focus on one case study, but over a broad temporal period, permitting this 
                                                
2 ‘Rhodesia’ officially became ‘Southern Rhodesia’ in 1901. From 1953 until 1963, 
Southern Rhodesia was a member of the Central African Federation with its British-ruled 
neighbours of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi). In 1965, following 
the break-up of the Federation and UDI, the territory reverted to its original name, 
Rhodesia. For simplicity in this discussion, the term ‘Rhodesia’ will be used to refer to the 
country known today as Zimbabwe. When considering alongside its neighbour, Northern 
Rhodesia, the territory will be distinguished as Southern Rhodesia. 
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research to transcend the divide between the colonial and post-colonial 
epochs so often applied to studies of European engagement with the African 
continent. The selection of Rhodesia as the principal case study for this 
research was made in light of the opportunities it presents to us as a lens 
through which to explore an array of different questions relating to Franco-
African relations, Anglo-French rivalry, French foreign policy and the 
history of African decolonisation.  
 
Southern Rhodesia had an unusual constitutional status in the British 
Empire as a self-governing colony without dominion status (Watts, 2012, 
p.16). In fact, in light of the role played by Cecil Rhodes and the British 
South Africa Company (BSAC) in the conquest and colonisation of this 
region south of the Zambezi River in the late nineteenth century, Britain 
never governed Southern Rhodesia directly (Wood, 2005, p.6). In 1922, the 
growing settler population of the region was given the choice between 
joining the Union of South Africa or responsible government. They chose 
the latter, leaving the colony with a status close to that of a dominion, with 
wide-ranging powers, such as defence. However, in light of the territory’s 
official colonial status, external affairs remained the responsibility of the 
UK government. Britain also retained reserved powers under the Southern 
Rhodesian Constitution Letters Patent (1923) and the Rhodesian 
Constitution, giving the British Monarch power of disallowance and 
requiring the Secretary of State’s approval before any subordinate 
legislation that discriminated against Africans in a manner not authorised by 
the Patent Act could be implemented (Wood, 2005, p.9). The British 
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Parliament, therefore, had full powers to legislate in Southern Rhodesia, but 
would not do so without the consent of the Southern Rhodesian Legislative 
Assembly. Moreover, in spite of the fact that Southern Rhodesia was, 
technically, a British colony, the territory was the responsibility of the 
Dominions Office, not the Colonial Office (CO), and the Southern 
Rhodesian Prime Minister was invited to the Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers’ Conferences (Wood, 2005, p.9). In constitutional terms, 
therefore, Rhodesia was without parallels, not only in the British African 
Empire, but also in French West and Equatorial Africa. Thus, this case 
study provides us with a unique lens through which to explore France’s 
policies towards and perceptions of Africa. 
 
There are, of course, a number of parallels between Rhodesia and France’s 
African Empire, the most obvious of which is Algeria. Both Rhodesia and 
Algeria had influential European populations with close ties to the colonial 
metropole. Both were economically important to the colonial metropole. 
Both experienced a three-way struggle between settlers, the indigenous 
population and the colonial administration during their transition to 
independence. In addition to the comparison between Rhodesia and Algeria, 
the question of Federations also binds together the British and French 
experiences in Africa in the late colonial period. Collins (2013, p.35) has 
described ‘a genuinely trans-national, world historical’ decolonising 
“Federal moment”, where Federations were seriously contemplated as an 
alternative to imperial rule and individual sovereign nation states, by 
colonisers and the colonised alike. In 1953, in British Africa, the Central 
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African Federation (CAF) was formed of Southern Rhodesia, Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, in response to fears in Whitehall that the region’s 
white settlers might ‘gravitate – by desire, design or accident – towards 
South African-style apartheid’ (Collins, 2013, p.29). The Federation was 
conceived, therefore, as ‘a desirable liberal counterpoise to Afrikanerdom in 
southern Africa’ (Wood, 2005, p.12). In French West Africa, it was the 
African nationalists who looked primarily to the Federal model, seen in the 
unsuccessful indigenous efforts to form the Mali Federation of Senegal, 
Soudan, Haute-Volta and Dahomey in the late 1950s on the grounds that a 
confederation in which France and its former colonies were equal partners 
would be preferable to the division of AOF into independent nation-states 
(Burbank & Cooper, 2010, p.11). These alternating parallels of Algeria and 
the Mali Federation underline the potential that the Rhodesian case study 
has to illuminate our understanding of the French approach to the African 
continent in the post-war period.  
 
The use of the Rhodesian example also permits the examination of French 
policy towards and perceptions of a region of Africa where Britain faced 
particular challenges and complications in its retreat from Africa. In the 
post-war period, especially following the establishment of the Central 
African Federation, Rhodesia’s white settlers increasingly sought to build 
upon their ‘quasi-dominion status’ (Murphy, 2006, p.750) and become a full 
dominion within the Commonwealth of Nations, with a similar degree of 
independence to Canada and Australia. According to Murphy (2006, p.751), 
‘the threat of a settler revolt [against Britain] ran throughout the lifetime of 
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the Federation and, indeed, predated it’, with Godfrey Huggins, Prime 
Minister of Southern Rhodesia (1933-1953) and Federal Prime Minister 
(1953-1956), and his successor, and longstanding advocate of the 
Federation, Roy Welensky, Federal Prime Minister (1956-1963), 
threatening a “Boston Tea Party” as early as December 1952 if the 
territory’s European population did not receive further political concessions. 
Throughout the Federal period, Southern Rhodesia’s European population, 
which in 1960 stood at 219,000 in contrast to the territory’s 3.4 million 
African inhabitants (Barber, 1967, pp.4-5), stubbornly resisted British 
efforts to introduce majority rule to the region. This intransigence 
contributed to the collapse of the Federation in 1963.  
 
Thus, when Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland achieved their independence 
in 1964 as Zambia and Malawi respectively, Southern Rhodesia’s continued 
commitment to maintaining “the real bastion of Christian civilisation in 
Southern Africa” (Macleod cited in Barber, 1967, p.181) acted as a barrier 
to the decolonisation of the region, setting its European settler population on 
a collision course with the UK government. The settler revolt eventually 
came on 11 November 1965, with the proclamation of a Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain by the Southern Rhodesian 
Prime Minister, and steadfast supporter of white rule in Africa, Ian Douglas 
Smith.3 This marked the beginning of fourteen-year rebellion against Britain 
by its own “kith and kin”, which created problems for successive UK 
governments at home (Dowden, 2008, p.132; Hyam, 2006, pp.367-370), in 
                                                
3 Smith was Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister (1964-1965), before becoming Prime 
Minister of Rhodesia (1965-1979) following UDI and the decision to drop the prefix 
‘Southern’.  
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the Commonwealth (Watts, 2012, pp.85-87) and in the world at large, 
evidenced by the ‘vociferous’ criticism of Britain’s Rhodesian policy 
received in United Nations (UN) and the loss of Britain’s prestige amongst 
its closest international partners (Watts, 2012, p.207). Thus, UDI seriously 
challenged Britain’s efforts, not only to draw a line under its colonial 
venture in Africa, but also to find a new role in a Cold War-dominated 
world order.       
 
Little is recorded in the secondary literature about France’s response to 
UDI. Alden (1996, p.15) has described the ‘tacit’ support given to the white 
settler regime, particularly through the existence of a Rhodesian interest 
office in Paris and the assistance provided to Ian Smith’s government by the 
Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage (SDECE). 
Bach (1990, pp.185-186) echoes these sentiments, noting, in addition to the 
points raised by Alden, the presence of French arms in Rhodesia, the 
continued activity of French companies, including Total and Peugeot, in the 
region despite international economic sanctions, and French willingness to 
turn a blind eye to the continuous flow of goods out of Rhodesia to the 
former French colony of Gabon. Investigative journalist, Pierre Péan (1983, 
pp.80-89), also explores French participation in the illegal trade between 
Rhodesia and Gabon in his wider study of Affaires Africaines. In addition, 
there are a number of references in the literature relating to the Rhodesian 
problem in the UN (Gowlland-Debbas, 1990, pp.196-197; Kapungu, 1973, 
pp.28-29; Strack, 1978, pp.101-102; Zacklin, 1974, pp.17-21), as well as in 
works on France and the UN (Smouts, 1979, p.332-336; Wood, 1973, p.36), 
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that single out France as the sole power not to oppose UDI in the 
multilateral setting. These citations point, therefore, to a surprising trend, 
whereby France, the self-styled champion of African decolonisation 
(Chafer, 2002a, p.353) offered covert support to an illegal, white regime in 
Anglophone Africa.  
 
The historiography of UDI, however, is virtually silent about France’s role 
in the crisis, focusing instead on Anglo-Rhodesian relations (Coggins, 2006; 
Meredith, 1979). Two highly detailed accounts of the events leading up to 
the Rhodesian rebellion and its aftermath by Wood (2005; 2008) make only 
passing references to France, such as a note regarding Rhodesian hopes that 
they would secure overt French support prior to UDI (Wood, 2005, p.395) 
and a reference to a press report from 1967 that accused a French company 
of exporting textiles to Rhodesia in exchange for Rhodesian tobacco (Wood, 
2008, p.268). Even studies purporting to be international histories of the 
crisis, such as Watts’ (2012) recent publication, fail to take into account any 
French perspective. As such, further investigation is required into France’s 
relations with Rhodesia after UDI that takes into account evidence from 
British, French and Rhodesian archives, and gives consideration to the 
foundations for this post-UDI Franco-Rhodesian interaction. This thesis 
seeks to achieve this end.   
 
The neglect for French involvement in Rhodesia in the existing 
historiography is especially acute in light of what we know about the long-
standing Anglo-French rivalry on the African continent. Surrender to the 
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British at Fashoda in 1898 left the French humiliated and fearful of all 
British activity in Africa, a legacy that, according to Chafer and Cumming 
(2010a, p.1130), shaped French African policy throughout the twentieth 
century. This can be seen in West Africa during and after the Second World 
War, with Kent (1992) and Michel (1983) exploring the numerous obstacles 
to Anglo-French cooperation in this setting. We also know of French fears 
about Anglophone infiltration and expansion into le pre carré français in 
sub-Saharan Africa, a concern that was articulated in a National Assembly 
debate on the loi-cadre in 1957, with the following warning that ‘quand 
vous aurez disloqué la fédération d’Afrique noire, craignez que les 
territoires [français] ne se tournent l’un vers Lagos [Nigeria], l’autre vers 
Accra [Ghana]’.4 The work of Thomas (2000) and Wall (2001) reveals the 
tensions created in relations between France, on the one hand, and the UK 
and the USA, on the other, as a result of “Anglo-Saxon” involvement in 
French North Africa. Looking to the post-colonial period, Torrent (2012, 
p.261) has described ‘the difficult dialogue between the French and British 
worlds and the intersecting but fundamentally distinct decolonisation 
processes at work in the respective spheres of influence of France and 
Britain’ and how this, in turn, informed the shape of the post-independence 
Cameroonian nation-state. The Nigerian civil war (1967-1970), where 
France supported the Biafran separatists in their struggle with the British-
backed Federal Nigerian government (Bach, 1980; Melville, 1979), is a 
further example of the ways in which Franco-British hostilities influenced 
the course of events in Africa, even after the end of formal colonial rule, and 
                                                
4 République française (1957, Jan 29), Journal officiel de l’Assemblée Nationale, p.373. 
Cited in Bach (1982).  
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how interaction in the African setting continued to influence Anglo-French 
relations.5 
 
The impact of French involvement in Rhodesia on Anglo-French relations 
and vice versa, however, remains underexplored by scholars. Less than one 
paragraph in a study of ‘Franco-British Relations during the Wilson Years’ 
by Young (2006, p.16) is dedicated to the difficulties created in Anglo-
French relations as a result of France’s Rhodesian policy, whilst Mtisi, 
Nyakudya and Barnes (2008, pp.133-134) are content with the conclusion 
that ‘political rivalry’ was the main motivation for France’s refusal to 
observe all of the sanctions against Rhodesia, failing to develop this 
argument further. Alden (1996, p.15) argues that France ‘used the issue of 
Rhodesia to subvert British interests in the region,’ but does not elaborate. 
In light of these assertions, and their underdevelopment, there is a pressing 
need to examine French involvement in Rhodesia as a source of insight into 
Anglo-French relations in the post-war period. It is the aim of this study to 
probe this issue, using official UK and French government archives to 
explore how far French involvement in Rhodesia was informed by Anglo-
French relations, as well as the reverse question of how the tumultuous 
Franco-British relationship was influenced by French engagement with this 
Anglophone African territory. 
 
                                                
5 My undergraduate dissertation (LSE, 2009), entitled Britain, France and the Nigerian 
civil war, 1967-1970, explored UK government responses to French backing of Biafra, 
arguing that it was a major bone of contention in Anglo-French relations in this period. 
However, the damage to Anglo-French relations was not irreversible as, immediately 
following the collapse of France’s Biafran policy and the end of the conflict in 1970, 
British hopes were once raised of future Anglo-French cooperation in Africa.  
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A connected history of decolonisation 
 
In order to understand European colonialism in Africa, scholars have long 
looked beyond the boundaries of a particular empire. In fact, according to 
Dimier (2004), efforts at theorising colonial administration and policy in the 
inter-war years, led by political scientists in France and the UK, centred on 
comparing British and French approaches to their respective colonies. After 
independence, the practice of comparing empires continued, with scholars 
such as Crowder (1964) and Kiwanuka (1970) seeking respectively to 
differentiate or equate the British and French methods in Africa. Historians 
have also compared the processes of decolonisation in Anglophone and 
Francophone Africa, seen for example in the work of Smith (1978), which 
analyses the different contexts that underpinned the transfer of power to the 
African majority in British and French Africa, arguing that Britain had four 
key advantages over France that facilitated the process by which rule was 
handed over to the majority, and Kahler (1984), which investigates how the 
alternating courses of decolonisation in Anglophone and Francophone 
Africa produced different effects on metropolitan society. 
 
In recent decades, this methodological approach has evolved, particularly in 
response to the rise of transnational and global history. This ‘international 
turn’ (Sluga, 2011, p.222) has led historians to ‘an intellectual frontier 
unbounded by geographies, hemispheres and continents, let alone national 
borders and parish boundaries’ (O’Brien, 2006, p.4). Leading the charge in 
this new field of research are historians such as McNeill and McNeill 
(2003), who have emphasised the ‘webs of interaction’ in human history, 
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exploring how human webs of ideas, people and practices have evolved in 
both their meaning and their degree of integration since the first world wide 
web was formed 12,000 years ago (pp.3-5). Other pioneering work has 
come from Bayly (2004), whose study of The Birth of the Modern World 
combines what he describes as “lateral history” - the history of connections 
- with “vertical history” - the history of the development of ideas - in order 
to obtain a fuller understanding of the development of modern political 
institutions and ideologies (p.4) in the period between 1780 and 1914.  
 
Imperial historians have also enthusiastically championed this methodology.  
According to Colley (2006, p.380), empires are ‘a vast, diffuse and 
recurrent phenomenon’, a view that is echoed by Burbank and Cooper 
(2010) who contrast the nation state, which they describe as ‘a blip on the 
historical horizon’ (p.2), with the enduring nature of empires, emphasising 
particularly how ‘varied but intertwined imperial trajectories repeatedly 
transformed the world over two millennia’ (p.444). In light of this, there 
have been appeals to imperial historians to broaden their perspectives and 
adopt a global, connected history methodology. Cooper and Stoler (1997, 
p.34), for example, have called upon historians to study the circuits of both 
colonised and colonising people and ideas, within and among empires, 
whilst Colley (2006, p.380) has emphasised the need for ‘a relentlessly 
wide-ranging, eclectic, comparative and questioning vision, [and] 
uncompromisingly plural approaches’. 
 
 18 
The impact of these calls can be seen in the recent rise of global histories of 
empire, such as that of Darwin (2008) and Burbank and Cooper (2010), 
which analyse the ‘intersecting trajectories’ (Burbank & Cooper, 2010, 
p.21) between different empires across vast geographical and temporal 
spaces. Similarly, amongst scholars of decolonisation, this broad, world 
history perspective is increasing in its popularity, seen in the work of 
Shipway (2008a) and Thomas, Moore and Butler (2008). Connected 
histories of empire were also the subject of a recent conference that took 
place at the University of Bristol in July 2013,6 demonstrating the growing 
momentum within the historical discipline for global imperial history. 
 
This PhD thesis takes its inspiration from these studies’ focus on broadening 
our perspective on the history of empire and decolonisation, whilst also 
looking to works concentrated on more confined geographical spaces and 
chronologies, which analyse the cross-cutting influences between different 
colonial empires. Dimier (2004), for example, has examined how British 
and French political scientists represented the colonial policies of their 
counterparts across the Channel during the inter-war period and how these 
observations, of what were essentially very similar administrative practices, 
contributed to the creation of the myth of the difference between British and 
French approaches to colonial rule in Africa and, subsequently, to 
decolonisation.  
 
                                                
6 Bristol Institute for Humanities and Arts. (2013, July 3). Connected histories of empire. 
Retrieved September 12, 2013, from 
http://www.bris.ac.uk/arts/research/events/2013/1650.html 
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Perceptions of different colonial systems are also at the centre of Keese’s 
(2007b) work on Francophone and Lusophone Africa. Rather than 
conducting a simple comparison between the end of French and Portuguese 
rule in Africa, Keese examines the cross influences and interconnections 
that linked and shaped these interdependent processes. In order to achieve 
this end, Keese employs the “mirror” of French perceptions of Portuguese 
Africa to examine the interests and strategies of the French administration 
during the transition to majority rule. Simultaneously, Portuguese responses 
to French overseas reform are analysed in order to provide new insights into 
the Portuguese colonial system (Kesse, 2007b, pp.35–36). He also 
investigates how France and Portugal’s perceptions of each other influenced 
their respective policy-making in Africa, and uses this study of mutual 
influences between colonial regimes to analyse the transfer of power in 
Africa (Keese, 2007b, p.12). In so doing, Keese offers an entirely innovative 
interpretation of the end of empire on the African continent, shedding new 
light on the ways in which colonial and decolonising policies were 
formulated with reference to another European colonial power’s approaches 
to the same challenges. This thesis will build upon and go beyond this work, 
by analysing the connections and cross influences between the British and 
French Empires, investigating French perceptions of British decolonisation 
as an insight into French strategies in its own sphere of African influence, 
whilst also exploring how certain French actors crossed national and 
colonial boundaries into Anglophone Africa and how these interventions 
influenced happenings in both British and French Africa, Anglo-French 
relations and French foreign policy more widely. As such, this thesis will 
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employ a transnational perspective for the study of a transnational object of 
study.  
 
Worldviews, mind-sets and unspoken assumptions 
 
In order to understand how and why French policy towards Rhodesia was 
formulated, as well as the diversity of actors and agendas engaged in this 
decision-making process, this thesis will examine the “mind-set” that 
underpinned French action towards this British colony. Historian, James 
Joll, was one of the first to highlight the advantages of studying a 
“worldview”, “mind-set” or set of “unspoken assumptions”. In his inaugural 
lecture as Stevenson Professor of International History at the London 
School of Economics in 1968, Joll called for the upbringing and education 
of policy-makers to form part of the analysis of the causes of the First 
World War, whilst also emphasising the significance of investigating ‘the 
general ideas in the air’ (1968, p.8), a universal set of shared assumptions 
that underpinned the European decision to go to war in 1914 (Bell, 1992, 
p.119). Thus, Joll (1968, p.24, cited in Winter & Prost, 2005, p.52) 
concluded, “It is only by studying the minds of men that we shall 
understand the causes of anything”. According to this method, therefore, 
analysing the “worldview”, “unspoken assumptions” or “mind-set” shared 
by a particular group of decision-makers makes it possible to understand 
what motivated them to make certain decisions that, in turn, shaped the 
course of history.  
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This approach is particularly pertinent in analysis of French foreign policy 
formulation. As has already been explored in the opening section of this 
introduction, since the Revolution, French policy-makers and ordinary 
citizens alike have presented the French nation as unique and the sole 
guardians of universalist Republican values, with a duty to spread this 
superior civilisation across the globe (Keiger, 2001, p.1). This, in turn, 
fuelled the French mission civilisatrice in Africa and elsewhere, whilst also 
influencing the histories written about France’s engagement with the outside 
world. As such, according to Keiger (2001, p.1), the ways in which 
decision-makers and the French population understood France’s world role 
was as significant as the realities that underpinned it.  
 
The concept of the “mind-set” has been applied to the French colonial 
context in two recent volumes edited by Thomas (2011b & 2011c). In the 
introduction to the first of these volumes, Thomas (2011a, pp.xi-xxxvii) 
defines ‘the colonial mind’ as the shared attitudes, presumptions and 
expectations that underpinned French decision-making towards its empire 
(p.xvi). By studying these ‘mental processes’ (p.xii) which preceded French 
action in empire, it is possible to ‘unpick the constituent parts of 
imperialist… thought and daily practice’ (p.xvi) and bring together ‘the 
seemingly endless colonial minds’ (p.xi) and ‘the multiple influences, 
domestic, colonial and foreign’ (p.xviii) which made actions ‘possible, 
indeed probable, and, in some cases, even inevitable’ (p.xxvi). This thesis 
will apply this approach to the Rhodesian context, exploring the worldview 
of the policy-makers, bureaucrats and diplomats engaged in Rhodesian 
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affairs during this period, how this “mind-set” manifested itself in the 
Rhodesian context and how this, in turn, shaped French action in the region. 
In so doing, it will be possible to explore the factors that motivated certain 
French actors to participate in Anglophone African affairs, whilst also 
obtaining a deeper understanding of the nature of French activity in 
Rhodesia. The application of the concept of the “mind-set” also provides us 
with the space to study the diversity of French actors, actions and agendas in 
Rhodesia, whilst simultaneously acknowledging the existence of shared 
foreign policy imperatives.  
 
In the context of the French Empire, Thomas (2011a, p.xviii) has 
acknowledged how foreign experiences, both at the ‘international level of 
competition between states and the transnational level of economic, cultural 
and political ties between communities across imperial boundaries’, 
combined with both local and metropolitan concerns to shape the French 
colonial mind. French participation in Rhodesia is, by its very nature as a 
French foreign policy, intertwined with external forces, not least French 
relations with Rhodesia’s colonial ruler - and France’s long-standing rival - 
Britain. Moreover, the extensive impact of the French Empire on France’s 
wider foreign policies, as well as Rhodesia’s geographical location in 
Africa, at the epicentre of France’s post-war efforts to restore its 
international position, suggests that assumptions that informed the French 
colonial “mind-set” may have also affected attitudes towards Rhodesia and, 
thus, French action in the region. As such, in applying the concept of the 
“mind-set” to this study of French engagement with Rhodesia, it will be 
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possible to enhance not only our understanding of the motivations behind 
French involvement with this region of British Africa, but also the ways in 
which French experiences in Rhodesia shaped, and were shaped, by 
France’s wider foreign policy objectives.  
 
There are two further reasons why this ‘essential and familiar analytical 
tool’ (Thomas, 2011a, p.xii) provides a particularly useful framework within 
which to analyse France’s participation in British Africa in the post-war 
period. According to Thomas, the study of the colonial mind provides an 
insight into the stereotypes used to legitimise the sometimes bizarre 
methods employed by the French in their colonies (p.xxiv). Similarly, 
French participation in Rhodesia appears out of the ordinary, particularly in 
light of the absence of geographical, historical and cultural ties between this 
British colony and the French metropole, as well as the extensive domestic 
and international challenges facing the French government in the post-war 
period. The concept of the “mind-set”, therefore, will permit this study to 
probe the unusual nature of French participation in Rhodesia and facilitates 
our understanding of the forces that made this involvement in a British 
colony possible. 
 
Another strength of this model is the flexibility it gives to the historian to go 
beyond the simple binaries of coloniser and colonised (Thomas, 2011a, 
p.xvii). Thus, employing the concept of the “mind-set” can help this work 
avoid ‘the colonial trap’ (Zorn, 2012, pp.215-232) and contribute to wider 
efforts to shake the study of empires “loose from the domination of 
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categories and ideas” that they produced (Prakash, 1995, p.5, cited in 
Colley, 2006, p.380). This endeavour has particular resonance in the case 
study of Franco-Rhodesian relations, where the very presence of French 
actors in a British colony challenges the traditional opposition between 
metropole and colony, highlighting the need for a model that goes beyond 
these rigid categories. Thus, in employing the methodological tool of the 
“mind-set”, this study seeks to contribute to the development of a new 
historical understanding of colonial rule and decolonisation in Africa.  
 
Methodology and sources  
 
This thesis is based primarily on archival research, carried out in France, the 
UK and South Africa. The decision to prioritise material found in the 
archives was made in light of the focus of this research on foreign policy 
formulation and diplomacy, and the subsequent need to draw upon official 
documentary evidence in order to understand these processes. There are, of 
course, disadvantages inherent in such a methodological approach. In the 
1960s and 1970s, the historical discipline came under attack from 
postmodernists who, amongst other things, criticised historians for 
‘documentary fetishism’ (Evans, 1997, pp.84-85). With poststructuralist 
linguist theory as the foundation for arguments, postmodernists claimed that 
the primary document was no different to a literary artefact, as it was 
subject not only to the bias of its author, but also the personal bias of the 
historian examining it. According to this view, the study of history is 
fundamentally flawed due to its reliance on documents (Jenkins, 2003, 
pp.47-8).  
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The historical discipline, however, has proved itself to be remarkably 
resilient, using the postmodernist attack to reinvigorate and reinvent the 
practices used to study the past (Passmore, 2003, p.138). As a result, 
historians have become more cautious in their use of documentary evidence, 
acknowledging openly the need to read sources ‘against the grain’ (Kelly, 
1991, p.212). This PhD project has endeavoured to adopt a similar approach 
to primary documents. All sources have been viewed critically, reflecting on 
the authorial intent and the nature of the document, as well as the context in 
which the document was written (Stone, 1992, p.189-190). The papers 
written by white Rhodesian settlers, for example, were approached with 
particular caution in light of their inherent bias towards the white Rhodesian 
cause as well as the insulated nature of Rhodesian society as a result of 
extensive censorship and propaganda (Windrich, 1981). Furthermore, every 
effort has been made to put aside any personal bias. While it may be 
impossible to achieve complete objectivity, it is hoped that this PhD will, to 
use Ranke’s famous phrase, “show how, essentially, things happened [wie 
es eigentlich gewesen]” (cited in Warren, 2003, p.26).  
 
This research project also faced other challenges common to conducting 
archival research but which were especially acute in light of the particular 
nature of the topic under consideration in this thesis. According to Evans 
(1997, p.89),  
doing historical research is rather like doing a jigsaw 
puzzle where the pieces are scattered all over the 
house in several boxes, some of which have been 
destroyed, and where once it is put together, a 
significant number of the pieces are still missing. 
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This statement is especially true of this study, as the transnational scope of 
the topic under consideration means that source material is deposited in 
various archival facilities, in three different countries and on two continents. 
Moreover, the destruction of documentary evidence has posed considerable 
obstacles to this project, notably with regards to papers produced by the 
Rhodesian settler government. Following Rhodesia’s independence as 
Zimbabwe in 1980, the former white rulers were anxious to eradicate any 
documentary evidence that might implicate them in the country’s suffering 
following UDI. As such, many of the papers and secrets of the Rhodesian 
government were burnt by supporters of the minority regime during the 
tumultuous transition to majority rule. A collection of documents from the 
Rhodesian Cabinet did survive this period, having been smuggled out of the 
country and deposited at the Cory Library at Rhodes University in South 
Africa by Ian Smith during the Lancaster House peace negotiations in 1979 
(Murambiwa, 2008, pp.4-5). In addition, the Cory Library also houses a 
collection of Ian Smith’s personal papers, donated to the library by Smith’s 
daughter, Mrs Tholet, in April 2010. The fact that the deposit by Mrs Tholet 
was made very recently has permitted this project to draw on sources 
previously unexamined by scholars. However, the collections are 
frustratingly incomplete, with numerous files missing, pages torn out and 
text covered up, and we are left only to speculate what might have been 
removed. In addition to these documents that we know were destroyed by 
the Rhodesians, there may also be numerous other French and British papers 
eliminated from the archival record without our knowledge, either 
consciously or unconsciously. The recent controversy surrounding the cover 
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up and destruction of British government papers relating to the Mau Mau 
Emergency in Kenya serves to reinforce this point.7 Furthermore, it is very 
likely that, with regards to some of the covert dealings explored in this 
thesis, things were simply not written down, meaning that there is not 
always an archival record to consult.  
 
In addition, for a variety of reasons, it was not possible to access certain 
documents relevant to this project, despite their known existence. At 
Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères at La Courneuve, for 
example, it was not possible to examine any of the fifty three cartons in the 
Série: Afrique, Sous-Série: Rhodésie-Zimbabwe (1971-1980) as these files 
are not currently catalogued and are, therefore, unavailable to researchers. In 
addition, only limited access was given to the Série: Afrique-Levant, Sous-
Série: Sud-Est africain britannique (1966) and Série: Afrique-Levant, Sous-
Série: Rhodésie (1967-1970) as the cataloguing of these files is still on 
going. Access to certain papers from the archives of Charles De Gaulle, 
President of France (1958-1969), and Georges Pompidou, President of 
France (1969-1974), was denied under article 20 of French law No.78-753. 
The Rhodesian Army Association Archive was similarly out of reach at the 
time of the researching and writing of this thesis, as a result of the closure of 
British Empire and Commonwealth Museum in Bristol, where these papers 
were originally catalogued and housed, along with issues of licensing 
                                                
7 Cobatin, I., Bowcott, O. & Norton-Taylor, R. Britain destroyed records of colonial crimes. 
The Guardian. Retrieved September 16, 2013, from 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/apr/18/britain-destroyed-records-colonial-
crimes?guni=Article:in%20body%20link 
Cobatin, I., & Norton-Taylor, R. Mau Mau massacre cover-up detailed in newly-opened 
secret files. Retrieved September 16, 2013, from 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/30/maumau-massacre-secret-files 
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agreements with the software company that designed the specifications from 
which the catalogue needs to work.  
 
In order to overcome these obstacles, this project draws upon a wide range 
of archival sources, so as to fill in some of the gaps left by the pieces 
missing from the puzzle. At the Archives du Ministère des Affaires 
Etrangères, for example, the Série: EU-Europe, Sous-Série: Grande 
Bretagne (1970-1976) and Série: Nations Unies et Organisations 
Internationales, Sous-Série: Décolonisation (1970-1973) were extremely 
useful in gaining insight into French policy towards Rhodesia in the early 
1970s, as well as the perspectives of different departments within the Quai. 
Similarly, at the Archives Diplomatiques in Nantes, papers repatriated from 
Pretoria were an invaluable resource for the late 1970s, containing 
documents not housed elsewhere. Official documents from the UK 
government, especially papers from the Foreign Office (FO) and, after its 
merger with the Commonwealth Office in 1968, the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO), were instrumental in providing additional 
insight into France’s position towards Rhodesia at this time, whilst also 
shedding new light on Anglo-French relations with regards to the Rhodesian 
problem. Although these pieces have not always fitted precisely into the 
spaces of the puzzle left by missing evidence, they have nevertheless helped 
put together a more complete picture of Franco-Rhodesian relations, 
particularly with regards to the latter years under consideration in this thesis. 
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This archival material has been supplemented by a small number of oral 
history interviews conducted with former Rhodesian settlers. Potential 
interviewees were identified via snowball sampling, as existing contacts - 
notably Dr. Sue Onslow, who was one of the lead researchers on the 
Rhodesian Forces Oral History Project (Onslow & Berry, 2010) and who 
put me into touch with Derek van der Syde, a former Rhodesian civil 
servant,8 and Brian Oliver, who was in charge of the UN at the Rhodesian 
Ministry of External Affairs9 - and those already interviewed provided the 
details of further potential participants. A chance meeting that took place 
whilst I was conducting archival research in South Africa put me into 
contact with Dinah Townsend, daughter of Hardwicke Holderness, a liberal 
politician in Southern Rhodesia during Sir Garfield Todd’s premiership 
(1953-1958).10  
 
This evidence was very problematic as it tended to be biased towards the 
white Rhodesian cause. There was also the problem of the time lag since the 
events in question took place, which meant interviewees might have 
forgotten exactly what happened, or have been very elderly or deceased. For 
example, I met with Collie Hill, a former employee of the Rhodesian sugar 
industry, and his wife Stella, in 2012. However, Mr Hill, who was 92 years 
old at the time of this interview, was unable to add any further details to that 
set out in his memoirs published in 2001.11 Another potential interviewee, 
                                                
8 Van der Syde. (2011, March 28). Interview by Joanna Warson. Bournemouth: UK. 
9 Oliver to Warson. (2011, November 11). Personal communication.   
Mr Oliver was not interviewed, as he professed to knowing very little about France’s 
involvement in Rhodesia via email correspondence.  
10 Townsend. (2011, June 6). Interview by Joanna Warson. Portsmouth:UK. 
11 C. & S. Hill. (2012, February 6). Interview by Joanna Warson. Banstead, Surrey: UK. 
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Rodney Davies, a representative of the Cold Storage Commission (CSC) 
who operated in the Ivory Coast in the 1970s, died in 2006, so I had to rely 
on the recollections of his wife and son in 2011, whose account, by their 
own admission, may have been influenced by the reading of Péan’s (1983) 
Affaires Africaines.12 In addition, not all of the potential interviewees I 
identified were willing to share their personal recollections with me. Brian 
Reavill, who worked at the Rhodesian Information Office in Paris in the late 
1960s, for example, declined to be interviewed by me on the grounds that he 
did not the wish to involve himself in any debate regarding Rhodesia.13 In 
spite of this, these oral history interviews provided valuable details to back 
up archival evidence, whilst also providing an interesting personal insight to 
events that took place and a sense of the era.  
 
Thesis structure  
 
This thesis will be divided into two parts, the first dealing with the period 
prior to UDI and the second focusing on the years that followed this pivotal 
event in the history of Rhodesian decolonisation, up until the territory’s 
independence as Zimbabwe in 1980. The decision to divide the thesis along 
these lines was made in response not only to the importance of UDI to the 
process by which British rule was concluded in the region, but also because 
of the way in which rebellion against Britain transformed Rhodesia into an 
illegal entity (Brownell, 2010, p.479), thus fundamentally transforming its 
ability to interact with the outside world and, by implication, France.   
                                                
12 M. & B. Davies. (2011, July 23). Interview by Joanna Warson. London:UK. 
13 Reavill to Warson. (2011, April 18). Personal communication.   
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The first part of the thesis will be split into two chapters, the first of which 
will deal with the mind-set and policy context that underpinned French 
engagement with Rhodesia in the period between 1947 and 1965. The 
second chapter will then analyse how this mind-set operated in practice, 
investigating French policy towards Rhodesia during this period. The 
second half of the thesis, which will be slightly longer than the first and 
comprise of three chapters, will examine the evolution of French policy 
towards Rhodesia after UDI, exploring the new setting for French 
engagement with Rhodesia (Chapter Three), the implementation of French 
policy towards the region (Chapter Four) and, finally, the impact of this 
policy for white Rhodesian efforts to maintain minority rule, France’s 
African policies and Anglo-French relations (Chapter Five). In so doing, 
this thesis aims to provide a comprehensive overview of French policy 
towards and perceptions of Rhodesia in the years between 1947 and 1980, 
analysing the impetuses behind France’s interpretations of and involvement 
in Rhodesia, and assessing throughout the significance of Franco-Rhodesian 
interaction in historical and historiographical terms. 
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Part One 
France and Rhodesia before 1965
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Chapter One  
France and Rhodesia before 1965: the mind-set and 
the policy discourse 
 
On Saturday 6 September 1947, a French diplomat arrived in Salisbury, the 
capital of Southern Rhodesia, to take charge of the newly established French 
Vice Consulate in this British colony. In the weeks that followed, the new 
French Vice Consul Francières was warmly received by the British Colonial 
Governor, Sir John Kennedy, as well as high-ranking members of the 
settler-dominated Southern Rhodesian government, including the long-
serving Prime Minister, Godfrey Huggins, and George Arthur Davenport, 
the Minister of Commerce and Industry. In one of his first despatches to 
Paris, Francières described his surprise at ‘des attentions dont j’ai été l’objet 
à plusieurs reprises’, concluding that his welcome to Rhodesia was ‘cordial 
et empressé’.1  
 
This friendly reception marked the beginning of a new Franco-Rhodesian 
friendship, the development of which in the eighteen years that followed 
will be the subject of Chapter Two of this thesis. However, in order to 
understand the establishment and subsequent development of France’s 
relations with the British, white minority-governed colony of Rhodesia – a 
region in which France had few geographical, cultural or historical ties, and 
at a time when the French Fourth Republic faced many challenges both at 
                                                
1 Francières, French Vice Consul, Salisbury, to MAE. (1947, November 4). Salisbury/1/ 
No.9. Nantes: Archives Diplomatiques (AD).  
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home and in its Empire - it is necessary first to explore the setting that 
underpinned this new, Anglophone dimension of French African policy. In 
order to achieve this end, this chapter will first analyse the wider foreign 
policy mind-set that underpinned French decision-making overseas in the 
aftermath of the Second World War. In particular, it will reflect upon the 
privileged position accorded to Africa by France in a wider strategy to 
restore and enhance France’s standing in the new post-war, Cold War-
dominated world order. Consideration will also be given to how the French 
viewed the “Anglo-Saxon” powers during this period and, especially, to the 
way in which the memory of humiliation at the hands of the British at 
Fashoda in 1898 intersected with new hostilities born during the Second 
World War and in its aftermath.  
 
In order to understand the specificity of French engagement with a territory 
in Central Southern Anglophone Africa, this chapter will then examine 
France’s existing regional presence. On the basis of existing, albeit limited, 
secondary literature, this section will begin by exploring relations between 
France and the Dutch, Portuguese and British-ruled territories in Southern 
Africa prior to 1939. In light of the shared border between Southern 
Rhodesia and South Africa, as well as the parallels and interconnections 
between these two, white-ruled regions, this chapter will then probe the 
development of relations between France and South Africa in the post-war 
period. Finally, on the basis of the small amount of archival evidence 
available relating to France’s presence in the possessions britanniques in 
Central Southern Africa in the immediate aftermath of the Second World 
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War, this section will piece together a picture of France’s presence in 
Southern Rhodesia in the years immediately preceding the establishment of 
the French Consulate in Salisbury in 1947. The third and fourth parts of the 
chapter will follow directly on from this to analyse French perceptions of 
Rhodesia in the years that followed the arrival of Francières on Rhodesian 
soil and, in particular, how these perceptions can be understood in the 
context of France’s wider foreign policy mind-set. Finally, this chapter will 
adopt a micro-perspective to analyse how and why France’s foreign policy 
mind-set manifested itself in different ways amongst the various, diverse 
French actors engaged in Rhodesian affairs, in the period between 1947 and 
1965.  
 
“La France ne peut être la France sans grandeur”:2 The 
French foreign policy mind-set in the post-war period  
 
In 1945, France emerged battered and bruised, yet victorious from the 
Second World War. Despite being on the winning side, France’s position in 
the post-war period was highly ambiguous, a legacy of being ‘at once 
conqueror and conquered’ (Bourmaud, 2003, p.14). The Fall of France, 
described by Heimsoeth (cited in Jackson, 2003, p.45) as “the fulcrum of 
the twentieth century”, dealt a humiliating blow to French prestige and left 
its mark on a generation of French policy-makers (Grosser, 1989, p.7). The 
repressive and racist policies of the Vichy regime, both at home and in the 
colonies, and the occupation of France’s South East Asian Empire by the 
                                                
2 De Gaulle, 1989, p.407, cited in Pedley, 1996, p.53. 
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Japanese, further undermined France’s claims to Great Power status, as well 
as to the superiority of French civilisation and moral virtues. In the 
aftermath of the Second World War, the principal concern of France’s 
policy-making élite was, therefore, to restore France’s rank as a Great 
Power, a commitment that is best expressed in the words of De Gaulle, who 
in his memoirs described his belief that France “n’est réellement elle-même 
qu’au premier rang”.3 It was in this context that France’s Empire took on a 
renewed significance in the French national psych, as a symbol of France’s 
continued greatness on the international stage (Jackson, 2003, p.45) and as a 
means of reversing the humiliation and territorial losses suffered during the 
war (Charbonneau, 2008, pp.34-35). Empire was crucial, therefore, in the 
restoration of France’s rank amongst the nations of the world (Rioux, 1989, 
p.85).  
 
Le pré carré français and the restoration of French rang  
 
This renewed commitment to empire was particularly acute with regards to 
Africa. After the fall of metropolitan France in 1940, when other allies 
disappointed and abandoned France, Africa remained loyal. Afrique 
Equatoriale Française allied itself with Free France, permitting the 
establishment of a new capital in Brazzaville and allowing ‘the Free French 
to claim continuity with an honourable France’ (Burbank & Cooper, 2010, 
p.407). Moreover, 200,000 African troops fought in the French army, 
playing a moderate but significant role in the liberation of France in 1944 
                                                
3 De Gaulle, 1989, p.407, cited in Pedley, 1996, p.53. 
 37 
and 1945 (Echenberg, 1985, p.365; Chafer, 2008, p.37). The significance of 
Africa’s contribution to the French war effort was, therefore, two-fold. On 
the one hand, it provided concrete evidence to support the French ‘colonial 
myth’: ‘the belief in an indivisible republic composed of France and its 
overseas territories’ (Marshall, 1973; Chafer, 2002b, p.85). On the other 
hand, according to Smith (1978, p.80), it proved once and for all that if 
France wanted to assure international greatness ‘she must count on her 
empire since in this enterprise she had no certain friends’. Africa’s 
privileged status in French foreign policy, and across French popular 
consciousness, was, therefore, confirmed.  
 
In the immediate post-war period, this renewed attachment to African 
Empire is evidenced by France’s willingness to resort to violence in order to 
maintain control across the continent. In 1945 in Sétif, Algeria, a peaceful 
demonstration was met by a brutal French clampdown that, in turn, fuelled a 
violent nationalist insurrection, resulting in the deaths of 102 Europeans. 
According to Evans (2012, pp.85-88), the French response was ‘swift and 
brutal’, and ‘characterized by the systematic humiliation of prisoners’.  The 
terms ‘swift and brutal’ are also used by Shipway (2008a, p.147) to describe 
the French military action used to put down the Malagasy Uprising, on the 
island of Madagascar, in 1947 and 1948. The human cost of this 
“pacification” (Shipway, 2008a, p.146) was vast, with some estimations of 
the final death toll as high as 89,000 (Clayton, 1994, p.85). France was not 
alone in its use of violence as a tool to maintain colonial authority in the 
post-war period, seen by Britain’s harsh clampdowns in Malaya, Cyprus and 
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Kenya. Yet, these examples serve to emphasise France’s willingness to 
employ force to maintain its foothold on the African continent and, as such, 
the prevalent position of Africa in its foreign policy mind-set. 
 
In contrast to its approach in Algeria and Madagascar, in West and 
Equatorial Africa, the regions most closely linked to France’s survival both 
during and after the war, France sought to reassert its position through 
development and reform. The recommendations set out at the Brazzaville 
Conference in 1944, including increased African political representation and 
investment in development projects, are an open expression of this new 
approach to colonial rule in sub-Saharan Africa in the post-war period 
(Chafer, 2002b, pp.56-61). Although, the Brazzaville recommendations 
were not implemented immediately, or in full, they did mark the beginning 
of a new phase in France’s presence in Black Africa, which saw the 
abolition of forced labour, the expansion of investment through the Fonds 
d’Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Social (FIDES) in 
1946, and substantially expanded African political participation, both at 
territorial level and in the Assemblée Nationale in Paris (Chafer, 2002b, 
pp.63-64). 
 
As with the use of force, France not unique amongst its European colonial 
counterparts in adopting these reformist measures. Increasingly, the 
European powers looked to their colonies to aid post-war metropolitan 
economic reconstruction and help reduce dependency on the United States. 
As such, Darwin (2008, p.464) has described how ‘the “nightwatchman” 
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state, which let sleeping dogs lie’ became ‘the “developmental” state, which 
interfered everywhere’. This period saw, therefore, an influx of European 
bureaucrats, experts, settlers, and capital, along with the expansion of 
developmental projects, in what has been characterised as a “second 
colonial occupation”, a strategy that both Britain and France hoped would 
simultaneously ‘make empires richer and more politically legitimate’ 
(Cooper & Burbank, 2010, p.420). 
 
The future of European colonial rule, however, was far from secure. The 
changed international context, in particular the Atlantic Charter of 1941 and 
the establishment of the UN in the 1945, as well as the overarching reality 
of Britain and France’s weakened international standing in the new global 
age of bipolarity, meant that it was no longer possible to justify empire in 
the same terms. This, in turn, contributed to a fundamental reassessment of 
the colonial project by coloniser and colonised alike, a process that Shipway 
(2008a, p.13) has described as the ‘late colonial shift’. Colonial rule was no 
longer seen as an inevitable part of the international order. Rather, a 
dramatic, and quite probably violent, transformation of the existing system 
was anticipated in the foreseeable future. Although many Europeans were 
slow to envisage national independence as the outcome of this process, it 
was clear, to both the rulers and the ruled, that colonialism, as it had been 
understood before the Second World War, could not, and would not, 
continue for much longer. 
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What stood France apart in this process was the unwavering belief that, 
despite necessary changes to the way in which French rule would be 
practiced and articulated in Africa, France’s African Empire would 
ultimately remain French. A clear statement of this was made at Brazzaville 
in 1944 when, despite recommending significant reforms to the French 
colonial system, “any possibility of evolution outside the French imperial 
block” and “the eventual creation, even in the distant future, of self-
governments in the colonies” (cited in Chafer, 2002b, p.57) was explicitly 
ruled out.  As such, it was intended that ‘the only independence they [the 
Africans] will want will be the independence of France’ (Shipway, 2008b, 
p.751).  This stands in marked contrast to the position of Britain, expressed 
by the Colonial Secretary, Malcolm MacDonald, in 1938, that “the ultimate, 
if distant, aim of British colonial policy was evolution towards self-
government” (cited in Chafer, 2002b, p.57). During the early years of the 
Fourth Republic, therefore, the commitment to sustaining a presence on the 
African continent was amplified to an extent not seen under previous French 
administrations.  
 
The unwavering commitment to the maintenance of French influence on the 
African continent was undeterred by the coming of the decolonisation of 
AOF and AEF in 1960. Rather, Africa was consistently viewed as 
‘guarantor of France’s standing in the world’ (Bourmaud, 2000), something 
that is largely attributable to the fact that Africa was the only arena in which 
France had enough power to guarantee its claims to middle power status 
(Bach, 1986, p.75; Chafer, 2008, p.39). In the words of Louis de Guiringaud 
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(cited in Bourmaud, 2003, p.17), “Africa is the only place where France 
can, with 500 men, change the course of history”. The desire to maintain the 
French pré carré in Africa as a means of restoring and sustaining French 
rang was, therefore, an immovable feature of the French foreign policy 
mind-set throughout the years under investigation in this thesis.  
 
France and “les Anglo-Saxons” after the Second World War 
 
In the same way that commitment to the preservation of France’s chasse 
gardée was heightened in the post-war period, so too was French hostility 
and suspicion of the “Anglo-Saxon” powers. The French experience of the 
Second World War compounded existing antagonisms towards Britain and 
the US, with the Fall of France in 1940, and all subsequent French losses 
during the war, frequently explained with reference to the weakness of 
Anglo-American support. France’s exclusion from Yalta in 1945, an act that 
Jackson (2003, p.241) has claimed Charles De Gaulle never forgot or 
forgave, compounded this French hostility towards Britain and the United 
States.  
 
It was events in Africa, however, that had the most damaging effect on 
France’s position towards “les Anglo-Saxons” during and after the war, 
demonstrating not only the privileged position of Africa in France’s foreign 
policy mind-set but also the resilience of suspicions rooted in the 
humiliation suffered at the hands of the British at Fashoda in 1898 (Chafer 
& Cumming, 2010a, p.1130). In July 1940, misunderstanding and 
miscommunication led to the British Navy bombardment of the French fleet 
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at Mers-el-Kébir, resulting in France’s largest naval losses of the entire war 
(Tombs & Tombs, 2006, pp.562-563). Moreover, Britain and America were 
increasingly viewed as a threat to French sovereignty in Africa, evidenced 
by the Allied Landings in North Africa in November 1942 (Evans, 2012, 
p.92). Celebrations to mark the end of the war in Algeria in 1945, which 
saw Algerians carrying placards proclaiming “long live the Atlantic 
Charter”, only served to rub salt in already open wounds (Evans, 2012, 
p.85). In French West Africa, these fears of “Anglo-Saxon” infiltration were 
equally evident, with the perception that the Americans had ‘flirted 
excessively’ with Pierre Boisson, the Vichy Governor General of AOF and 
AEF (Michel, 1999, p.155), and resentment of French West Africa’s 
military and economic dependence on the Allies during the Free French 
period (Chafer, 2002b, p.41). Thus, Michel (1999, p.155) has described the 
‘mistrust’ and ‘animosity’ that characterised France’s relations with Britain 
and the United States in the African context at this time.  
 
The French, therefore, increasingly viewed Britain and America with 
distrust, particularly in the African setting. The statements of France’s 
intention to retain its African colonies made at Brazzaville Conference in 
1944 can be interpreted as an attempt to ward of further Anglo-Saxon 
intervention in Francophone Africa (Chafer, 2002b, p.55). The post-war 
period also witnessed growing fears of an “Anglo-Saxon” conspiracy in the 
French Empire (Michel, 1999, p.155) evidenced in the widespread rumours 
of a plot to push France out of the Middle East and Africa by placing 
France’s colonies under a UN Trusteeship (Evans, 2012, p.92). American 
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proposals to introduce Marshall Aid to the colonies and fears about the US 
providing a pole of attraction to French-educated évolués heightened these 
French fears (Michel, 1999, p.155). This anti-“Anglo-Saxon” sentiment was 
also present in France’s wider foreign policies in the post-war period. 
Shepard (2011, p.286) has explored French efforts to find allies in Latin 
America to help contain the “clan anglo-saxon” (Maurel, cited in Shepard, 
2011, p.286) and create a “Latin-European-Arab” bloc “to outmanoeuvre 
the ‘Anglo-American groups’” (Maritain, cited in Shepard, 2011, p.286). 
These efforts yielded positive results, for example, in 1955 when Mexico 
and Columbia supported French attempts to keep Algeria off the UN agenda 
(Shepard, 2011, p.286). This demonstrates how France’s “Fashoda 
Syndrome” was not merely a concern in Africa, but infiltrated France’s 
foreign policy mind-set as a whole. 
 
Hostility and suspicion of the “Anglo-Saxons” fuelled a growing French 
conviction in the importance of preserving national independence (Jackson, 
2003, p.239). France’s junior position in the Atlantic Alliance, the belief 
that the Cold War exacerbated France’s colonial problems - American 
participation in Indochina and encouragement of the Algerian nationalists 
were seen as prime examples of this – and France’s humiliation at Suez in 
1956 served to enhance French efforts to assure its strategic autonomy 
(Bozo, 2010, p.164). Thus, in the post-war period, in spite of France’s 
position in the Western “camp”, the Fourth Republic government frequently 
sought to act autonomously from Britain and the United States, and break 
free from the constraints of bipolarity (Bozo, 2010, p.175). French 
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opposition to the European Defence Community (EDC), for example, was 
founded on fears that the EDC was ‘a device for sacrificing French national 
sovereignty to the imperatives of the bloc system’ (Chafer & Jenkins, 1996, 
p.2). More broadly, many policy-makers under the Fourth Republic 
conceived of Europe, with France at its helm, as a potential ‘third force’ in 
global politics (Chafer & Jenkins, 1996, p.2; Hitchcock, 1998, p.204). 
French efforts to build a “Eurafrican sphere centred on the Mediterranean, 
tied by common interests and equally accepted by the two blocs, East and 
West, and free of them both” (De Wailly, cited in Wall, 2001, p.158) 
similarly was part of this broader French strategy to maintain national 
independence and provide a non-aligned alternative to a world dominated 
by Western capitalism and Eastern communism.  
 
After the collapse of the Fourth Republic in 1958, this pursuit of 
independence remained central to French foreign policy, appropriated by the 
Gaullists to such an extent that the Fourth Republic foundations for this 
strategy of national assertion are often overlooked (Hitchcock, 1998; Wall, 
2001). In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the commitment to the cause of 
autonomy shaped French efforts to prevent Anglo-Saxon infiltration of the 
European integration project, particularly the rejection of Britain’s 
application to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1963 
(Chafer & Jenkins, 1996, p.2). The early years of the Fifth Republic also 
saw the first concrete manifestation of the French commitment to 
developing an independent French nuclear deterrent, or force de frappe, 
seen by the explosion of France’s first atomic bomb over the Sahara in 
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February 1960 (Jackson, 2003, p.243). In the African setting, French 
support for Moïse Tshombe and a Katanga-centred Federation in the former 
Belgian Congo can similarly be conceived of as a strategy that aimed to 
offer an alternative to a world dominated by the superpowers (Bat & 
Geneste, 2010, p.94; Williams, 2011, p.166). Thus, throughout the two 
decades that followed the conclusion of the Second World War, French 
suspicions of “les Anglo-Saxons” were crucial to France’s foreign policy 
“mind-set”. This, in turn, fuelled the French desire to protect their chasse 
gardée from UK and US infiltration, and efforts to secure French autonomy 
on the international stage.  
 
Beyond the Francophone fold: France in Southern Africa 
 
Although the historiography of French engagement with Africa in the post-
war period is dominated by discussions of France’s relations with its 
colonies, the decolonisation process in AOF and AEF, and the subsequent 
form of the post-colonial friendship between France and its former sub-
Saharan dependencies, France’s view of the African continent in the years 
immediately following the end of the Second World War was not - and 
never had been - uniquely Francophone in its focus. Chapter Two will 
develop this argument through analysis of French policies towards the 
British colony of Rhodesia in the period between 1947 and 1965. However, 
in order to fully comprehend the nature and extent of French engagement 
with this British colony during these years, it is necessary to first explore 
France’s existing regional presence. This section will draw together the 
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existing literature in this field – although limited, there is a growing body of 
literature concerning France’s relations with the British, Portuguese and 
Afrikaner-dominated territories south of the Equator – with archival 
evidence, to piece together a picture of France in Southern Africa at this 
time. This, in turn, will be crucial to our understanding of how and why 
France’s Rhodesian policies developed in the post-war period.  
 
Une présence modeste: France and Southern Africa before the Second 
World War 
 
France was traditionally an outsider in Southern Africa, a region dominated 
by the Portuguese, the Dutch, and later their Afrikaner descendants, and the 
British. France was excluded from the “Scramble” in Southern Africa 
(Alden, 1996, p.14) and its nearest territorial possessions were the islands of 
Madagascar and Réunion in the Indian Ocean.4 From the mid-nineteenth 
century onwards, French missionaries, explorers and traders travelled to 
Portuguese-ruled Angola and Mozambique. Their numbers, however, were 
small. Pélissier (1990) has estimated that less than one hundred French 
citizens visited Angola each year prior to 1914 (p.74), prompting him to 
describe the French presence in the territory as ‘superficielle’ (p.69). In 
Mozambique, although French interest in the region was greater due to its 
close geographical proximity to the Indian Ocean (p.74) and there existed a 
small colonie française comprising of at least half a dozen mixed-race 
                                                
4 The French first occupied Réunion in the seventeenth century, before the island became a 
Department d’Outre-Mer in 1946. Madagascar became part of the French colonial empire 
during the period of aggressive European colonisation in the late nineteenth century and 
achieved its independence along with Francophone sub-Saharan Africa in 1960.  
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families of French descent (p.83), the French presence remained relatively 
minor. In Anglophone Central Southern Africa, the state of affairs was 
similar. In the nineteenth century, missionaries from the Catholic order of 
the Pères Blancs and the Protestant Société des Missions évangeliques de 
Paris played a role in the establishment of British rule in Lesotho and 
Northern Rhodesia (Siegfried, 1949, p.110; Holmes, 1990, pp.85-109; 
Perrot, 1990, pp.111-132). 5  However, beyond this limited religious 
engagement, which, as was also the case with missionaries active within 
their own nations’ colonial sphere,6 often went against the broader French 
project in Africa due to collaboration between French missionaries and 
colonial administrators from other European powers, France had few ties in 
the region. 
 
In South Africa, France’s experience was slightly different. French 
Huguenots were amongst the original white settlers that came to the Cape in 
1652 (Moukambi, 2008, p.85). Their long-term influence over the 
development of the Afrikaner language and culture, however, was limited, 
the result of the first French settlers’ rapid absorption into the Dutch 
population (Vigne, 1990, pp.35-36). In the late nineteenth century, Franco-
South African contacts were reignited, as Boer grievances with British rule 
converged with French hostility towards British activity on the African 
continent (Tombs & Tombs, 2006 pp.432-434), permitting the French to 
                                                
5 Société des Missions Evangeliques de Paris. (1953, June 3). Note: Mwanawina III 
“Paramount Chief” du Barotesland. Afrique-Levant (AL)/Sud-est africain britannique 
(SEAB)/9. Paris: Archives du Ministère des Affairs Etrangères (AMAE).  
6 In their respective studies of religious workers in the British and French Empires, Porter 
(2004) and Foster (2013) have explored how missionaries had a complex relationship with 
the colonial project and often acted in opposition to the desires of the European 
administrations.  
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offer the Boers ‘soutien enthousiaste’ (Maubrey, 1990, pp.39-40) during the 
Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902). This, in turn, increased France’s standing 
amongst the Afrikaners. The mixture of limited territorial, cultural and 
linguistic ties alongside long-standing connections has led Jacques (2003, 
p.26) to conclude that ‘the relationship between France and South Africa 
has always been solid, if not intimate’. In a similar vein, Konieczna (2009, 
p.323) has described how,  
au lendemain de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, les 
liens historiques entre la France et l’Afrique du Sud 
sont déjà anciens. Mais la position de la France dans 
ce pays reste modeste. 
Relations between France and South Africa may have had deeper historical 
roots and been more developed than those between France and the 
dependent territories in Anglophone and Lusophone Southern Africa, but 
they nevertheless remained highly circumscribed prior to the outbreak of the 
Second World War.  
 
The development of Franco-South African relations in the post-war 
period 
 
The post-war period witnessed a shift in France’s presence in South Africa. 
Declining relations between London and Pretoria, manifest especially in the 
May 1948 defeat of the United Party, the political party favoured amongst 
South Africa’s English-speaking settlers, by the Afrikaner-dominated 
National Party (NP), on a platform of apartheid7 (Iliffe, 2007, pp.281-2), 
                                                
7 Apartheid, literally translated into English from Afrikaans as ‘separateness’, was the 
policy of rigid, racial segregation, enforced by the centre, along with the idea that each race 
should be allowed to manage its own affairs and practice its own culture. The NP enforced 
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‘ouvre la voie à la redefinition des relations entre les deux pays’ 
(Konieczna, 2009, p.323). Less than a year later, in March 1949, this new 
Franco-South African rapprochement led the Quai d’Orsay to elevate the 
status of its diplomatic representation in Pretoria from a Legation to an 
Embassy, a move that was reciprocated with the arrival of a South African 
Ambassador to France in Paris in October of the same year (Konieczna, 
2009, pp.323-4). Initial French efforts concentrated on the expansion of 
economic relations with South Africa (Konieczna, 2009, p.324), a strategy 
that yielded some positive results seen, for example, by the arrival of French 
firms such as Total and Peugeot in the region in the 1950s (Cuddumbey, 
1996, p.69). As the 1950s progressed, attention was also given to the 
promotion of French military equipment in the region, although progress in 
this domain was initially limited (Konieczna, 2009, pp.325-335).   
 
Events taking place in South Africa led to further expansion of relations 
between Paris and Pretoria in the early years of the Fifth Republic. The 
Sharpeville Massacre of 1960 – an incident over which the French 
authorities remained remarkably silent – revealed the weakness of the 
apartheid regime, prompting them to accept the military support offered to 
them by the French in the form of arms contracts (Konieczna, 2009, pp.335-
338). South Africa’s rupture with the Commonwealth in the following year 
pushed Pretoria further into the Francophone fold, as part of a wider 
strategy to balance its desire to escape British dominance with criticism of 
the United States’ African policy and isolation on the continent (Konieczna, 
                                                                                                                       
policies of apartheid in South Africa following their election victory in 1948 (Iliffe, 2007, 
pp.281-283). 
 50 
2012, p.93). This approach aligned with France’s own strategic 
considerations on the African continent in the context of the Cold War, 
particularly their desire to oppose Communist infiltration whilst 
simultaneously maintaining national independence (Konieczna, 2012, 
pp.93-4). Thus, according to one British MP, France found in South Africa 
‘a natural alliance’ that ‘suits the French book wonderfully’.8 
 
It was in this setting that Franco-South African ties began to grow rapidly, 
particularly in the military domain, with France becoming, from 1962, one 
of the principal suppliers of arms to the apartheid regime, in spite of 
France’s vote in favour of UN Security Council Resolution 182 in 
December 1963 that imposed an arms embargo against South Africa (Bach, 
1990, p.177; Konieczna, 2012, p.94). 9  Engagement with South Africa 
provided the French with access to raw materials crucial to the pursuit of 
national independence, in particular the uranium necessary for the 
development of an independent strategic nuclear force. In 1963, Pretoria 
agreed in principal to sell uranium ‘libre d’usage’ to France (Bach, 1990, 
p.175). This was followed, in 1964, by the signing of a contract between the 
South African Atomic Energy Commission and the Commissariat à 
l’Energie Atomique (CEA), something that Bach (1990, pp.175-176) has 
claimed profoundly irritated the United States. Alongside these commercial 
and military ties, the early 1960s also witnessed the establishment of 
France-Afrique du Sud friendship groups in the Assemblée Nationale and 
the French Senate (Konieczna, 2012, p.95). Thus, although France was not 
                                                
8 Paget, MP for Northampton, (1967, December 19),. House of Commons Debate, vol.756, 
c.1118. 
9 UN. (1963, December 4). Resolution 182 (1963).  
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an active colonial power in South Africa, the post-war period saw the 
expansion of France’s presence in the region, especially in the early 1960s, 
as the foundations laid by the Fourth Republic aligned with the evolving 
situation on the ground in South Africa and France’s geo-strategic interests 
to create the context in which Franco-South African relations could begin to 
flourish. As we shall see in the chapters that follow, the existing patterns of 
interaction between Paris and Pretoria were to have important consequences 
for the development and evolution of Franco-Rhodesian relations.  
 
Franco-Rhodesian relations before 1947  
 
Prior to 1947, France’s position in South Africa’s neighbour, the self-
governing British colony of Southern Rhodesia, was highly limited. 
Certainly, French Protestant and Catholic missionaries remained active in 
Lesotho and Northern Rhodesia throughout the war and after, ensuring a 
continued French religious presence in the surrounding area.10 A number of 
men from the Southern Rhodesian military had also fought alongside the 
Free French in Africa and were decorated for their service to the French 
cause,11 while others served in Europe during the Second World War 
playing an important role in the Allied victory, including later Prime 
Minister Ian Smith, who served with the British Royal Air Force (RAF) in 
Western Europe in the latter years of the conflict (Smith, 1997, pp.13-21).  
                                                
10 French Legation, Pretoria, to MAE. (1944, October 30). AL/Possessions britanniques 
(PB)/16/No.160. Paris:AMAE. 
MAE (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères) to Ministère de la France l’Outre-Mer (MOF). 
(1945, July 17) AL/PB/16. Paris:AMAE.   
11 Roux, French Vice Consul, Nairobi, to MAE. (1947, February 8). AL/PB/16/No.42. 
Paris:AMAE. 
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Yet, the Franco-Rhodesian relationship remained extremely constrained in 
the mid-1940s. The French diplomatic presence in Salisbury was confined 
to a solitary Consular Agent,12 meaning that the principal sources of French 
information about the region did not come directly from Rhodesia, but from 
the French Consulate in the neighbouring British territory of Kenya as well 
as the French diplomatic representation in South Africa. In Paris, interest in 
Rhodesia in this immediate post-war period was limited. Despite being 
established in 1944 to oversee all non-Francophone territories in Africa, the 
Afrique-Levant department at the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (MAE) 
initially appeared unconcerned by this region of Anglophone Central 
Southern Africa. This central indifference is evidenced by the explicit 
failure of the Quai to reply to repeated requests from Nairobi in early 1947 
for a government bursary for a South African student resident in Salisbury 
to study in France and improve her language skills in preparation for 
doctoral studies in French literature.13  French trade in the region was also 
minimal during this period, as strict duties and tariffs imposed on countries 
outside the sterling zone restricted the quantity of trade between France and 
Britain’s territories in Central Southern Africa. A few private companies 
attempted to breach these regulations and establish closer trading links with 
Southern and Northern Rhodesia, such as Nice-based Parfums Jean Duff. 
However, such efforts were condemned by those on the ground in British 
Africa and believed to have a negative impact on France’s interests in the 
                                                
12 Roux to MAE. (1947, February 8). AL/PB/16/No.42. Paris:AMAE. 
13 Roux to MAE. (1947, February 28). AL/PB/No.61. Paris:AMAE. 
Beaulieux, French Consul, Nairobi, to MAE. (1947, August 7). AL/PB No. 239. 
Paris:AMAE. 
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region.14 Beyond engagement in these limited spheres, relations between 
France and Rhodesia did not exist.  
 
French perceptions of Southern Rhodesia in the post-war 
period 
 
In 1947, however, this all changed, with the establishment of a French 
Consulate in Salisbury providing the catalyst for the expansion of relations 
between France and Rhodesia. Before exploring the development of the 
Franco-Rhodesian connection in the years that followed - the focus of 
Chapter Two - it is necessary to obtain a deeper understanding of how 
Rhodesia was viewed by the French observing and operating in this region 
of Anglophone Southern Africa, and how and why these French 
interpretations were formulated. Therefore, this chapter will now examine 
the predominant French perceptions of Rhodesia during this period, before 
assessing the different influences that informed these views.  
 
‘Un pays jeune et en pleine expansion’:15 French views of Rhodesia 
after 1947 
 
In contrast to the relative neglect and disinterest in Rhodesia in the pre-war 
and immediate post-war periods, it is possible to detect in the years 
following Francières’ arrival in Salisbury a growing awareness about 
                                                
14 Roux to MAE. (1947, February 7). AL/PB/16/No. 41. Paris:AMAE.  
15 Warren, French Vice Consul, Salisbury, to MAE. (1954, September 7). 
AL/SEAB/9/No.262. Paris:AMAE. 
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Rhodesia amongst certain French policy-makers, diplomats and bureaucrats 
in Paris, London and on the ground in Anglophone Africa. France’s new 
interest in Rhodesia stemmed from common conceptions of the region as 
‘un des centres d’évolution les plus actifs de l’Afrique’.16 According to 
Réginald de Warren, French Vice Consul to Salisbury (1950-1955), 
Rhodesia’s wealth and economic vibrancy was the result of ‘les richesses 
naturelles, le climat, les conditions d’installation… la modicité des taxations 
ainsi que des frais de main d’œuvre’.17 This, in turn, contributed to the 
region’s industrial and economic development on a scale described by Paul-
Marc Henry, Deputy Director of African Affairs at the Quai, as 
‘magnifique’ and ‘remarquable’.18 Positive interpretations of Rhodesia’s 
economy continued into the late 1950s, with the ‘amélioration spectaculaire’ 
of the Federation’s trade deficit in 1959 cited as evidence of the region’s 
‘dynamisme’ and ‘développement extraordinairement rapide’. 19  The 
Southern Rhodesian capital city was also likened to ‘une ville américaine 
neuve, étonnante dans ce décor africain’.20  
 
Alongside these perceptions of economic vitality and modernity, the French 
observing and operating in the region also viewed Rhodesia’s white settler 
minority in a favourable light. The territory’s European population, which in 
                                                
16  French High Commission, Tananarive to Francières. (1950, March 20). Fonds 
Territoriaux, Madagascar (MAD)/Gouvernement Général de Madagascar 
(GGM)/D/6(1)/79. Aix: Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer (ANOM). 
17 Warren to MAE. (1952, January 15). Salisbury/1/No.16. Nantes:AD.  
18 Henry, Deputy Director of African Affairs, MAE, to Siguret, French Consul General, 
Salisbury. (1958, January 1). AL/SEAB/1. Paris:AMAE. 
19 Hullo, Commercial Attaché, French Consulate General, Salisbury, to Direction des 
Relations Economiques Extérieures (DREE). (1960, April 6). AL/SEAB/33/No.0481. 
Paris:AMAE.  
20 French Embassy, London to MAE. (1958, June 6). AL/SEAB/6/No.781. Paris:AMAE.  
Mariani to Ministère de la Défense (MOD) & MOF. (1958, June 6). AL/SEAB/9/No.13. 
Paris:AMAE. 
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the 1950s comprised of a unique blend of British, South African and 
Rhodesian-born settlers,21 was perceived of as being well acquainted with 
the French language; aware of ‘l’importance et la valeur’ of France, its 
culture and its social, economic and political action in its overseas 
territories; and, as such, was perceived as ‘sincèrement francophile’.22 This 
francophilia was evidenced by the enthusiastic reception given to André 
Siegfried of the Académie Française during his visit to Rhodesia in 
September 1948,23 as well as through numerous favourable accounts of 
France in the Rhodesian press. In 1954 and 1955, for example, sympathetic 
articles concerning the French plight in Indochina were published in the 
colony’s main settler newspaper, The Rhodesia Herald, including an 
editorial that expressed the view that France was better qualified than any 
other European power to resolve the crisis in South East Asia.24 Other 
positive press reports included an encouraging account of the Assemblée 
Nationale’s decision not to ratify the EDC treaty in 1954 and glowing 
commentaries on French colonial policies.25  Rhodesian politicians also 
publically aired their admiration for France, such as Abrahamson, a member 
of the Southern Rhodesian Parliament who, prior to a visit to France in 
                                                
21 Barber (1967) has estimated that, in 1951, 32.7% of Rhodesia’s 125,000 white settlers 
had been born in Rhodesia, 30.5% had been born in South Africa (of which 13.5% were of 
Afrikaner descent] and 28.8% had been born in Britain.  
22 Anonymous. (1955, June 26). The Sunday Mail. AL/SEAB/1. Paris:AMAE. 
Warren to MAE. (1952, January 15). Salisbury/1/No.16. Nantes:AD.  
Warren to MAE. (1951, October 9). AL/PB/16/No.43. Paris:AMAE. 
23 Francières to Nairobi. (1948, October 18). AL/PB/16/No.109. Paris:AMAE. 
24 Anonymous. (1954, March 23). French forces expect new Viet-Minh onslaught. The 
Rhodesia Herald.  
Warren to MAE. (1954, March 30). AL/SEAB/8/No.94. Paris:AMAE. 
Anonymous. (1955, May 5). War returns in the East. The Rhodesia Herald. 
Warren to MAE. (1955, May 7). AL/SEAB/8/No.200. Paris:AMAE. 
25 Anonymous. (1954, September 1). Europe at the crossroads. The Rhodesia Herald. 
Warren to MAE. (1954, September 7). AL/SEAB/8/No.263. Paris:AMAE. 
Kraft, L. (1954). French experiment with association policy. The Rhodesia Herald. 
AL/SEAB/2/No.265. Paris:AMAE. 
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1956, described his ‘vive sympathie’ for France.26 In light of its amenable 
settler population, France’s “men-on-the-spot” in Anglophone Africa 
believed that French initiatives in Rhodesia had ‘bonne chances de 
succès’.27 
 
This new French interest centred on a common conception of Rhodesia as a 
separate territory, open to a fresh French presence, with the region’s 
international status as a colony in the British Empire viewed merely as a 
secondary concern. This sentiment is expressed explicitly in diplomatic 
correspondence from the French post in Salisbury, where Rhodesia was 
frequently described as ‘un jeune pays’ or a ‘nouvel état africain’. 28 These 
sentiments were echoed across the government in Paris. A report produced 
by the Ministère de la France d’Outre-Mer (MOF) in the late 1940s, entitled 
‘L’évolution récente et les tendances actuelles de la politique coloniale 
britannique’, emphasised the likelihood that an eighth British dominion 
would be formed from the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland.29 The Afrique-
Levant department of the Quai also portrayed Rhodesia as a ‘futur 
dominion… en pleine expansion’.30 This shared vision of Rhodesia as a 
vibrant and increasingly independent entity contributed to the development 
of a sentiment amongst certain groups in the French government and 
                                                
26 Colmant, Commercial Attaché, French Consulate General, Salisbury, to Centre Nationale 
du Commerce Extérieur (CNCE).  AL/SEAB/9/No.56429. Paris:AMAE.  
27 Francières to MAE. (1947, 24 November). AL/PB/16/No.18. Paris:AMAE. 
28 Warren to MAE. (1953, March 30). AD/Salisbury/1/No.68. Nantes:AD. 
Warren to MAE. (1953, September 21). AL/SEAB/1. Paris:AMAE 
29 Anonymous. (nd.). L’évolution récente et les tendances actuelles de la politique 
coloniale britannique. Fonds ministériels (FM)/1AFFPOL/393. Aix:ANOM. 
30 Direction Afrique-Levant (AL), MAE, to Direction des Affaires Politiques (AP), MAE, 
(nd). AL/SEAB/9. Paris:AMAE. 
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diplomatic service that Rhodesia was a region in which France had ‘un 
grand intérêt’.31 
 
At first glance, this growing disregard for Rhodesia’s status as a colony 
within the British Empire could be interpreted simply as a French 
observation about the growing fissure between Britain and Rhodesia in the 
post-war period. The French engaged in Rhodesian affairs often reported 
upon Anglo-Rhodesian differences at this time. In 1949, following his visit 
to Rhodesia the previous year, Siegfried wrote of the desire of the 
Rhodesian settlers to establish a Central African Dominion of Southern and 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Siegfried noted, however, that 
‘l’Angleterre n’envisage pas le projet avec faveur’ (1949, p.137), indicating 
a breach between the Rhodesian white minority and the British government. 
Similar sentiments emanated from the Quai and the French diplomatic 
service. A report from the MAE in 1957, for example, noted how ‘les 
rapports quotidiens difficiles entre Salisbury et Londres accroissent le désir 
d’indépendance des Rhodésiens’, 32  whilst France’s representatives in 
London described ‘la menace d’une nouvelle “Boston tea Party” en 
Rhodésie’.33  
 
The fact that the British authorities transferred increasing responsibilities for 
external affairs to the settler government during this period also contributed 
                                                
31 D’Aumale, MAE, to Salisbury. (1958, June 21). AL/SEAB/9/No.16. Paris:AMAE.  
31 Warren to MAE. (1955, April 6). AL/SEAB/8/No.26/27. Paris:AMAE. 
Colmant to DREE. (1956, December 12). AL/SEAB/8/No.561829. Paris:AMAE. 
32 Anonymous. (1957, March). Federation des Rhodesies et du Nyassaland. AL/SEAB/8. 
Paris:AMAE. 
33 French Embassy, London, to MAE. (1961, November 16). AL/SEAB/24/No.1382. 
Paris:AMAE. 
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to French conceptions of the territory as an increasingly independent entity 
and, subsequently, an area in which France could legitimately participate, in 
spite of its colonial status. This can be seen in despatch from Warren that 
cited Rhodesia’s membership of the Commission de Coopération Technique 
en Afrique au Sud du Sahara (CCTA), its inclusion in the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and Huggins’ participation in the 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conferences as proof of the settler 
government’s autonomy.34 More generally, the Federation was described as 
‘un état, membre pour son compte de diverses organisations internationales, 
doté d'un governement propre et d'un statut se rapprochant beaucoup de 
celui des Etats du Commonwealth britannique’.35 Thus, it is possible to 
interpret the French conception of Rhodesia, not in terms of its status as a 
colony within the British Empire, but as a new, young and autonomous 
country, as a commentary upon the state of Anglo-Rhodesian relations, as 
well as a response to Rhodesia’s economic growth and the existence of an 
amenable, francophile settler minority.   
 
Manifestations of France’s foreign policy mind-set in 
Rhodesia  
 
The long-standing Anglo-French rivalry on the African continent, however, 
suggests that France’s new conceptions of Rhodesia might have been more 
than a mere observation about declining Anglo-Rhodesian relations. 
                                                
34 Warren to MAE. (1955, May 27). AL/SEAB/1/No.51. Paris:AMAE.  
35 Negre, Director, AL, MAE, to Personnel. (1956, November 11). AL/SEAB/1. 
Paris:AMAE. 
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Moreover, the fact that this shift in France’s understanding of Rhodesia took 
place in 1947, at the moment of the onset of the Cold War, indicates that the 
new French understanding of Rhodesia could be linked to France’s wider 
foreign policy concerns in the growing bipolarity of the post-war era. In 
light of this hypothesis, it is the purpose of this section to explore the 
manifestations of France’s foreign policy mind-set in Rhodesian setting and 
assess the extent to which this framework can be usefully applied to explain 
France’s growing interest in the British colony of Rhodesia after 1947.  
 
Rayonnement in Rhodesia: Anglophone Africa and the maintenance of 
France’s Great Power status 
 
The first element of France’s foreign policy mind-set – the desire to use the 
French presence in Africa as a means of assuring France’s position on the 
world stage – can clearly be identified in the Rhodesian setting. At a simple 
level, Rhodesia was seen as a new trading partner for France’s overseas 
colonies, with the potential to enhance the economic wellbeing of the 
French Union and, subsequently, the strength of France’s position overseas.  
This was especially true with regards to the French colony in closest 
geographical proximity to Rhodesia, the island of Madagascar. Thus, from 
1948 onwards, trade between British Central Southern Africa and 
Madagascar was actively encouraged by France’s “men-on-the-spot” in 
Salisbury, Nairobi and Tananarive.36  
                                                
36 Beaulieux to French High Commission, Madagascar. (1948, October 5). 
AL/PB/16/No.522. Paris:AMAE.  
Francières to French Consulate, Nairobi. (1948, December 23). AL/PB/16/No.126. 
Paris:AMAE. 
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Economic relations were also promoted between Rhodesia and France’s 
African Empire at large. In 1952, the MOF sent the following request to the 
High Commissioners in AOF, AEF, Cameroun and Madagascar: 
je vous demande d’encourager et de multiplier les 
contacts avec nos voisins britanniques (ceci intéresse 
particulièrement nos territoires continentale, mais 
concerne aussi bien qu’un moindre degré 
Madagascar).37 
The following year, the decision was made to grant Mr MacFarlane 
(Southern Rhodesian Trade Commissioner in British East Africa) 
jurisdiction in Madagascar and AEF.38 Similarly, economic motivations 
were cited alongside concerns about French prestige in the Afrique-Levant 
department’s promotion of the participation of AEF, Madagascar and 
Réunion in the Rhodes Centenary Exhibition of 1953 to mark one hundred 
years since the birth of Rhodesia’s founder (Shutt & King, 2005).39 All of 
these measures aimed to enhance the French colonial economy, revealing 
how the new French interest in Rhodesia stemmed from wider concerns 
about the maintenance of France’s presence on the African continent.  
 
Alongside this belief that Rhodesia could indirectly influence the restoration 
of France’s Great Power status, there was also a perception amongst the 
French observing and operating in Rhodesia that this British colony might 
have a direct role to play in France’s pursuit of grandeur on the 
international stage. Cultural ventures lay at the heart of France’s strategies 
                                                                                                                       
Beaulieux to MAE. (1949, February 26). AL/PB/16/No.68. Paris:AMAE.  
37 MOF to AOF, AEF, Madagascar & Cameroon. (1952, April 22). MAD/GGM/D/6(1)/83. 
Aix:ANOM. 
38 AL to MOF. (1952, November 7). AL/PB/16/No.1848. Paris:AMAE. 
MOF to MAE (1953, October 7). FM/1AFFPOL/2126/No.7187. Aix:ANOM. 
MOF to Madagascar (1953, October 23). MAD/GGM/D/6(1)/84/No.7690. Aix:ANOM. 
39 MAE to MOF. (1952, November 7). PB/16/No.1848. Paris:AMAE. 
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in the region from the outset, with the French language and culture 
consistently promoted as a means of securing the ‘rayonnement 
exceptionnel du prestige français’ in Rhodesia.40 More broadly, Rhodesia 
was viewed as a base from which to pursue ‘le rayonnement française sur le 
continent noir’,41 with this British territory increasingly integrated into a ‘un 
plan plus général’ that sought to develop ‘une position privilégiée par 
rapport aux pays tiers’ for France.42 It was this imperative that prompted, for 
example, France’s representatives on the ground to promote to the Quai the 
participation of citizens from the former French African colonies in a 
summer school set to take place at the University of Salisbury in June-
September 1963 on the grounds that it would ‘permettre une meilleure 
connaissance par les rhodésiens, blancs ou noirs, de l’œuvre que nous avons 
accomplie en Afrique et de la situation économique et politique de ces 
anciennes colonies’.43 According to Jean Desparmet, French Consul General 
to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1963-1965), initiatives such 
as these were as essential in light of ‘les intérêts et les responsibilities de la 
France sur une fraction importante du continent’ and ‘le rôle capital que 
nous jouons dans “l’autre Afrique”’, which meant that France had ‘une 
obligation de consacrer à ces activités une attention toute spéciale’.44 
Engagement with Rhodesia, therefore, created new avenues through which 
French influence on the African continent – perceived as a vital source of 
                                                
40 Warren to MAE. (1954, February 1). AL/SEAB/No.31. Paris:AMAE. 
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23). AL/PB/16/No.1426. Paris:AMAE.  
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strength in the post-war period - could be both directly and indirectly 
maintained. This, in turn, demonstrates the application of the wider French 
belief that Africa was crucial to the maintenance of France’s Great Power 
Status not only to the French African Empire, but also to Anglophone 
Africa.  
 
Friend or foe?: France’s relations with “les Anglo-Saxons” in the 
Anglophone African context 
 
Kent (1992) and Michel (1983) have described the extremes of conflict and 
cooperation that characterised Anglo-French relations in the post-war 
African context. With the onset of the Cold War, Britain and France’s 
shared interest in ensuring that their colonies developed in ways that would 
keep them in the Western sphere (Kent, 1992, p.160), along with the need 
for a common agenda to combat growing criticism of colonialism; the UN 
trusteeship agenda, especially in the case of Togoland; and the possibility 
that increased American aid to Africa would undermine Britain and 
France’s credibility as enlightened colonial powers, raised the possibility of 
Anglo-French cooperation in the African setting (Kent, 1992, p.198-199; 
Michel, 1983, pp.155, 162). However, although collaboration was 
sometimes possible a local level (Kent, 1992, p.329), as well as with regards 
to technical issues (Michel, 1983, p.168), large-scale political and economic 
cooperation initiatives in Africa were persistently blighted by different aims, 
approaches and administrative practices (Kent, 1992, pp.329-332), along 
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with France’s growing concerns about the involvement Britain’s closest 
ally, the USA, on the African continent (Michel, 1983, p.166). 
 
These patterns in Anglo-French relations also emerged in the Rhodesian 
setting. Rhodesia’s status as a British colony meant that collaboration with 
the UK government was essential for France to operate in the region. Thus, 
French diplomats and policy-makers sought British approval for the 
development of France’s relations with Rhodesia. This is evidenced in 
French requests in 1955 for permission to receive Rhodesian statesmen in 
Paris,45  consultation with the British Board of Trade before finalising 
Franco-Federal commercial agreements in 1956,46 and efforts to gain British 
support for the technical and commercial mission to the Federation by 
Alsthom, a large French firm involved in transport and power generation, in 
1959.47  
 
In the immediate post-war period, Rhodesia also formed part of broader 
Anglo-French efforts to cooperate to preserve their respective African 
Empires. Direct Anglo-French exchanges of information concerning 
Rhodesia took place during this period, in much the same way that MOF 
collaborated with the Colonial Office, and Afrique-Levant section of the 
Quai maintained contacts with the West Africa Department of the FO over 
the question of West Africa (Michel, 1983, p.156). In August and 
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September 1952, for example, on the request of Henry Hopkinson, Minister 
of State for the Colonies (1952-1955), Warren met with Peter Smithers MP 
to share information about events taking place in Rhodesia in line with the 
‘désir commun des deux gouvernements d'harmoniser leur politique en 
Afrique’.48  
 
Southern Rhodesia was also the only non-independent African member of 
the CCTA, an organisation founded by the UK and French governments in 
1949 with the aim of preserving European colonial rule in Africa in the face 
of growing international interventionism, in particular pressure from the 
Americans (Kent, 1992, p.284; Michel 1983, p.162). The French Foreign 
Ministry also viewed Southern Rhodesia as part of a strategy of Franco-
British cooperation in the Indian Ocean. A report from the Direction des 
Affaires Politiques at the Quai to the MOF attests to this fact, listing the 
various interactions between Rhodesia and Francophone Africa, especially 
the Indian Ocean island of Madagascar, and stating how the department has 
‘toujours recherché le plus grand nombre d’occasions possibles de 
multiplier les contacts dans tous les domaines et à tous les échelons, avec 
nos voisins britanniques’.49 In addition, Rhodesia was of interest to the 
Comité Franc-Sterling, an organisation linked to the Centre National du 
Commerce Extérieur (CNCE) and the Ministry for Economic Affairs, with 
the objective of promoting French economic exchange with the UK. The 
committee’s remit extended beyond the UK metropole, to its colonies, seen 
in the important role it played in arranging a technical mission to the 
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Federation in 1957, 50  as well as the visit to Salisbury from Henry 
Caustelnault, the organisation’s Secretary General, in February 1960.51  
 
However, French concerns about Anglo-Saxon imperialism on the African 
continent, along with the desire to maintain foreign policy autonomy, were 
persistently present in the minds of the French engaged in Rhodesian affairs. 
This can be seen especially in the way in which certain French policy-
makers, diplomats and bureaucrats identified opportunities in Rhodesia for 
France to combat British and American dominance and to act independently 
from the  “Anglo-Saxon” powers. Although there were clear limits to this 
strategy - it was obviously impossible to prevent “Anglo-Saxon” infiltration 
in a region already ruled by the British and in which the United States 
occupied a privileged position due to its “special relationship” with the 
territory’s colonial ruler – the French observing and operating in Rhodesia 
nevertheless conceived of the region as one in which the broader objective 
of assuring autonomy from “les Anglo-Saxons” could be achieved. On the 
one hand, engaging with the settler government created the possibility to 
reduce France’s reliance on the sterling and dollar currencies. This 
opportunity is explicitly outlined in an Agence France Presse Special 
Bulletin published by the Central African Review in 1956 that noted how,  
France has a heavy balance of trade against her 
when dealing with Sterling bloc. The opportunity to 
redress this by selling to the Federation is becoming 
well known in France, but plans for a full scale 
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assault on the Central African market must 
inevitably mature slowly.52  
 
On the other hand, by promoting Franco-Rhodesian trade and the French 
language and culture in Rhodesia, it was possible to reduce the “Anglo-
Saxon” stranglehold over commerce and culture in the region. As such, in 
1951, efforts were made to supersede Britain as the main supplier of lorries 
and locomotives to the region,53 whilst in 1953 Warren held talks with the 
Rhodesian authorities about France’s possible replacement of the US as 
Rhodesia’s principal provider of tyres, whisky, utility vehicles and cigarette 
papers, all of which were important French exports. This was all the more 
appealing in light of the French perception that ‘Mr Bertram [the Secretary 
General of the Federal Ministry of Commerce and Industry] ne semble pas 
s’inquiéter de la zone dollar’.54 Equally, cultural initiatives were conceived 
of as a chance to reduce Anglophone dominance in the region, with 
arguments for the extension of an exhibition of French contemporary art 
touring South Africa to Southern Rhodesia in 1951, for example, centring 
on Rhodesia’s position in the Anglophone world in contrast to its separation 
from the Francophone sphere,55 and the importance of creating a French 
Chair at the University of Salisbury heightened by Rhodesia’s status as an 
“Anglo-Saxon” country. 56  France’s interest in developing ties with 
Rhodesia after 1947 can be understood, therefore, as part of a broader 
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strategy that aimed to reduce France’s reliance on the “Anglo-Saxon” 
powers, particularly in fiscal terms, and prevent Anglophone cultural and 
economic dominance of the African continent.  
 
French concerns about “Anglo-Saxon” infiltration of the African continent 
grew in line with the growing closeness of the Anglo-American “special 
relationship”, particularly in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis of 1956, when 
Britain moved ever closer to the United States, convinced that ‘only 
America could be the buttress of their security, power and interests’ (Tombs 
& Tombs, 2006, p.617). The French, who attributed their humiliation at 
Suez to the fact that ‘once again, timorous Albion had let France down’, 
resented their exclusion from the Anglo-American rapprochement, which 
they viewed as confirmation of their need to act autonomously from the 
“Anglo-Saxons” (Tombs & Tombs, 2006, p.617). Thus, according to Vaïsse 
(1989, p.335, cited in Tombs & Tombs, 2006, p.617), for France, relations 
with Britain were “never the same again”.  
 
This shift informed French approaches to Rhodesia, particularly in the 
context of the CCTA. A report from 1956 prepared by the Afrique-Levant 
department noted how ‘l’échec britannique dans l’affaire de Suez’ 
contributed to ‘une perte de confiance à l’égard de la métropole’ amongst 
Rhodesia’s white settler population. Moreover, the French observed how, 
au sein de la CCTA notamment…  la politique 
française bénéficie de cette évolution. Nous 
pourrions en bénéficier également dans le domaine 
des relations économiques quoique ici la préférence 
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impériale et la dépendance vis-à-vis des capitaux de 
la cité soit très étroite.57  
Thus, in certain quarters of the French government, possibilities in Rhodesia 
were identified as a result of Britain’s declining position in the region, 
opportunities that were all the more appealing in light of French resentment 
of British behaviour at Suez and its aftermath. In a similar vein, in 1957, a 
centrally produced paper noted how the growing divide between Salisbury 
and London led Rhodesia’s white settlers to be more open ‘aux conseils et 
aux offres étrangers’.58 This underscores not only an awareness of the 
problems Britain faced in Rhodesia, but also the opportunities it afforded to 
France to break free from the stranglehold of Anglophone economic 
dominance of the region. France’s desire to exploit Britain’s weaknesses in 
the region is symptomatic, therefore, of the persistent French hostility 
towards Britain and the growing French desire to operate autonomously 
from the UK and the United States, even in regions that formed part of the 
Anglophone African sphere.  
 
As relations between London and the white settler government in Salisbury 
soured in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the opportunities for France in 
Rhodesia and elsewhere in Britain’s traditional African domain increased 
further. The French observing the situation in the region noted Britain’s 
growing difficulties on the African continent, as its inability to deal with the 
Rhodesian problem clashed with the momentum towards majority rule in 
Anglophone West Africa and the British rhetoric of decolonisation, as set 
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out by Harold Macmillan in his “wind of change” speech in February 1960. 
A report on Britain’s African policy produced by the Afrique-Levant 
department in 1960, for example, noted the ‘trois politiques différentes’ 
pursued by the British in Africa: ‘accession rapide au Self Government puis 
à l’independence’ in West Africa, efforts at ‘l’instauration d’Etats 
multiraciaux’ in Kenya and Tanzania, and ‘la suprématie blanche’ in Central 
Africa. The report goes on to describe how ‘en 1960, les contradictions de 
ces trois politiques apparaissent dans leurs résultats de façon 
particulièrement brutale’ with ‘les états de l’Ouest constituent 
inévitablement un exemple pour les territoires de l’Est’ and, 
des contaminations se sont produites entre les 
hommes : si Lumumba est allé recueillir la bonne 
parole à Accra, il en est de même du Dr. Banda 
(Nyassaland) [sic] jusqu’alors homme très modéré.59  
This demonstrates a growing French awareness of the disconnect between 
the different British approaches to the question of African decolonisation 
and how the decision to introduce majority rule to the Gold Coast and 
Ghana was contributing to the unravelling of British control over its 
colonies in East and Central Southern Africa.  
 
The French were consistently perplexed by the British approach to Rhodesia 
and Africa more broadly. The term ‘curious’ was often used in French 
descriptions of Britain’s Rhodesian policy, seen in 1957, when Siguret, 
French Vice Consul to Salisbury (1955-1958), labelled events surrounding 
an attempt to amend the Federal constitution as ‘curieuse’,60 whilst the 
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Anglo-Rhodesian conversations in 1959 was described as having ‘une 
curieuse sécheresse’. 61  This, in turn, reveals an ingrained French 
incomprehension of the British approach to African affairs. More explicitly, 
Southern Rhodesia’s quasi-independent status, the perceived root of 
Britain’s problems in the region, was attributed to ‘la souplesse de 
l’articulation administrative anglaise’, something that stood in contrast to 
the more rigid, refined approach adopted by the French, where either ‘un 
pays est totalement indépendant ou il ne l’est pas’.62  In the minds of the 
French, therefore, Britain’s problems in Rhodesia were unique to the British 
context and could not occur in the French Empire. This conception is an 
interesting mirror image of the British belief that many elements of the 
Algerian conflict were ‘specifically French problems unlikely to occur in 
the British context’ (Thomas, 2000, p.213), in spite of the obvious 
similarities between the situation in Algeria and the problems that the 
British faced as a result of growing white settler influence over the colonial 
administrations in Southern Africa. This, in turn, reveals the persistent 
disconnect between British and French approaches to the African continent.  
 
Of course, until 1962, France faced its own, arguably graver problems in 
Algeria, where ‘the scale and intensity’ of the colonial war ‘surpassed 
anything in Britain’s recent imperial past’ (Thomas, 2000, p.11). Thomas 
(2000, p.213) has described the British government’s relief, alongside ‘the 
occasional glimpse of smugness’, that its difficulties in the colonies were 
not as bad as the problems that the French faced in Algeria. More broadly, 
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prior to 1962, Britain had tended to gain the upper hand in the Anglo-French 
battle for legitimacy on the African continent, with victories over France in 
the context of the League of Nations Mandate Commission in the inter-war 
period and, later, success in presenting their methods in Africa as more 
suitable preparation for independence than French assimilationary tactics 
(Dimier, 2004, p.275).  
 
However, as Anglo-Rhodesian relations continued to decline in the early 
1960s, the situation shifted substantially, as Britain’s inability to resolve its 
disagreements with the Rhodesian authorities prevented the full 
decolonisation of Anglophone Africa. The French engaged in Rhodesian 
affairs acknowledged this obstacle to the end of the British African project. 
In November 1962, Desparmet claimed that ‘les anglais devront mettre dans 
leur jeu les leaders africains et convaincre les européens de la Fédération 
encore très réticents’, if the British government was to achieve its objectives 
in Rhodesia and ‘mettre fin dès que possible à ses difficultés coloniales’.63 
The pivotal position of Rhodesia and its settler leaders to the wider success 
of Britain’s efforts to retreat from Africa was also noted by the French in 
London, who claimed in February 1962 that ‘l’échec de la Conférence de 
Lancaster House marque un sérieux à-coup dans le processus de 
décolonisation mis au point par M. Macleod’.64 At this stage, Jean Chauvel, 
the French Ambassador to London (1955-1962), claimed that ‘il serait 
prématuré de parler d’échec de sa politique africaine’. However, there was 
nevertheless the growing perception amongst the French observing and 
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operating in Rhodesia that Britain faced considerable difficulties in the 
region and that these difficulties, in turn, created a substantial obstacle to 
Britain’s ability to draw a line under its African Empire.65 
 
Britain’s continued problems in Rhodesia after 1962 stood in contrast to 
France’s own much more positive position on the African continent by this 
time. France had transferred power to the African majority in West Africa, 
successfully orchestrating the process so as to maintain France’s 
considerable influence over the region. Thus, according to Torrent (2012, 
p.43), France had gained ‘the lead in the decolonisation of West and Central 
Africa’ due to its ‘rapid, albeit superficial, transformation of its West and 
Equatorial territories’. The resolution of the Algerian conflict in 1962 
further increased the French feeling of superiority when it came to African 
affairs as, despite eight years of violent conflict, France emerged with its 
reputation relatively intact, successfully “inventing” decolonisation to allow 
‘the messy episodes’ of the Algerian War to disappear (Shepard, 2006, p.2).  
 
By contrast, Britain’s position on the world stage was increasingly under 
threat, something that was acknowledged by the French Embassy in London 
in 1963. In a report on the subject of ‘trois ans de décolonisation 
britannique’, the French in London noted how, 
La politique du "wind of change" a perdu 
évidemment de son dynamisme et de son prestige 
auprès de l’opinion internationale comme de 
l’opinion britannique. Les raisons de cet état de 
chose sont multiples… La plupart des problèmes 
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sont résolus. Ceux qui ne le sont pas, comme le 
Rhodésie, ne peuvent pas l’être par simple 
application des principes du "wind of change".66  
Speaking later about diplomacy and the independence of Rhodesia, Michael 
Palliser (cited in Charlton, 1990, p.15), a British diplomat who, amongst 
other things, served at the British Embassy in Paris in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, set out a British perspective, 
The French have been wiser than we have… While 
playing a leading role in Europe they’ve also 
managed to play a neo-imperial role. We have lost, 
and they dominate West Africa. Of course, the 
French empire was, essentially, a west African black 
empire, but they decided to keep as much as they 
could and by indirect methods they’ve succeeded. 
The French gave independence, quicker than we did, 
to all their African colonies. But they so managed 
the retreat from empire that they were able to leave 
garrisons behind and civil servants behind... 
The roles had been reversed, therefore, with France gaining the upper hand 
over Britain in African affairs, as the UK government faced spiralling 
difficulties in dealing with an increasingly reactionary settler minority in 
Rhodesia.  
 
This shift was especially evident in the UN, as France’s successful 
resolution of the Algerian crisis meant that it was no longer ‘the choice 
imperial villain’ (Thomas, 2000, p.213). Instead, attentions turned to the 
British and their failure to introduce majority rule in Southern Rhodesia. In 
1961, limited constitutional reforms, which set out plans for the eventual 
introduction of majority rule, albeit at some point in the undetermined 
future, were implemented by the Southern Rhodesian government. In 
Britain, this reform was viewed as a sufficient safeguard that African 
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representation would soon be achieved and the UK parliament responded by 
surrendering its reserve powers over the territory. As such, according to 
Butler (2000, p.136), ‘settler leaders saw this constitution as the basis for 
Southern Rhodesia’s imminent independence’, although it was rejected by 
the National Democratic Party, an African nationalist party in Southern 
Rhodesia, which was the predecessor of the Zimbabwe African People’s 
Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). 
 
It was in this context that Britain’s Rhodesian policies came under 
increasing scrutiny in the UN. In October 1961, for example, in the UN 
General Assembly’s (UNGA) Fourth Committee (the Special Political and 
Decolonisation Committee), Ghana demanded that Britain provide 
information on Southern Rhodesia under Article 732 of the UN Charter. 
Such a demand was unprecedented. Britain had never submitted information 
on Southern Rhodesia as, not only did it not receive information from the 
territory, but also because it did not believe it was required to do so in light 
of Southern Rhodesia’s self-governing status. Therefore, this created a 
situation that was highly problematic for the British government. In light of 
the expectation that a resolution was likely to be passed to this effect at the 
resumed sixteenth session in 1962, Britain sought measures to limit the 
damage inflicted on its Rhodesian policy and its international reputation 
(Watts, 2012, pp.187-188). One such initiative, although hitherto neglected 
in the historiography,67 was to approach the French government for its 
                                                
67 In his recent international history of the Rhodesian UDI, Watts (2012) has explored how 
Britain looked to the United States and its partners in the Old Commonwealth to help it 
manage the Rhodesian problem in the UN, but neglects British efforts to obtain French 
support for its Rhodesian policies in this international arena.  
 75 
support. In February 1962, Hugh Foot, British Ambassador to the UN 
Trusteeship Council, approached Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet, Permanent 
French Delegate on the UN Trusteeship Council, in an official capacity, to 
ask if the French delegation would take the initiative and propose to the 
Fourth Committee that it should no longer examine a resolution concerning 
Rhodesia on the grounds that ‘le Royaume-Uni n’a ni la possibilité ni le 
droit d’exiger du gouvernement de la Rhodésie du Sud des renseignements 
que ce dernier ne voudra pas lui communiquer’.68  
 
Despite viewing this British argument as ‘parfaitement pertinents’ and 
acknowledging ‘l’importance réelle que nos alliés britanniques attachent au 
service qu’ils nous demandent’, France’s diplomats in New York expressed 
doubts about proposing a motion on the grounds that ‘nos amis africains 
pourraient s’étonner que nous nous départissions de notre réserve habituelle 
dans un problème où leur sensibilité est vive’. There was also the ‘risque 
supplémentaire d’attirer l’attention sur nos territoires, et départements 
d’outre-mer’ as well as ‘les accusations dont nous avons été l’objet à propos 
des problèmes du Katanga’.69 Similar reservations were raised by Paris and, 
as such, the French representation in New York was advised to inform Foot 
that France would be unable to propose a motion on Britain’s behalf, 
although it would support ‘toute motion hostile à l’examen d’une résolution 
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qui tend à attribuer à l’Assemblée un pouvoir d’appréciation que nous lui 
avons toujours contesté’.70  
 
With France unwilling to act on their behalf, the British delegation was 
forced to put forward its own motion that the Committee not debate a 
resolution concerning Rhodesia. Although France supported Britain by 
voting in favour of this motion, it was defeated, and the UNGA adopted 
Resolution 1745 (XVI) by 57 votes to 21 (Britain, the United States and 
France all opposed the Resolution) that asked the Special Committee of 
Seventeen to examine the question of Southern Rhodesia and determine 
whether the territory could be viewed as non-self-governing as defined by 
Article 73 of the UN Charter (Watts, 2012, p.188).71 The instance is 
interesting not only as evidence of the ways in which the Rhodesian 
problem left the UK vulnerable to attack in the UN, but also how France, 
unwilling to risk the same fate, limited its support for Britain’s Rhodesian 
policy to actions that did not pose a risk to its international reputation, 
especially amongst the newly independent states in Francophone sub-
Saharan Africa.  
 
The French, and particularly those in the Elysée Palace, were acutely aware 
of Britain’s growing difficulties and the opportunities it gifted to France in 
Southern Africa and beyond. These sentiments are explicit in a note housed 
in the private archives of Jacques Foccart, which described ‘les cruels 
échecs de la décolonisation britannique’. Moreover, these failures are 
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represented as being of benefit to France, particularly the way in which 
Britain’s ‘multiples erreurs’ permitted France to replace ‘progressivement 
l’Angleterre en Afrique du Sud’. According to the author of this report, the 
British viewed this process with ‘inquiétude’ and ‘amertume’, something 
that may have been received with glee amongst certain parties in French 
government in light of the aforementioned smugness amongst the British 
with regards to France’s earlier problems in Algeria.72  
 
The crisis in Rhodesia not only created opportunities for France to increase 
its activity in the region. It also permitted France to take the moral high 
ground on the international stage, attacking Britain’s African policy whilst 
simultaneously presenting France’s own approach to the continent in a more 
favourable light. This had consequences not only in Africa, but also more 
broadly. For example, the French often used Britain’s difficulties in 
retreating from Africa as a way to attacking Britain’s wider foreign policies. 
In 1963, for example, De Gaulle claimed that Britain’s failure to decolonise 
fully was evidence of its lack of commitment to the project of European 
integration and, as such, a strong motivation for keeping the United 
Kingdom out of the EEC (Shepard, 2006, p.7). Thus, Britain’s persistent 
problems in Rhodesia enhanced French efforts to prevent “Anglo-Saxon” 
infiltration of the European integration project and, as such, France’s wider 
Cold War strategy to secure foreign policy autonomy.  
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Diplomats, bureaucrats, policy-makers and businessmen: the 
agents of France’s Rhodesian policy 
 
The principal agents of France’s Rhodesian policy in the post-war period 
were French diplomats stationed in the Anglophone world. French “men-on-
the-spot” in British Africa were often the first to bring opportunities in 
Rhodesia to the attention of those in Paris and the colonies. In 1948, for 
example, it was the French Consul in Kenya who initiated the extension of 
the commercial network that existed between Madagascar and British East 
Africa to Rhodesia, whilst, in 1953, it was Warren who first advocated the 
need for a Commercial Attaché in Salisbury. 73  Even official trade 
negotiations were initially the responsibility of Frenchmen based in 
Southern Africa, notably in 1953, when the Commercial Advisor to the 
French Embassy in South Africa led the brokering of an official Franco-
Rhodesian trade accord.74 In light of Rhodesia’s status as a British colony 
throughout the period in question, the French in London were also at the 
forefront of France’s presence in the region. In August 1949, for example, a 
visit to Salisbury from the French Commercial Advisor to Pretoria was 
carried out at the request of Jean de Sailly, the French Commercial Advisor 
in London.75 De Sailly remained active in the Franco-Rhodesian connection 
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throughout the 1950s, travelling to Salisbury in 1956 on a goodwill mission 
as part of a broader effort to expand Franco-Rhodesian trade.76  
 
Although often responding to a push from the periphery, it is also possible 
to detect a growing interest in the development of Franco-Rhodesian ties in 
the French metropole during this period. Perhaps unsurprisingly given their 
department’s responsibility for Anglophone African affairs, the greatest 
metropolitan enthusiasm for France’s growing presence in Rhodesia came 
from the Afrique-Levant department of the Quai d’Orsay. In a letter to the 
Cultural Relations department of the MAE in April 1948, for example, the 
department openly claimed to attach ‘le plus grand prix’ to the development 
of relations with this British colony.77 Thus, the department played a 
particularly active role in the establishment of Franco-Rhodesian links, such 
as in 1952, when it was vocal in its encouragement of French colonial 
participation in the Rhodes Centenary Exhibition planned for 1953.78  
 
Looking to French government more broadly, although interest in Rhodesia 
did not begin to develop until slightly later in the 1950s, there is clear 
evidence of a growing awareness of this British colony amongst certain 
policy-makers and bureaucrats outside of the Direction d’Afrique-Levant. In 
1955, for example, the Quai sent a delegation to Rhodesia that included 
Louet, the Chef de Service of the Direction des Affaires Economiques at the 
MAE, Roussillon, a civil servant from the Secrétariat d’Etat aux Affaires 
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Economiques, who had also visited Rhodesia in 1954, and a representative 
from the French state-owned tobacco monopoly, the Service d’Exploitation 
Industrielle des Tabacs et des Allumettes (SEITA). This visit was intended 
to demonstrate to Rhodesia ‘l'intérêt que nous attachons au développement 
des échanges commerciaux, entre les deux pays’.79 Similarly, Welensky’s 
visit to French hydroelectric and railway plants in 1955 was viewed by the 
Direction des Affaires Economiques et Financières with ‘le plus grand 
intérêt pour le développement de notre expansion économique dans ce 
pays’.80  
 
Alongside these state participants in Rhodesia, this period also saw the 
expansion of the activities of private companies and individuals in Rhodesia 
who, whilst operating largely within the broader interests of the French 
state, were nominally independent. This can be seen especially in the case of 
the Union aéromaritime des transports (UAT). After the departure in 1956 
of the then government-owned airline, Air France, UAT became the only 
non-British or South African airline operating out of the Central African 
Federation.81  The creation of a twice-weekly air link with the French 
metropole led not only to UAT profits but also to a rise in Franco-
Rhodesian tourism, with, for the first time, French tourists holidaying in 
Rhodesia.82 The success of UAT, was the result of individual endeavour, 
notably the two years of prospecting by an Air France representative that 
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prepared the ground for the establishment of a strong UAT base in the 
region.83  
 
Alternating actors, alternating agendas: the importance of context in 
shaping French responses to Rhodesia  
 
In the context of the French Empire, Thomas (2011, p.xvi) has described 
how, 
the professional, social, and familial milieus 
inhabited by colonial officials, soldiers, educators, 
religious orders, or settlers… molded responses to 
the workaday challenges of colonial life, whether at 
the level of high policy or at that of personal 
interaction with indigenous people.  
This, in turn, shaped the nature of France’s relationship with its colonies, as 
is demonstrated by Chafer (2011, p.276), who argues that the overlapping, 
often contradictory, aims and approaches of different colonial élites 
influenced the process and outcomes of decolonisation in French West 
Africa. Similarly, the actions of each individual or group engaged in 
Rhodesian affairs were subject to numerous diverse influences and 
constraints that subsequently determined the shape and extent of Franco-
Rhodesian relations following the establishment of the French Consulate in 
Salisbury in 1947.  
 
France’s representatives in Anglophone Africa were generally men with 
military experience. The second and fourth French Consuls to Rhodesia, 
Warren (1950-1955) and Louis de Cabrol (1958-1961), for example, both 
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served in the French army prior to their postings in Salisbury, Warren as a 
cavalry officer (1937-1946) and Cabrol in an array of roles in the period 
between 1932 and 1945, including fighting with the Forces Françaises 
Combattantes.84 This experience is likely to have imbued these diplomats 
with the French foreign policy mind-set, in particular the desire to restore 
France’s position on the world stage. The existence of this sentiment is 
manifest in the justifications given by French diplomats for the development 
of France’s position in the region. When promoting the appointment of a 
Commercial Attaché to the French office in Salisbury in 1953, for example, 
Warren expressed his concerns about France’s prestige in Rhodesia and its 
neighbours being ‘éclipsé par une propagande envahissante issue de 
certaines nations ex ennemies et absentes du sol africain’.85 Similarly, in 
1954 and 1955, when the air link between Livingstone 86  and the 
Madagascan capital of Tananarive was threatened with suspension, Warren 
warned of the ‘répercussions fâcheuses’ not only for relations between the 
Federation and Madagascar, but also for French companies wishing to 
establish themselves ‘dans ce pays neuf’, as it would give the local 
authorities ‘une fausse impression sur les qualités d’organisation, de 
persévérance et de sérieux des Français’. As such, the move posed a great 
risk to French prestige in the region and it was necessary to act quickly to 
‘sauver la face vis-à-vis des Rhodésiens’.87 This, in turn, led Warren to 
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conclude that it was essential that ‘la lutte continue’ – ‘qu’une liaison soit 
maintenue avec Tananarive’.88  
 
However, despite a shared appreciation of the wider French foreign policy 
mind-set, those in Paris and those on the ground in Anglophone Africa 
interpreted France’s foreign policy imperatives in different ways. This can 
be seen, for example, in debates surrounding automobile quotas in the mid-
1950s. Perhaps in light of the importance attributed to the automobile 
industry in the French post-war economy, the privileged position of German 
car exports to the Federation was a source of envy amongst the French 
involved in Rhodesia. In 1956, for example, Pierre-Marie Colmant, 
Commercial Attaché to the French Consulate in Salisbury (1954-1957), 
wrote to the Federal Secretary of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
contrasting Southern Rhodesia’s imports of £61,750 worth of German 
automobiles during a six-month period with the paucity of France’s own 
yearly quota of just £8,625. As such, Colmant requested that a minimum 
yearly quota of £70,000 be established for Rhodesian purchases of French 
cars, based on the ratio of 1:2 (tobacco exports: automobile imports).89 
However, Colmant’s efforts to bring quotas for French automobiles in line 
with German levels were met with concerns from the Direction Economique 
of the Quai, who believed that a request to increase the ratio of motorcars to 
tobacco might permit Germany to gain the same advantage, demonstrating a 
different interpretation of the situation in the context of the metropole.90 
                                                
88 Warren to MAE. (1955, February 24). MAD/GGM/D/6(1)/84/No.20. Aix:ANOM. 
89 Colmant to Federal Ministry of Commerce & Industry. (1956, March 13). 
AL/SEAB/8/No.90. Paris:AMAE. 
90 Sebilleau to Salisbury. (1956, June 10). AL/SEAB/8/No.43/44. Paris:AMAE.  
 84 
Although those in Salisbury and Paris both formulated their ideas in 
response to the same desire to consolidate France’s position in the region 
vis-à-vis other European powers, notably the source of its most recent 
domestic humiliation, Germany, their different contexts contributed to 
divergent approaches to the situation. Thus, although a shared worldview 
drove French economic engagement with Rhodesia in the post-war period, 
the alternatives ways in which the different actors engaged in Rhodesian 
affairs interpreted this foreign policy mind-set shaped French responses to 
the situation in Rhodesia.  
 
Splits within the Quai were also apparent. In 1953, for example, following 
the establishment of the Federation, Warren called upon Paris to increase 
the status of the French Consulate in Salisbury.91 In this instance, the 
Afrique-Levant department quickly took up the cause, claiming that the 
elevation of the French Consulate to a Consulate General was 
‘indispensable’ especially as ‘le Gouvernement Fédéral est devenu 
responsable… de l’exécution des obligations internationales du nouvel 
Etat’.92 In pressing for the improved status of the French representation in 
Salisbury, those in Paris charged with Anglophone African affairs, along 
with those on the ground, were also responding to the actions of other 
European powers in the region and, in particular, ‘l’ouverture, avec 
nombreux personnel, d’un Consulat général d’Allemagne en Rhodésie’.93 
According to Warren, the German representation threatened to ‘nuire au 
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prestige française’, 94  an appeal, perhaps, to sensibilities in the central 
administration about France’s standing in Africa. The French Embassy in 
London also advocated the elevation of the status of France’s diplomatic 
representation in Salisbury, although their justification was based on 
requests from the British Foreign Office, evidence, once again, of how 
context was vital in informing the responses of French actors involved in 
Rhodesian affairs.95  
 
In spite of support in Salisbury, London and at the Afrique-Levant 
department for the elevation of the French Consulate in the Federation to the 
status of Consulate General, along with the positioning of this initiative 
within a broader strategy to project French power in the African setting, the 
Direction Générale du Personnel at the Quai claimed that such a move was 
‘absolutement impossible’, with funding unavailable ‘au moment où celui-ci 
demande au Département le suppression de huit consulats et consulats 
généraux’. As such, the only solution was to represent the mission locally as 
a Consulate General, without officially according the office this title or 
status.96 This instance reveals, therefore, how different interpretations of the 
same imperatives influenced French action in Rhodesia.  
 
A similar divergence can be detected between the approaches of French 
state and non-state actors on the ground in Rhodesia, where, despite a 
shared enthusiasm for the expansion of the Franco-Rhodesian connection, 
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the relationship was not always a smooth one. This can be seen in the 
activities of a Paris-based organisation, L’Expansion Economique Française 
à l’Etranger. 97  In 1953, this independent society organised a touring 
exhibition of several countries in Southern Africa, including Southern 
Rhodesia, entitled “Crosière Afrique Australe”, with the explicit aim “to 
make France better known and give South Africans and Rhodesians a 
chance of inspecting samples of its products”.98 Despite this self-affirmed 
intention, the venture was not endorsed by French officials on the spot, who 
believed the tour would yield few ‘resultats tangibles’ and feared that efforts 
to expand Franco-Rhodesian trade, in contravention of the restrictive trade 
regime, risked creating ‘mécontentements tant chez les milieux 
professionnels que chez les consomateurs’.99  By contrast, a hand-written 
response to a note from the Direction des Relations Culturelles at the Quai 
indicates that the Afrique-Levant department actually approved of the 
participation of France’s Johannesburg post in this enterprise. 100  This 
example serves to emphasise, therefore, on the one hand, the widespread 
influence of France’s foreign policy mind-set across the French engaged in 
Rhodesian affairs, and, on the other, the different ways in which this wider 
purpose was interpreted.  
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In addition to this divergence in interpretations of the French foreign policy 
mind-set between the centre and the periphery, as well as amongst private 
and public “men-on-the-spot”, the particular experiences and contexts of 
each individual agent of France’s Rhodesian policy informed the nature of 
their enthusiasm for the development and extension of Franco-Rhodesian 
ties. For diplomats representing France in English-speaking countries, the 
fact that their career paths were focused on the Anglophone world was of 
significance. Prior to his posting in Salisbury, Cabrol had been head of the 
military liaison mission to the Second British Army and represented France 
in various capacities in its engagement with the English-speaking countries, 
including as French Consulate to Boston (1946) and head of the mission in 
British-administered Khartoum (1952). He went onto serve as French 
Consul General to Los Angeles (1962) and to Edinburgh and Glasgow 
(1965-1972).101 Similarly, following the end of his positing in Salisbury, 
Warren took on roles in Cardiff (1956-1959), London (1959) and 
Philadelphia (1968). 102  Similar patterns emerged amongst France’s 
commercial agents in Rhodesia, such as Colmant, who prior to his posting 
as the Head of Economic Expansion at the French Consulate General in the 
Central African Federation (1954-1957), served as Commercial Attaché to 
the French Embassy in London (1946-1954).103   
 
The links between France’s representatives on the ground and the 
Anglophone world were further augmented by the fact that British nationals 
were often called upon to act on behalf of the French state in Rhodesia. In 
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1953, for example, when a consular agency was established in Bulawayo, 
the second largest city in Southern Rhodesia, a French-speaking, British 
national by the name of James Gilchrist filled the post.104 Closer to the heart 
of the French presence in the region was Frank de Saint-Jorre, another UK 
national who in the late 1950s acted as a close contact of Colmant, 
facilitating the development of a strong French commercial presence in the 
region.105 Later, when Colmant’s successor, Hullo, had to return to Paris 
temporarily after just six months in his post, Saint-Jorre acted as French 
Commercial Attaché until a suitable official candidate was found to take up 
the position.106 France’s representatives on the ground in Rhodesia were 
oriented, therefore, towards the English-speaking world. This, in turn, may 
have increased their desire to promote the ties between France and British 
Africa.  
 
Another significant influence over France’s “men-on-the-spot” was their 
physical presence on British African soil and, in the case of those based in 
Salisbury, their regular interaction with Rhodesian politicians. France’s 
diplomats enjoyed a privileged position in Rhodesia and were invited to 
official state events often as the sole foreign representatives in attendance, 
notably at the opening of the Theatre Royal in June 1953 and a ceremony to 
mark the establishment of the Supreme Court in 1955.107 The French on the 
ground in Rhodesia also maintained close personal relations with high-
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ranking Rhodesian politicians, including Huggins, Welensky, Bertram and 
F. H. N. Parry, Secretary to the Prime Minister and Cabinet (1953-1963), 
leading to the development of what the French Commercial Attaché to 
South Africa described as ‘un rapport constant avec les autorités 
rhodésiennes’.108 Relations also grew between Frenchmen and Southern 
Rhodesian businessmen, creating ‘réseaux commercial’.109  
 
These close links, in turn, shaped the approach of France’s “men-on-the-
spot” to this British colony. In 1953, for example, Warren was the first to 
call for the consulate’s mandate to be extended to include Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland following the establishment of the Central African 
Federation in August 1953. Here, Warren’s situation on the ground was 
crucial, as it was an approach from the Federal Secretariat for External 
Affairs that prompted his request to Paris.110 The influence of this personal 
contact is also demonstrated by the justification of language teaching 
initiatives as a means to counterbalance the influence of South Africa in the 
region. In 1947, Francières claimed that the establishment of a branch of the 
Alliance Française in the Rhodesian capital ‘serait d’ailleurs vue sans 
déplaisir par les autorités locales qui favoriseraient sans doute tout ce qui 
pourrait balancer l’influence de l’Union [de l’Afrique du Sud]’.111 Similarly, 
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in 1953, Warren was vocal in his encouragement of the creation of a Chair 
in French at the new University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, on the 
grounds that ‘le chaire de française, dans l’esprit des fondateurs de 
l’Université, devait contrebalancer l’influence d’Afrique du Sud.112 More 
generally, it was claimed that, 
tout effort, si modeste soit-il, de notre part… serait 
très apprécie par le gouvernement local qui veut 
absolument combattre une mouvement en formation, 
dans les milieux afrikaans, tendant a demander que 
l’Anglais et l’Afrikaans soient les deux langues 
officielles dans les écoles de la Rhodésie.113  
Thus, in promoting the spread of French language in Rhodesia, French 
“men-on-the-spot” were responding not only to an ingrained commitment to 
rayonnement, but also to their specific context. It is possible to argue, 
therefore, that by justifying ventures in Rhodesia in terms of the potential 
positive or negative impact for France’s international reputation, the French 
on the ground in Anglophone Africa were attempting to exploit the 
prevelance of the foreign policy mind-set in Paris so as to further an agenda 
based on links with Salisbury.  
 
By contrast, in the French metropole, alternative priorities were at the 
forefront of the minds of policy-makers and bureaucrats engaged in 
Rhodesian affairs. The importance of adhering to international diplomatic 
protocol limited the extent to which metropolitan enthusiasm could be 
translated into action. In 1955, for example, when both Huggins and 
Welensky expressed their interest in visiting Paris as part of a wider effort 
to expand Franco-Rhodesian connections, the Federation’s status as ‘une 
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colonie de la Couronne’ prevented the Quai from offering the two 
Rhodesian statesmen ‘une invitation officielle’. 114  There was also the 
problem of creating a precedent that would permit official invitations to be 
sent to the Prime Ministers of the Gold Coast or Nigeria if they visited 
Europe.115 The department went to great lengths to ensure that the inability 
of the French government to receive representatives from this British colony 
officially would not discourage Huggins and Welensky from making these 
stopovers, with claims that ‘les autorites Français seraient heureuses de les 
accueillir’. 116  However, Rhodesia’s status as a British colony was a 
persistent obstacle for those in Paris wishing to conduct direct relations with 
Rhodesia.  
 
There were also other, more pressing concerns, both at home and in 
France’s Empire, during this period, which distracted the attentions and 
resources of metropolitan policy-makers and bureaucrats away from the 
British colony of Rhodesia. This is manifest in the way in which the French 
Consulate in Salisbury remained consistently underfunded throughout the 
period in question. In 1955, for example, Warren complained to 
Schaffauser, Diplomatic Advisor to the French High Commission in 
Madagascar, about how the Department’s refusal to pay for an additional 
secretary at French office in Salisbury meant that he had to personally type 
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correspondence, something that he acknowledged he did extremely 
poorly.117 The following year, similar grievances were aired by Warren’s 
successor, Siguret, who complained about the insufficient expenses 
accorded to his office and the fact that the head of the post was often forced 
to cover the cost of accommodation and transportation for more than a year 
before reimbursement from Paris. Such weak financial backing, he warned, 
risked reducing the quality of the service offered by the Consulate.118  
 
There was, therefore, shared enthusiasm for the development of Franco-
Rhodesian ties across a range of departments in French government and the 
diplomatic service, as well as amongst an array of private individuals and 
groups. This interest was formulated with reference to the wider French 
foreign policy mind-set. However, the way in which these foreign policy 
imperatives were interpreted varied substantially between those based in the 
centre and on the periphery, as well as between departments in the Quai and 
amongst state and non-state actors on the ground in British Africa. 
Moreover, the varying contexts and experiences of the agents of France’s 
Rhodesia presence both propelled and constrained French action in 
Rhodesia. Careers based in the Anglophone world and personal relations 
with Rhodesian politicians, civil servants and businessman, enhanced 
enthusiasm for the expansion of France’s presence in Rhodesia amongst 
“men-on-the-spot’. By contrast, in Paris, despite interest in certain quarters 
for the development of French links with this British colony, diplomatic 
protocols, intra-departmental differences and alternating priorities served to 
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limit the central support accorded to Anglophone African initiatives. This, 
in turn, further increased the importance of France’s private and public 
“men-on-the-spot” in the Franco-Rhodesian connection, something that, as 
we shall see in the second half of this thesis, was to have important 
consequences for the nature of French relations with Rhodesia after 1965.   
 
Conclusions  
 
In the post-war period, France’s engagement with the outside world was 
founded upon a foreign policy mind-set that was preoccupied with restoring 
France’s status on the world stage. Africa was situated at the heart of this 
venture and viewed as having a privileged role to play in the restoration of 
French grandeur. Preventing Anglo-Saxon infiltration of the French chasse 
gardée and maintaining foreign policy autonomy from the Anglo-American 
allies was equally crucial to this endeavour. France’s particular commitment 
to its African Empire in the post-war period renders the new interest of 
certain French actors in the British colony of Rhodesia after 1945 as 
somewhat perplexing. Yet, as this chapter has demonstrated, it was 
precisely because of France’s broader foreign policy objectives at this time 
that Rhodesia began to enter the African vision of small group of policy-
makers, diplomats and bureaucrats in the post-war period. In this British 
colony, French actors engaged in Rhodesian affairs found a new arena in 
which to enhance France’s position on the African continent, in the existing 
French colonies and beyond. In addition, although it was obviously 
impossible for the French to eradicate completely the Anglo-American 
 94 
partners from this British dependency, the French engaged in Rhodesian 
affairs nevertheless identified possibilities in the region to reduce 
Anglophone dominance whilst simultaneously pursuing a policy that was, at 
least in part, autonomous from the “les Anglo-Saxons”. The French foreign 
policy mind-set fuelled, therefore, a new interest in Rhodesia amongst 
certain French diplomats, policy-makers, bureaucrats and businessmen 
based in Paris, London and on the ground in Anglophone Africa in the post-
war period.   
 
The way in which this foreign policy mind-set manifested itself, however, 
was not homogenous. In the same way that colonial minds were ‘far from 
uniform’ (Keese, 2011, p.331), the French engaged in Rhodesian affairs 
were influenced by their experiences and the context in which they were 
situated. The French on the ground in Anglophone Africa, with their ties to 
the settler political and business élite, were, for example, more inclined than 
their counterparts in Paris to promote, without reserve, the development of 
Franco-Rhodesian relations. By contrast, despite a keen interest in certain 
metropolitan quarters about the growth of France’s presence in the region, 
the extent to which those in the Quai could act upon this enthusiasm was 
restricted by the realities of making foreign policy in the post-war period, in 
particular the diplomatic protocols associated with Rhodesia’s colonial 
status, but also France’s more pressing commitments at home and overseas 
which took precedence in the allocation of French resources and attentions. 
Put another way, despite a growing awareness of the potential opportunities 
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for France in British-ruled Central Southern Africa, Rhodesia was not a 
foreign policy priority in Paris. 
 
Nevertheless, in spite of its relatively low-status on the French foreign 
policy agenda after 1945, Rhodesia did become, during this period, part of 
France’s African vision. Cooper (2005, p.29) has claimed that, after 1946, in 
response to the challenges of legitimacy to the French Empire, the colonial 
nature of the empire was replaced by a broader, imperial vision of Greater 
France. Through analysis of the case study of Rhodesia, it is possible to take 
this argument one step further, and argue that in order to protect and 
enhance France’s influence overseas, French policy-makers were forced to 
diversify their approach to the African continent, seeking new, and 
previously untapped arenas in which France’s wider foreign policy 
objectives could be achieved. The post-war period witnessed, therefore, a 
reconfiguration of France’s understanding of the African continent, as 
certain French actors went beyond the traditional binaries of colonial and 
foreign policy, coloniser and colonised, that had previously dictated 
France’s engagement with the African continent.  
 
 96 
Chapter Two  
France and Rhodesia before 1965: the policy and its 
significance 
 
Chapter One has charted the process by which France’s African vision 
began to expand in the post-war period to include the British colony of 
Rhodesia. This stands in contrast to the existing literature of France’s 
engagement with Africa in the years prior to 1960, which concentrates on 
relations between France and its colonial dependencies. Although, as was 
explored in the introduction to this thesis, scholars have begun recently to 
explore France’s engagement with regions outside of its traditional sphere 
of African influence in the post-colonial period,1 French engagement in 
non-French speaking territories before 1960 remains the subject of only 
minimal scholarly consideration.2 French participation in Rhodesia in the 
post-war period has not yet been the subject of any historical analysis. This 
is in spite of its interconnection to France’s broader foreign policy 
objectives at this time, as outlined in Chapter One. 
 
It is the aim of this chapter, therefore, to fill in this gap in the historiography 
by exploring the practical consequences of the expansion of France’s 
African vision to include a British colony and examine the development of 
                                                
1 See for example, Alden (1996), Bach (1980, 1982 & 1990), Chafer (2002 & 2005), 
Cumming, (2005), Konieczna (2012) & Torrent (2012). 
2 Keese (2007) has explored French policies and perceptions of Lusophone Africa between 
1930 and 1961. Stanley (2004), Moukambi (2008) & Konieczna (2009) all examine 
Franco-South African relations in the post-war period, although the former two are 
unpublished doctoral theses, and the latter is only available in the French language.  
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relations between France and Rhodesia (as well as, to a lesser extent, 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland as, from 1953 until 1963 they were 
joined to Southern Rhodesia in the Central African Federation and 
administered by the Federal authorities in Salisbury) in the period between 
1947 and 1965. The temporal scope of this chapter is intentionally broad to 
take into account Rhodesia’s colonial status throughout the period in 
question, but also to permit this study to break free of the binaries that 
dominate existing studies of France’s foreign and African policies, in 
particular the tendency to separate the Fourth Republic from its successor 
and the artificial divide between the colonial and post-colonial periods.  
 
Given the importance of the establishment of the French Consulate as a 
catalyst for the growth of Franco-Rhodesian relations in the post-war 
period, the chapter will take as its starting point France’s expanding 
diplomatic presence in the region. It will then explore the development of 
Franco-Rhodesian cultural and commercial ties during this period. 
Following on from this analysis of the growing bilateral relations between 
France and Rhodesia, and in light of the fact that certain French actors 
identified Rhodesia as a means to strengthen the French African Empire, 
this chapter will then explore the development of the triangular relations 
between France, Francophone Africa and Rhodesia in response to this 
imperative. Consideration will be given to how these relations shifted 
following the formal transfer of rule to the African majority in West and 
Equatorial Africa in 1960. This investigation, in turn, will provide us with 
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the framework essential to analysing French involvement in Rhodesia after 
1965, the subject of the second part of this thesis.  
 
Putting France on the ‘map’ in Rhodesia:3 the development 
of Franco-Rhodesian relations, 1947-1965 
 
Diplomacy 
 
As has already been noted in Chapter One, in the immediate post-war 
period, diplomatic relations between France and Rhodesia were limited to a 
solitary consular agent in Salisbury.4 The arrival of Francières to take up the 
post of French Vice Consul in Rhodesia in 1947, however, marked the 
beginning of the incremental expansion of Franco-Rhodesian diplomatic 
ties. By December 1963, the French post in Salisbury comprised of a Consul 
General, a Deputy Consul, a Vice Consul, a contractual agent responsible 
for information, and two additional auxiliaries, one French and one British. 
In addition, although there was no French cultural advisor or military 
attaché based in Salisbury, the post benefited from two SDECE agents as 
well as four individuals responsible for economic expansion, including a 
dedicated Commercial Advisor. 5  The French physical presence on the 
ground in Salisbury was larger than any other Western European power in 
the region - only the United Kingdom and the United States were better 
represented than France in Southern Rhodesia, with 157 and 52 diplomatic 
                                                
3 Anonymous. (1955, June 26). The Sunday Mail. AL/SEAB/1. Paris:AMAE. 
4 Roux to MAE. (1947, February 8). AL/PB/16/No.42. Paris:AMAE. 
5 Desparmet to MAE. (1963, December 31). AL/SEAB/15/No.459/8(2). Paris:AMAE. 
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representatives respectively6 - demonstrating the extent of the growing 
French interest in this area of Anglophone Africa during the period in 
question.  
 
France’s diplomatic presence in the region expanded in line with the 
evolving political situation on the ground.  Following the establishment of 
the Central African Federation in 1953, for example, France also opened 
Consular Agencies in Bulawayo, the home of the Southern Rhodesian 
territorial government;7 Lusaka, the capital of Northern Rhodesia;8 and 
Blantyre, the main city in Nyasaland.9 This measure, which was approved 
by all those engaged in Rhodesian affairs on the ground in Anglophone 
Africa, in London and across the Quai, was intended to ensure a French 
diplomatic presence at both a Federal and a territorial level and, in so doing, 
capitalise on the opportunities presented to France in the region.10 Later, the 
problems associated with only having a single Consul General overseeing 
all three Federal territories, in particular the need for the French 
representative in question to frequently leave the post in Salisbury to visit 
other areas in the Federation,11 prompted the creation of a new post of 
                                                
6 Desparmet to MAE. (1963, December 31). AL/SEAB/15/No.459/8(2). Paris:AMAE. 
7 Warren to MAE. (1954, February 1). AL/SEAB/1/No.31. Paris:AMAE 
Warren to MAE. (1953, April 20). AL/SEAB/2/No.95. Paris:AMAE. 
AL to Personnel. (1953, June 9). AL/SEAB/2/No.1176. Paris:AMAE 
Personnel to AL. (1954, January 1). AL/SEAB/2/No.1. Paris:AMAE. 
8 Warren to MAE. (1954, January 27). AL/SEAB/2/No.29. Paris:AMAE.   
Warren to MAE. (1954, February 11). AL/SEAB/2/No.50. Paris:AMAE. 
 Personnel to AL. (1954, June 7). AL/SEAB/2/No.584. Paris:AMAE. 
AL to Personnel. (1954, June 9). AL/SEAB/2/No.866. Paris:AMAE.  
Warren to MAE. (1954, June 28). Salisbury/1/No.176. Nantes:AD 
9 Lebel, First Advisor, French Embassy, London, to MAE. (1953, February 24). 
AL/SEAB/2/No.277. Paris:AMAE. 
10 Warren to MAE. (1953, April 20). AL/SEAB/2/No.95. Paris:AMAE. 
Warren to MAE. (1954, June 28). Salisbury/1/No.176. Nantes:AD 
11 Anonymous. (1957, March). Federation des Rhodesies et du Nyassaland. AL/SEAB/1. 
Paris:AMAE. 
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Deputy Consul, to which Daniel Oriez was appointed in the autumn of 
1958.12 This, in turn, demonstrates how France’s diplomatic presence in this 
part of Anglophone Africa evolved in response to the shifting political 
circumstances in the region in the 1950s. 
 
This continued into the 1960s, as ‘les transformations politiques que 
subissent actuellement l’Afrique Centrale et Orientale’ prompted a 
reassessment of France’s diplomatic strategies towards the Federation.13 
During this period, the French observing and operating in the region became 
increasingly aware of the growing possibility that the Federation would 
collapse and that Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland would achieve 
independence. In April 1962, for example, Balthazar, a representative of the 
Inspection Générale des Postes Diplomatiques et Consulaires, visited the 
Federation and reported that ‘tout le monde s’accorde pour voir ce pays 
[Nyasaland] souverain en 1963’.14 Similar sentiments emanated from those 
observing the situation in Rhodesia at the French Embassy in London. In 
April 1963, almost exactly a year after Balthazar’s report to the Afrique-
Levant Department, Geoffrey Chodron de Courcel, French Ambassador to 
London (1962-1972), wrote to Couve de Murville, French Minister of 
Foreign Affairs (1958-1968), reporting that ‘il est donc vraisemblable que 
                                                
12 AL to Personnel. (1958, September 10). AL/SEAB/1/No.83. Paris:AMAE.  
Oriez, French Deputy Consul, Salisbury. (1958, October 10). AL/SEAB/1. Paris:AMAE.  
13 Desparmet to MAE. (1963, 1 August). AL/SEAB/14/No.296. Paris:AMAE. 
14 Balthazar, Inspection Générale des Postes Diplomatiques et Consulaires, to Limairac, AL. 
(1962, April 14). AL/SEAB/14. Paris:AMAE. 
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trois nouveaux états indépendants d’Afrique viendront s’ajouter en 1964 à 
une liste déjà longue’.15 
 
The French engaged in Rhodesian affairs acknowledged the need to respond 
to this shift, calling for the establishment of separate French diplomatic 
representations in Lusaka and Blantyre, as well as a dedicated commercial 
office for Northern Rhodesia.16 A key motivation for setting up these 
autonomous diplomatic and commercial bureaus was a growing concern 
about French relations with African nationalists in Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland. The Afrique-Levant department, for example, promoted separate 
diplomatic posts on the grounds that France did not wish to appear to have 
‘un ordre de prioritaire entre deux membres de la Fédération’ by favouring 
Salisbury over Lusaka and Blantyre.17 Concerns were also raised about the 
problematic nature of defending French interests in an independent 
Northern Rhodesia or Nyasaland from the French Consulate in Southern 
Rhodesia in light of ‘l’opposition qui existe entre le régime de Salisbury et 
ceux de Lusaka et du Blantyre’,18 and, in particular, the growing perception 
within these territories of Salisbury as a ‘siège lointain d’une fédération 
moribonde et d’un gouvernement sud-rhodésien que les nationalises 
considèrent comme leur ennemi’.19 The promotion of the establishment of 
autonomous French offices in Lusaka and Blantyre is further evidence, 
                                                
15 Courcel to Couve de Murville, French Minister of Foreign Affairs. (1963, April 12). 
AL/SEAB/14/No.477. Paris:AMAE.  
16 AL to Personnel. (1961, February 9). AL/SEAB/14/No.16. Paris:AMAE.  
Personnel to AL. (1961, February 18). AL/SEAB/14/No.267. Paris:AMAE.   
Balthazar to Limairac. (1962, April 14). AL/SEAB/14. Paris:AMAE. 
Courcel to Couve de Murville. (1963, April 12). AL/SEAB/14/No.477. Paris:AMAE.   
AL to Secretaire d’Etat. (1964, March 18). AL/SEAB/14. Paris:AMAE. 
17 AL to Personnel. (1961, February 9). AL/SEAB/14/No.16. Paris:AMAE. 
18 AL to Personnel. (1964, April 15). AL/SEAB/14/No.20. Paris:AMAE. 
19 Courcel to Couve de Murville. (1963, April 2). AL/SEAB/14/No.477. Paris:AMAE. 
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therefore, of the growing momentum for the expansion of France’s 
diplomatic presence in Central Southern Anglophone Africa in response to 
the changing situation on the ground. 
 
That is not to say, however, that the development of diplomatic relations 
between France and British Africa was without its difficulties. We have 
already seen in Chapter One how, in 1953, a limited financial budget 
informed the decision to represent the mission locally as Consulate General 
rather than officially elevating the status of the French post in Salisbury.20 
In fact, weak metropolitan backing created an obstacle to the growth and 
progress of the French mission in Rhodesia throughout the period in 
question. This can be seen especially in the selection of diplomats to 
oversee the French post in Salisbury. Although the first two French Consuls 
in Rhodesia, Francières and Warren, were described as ‘très actif’,21 their 
immediate successor, Siguret, was, according to a report produced by the 
Quai in March 1957, ‘passif’ and demonstrated ‘peu d’intérêt pour son 
métier’. In the same report, an equally damning assessment was made of 
Siguret’s deputy, Trachta, who was labelled as ‘un agent doté de faibles 
moyens intellectuels et dont le seuls soucis sont d’ordre pécuniaire’. These 
poor quality diplomatic representatives, the report concluded, contributed to 
‘la modicité des effectifs du poste de Salisbury’ and, as such, ‘le 
remplacement de M. Siguret et du vice-consul, M. Trachta, sont la condition 
                                                
20 Personnel to AL (1954, January 1). AL/SEAB/1/No.1224. Paris:AMAE. 
21 Gazel, French Consulate, Le Cap, to Paris. (1954, May 5). AL/SEAB/8/No.85/86. 
Paris:AMAE.  
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préalable à toute réorganisation du poste’. 22 In spite of this critical account, 
Cabrol was not appointed to replace Siguret until the summer of 1958.23 
Moreover, Trachta remained in post and was actually called upon to cover 
the gap between Siguret’s departure and the arrival of Cabrol in 1958, in the 
same way he had taken charge of the post in the interim period between 
Warren and Siguret’s postings in the summer of 1955.24 This slow-paced 
response to a centrally produced report, along with the willingness to 
overlook key elements of its findings, underlines the limitations placed on 
France’s diplomatic presence in Rhodesia by the centre.  
 
The effectiveness of the French post in Salisbury was also hampered by its 
distance from France and, in particular, the limited channels of 
communication to the French office in Rhodesia, a problem that expanded 
in line with France’s growing activity in the region. In January 1960, for 
example, in response to the increased quantity of encoded telegrams being 
received by the Salisbury post, Cabrol asked the Afrique-Levant department 
to approach the Service du Chiffre et des Transmissions on his behalf and 
request for certain non-confidential material to be sent already decoded, on 
the next flight to the Federation. This, Cabrol believed, would not only 
permit telegrams to arrive in Salisbury in a more timely fashion, but would 
also mean that he could avoid spending, in his own words, ‘tout mon temps 
au déchiffrement de ces télègrammes’.25 The Direction d’Afrique-Levant 
                                                
22 Anonymous. (1957, March). Federation des Rhodesies et du Nyassaland. AL/SEAB/1. 
Paris:AMAE. 
23 Siguret to Henry. (1958, July 25). AL/SEAB/1. Paris:AMAE.   
AL to Personnel. (1958, September 10). AL/SEAB/1/No.83. Paris:AMAE.  
24 Siguret to MAE. (1958, August 19). AL/SEAB/1/No.59. Paris:AMAE.  
25 Cabrol to MAE. (1960, January 20). AL/SEAB/14/No.26. Paris:AMAE. 
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passed this proposal onto the relevant department, demonstrating the desire 
of those engaged in Anglophone African affairs at the Quai to respond 
favourably to Cabrol’s request. The Service du Chiffre et des Transmissions 
also responded positively, agreeing to send the requested telegrams on the 
next flight.26 Here, therefore, Cabrol’s demands yielded favourable results. 
Yet, the wider issue – the fact that the Consulate in Salisbury did not benefit 
from an unaccompanied diplomatic bag and, subsequently, a secure channel 
of communication between Paris and Salisbury – remained unresolved.27 
Thus, throughout the period in question, despite enthusiasm for the growth 
of Franco-Rhodesian diplomatic relations amongst a small group of French 
diplomats, bureaucrats and policy-makers, and the expansion of France’s 
diplomatic presence on the ground in the region, the extent of France’s 
formal presence on the ground in Rhodesia was consistently restricted by 
the practicalities of engaging with a region so far removed from the 
traditional Francophone sphere.  
 
Other obstacles stood in the way of France’s diplomatic presence in the 
region, notably the problem of operating in a British colony. Despite 
championing the establishment of separate diplomatic posts in Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland as the two territories moved towards independence 
in the early 1960s, it was not entirely simple for the French to set up new 
offices in Lusaka and Blantyre. For those French diplomats in London 
especially, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland’s constitutional ties to the UK 
                                                                                                                       
Cabrol to Service du Chiffre et des Transmissions (CT). (1960, January 19). 
AL/SEAB/14/No.3. Paris:AMAE. 
26 CT to AL. (1960, January 27). AL/SEAB/14/No.14. Paris:AMAE. 
27 CT to AL. (1960, January 27). AL/SEAB/14/No.14. Paris:AMAE. 
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prevented the implementation of any measures prior to independence. In the 
words of Courcel, ‘rien ne peut être fait sans l’accord de Whitehall puisqu’il 
s’agit de territoires coloniaux relevant encore de la souveraineté anglaise’. 
Courcel opposed the immediate establishment of a French diplomatic 
representation in Lusaka, therefore, on the grounds that ‘il est probable que 
Londres et Salisbury objecteraient… avant l’accession de la Rhodésie du 
Nord au self-government’, concluding that,  
les intérêts de la France dans cette partie d’Afrique 
ne sont pas telles que nous devions dès maintenant 
diversifier fondamentalement notre représentation et 
nous ne devons pas, en tout cas, paraître précéder 
l’évènement.28  
This, in turn, reveals the existence of another impediment to the growth of 
France’s diplomatic presence on the ground in this region of Anglophone 
Africa. Thus, despite the substantial growth of Franco-Rhodesian diplomatic 
ties after 1947, a range of factors persistently limited the extent of these 
relations.  
 
Culture and propaganda 
 
From the outset, as was also the case in France’s strategies towards its 
African colonial sphere, cultural ventures in Rhodesia were prioritised. In 
November 1947, just two months after his arrival in Salisbury, Francières 
called for the establishment of a branch of the Alliance Française in 
Salisbury aiming to, 
propager la langue française, contribuer à accroitre 
l’influence intellectuelle et morale de la France, 
grouper les Français et les amis de la France afin de 
                                                
28 Courcel to Couve de Murville. (1963, April 2). AL/SEAB/14/No.477. Paris:AMAE. 
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maintenir chez les uns, de développer chez les autres 
le culte de la langue et de la pensée française, [et] 
susciterait un grand intérêt en Rhodésie du Sud et 
trouverait aisément les concours nécessaires pour 
vivre se développer.29  
Francières’ requests that educational material for the Alliance Française 
library and film club be sent ‘malgré les temps’ demonstrates the 
importance certain French actors attributed to spreading French culture in 
this British colony.30 Efforts were also made to ensure that French be taught 
in Rhodesian schools to assure ‘le rayonnement’ and ‘la diffusion de notre 
langue’,31 whilst the creation of a Chair in French at the new university in 
Salisbury in 1952 was seen as having ‘importance capitale’ ‘pour le 
développement de notre culture et notre langue… et aider puisement à 
consolider notre position’.32 In addition, the Rhodes Centenary Exhibition in 
July and August 1953 provided a unique opportunity to showcase French 
culture to a broad section of Rhodesian society, through a French Union-
themed Pavilion and a French cultural week comprising of lectures, 
documentary film screenings, a tourist exhibition, two artistic evenings and 
a ball.33 According to the Afrique-Levant department, French participation 
in this three month event, which would attract 750,000 visitors, was vital, in 
order to, 
assurer à la France une place et une participation 
dignes de ses intérêts et de son prestige à cette 
manifestation africaine qui marquera une étape dans 
l’évolution de l’Afrique transformée par la 
colonisation blanche.34  
                                                
29 Francières to MAE. (1947, November 24). AL/PB/16/No.18. Paris:AMAE. 
30 Francières to MAE. (1947, November 24). AL/PB/16/No.18. Paris:AMAE.  
31 Warren to MAE. (1951, May 1951). AL/PB/No.76. Paris:AMAE. 
32 Warren to MAE. (1953, January 26). AL/SEAB/1/No.30. Paris:AMAE. 
Warren to MAE. (1955, May 27). AL/SEAB/1/No.51. Paris:AMAE. 
33 Warren to MAE. (1954, February 1). AL/SEAB/1/No.31. Paris:AMAE. 
34  MAE to MOF. (1952, November 7). AL/PB/16/No.1848. Paris:AMAE. 
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This particular emphasis on cultural activities in Rhodesia continued in the 
late 1950s and into the 1960s. A report by a representative of the Quai on 
his visit to British Africa in April 1962, for example, records how French 
was the second foreign language taught in Rhodesian schools after 
Afrikaans and that ‘nombreux jeunes gens et jeunes filles s’adressent 
d’autre part à l’Alliance Française pour se perfectionner dans notre langue’. 
In addition, the Southern Rhodesian Secretary for Education travelled to 
Paris to observe French teaching methods, in particular the use of audio-
visual material.35 Thus, as in Francophone Africa, so in Anglophone Africa, 
cultural rayonnement was a vital component in a wider strategy to enhance 
France’s standing in Rhodesia.   
 
Closely interlinked to these efforts to project French cultural power in 
Rhodesia were propaganda initiatives. These efforts fell into two broad 
categories: ‘passive’ dissemination of information about France through the 
press, French language teaching and the provision of clear and precise 
documentation on France in the English language, and ‘active’ efforts to 
directly approach persons of influence in Rhodesian society, including 
politicians, newspaper editors and university professors, to share ‘des 
informations régulières sur les questions politiques ou économiques 
françaises et le point de vue français dans les affaires internationales’.36 An 
example of the former was Nouvelles de France, a monthly English 
language information bulletin about France established in 1954 for 
                                                
35 Dupuy, MAE. (1962, April). AL/SEAB/16. Paris:AMAE.  
36 Desparmet to MAE. (1963, 1 August). AL/SEAB/14/No.296. Paris:AMAE. 
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distribution amongst Rhodesian political and education establishments.37 
The diffusion of information about France in Rhodesia was justified in 
similar terms to cultural ventures. Nouvelles de France, for example, was 
seen as an opportunity to enhance French prestige in the region, as well as a 
vital response to similar measures introduced by the Americans, the Italians 
and the Portuguese.38  
 
Alongside concerns about France’s standing in Rhodesia, cultural and 
propaganda initiatives were often also imbued with economic objectives. 
For instance, the Afrique-Levant department promoted French colonial 
participation in the Rhodes Exhibition, not only on the grounds of the 
potential benefits for France’s prestige in the region, but also because the 
prospective economic benefits made French involvement in this event 
‘indispensable’.39 Equally, Nouvelles de France was founded with both 
‘notre prestige et notre économie’ in mind.40 The content of the bulletin 
serves to reinforce this point. Each edition contained details of France’s 
domestic and international economic activities, such as a feature on the 
economic policy of the Mendès-France government41 and a summary of the 
Franco-German agreement on the Saar.42 Alongside these explicit attempts 
to promote French economic policy, Nouvelles de France also contained 
more trivial articles, such as a discussion of chain smoking in France43 and a 
                                                
37 Warren to MAE. (1954, September 7). AL/SEAB/8/No.262. Paris:AMAE. 
38 Warren to MAE. (1954, September 7). AL/SEAB/8/No.262. Paris:AMAE. 
39 AL to MOF. (1952, November 7). AL/PB/16/No.1848. Paris:AMAE. 
40 Warren to MAE. (1954, September 7). AL/SEAB/8/No.262. Paris:AMAE. 
41 Service d’Information du Consulat Général de France en Afrique Centrale Britannique 
(SI). (1954, November 1). Nouvelles de France, 1:1. AL/SEAB/2. Paris:AMAE.  
42 SI. (1954, November 15). Nouvelles de France, 1:2. AL/SEAB/2. Paris:AMAE. 
43 SI. (1954, December 1). Nouvelles de France, 1:3. AL/SEAB/2. Paris:AMAE. 
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report on the French soccer team victory over Germany.44 Yet, even these 
more frivolous features served a purpose in this wider project to further 
economic ties between France and Rhodesia. The article on chain smoking, 
for example, becomes more decisive given the importance of the tobacco 
trade to the Southern Rhodesian economy (Scott, 1952, p.189) and the 
growing purchases of Rhodesian tobacco by the French tobacco 
monopoly.45 Efforts to increase knowledge about France in Rhodesia were, 
therefore, closely tied to France’s economic aims in the region.  
 
In spite of the benefits for France’s standing in the region, both in terms of 
economic stakes and prestige, there existed persistent obstacles to the 
success of French cultural and propaganda initiatives in Rhodesia, which 
were similar to the problems faced in the diplomatic sphere. From the 
outset, for example, the activities of the Alliance Française were hampered 
by inadequate metropolitan support. It was not until April 1951, three and a 
half years after Francières’ initial proposal, that the Salisbury branch of the 
Alliance Française was established. 46  Moreover, the activities of the 
Alliance Française were persistently blighted by a lack of central funding, 
seen by repeated requests to the Quai for financial support, in 1956 to pay 
the rent and, a year later, for audio-visual equipment.47 Similarly, and in 
spite of support from the Afrique-Levant department for the venture, funds 
                                                
44 SI. (1954, November 15). Nouvelles de France, 1:2. AL/SEAB/2. Paris:AMAE. 
45 For example, purchases of Rhodesian tobacco in 1956 were £355,295, more than double 
the £163,913 imported by France and the French Union in 1955. 
Colmant to DREE. (1957, February 4). AL/SEAB/8/No.57179. Paris:AMAE.  
46 Roux to MAE. (1947, February 28). AL/PB/No. 61. Paris:AMAE. 
Beaulieux to MAE (1947, August 7).  AL/PB No. 239. Paris:AMAE. 
AL to RC. (1952, May 8). AL/PB/16. Paris:AMAE. 
47 Siguret to MAE. (1956, September 11). AL/SEAB/12/No.104. Paris:AMAE 
Siguret to MAE. (1957, May 3). AL/SEAB/12/No.35. Paris:AMAE 
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for the establishment of a French Chair at the University in Rhodesia in 
1952 were not forthcoming and it was left to the already overstretched 
Alliance Française and the institution itself to foot the bill for this venture.48 
The fact that French professor at the University was a Dane, not a native 
French speaker, further underscores the limitations imposed on French 
cultural activity in Rhodesia by limited metropolitan support.49  
 
These restrictions remained in place into the 1960s, seen when at least two 
requests from Cabrol in the autumn of 1960 for some high quality French 
films and television programmes to be sent for broadcast on Rhodesian 
television alongside the existing South African, British and American shows 
were left unanswered by the Direction Générale des Affaires Culturelles et 
Techniques at the Quai.50 Cabrol did not disguise his distaste with the 
metropolitan inaction and his subsequent concern about dominance of the 
region by the inferior “Anglo-Saxon” culture, in particular the fact that ‘les 
services d’informations américains occupent exclusivement les écrans 
rhodésiens avec les habituelles stupidités du Far West.’51 Thus, in spite of 
concerns on the periphery about combatting Anglophone cultural 
dominance, weak support from the centre held back efforts to spread French 
culture and language in Rhodesia.  
 
                                                
48 AL to RC. (1952, May 8). AL/PB/16. Paris:AMAE.  
RC to AL. (1952, May 14). AL/PB/16. Paris:AMAE. 
49 Anonymous. Federation des Rhodesies et du Nyassaland (1957, March). AL/SEAB/8. 
Paris:AMAE. 
50 Cabrol to RC. (1960, September 29). AL/SEAB/34/No.190. Paris:AMAE. 
Cabrol to MAE. (1960, November 25). AL/SEAB/34/No.580. Paris:AMAE. 
51 Cabrol to MAE. (1960, November 25). AL/SEAB/34/No.580. Paris:AMAE. 
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The same was also true in the field of propaganda. Nouvelles de France was 
a short-lived venture and less than a decade later, in 1963, the Consulate in 
Salisbury once again called for an increase in the availability of information 
about France in English.  According to Desparmet, existing strategies, 
ne correspondent encore ni à l’importance de la 
mission de la France en Afrique ni aux efforts que 
dispensent d’autres puissances dont les intérêts dans 
ces parages et les relations historiques avec ce 
continent ne se comparent nullement avec les 
nôtres.52  
This, in turn, reveals how, despite a definite increase in France’s cultural 
presence in the region, and regardless of ambitious plans set out by “men-
on-the-spot” – in his note to the Quai, Desparmet set out his design to 
transform the Information Services at the Consulate, which he described as 
‘une organisation plus étoffée’, into an active department, similar to that of 
the United States, comprising of ‘des vitrines, des salles de lecture, une 
bibliothèque, une salle de projection et une filmothèque’53 – insufficient 
backing from Paris hampered efforts to expand French culture and 
propaganda efforts in Rhodesia.  
 
Commerce and industry 
 
The years following the establishment of the French diplomatic post in 
Rhodesia witnessed a substantial expansion of French economic activity in 
the region. At first the rate of growth of France-Rhodesian trade was 
relatively small (Table 1). Discussions took place about increasing 
economic exchanges between the two countries, such as a meeting between 
                                                
52 Desparmet to MAE. (1963, 1 August). AL/SEAB/14/No.296. Paris:AMAE 
53 Desparmet to MAE. (1963, 1 August). AL/SEAB/14/No.296. Paris:AMAE 
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Francières and Sir Arthur Griffen, the Director General of Rhodesian 
Railways, concerning the possible exchange of French metallurgical 
products for Rhodesian chrome in early 1949.54 Later that year, the MAE 
sent the French Commercial Advisor in South Africa to Rhodesia to meet 
with high-ranking economic officials, including Halsted, Minister of 
Commerce, MacLachlan, Director of Customs Services, and Watson, 
President of the Federal Commercial Chambers in Southern Rhodesia, as 
well as various Rhodesian businessmen. 55  In July 1951, Rhodesia 
reciprocated these advances, sending Harper, General Secretary of the 
Federation of Rhodesian Industry, to Paris to discuss ‘les possibilités 
d'accroître le marche français en Rhodésie’.56   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yet progress was minimal, as new restrictions on trade outside of the 
sterling zone, set up in response to the Rhodesian trade deficit and rising 
living costs in the region, had particularly detrimental consequences for the 
expansion of traditional French export products, including textiles, wines 
                                                
54 Francières to MAE. (1949, March 3). AL/PB/16/No.28. Paris:AMAE.  
55 Francières to MAE. (1949, August 10). AL/PB/16/No.99. Paris:AMAE.  
56 MAE to MAEF. (nd). AL/PB/16. Paris:AMAE. 
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Table 1: Franco-Rhodesian trade, 1947-1952.1 
Date 
French imports 
from Rhodesia 
(in £ Sterling) 
French 
exports to 
Rhodesia (in £ 
Sterling) 
1947 209,630 182,057 
1948 n/a n/a 
1949 271,275 236,440 
1950 309,225 361,265 
1951 172,695 704,790 
1952 289,017 923,118 
 
 113 
and liqueurs.57 Furthermore, the absence of a dedicated French Commercial 
Advisor directly responsible for Rhodesia meant that French efforts to 
promote Franco-Rhodesian trade lacked clear leadership, further limiting 
the growth of commerce between these two regions.   
 
Following the establishment of the Central African Federation in 1953, 
French trade with the region increased dramatically and continued on an 
upward trajectory throughout the remainder of the life of the Federation 
(Table 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At a superficial level, this shift can be attributed to the inclusion of Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland alongside Southern Rhodesia in the trade statistics. 
However, it is important to note that Southern Rhodesia dominated the 
Federation, geographically, with the Federal capital in Salisbury; 
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Table 2: Franco-Federation trade, 1953-1963.1 
Date 
French imports 
from CAF (in £ 
Sterling) 
French 
exports to 
CAF (in £ 
Sterling) 
1953 373,660 168,686 
1954 1,923,033 244,487 
1955 5,117,578 512,374 
1956 4,259,254 797,836 
1957 3,713,768 998,480 
1958 4,367,143 1,213,671 
1959 4,662,000 1,587,000 
1960 6,142,000 1,953,000 
1961 6,834,000 2,058,000 
1962 7,861,000 2,164,000 
1963 (1st 10 
months) 5,477,000 1,862,000 
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economically, with revenues from the Northern Rhodesian copper mines 
used to finance economic development in the South, and the growth of 
Southern Rhodesian commerce and industry fuelled by the expanded size of 
their markets following the establishment of the Federation; and politically, 
as white Southern Rhodesians controlled the Federal government that 
oversaw internal affairs and had a growing degree of influence over foreign 
and defence policy (Meredith, 1979, p.23). Southern Rhodesia also retained 
the upper hand over its Federal partners by remaining the responsibility of 
the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO), 58  in contrast to Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland’s administration by the CO (Murphy, 2006, p.751). 
In light of this, the French focused their attentions principally on the Federal 
capital, Salisbury, 59  and viewed Southern Rhodesia as ‘le chemin à 
l’ensemble de la Federation’. 60  Thus, even though Northern Rhodesia 
accounted for a substantial proportion of France’s growing trade with the 
Federation after 1953 - according to a note written by the Afrique-Levant 
department in 1964, the territory accounted for ‘la plus grande partie du 
commerce entre la France et l’ancienne fédération’61 – the organisation of 
the Federation, along with French perceptions of the region, combined to 
ensure that attentions remained focused on Southern Rhodesia.  
 
Increased Franco-Federal trade in the years following 1953 was also a 
consequence of a more systematic French strategy towards the region. This 
began on 5 August 1952, when France and Southern Rhodesia signed an 
                                                
58 The Dominion Office became the CRO in 1947.  
59 Warren to MAE. (1954, March 10). AL/SEAB/3/No.74. Paris:AMAE. 
60 French Embassy, London to MAE. (1958, June 6). AL/SEAB/6/No.781. Paris:AMAE.  
61 AL to Secretaire d’Etat. (1964, March 18). AL/SEAB/14. Paris:AMAE. 
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official trade agreement for the sale of tobacco in exchange for French 
wines and liqueurs.62 Whilst the terms of this deal may not have been 
particularly favourable for the French – sales of wine and liqueurs were 
restricted to £15,000 for every £100,000 of Rhodesian tobacco purchased – 
this agreement did act as the catalyst for the increase in France’s trade with 
the region, as well as providing the context in which France could become 
the first country outside of the sterling zone to benefit from a direct trade 
agreement with Federation as a whole, demonstrating the importance given 
to France in a commercial system largely dominated by Britain, the 
Commonwealth and South Africa.63 The establishment of a Commercial 
Office attached to the French Vice Consul in Salisbury and the arrival of 
Colmant to take up this new post in 1954 provides further evidence of a 
more concentrated French approach towards the region, which can help 
explain the dramatic increase in Franco-Federal trade after 1953. 64 
According to Colmant, the substantial rise in French trade with Rhodesia 
that took place in the period that followed his appointment, notably the 
three-fold increase in exports between 1954 and 1956, was directly ‘le 
résultat de la décision du Gouvernement français d’ouvrir à Salisbury un 
poste du Service de l’expansion économique’.65  
 
Rising Franco-Federal economic interaction after 1953 is also symptomatic 
of the shifting nature of French engagement with the region and, in 
particular, the move towards participation in larger-scale infrastructure 
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projects, something that echoes very closely France’s increased emphasis on 
the economic and social modernisation of its sub-Saharan colonies in the 
post-war period, exemplified by the activities of FIDES. Established in 
1946, FIDES was a regional development fund with powers to use the 
metropolitan budget, the budget of overseas territories and loans from the 
Caisse Centrale de la France d’Outre-Mer to provide investment grants to 
colonies (Cumming, 2001, p.59). In addition, in the immediate post-war 
period, with the implementation of the first Ten Year Plan for the social and 
economic development of the French Union, attentions were concentrated 
on channelling money towards infrastructure projects, such as roads, 
railroads and ports, with health and education as secondary concerns (Betts, 
1991, pp.118-119; Cumming, 2001, p.59). Thus, in the decade or so that 
followed, Massigli (1957, p.413) estimated that investments in Tropical 
Africa from metropolitan funds totalled £550 million, with £80 million 
invested each year by the state, along with at least £18 to £20 million in 
private capital. The uses of this money were diverse, but the majority was 
focused on infrastructure projects, including the development of 
cooperatives, funding extensive basic public works and technical and rural 
equipment, and providing price stabilisation and textile support funds.  
 
According to Cumming (2001, p.59), ‘colonial assistance was by definition 
only available to colonies’. And whilst it is certainly true that the quantity of 
funds available to territories outside of the French Union was minute in 
comparison to the money invested in France’s African colonies, the focus in 
Francophone Africa on investment in infrastructure and development was 
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reproduced and adapted to the Rhodesian setting. Of particular note was 
French participation in the Kariba dam project. French technical expertise 
played a central role in the initial planning stages of this venture, with a 
team of hydraulic technicians, led by then state-owned Electricité de France 
(EDF) providing expertise and advice.66 These technical advisors influenced 
the Rhodesian decision to build their hydro-electric plant at Kariba, in 
opposition to the backing from Anglo-American, the UK and US-owned 
mining company, for a similar venture in Kafue.67 Following the formal 
announcement of plans for the Kariba dam, EDF experts were also named 
as technical advisors for the realisation of the scheme.68 In addition, various 
Rhodesian politicians travelled to Paris to investigate French hydro-electric 
technology, such as Malcolm Barrow, Federal Minister for Commerce and 
Industry, who was invited by the French government to visit various 
hydroelectric plants in the Rhône in November 1954,69 whilst a visit to Paris 
in September 1955 from Welensky centred on possible French participation 
in the realisation of the dam. 70  The high esteem accorded to French 
technical expertise continued even after it became apparent that the costs of 
this project would be substantially higher than original French estimates.71  
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As a result of this ‘indispensable’ role in the inception of the Kariba dam 
project, hopes were high amongst France’s “men-on-the-spot” for large-
scale French investment and industrial participation in the venture.72 In the 
event, this was never attainted, with the Imperial Preference – a system 
designed to stimulate trade within the British Empire by according the 
colonies and dominions lower import tariffs than other countries - handing a 
British company the advantage in securing a bid to provide electrical and 
mechanical equipment to the value of £5.08 million in 1955.73 Italian 
involvement in the building of the dam was also extensive, something which 
was officially blamed on the higher cost of French equipment.74 In private, 
however, the French on the ground in Rhodesia ascribed France’s failure to 
the better technology offered by the British and Italians,75 along with the 
fact that ‘les offres françaises aient été mal placées’. 76  NEYPRIC, a 
Grenoble-based producer of hydroelectric turbines, had to settle, therefore, 
with a £1.1 million sub-contract through an Italian company. Although this 
did represent one of the largest supply contracts accorded to a private 
French company in Rhodesia up until this date, it was nevertheless far from 
the lofty heights initially anticipated, and certainly not in keeping with the 
‘indispensable’ role that French technical expertise had played during the 
planning stages of the venture.77 In addition, French state investment in the 
project was deemed impossible due to Rhodesia’s status as a British colony, 
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not just because of the Imperial Preference, but also due to French fears 
about investment in Rhodesia setting a precedent that might upset the 
preferential systems in place in AOF and Algeria.78 It is apparent, therefore, 
that French priorities lay elsewhere.  
 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that certain French actors sought to adapt the 
models implemented in the Union Française to the Anglophone African 
context. To add further weight to this argument, there are a number of other 
examples of French efforts to participate in the expansion of Rhodesian 
infrastructure, in particular the development of Federal railway network. 
During his aforementioned visit to Paris in September 1955, Welensky 
drove a new French locomotive79 and was reported to have been ‘très 
favorablement impressionné par les réalisations qui lui on été par la SNCF’ 
(Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français).80 In light of this, the 
Direction des Affaires Economiques et Financières at the MAE noted the 
opportunities for ‘vastes programmes d’équipement’ in the rail industry.81 
Subsequently, French transportation and power generation company, 
Alsthom, sent a technical and commercial mission to the Federation in 
1959,82 which, in turn, led to a purchase of locomotives by the Nyasaland 
Railways.83 More generally, a visit to Paris from R. L’Ange, Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Minister of Transport and Public Works, in January 1957 
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was arranged with a view to increasing French technical participation in 
Federal Public Works. 84  French involvement in Rhodesia mirrored, 
therefore, the growing technical and developmental emphasis of France’s 
colonial policies in the post-war period, although the extent to which this 
vision of French participation in the expansion of Rhodesian infrastructure 
could be translated into action was limited, like so many other aspects of 
French engagement with Rhodesia during this period, by Rhodesia’s 
colonial status, alternative French priorities and the practicalities of 
engaging with a region far removed from the Francophone sphere.  
 
French trade with Rhodesia continued to expand in the late 1950s and early 
1960s, in spite of a relative slow down of the Federal economy.85 France 
was one of just five countries86 that saw its sales to the Federation expand 
between 1958 and 1959, as countries including Great Britain, the United 
States, Germany and the Netherlands witnessed a decline in exports during 
the same period.87 The growth of French commerce in the region at this time 
was the direct consequence of the foundations laid during the Fourth 
Republic period. This is something that can be seen especially in the 
military sector, where French exports increased as a direct result of efforts 
before 1958. In December 1957, a demonstration was given to the 
Rhodesian Royal Air Force (RRAF) of the French-designed and 
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manufactured Alouette 2 helicopter. 88  Although a mechanical problem 
overshadowed this particular display, Siguret and Colmant persisted in their 
promotion of French aviation equipment in the region, explaining the 
technical difficulties to the Rhodesians and arranging for a replacement 
turbine to be sent, thus permitting a more successful demonstration of the 
French-manufactured helicopter to take place later in the month.89  
 
These efforts fuelled considerable interest in Alouettes amongst the local 
authorities,90 which led, in 1961, to the signature of a contract between the 
Federal authorities and the Office Français d’Exportation de Matériel 
Aéronautique (OFEMA) for the sale of five Alouette III helicopters.  This 
deal, valued at 4.5 million NF, was followed immediately by a strong 
expression of interest from the RRAF in purchasing an additional seven 
helicopters with 1962/1963 credits, to increase their fleet to a total of twelve 
Alouettes.91 Although the French archives do not provide evidence of this 
later deal taking place, Watts (2012, p.62) reports in his recent international 
history of Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence that, at the 
time of the dissolution of the Central African Federation in 1963, the RRAF 
‘was equipped with around seventy aircraft… including a squadron of 
Alouette helicopters’ indicating that at least twelve French-manufactured 
helicopters had been sold to Rhodesia prior to this date. Thus, in the same 
way that the strategies pursued by France in the immediate post-war period 
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provided the foundations for the successes of the Fifth Republic in its 
relations with Europe and the United States (Hitchcock, 1998, pp.6-7), the 
French engaged in Rhodesian affairs under the Fourth Republic established 
the bases for France’s continued economic presence in the region after 
1958.  
 
Throughout the period in question, France’s “men-on-the-spot” were at the 
forefront of France’s growing economic presence in the region. Of 
particular importance was the growing number of private French companies 
active in the region. In addition to NEYPRIC and UAT noted above, 
automobile manufacturers, such as Renault, Peugeot and Citroen, became 
active in the Federation during this period.92 Renault, for example, had 
offices in Salisbury, Bulawayo and Lusaka by 1953.93 The provision of oil 
was another sector in which private French businesses actively participated. 
Total, a subsidiary of the Compagnie Française des Petroles (CFP), 
‘invaded’ the Central African Federation from their bases in South Africa 
and Mozambique during this period, establishing sixteen filling stations 
across the two Rhodesias and a bulk depot in Salisbury, demonstrating the 
importance of France’s existing regional ties as the foundation for increased 
engagement with the Federation.94 The extent of the activities of private 
French companies in the region led Hullo, the Commercial Attaché to the 
French Consulate General in Salisbury (1958-1961), to conclude that the 
six-fold increase in French exports in the six-year period following the 
creation of the Federation in 1953 was ‘une performance à porter à l’actif 
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des Exportateurs français qui ont réellement fait œuvre de pionniers sur ce 
marché’.95 Moreover, the fact that these private companies were especially 
active in the transportation and communication sectors underlines the 
argument set out above regarding the particular French focus on 
infrastructure in Rhodesia, in line with France’s wider African strategies at 
this time.  
 
France’s diplomatic representatives on the ground were also crucial to the 
expansion of Franco-Rhodesian trade in this period. However, as was also 
the case in the diplomatic and cultural domains, their efforts were 
persistently blighted by insufficient support from the French metropole. In 
1953-1954, for example, it took at least two separate requests and the best 
part of a year for the Quai to respond positively to appeals from “men-on-
the-spot” for a representative from SEITA to visit the region with a view to 
increasing French purchases of Rhodesian tobacco. 96  This important 
Rhodesian export product remained a topic of contention, notably in 1956, 
when the French Commercial Advisor in Salisbury called upon Paris to 
guarantee that French tobacco purchases met the levels set out in the trade 
agreement between the two countries.97 The Quai’s Economic Department, 
however, claimed not to be able to help, attempting to deflect the question 
of quotas by proposing to link tobacco imports to French exports.98 Paris 
eventually agreed to grant import licenses of £430,000 for Rhodesian 
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tobacco, but only after making it clear that this figure represented a potential 
market rather than a firm agreement to purchase. 99  However, discord 
between Paris and the French in Anglophone Africa persisted, as further 
demands for long-term assurances were met by metropolitan assertions that 
they could not guarantee a minimum quota for French imports of tobacco in 
1957.100  
 
After Welensky’s departure from office and the collapse of the Central 
African Federation in 1963, the difficulty of balancing French interests in 
Rhodesia with the realities of its colonial status continued. This can be seen 
in October 1964 when Rudland, the Southern Rhodesian Minister for 
Industry and Commerce, visited Paris as part of a tour of the main European 
capitals. In the weeks prior to his arrival in Paris, the French engaged in 
Rhodesian affairs corresponded regarding the risks and benefits of 
developing this contact. Although the visit was enthusiastically championed 
by France’s “men-on-the-spot” – Desparmet, for example, claimed that ‘la 
visite de M. Rudland paraît extrêmement intéressante pour notre 
implantation économique en Rhodésie du Sud’101 – and was seen by some in 
Paris as ‘une chance réelle d’implantation française dans un nouveau pays 
anglophone qui démure notre plus important client parmi les membres de 
l’ancienne fédération’,102 concerns were raised in the French metropole 
about the development of governmental ties outside the channels of the 
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British authorities.103  Rudland persisted in his requests for audiences with 
various high-ranking French officials.104  
 
Fortunately for Rudland, French concerns about securing British support 
soon dissipated as the British Embassy in Paris wrote to the French Foreign 
Ministry informing them of Rudland’s visit and making requests for 
audiences with French politicians and diplomats on Rudland’s behalf.105 
Thus, Rudland travelled to Paris, as planned, in late October 1964, 
accompanied by P.K. van der Byl, the Southern Rhodesian Parliamentary 
Secretary for Information. 106  During his visit, he met not only with 
representatives from various private French companies, but also the 
Secretary General of the CNCE, the President of the Comité Franc-Sterling 
and a representative from the Direction des Relations Economiques 
Extérieurs (DREE) of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs.107 He 
was also received by members of the Groupe France-Rhodésie, a 
parliamentary friendship group, led by the Rassemblement Démocratique 
(RD) député for Gironde, Franck Cazenave, with the aim of developing ‘des 
contacts avec le Parlement et le Gouvernement Rhodésiens’ and ‘d’informer 
les entreprises françaises sur les débouchés éventuels en Rhodésie’.108 This 
visit demonstrates, therefore, the enthusiasm amongst certain parties in 
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French government about the expansion of Franco-Rhodesian ties, but also 
how this enthusiasm was tempered by Rhodesia’s colonial status. Thus, 
across all three key areas of French engagement with Rhodesia in the period 
between 1947 and 1965 – diplomatic, cultural and economic – enthusiasm 
for Franco-Rhodesian on the peripheries was tempered by the metropole. 
This, in turn, shaped the nature and extent of France’s bilateral relations 
with this region of Central Southern Anglophone Africa.   
 
The triangular relations between France, Francophone 
Africa and Rhodesia 
 
From 1947 onwards, Rhodesia formed part of France’s African vision and 
was identified by certain French policy-makers, diplomats and bureaucrats 
as an arena in which France’s position in its colonies on the continent could 
be strengthened. This, in turn, contributed to the diversification of France’s 
relations with Rhodesia to include the French dependencies in sub-Saharan 
Africa and the Indian Ocean. The remainder of the chapter will explore the 
development of these triangular ties between France, Francophone Africa 
and Rhodesia, before considering how these relations were altered by the 
coming of Francophone African independence in 1960.  
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The expansion of ties between Rhodesia, France and the French 
African Empire, 1947-1960 
 
As we have already seen in Chapter One, in the immediate post-war period, 
various French actors viewed interaction between Rhodesia and France’s 
African dependencies as a means of enhancing the French colonial economy 
and, thus, capable of contributing to a broader effort to shore up French 
power in the Union Française. This, in turn, led to the growth of relations 
between the white settler government in Salisbury and the colonial 
administration in Francophone Africa, especially the French colony in 
closest geographical proximity to Rhodesia, Madagascar. From the late 
1940s, a conscious French effort was made to promote trade between this 
French-ruled island in the Indian Ocean and British Central Southern 
Africa.109 Initial interest centred on the export of nitrogen fertiliser (meat 
and blood meal) from Madagascar to the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, where 
demand for these products was high.110 Rhodesian-Madagascan relations 
were cultivated into the 1950s, demonstrated by visits to this British colony 
from various high-ranking French colonial officials, including Robert 
Bargues, High Commissioner to Madagascar, in 1953 and Clotaire Bee, 
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Director of Economic Services to Madagascar, in 1954.111 M. Bee’s visit, 
especially, provides evidence of the desire to expand Rhodesian-
Madagascan economic relations. During his stay, Bee met with high-
ranking Federal officials to discuss Madagascan interest in purchasing 
electric cabling, fruit juice, tea, clothing and shoes from the Federation in 
exchange for Madagascan coffee, semi-precious stones, graphite and 
vegetable oil. Rhodesian politicians also indicated to Bee their desire to 
learn more about the French-built railways on the island and expressed a 
wish to secure material for Rhodesian railway expansion from Madagascan 
sources.112  
 
In addition, transportation between the Rhodesias and Madagascar was 
promoted, notably through a direct air link between Livingstone and 
Tananarive that would ‘consolider les liens de bon voisinage, et les 
possibilités d’échanges dont les bases avaient été solidement établies par la 
visite du Gouverneur Général de Madagascar en Rhodésie du Sud’.113 In 
1953, following the establishment of an Air France Office in Salisbury, the 
Paris-Alger-Brazzaville line was extended to include Livingstone and 
Tananarive, creating a direct connection between France, Francophone 
Africa and the British-ruled Central African Federation.114 
 
Military exchanges also took place during this period, with visits to 
Rhodesia from General Jean Landouzy, Superior Commander of the 
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Madagascan Forces, in August 1954 and General Fleurquin, Commander of 
the French Air Forces in Madagascar, in May 1955.115 ‘Establishing contact 
with, and exchanging views between’ the French Air Force and the RRAF 
was the objective of the latter’s five day stay in the region,116 with particular 
emphasis placed on obtaining information about the recruitment and 
training methods used by the RRAF; observing their equipment and training 
facilities; and exploring opportunities for a regular exchange of information 
and the future possibility of combined manoeuvres.117 Landouzy’s mission 
had a similar remit, but was also conceived of as part of a wider strategy of 
‘échanges et de contacts avec les autres Territoires Africains voisins de 
l’Ocean Indien’.118 This, in turn, demonstrates how Rhodesian-Madagascan 
interaction was situated within France’s broader African strategies in the 
post-war period, as certain actors looked to British Central Southern Africa 
in order to preserve and enhance French influence across the continent. 
 
As Francophone Africa neared independence in the late 1950s, efforts were 
made to enhance the ties between white Rhodesians and Francophone 
Africans. This can be seen by efforts in 1959 to secure the representation of 
the French Union at the International Congress of African Culture that was 
to be held in Salisbury in June and July 1960. In July 1959, Cabrol relayed a 
request to Paris from McEwen, Director of the National Gallery in Salisbury 
and President of the local section of the Alliance Française, calling for the 
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participation of France and other governments in the Communauté in this 
international celebration of African culture. In particular, requests were 
made for ‘quelques œuvres d’art… la participation aux colloques de 8 à 12 
spécialistes français ou d’Afrique Français et la présence, ici, d’un ou deux 
orchestres indigènes’. The strength of language employed in these requests, 
for example the use of the adverb ‘vivement’, underscores the importance 
attached to this initiative amongst the French in Salisbury. 119  
 
Paris claimed to be unable to support this venture financially, an additional 
example of the ways in which metropolitan action was constrained by ‘des 
raisons budgetaires’.120 Yet, it is clear that the Quai viewed this endeavour 
as significant, seen by their decision to pass the request from Salisbury onto 
the Institut Français d’Afrique Noire (IFAN) in Dakar and their subsequent 
profuse thanks to IFAN for their collaboration in this endeavour.121 Dakar, 
in turn, was enthusiastic about Francophone African participation in this 
event, seen by the Director of IFAN’s claim that, 
une participation française à cet effort international 
serait heureusement souhaitable et il va sans dire que 
l’IFAN est prêt, dans la mesure de ses moyens, à 
s’associer à la manifestation projetée. 
Thus, IFAN offered to send some examples of West African art, along with 
a specialist from the Ethnographic section of the organisation, to the 
Congress in Salisbury in the summer of 1960. Moreover, although 
musicology was outside of IFAN’s area of specialism, Monod passed on the 
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details of a relevant expert of African music to the Cultural Relations 
department of the Quai.122 This instance, in turn, underscores Rhodesia’s 
situation within a broader French strategy to maintain its position on the 
African continent and how this, in turn, brought Rhodesia’s white settlers 
into contact with Francophone African nationalists and their culture.  
 
The multiplication and diversification of the triangular relations 
between France, Francophone Africa and Rhodesia after 1960 
 
The independence of Francophone sub-Saharan Africa in 1960 and Algeria 
in 1962 in augured a new era of optimism about France’s presence in 
Anglophone Africa amongst French diplomats on the ground in Salisbury. 
In the words of Desparmet,  
Pour la première fois depuis des années notre dossier 
africain est excellent. La fin de la guerre d’Algérie a 
marqué la clôture de l’ère de décolonisation en 
Afrique si l’on en excepte Djibouti et les Comores. 
Il serait cependant optimiste de penser que nos 
efforts et nos sacrifices nous vailient [sic] pour celà 
[sic] les éloges de l’Afrique anglophone.123 
The praise that the French received from African nationalists in Southern 
Rhodesia provided evidence to support this view. In 1962, Jasper Zengeza 
Savanhu, the former African Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs in 
the Federal Ministry, and a close colleague of Zimbabwean activist, Joshua 
Nkomo, spoke at length in the Federal Assembly in extremely favourable 
terms about France and its policies towards its former African colonies: 
… la France est dans une autre catégorie que la 
Grande Bretagne en ce sens que les nouveaux 
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dirigeants des territoires qui étaient sous la 
domination française, furent toujours traités en 
égaux par les Français ; ils ont représenté leurs pays 
à l’Assemblée Nationale Français depuis que ces 
territoires ont été considérés comme des provinces 
d’outre-mer de l’Union Française. Ils fréquentait les 
Universités françaises, ils étaient pénétrés de culture 
française et ils étaient accueillis sans restrictions sur 
la base de leurs mérites et de leurs travaux, comme 
être humains, comme n’importe quel français. En 
fait, ces mêmes personnalités qui représentaient ces 
territoires à l’Assemblé Nationale Française sont 
maintenant les chefs politiques de leurs pays 
respectifs, ici en Afrique, et ils n’ont pas 
l’impression de continuer à être attachées par des 
liens économiques à leurs anciens maîtres. Il y avait 
aussi une complète égalité entre les africains 
parvenus à un certain niveau d’éducation et les 
français.124 
The idealism of this intervention aside, it is striking to see such a positive 
interpretation of France held by someone so closely engaged in the 
Zimbabwean nationalist cause and it is evidence of the success of France’s 
efforts to present a favourable image of itself and its African policies to the 
native population of Southern Rhodesia. 
 
With regards to the European settler population, there was a disconnect 
between the image that France presented of itself as a ‘champion’ of African 
interests in a Cold-War dominated world order (Chafer, 2002a, p.353) and 
as ‘a respectable middle power, free from superpower hegemony, truly non-
aligned, and thus a natural ally of the Third World’ (Martin, 1995, p.8), and 
the desire of many white Rhodesians to maintain their privileged position in 
this region of Central Southern Anglophone Africa. In spite of this, many 
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high-ranking Rhodesian officials continued to hold France in high esteem 
and viewed it as an important ally on the African continent. One notable 
Francophile was Welensky who, during his time as Federal Prime Minister, 
actively sought to promote ties between France and the Rhodesian 
authorities seen, for example, by his aforementioned visits to Paris and 
efforts in this context to gain an audience with Charles De Gaulle. 
According to Cabrol, ‘le premier ministre fédéral ayant toujours manifesté 
beaucoup de sympathie pour notre pays [France]’.125 Welensky himself 
explicitly set out this sentiment in a personal letter written in February 1963 
in which he described De Gaulle as ‘a man of courage and character’,126 
sentiments that he echoed after his resignation from office.127 Welensky also 
praised De Gaulle’s governance, asserting that he had done a ‘marvellous 
job’ for France,128 evidenced by everything he had done ‘to pull France out 
of the mess she was in – she was certainly on the way to becoming a 
Communist state before he appeared on the scene’.129  Even the most 
reactionary Rhodesians identified France as a potential ally.  For instance, in 
August 1964, the new Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Smith, advocate of 
“no majority rule in my lifetime” (cited in Meredith, 2006, p.133), 
approached a French representative in Salisbury personally, requesting that 
he inform the French authorities that, 
le gouvernement de Rhodésie du Sud attache le plus 
haut prix à l’intensification des relations 
économiques avec l’Europe et principalement avec 
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la France dont la prééminence politique et 
l’expansion économique sont croissantes.130  
 
A question that remains unanswered, however, is why these Rhodesian 
settlers identified so closely with France in light of their publically opposing 
stances to African affairs? In the years prior to Algerian independence, it is 
possible to hypothesise that these sentiments resulted from a sense of 
affiliation with the French plight in North Africa and a belief that France 
understood the question of European settlers in Africa better than their own 
colonial rulers, the British. In October 1960, Cabrol noted how Welensky,  
n’a cessé de s’interesser à l’evolution de notre 
Communauté, et au problème algérien, pour lequel il 
espérait – et espère toujours – que le Général de 
Gaulle trouvera une solution susceptible d’avoir 
d’heureuses repercussions sur les problèmes et 
l’avenir de la Fédération.131  
Similarly, in 1961, a report prepared by the Federal Intelligence Security 
Bureau (FISB) claimed that if negotiations for self-determination in Algeria 
reached a successful conclusion, Algeria would be in a similar position vis-
à-vis France that Australia was to the United Kingdom, a fate that 
Rhodesia’s Europeans also desired for themselves. The report concluded 
that it was ‘most unlikely that France would ever agree to total severance of 
the links between France and Algeria’.132 It is possible to suggest, therefore, 
that the Rhodesians looked to France’s Algerian policy as a potential 
example that could be employed by Britain, which might allow them to 
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achieve the status of a fully independent Dominion in the Commonwealth of 
Nations and, as such, maintain European rule in the region.  
 
Yet, this does not explain the continued Rhodesian interest in developing 
relations with France and the persistence of positive interpretations about 
France amongst Rhodesia’s European settlers after 1962. In fact, the 
Federation’s settler population actually gave its approval to France’s 
decision to grant independence to Algeria. Despite concerns that the Evian 
Accords of March 1962 marked ‘un nouvel affaiblissement de la position 
des blancs en Afrique’, press reports in the immediate aftermath of Algerian 
independence indicate that Rhodesian society continued to have confidence 
in De Gaulle’s approach to situation in Algeria, believing that ‘les 
négociations avec le GPRA étaient nécessaires et que les accords conclus 
constituent, sans doute, un moindre mal’. 133  The Rhodesia Herald 
condemned the acts of terrorism by the OAS, whilst an article in the Daily 
Mail paid homage to De Gaulle’s policies as ‘courageuse et réaliste’.134 
Similarly, despite congratulating the OAS on “ses glorieux sacrifices pour la 
cause de l’auto-détermination” [of the colons] - a statement that was 
interpreted by Cabrol as an indication that European settlers in the 
Federation might also consider employing terrorist actions - Colin 
Cunningham, the Vice-President of the Rhodesian Republican Party 
(Northern Rhodesia), appeared to overlook De Gaulle’s role in leading 
Algeria to independence, focusing instead on the French support for the 
British during the Second World War and “les maquis de France luttaient et 
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se sacrifiaient avec les Forces Alliées”. 135 De Gaulle’s “invention” of 
decolonisation in Algeria clearly influenced the Rhodesians as much as it 
did the French.   
 
Why then did the Rhodesians remain so resolute in their feelings of 
affiliation with France throughout the first half of the 1960s, despite 
France’s African policies that, on the surface, appeared to counter the 
interests of Europeans in Africa? One explanation for this conviction could 
be pragmatism. As has been discussed above, France was increasingly the 
strongest European power in Africa. In attempting to ally itself with France, 
Rhodesia’s settlers could be seen to be responding to the evolving situation 
on the continent and attempting to better preserve their position. This is 
evidenced particularly in the ways in which the European authorities in 
Rhodesia identified France as an important partner in their efforts to break 
free from the British stranglehold. A record of a meeting between Noreau, 
Commercial Attaché to the French Consulate General in Salisbury (1961-
1965), and Rudland in September 1964, for example, notes the Rhodesian 
interest in  
dégager progressivement de l’influence économique 
de la Grande-Bretagne de des capitaux sud-africaine. 
Ils se tournent, l’un et l’autre, tout naturellement 
vers la seul pays qui apparaisse indépendant, à la 
fois de l’Afrique et de la Grande-Bretagne, c’est à 
dire: la France.136  
This view is reiterated in the surviving papers from the Rhodesian Cabinet. 
In July 1965, for example, a report from Rudland on the ‘External trade 
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representatives: Paris and Lisbon’ states ‘the absolute necessity for the post 
in Paris’ in order to ‘diversify our trade and the sources from which we 
receive investment’. The importance of opening an office in Paris was 
further enhanced by Rudland’s belief that ‘with proper handling, the French 
could be persuaded to extend their interests to Rhodesia’.137 The Rhodesians 
clearly viewed France as an important ally, therefore, in their efforts to 
achieve independence from Britain.  
 
France, Rhodesia and the secession of Katanga  
 
There were also issues over which the French and Rhodesia’s white settlers 
held similar positions, notably the question of the Belgian Congo, especially 
following the secession of the mineral rich province of Katanga on 11 July 
1960. As was also the case elsewhere on the African continent in the Cold 
War context, the French worried about “Anglo-Saxon” and Communist 
infiltration of the region, concerns that were particularly acute in the case of 
the Belgian Congo in light of its close geographical proximity to the former 
French Congo, with its capital, Brazzaville, separated only by the Congo 
River from the once Belgian-ruled territory’s principal city, Léopoldville 
(Kinshasa). Thus, the French supported Katangese secession ‘car elle 
permet de morceler le « Grand Congo » et de redistribuer ainsi les cartes de 
l’hégémonie de la zone’ (Bat, 2012, p.276). However, as France was unable 
to intervene openly outside of its traditional sphere of influence, the Elysée 
sought unofficial means of protecting France’s African interests. As such, 
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Foccart made his deputy in Brazzaville, Jean Mauricheau-Beaupré, 
responsible for controlling the situation in Katanga by providing support, 
notably in the form of mercenaries, to the leader of the Katangese separatist 
movement, Moïse Tshombe, against the UN and the government in 
Léopoldville (Bat & Geneste, 2010, p.93; Williams, 2011, p.165). 
 
The Belgian Congo also shared 2000 miles of its border with the Central 
African Federation, with Katanga lying next to the Copperbelt region of 
Northern Rhodesia. European settlers in Ndola, the main urban centre in the 
Copperbelt, often crossed over to the Katangese capital, Elisabethville, and 
vice versa, leading to much interconnection between the white communities 
in these two regions (Williams, 2011, pp.50-51). According to Chauvel,  
les liens ethniques et économiques [between 
Katanga and the Federation] sont nombreux. L’idée 
d’une fusion des deux territoires avait d’ailleurs été 
lancée par certains "ultras" britanniques, porte-
parole du groupe de pression rhodésien.138  
There were also fears amongst the European settlers in the Rhodesias that 
the crisis in the Congo would spread to the Federation, a fact that the French 
engaged in Rhodesian affairs were acutely aware of. A despatch from 
Cabrol sent in August 1960, for example, noted the growing concern 
amongst ‘certain elements de la minorité blanche’ about ‘des évènements du 
Congo’.139 In a similar vein, a report by the Direction Afrique-Levant 
acknowledges how ‘les évènements du Congo Belge… ont accru leurs [the 
white settlers’] inquiétudes’.140 In the minds of many European settlers in 
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the Federation, therefore, Katanga was central to the preservation of white 
rule in the region. In the words of Welensky, Katanga was “an ideal buffer 
between ourselves and the wilder forms of pan-Africanism to the north of 
us” (cited in Williams, 2011, p.51). A report from the French post in 
Salisbury similarly notes how ‘Sir Roy attribute à l’évolution de la situation 
au Katanga “une importance vitale” pour la Féderation’.141 
 
Thus, the Rhodesians had a vested interest in sustaining “a strong and 
friendly regime in Katanga” (Welensky, cited in Williams, 2011, p.51) and, 
as such, turned a blind eye to the passage of mercenaries, including private 
French soldiers, from the Federation to Katanga. The Federation’s settler-
dominated government also allowed the Union Minière du Haut Katanga, 
which provided the breakaway state with its main source of income, to 
continue to send its exports through the Rhodesias to South Africa 
(Williams, 2011, pp.32-34). Rhodesian support for Katanga, in turn, 
contributed to ‘une vive critique’, particularly on the part of Welensky, of 
‘l’actuelle politique d’intervention des Nations Unies au Katanga’, which he 
characterised as ‘illégale… et contraire au principe de la liberté des peuples 
à disposer d’eux-mêmes’.142 This opposition to UN involvement in Katanga 
was shared by the French, founded on their long-standing hostility towards 
supranationality (Smouts, 1979, p.252) and manifest in the Elysée’s covert 
military support for the secessionist state which has been described as a 
‘French war against the UN’ (Williams, 2011, p.169).  
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This shared approach to the Katanga crisis created a new focal point for 
Franco-Rhodesian interaction. Just two months after the Katangese 
secession, for example, during a personal meeting with Cabrol, Welensky 
requested that the French post in Salisbury share with him, ‘à titre tout à fait 
confidentiel’, all the information that it received on the evolution of the 
situation in the Congo. Welensky was interested in information received 
from the French Ambassador in Léopoldville and especially wished to glean 
greater knowledge about the response to Tshombe’s policies from Fulbert 
Youlou, the President of the Republic of the Congo.143 Even after a UN-led 
force reintegrated Katanga into the Congo in January 1963, France and 
Rhodesia continued to cooperate over the crisis in the region. In May 1963, 
Mauricheau-Beaupré and Daniel Richon, the Director of External Affairs at 
the Union de Transports Aériens (UTA),144 sought Welensky’s support, via 
a Rhodesian intermediary, in their attempts to receive information direct 
from Léopoldville ‘because there is some risk of leakage en route and they 
[Mauricheau-Beaupré and Richon] believe that the consequences of a 
leakage might be serious’.145 Welensky, for his part, was unconvinced by 
this approach and continued to view Brazzaville as a crucial linchpin in 
Franco-Rhodesian efforts to share information over the Congo Crisis, as is 
evidenced by a handwritten note from Welensky at the end of the secret 
minute, in which he expressed his reservations about a Léopoldville 
connection, proposing Brazzaville as an alternative point of exchange.146 
Notwithstanding this difference of opinion, Franco-Rhodesian contacts over 
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the Congo crisis reveal the growing sense of affinity towards France 
amongst Rhodesia’s European settler population with regards to certain 
African questions in the post-1960 period.  
 
Rhodesia and the réseaux franco-africains 
 
The situation in the Belgian Congo is useful, therefore, in explaining how 
the French and Rhodesians were able to reconcile themselves to relations 
with each other in spite of their seemingly opposing stances to African 
affairs. It also draws our attention to the growing participation of members 
of Foccart’s cellule africaine, such as Mauricheau-Beaupré and Richon, in 
Rhodesian affairs during this period. Both men were pivotal to the Franco-
African post-colonial réseaux. According to Bat and Geneste (2010, p.82), 
Mauricheau-Beaupré was central to the remarkable durability of France’s 
African policy after decolonisation, whilst in his role as Director of External 
Affairs at the UTA, Richon was situated ‘à la croisée stratégique de 
l’univers de transport, des agences de renseignement et des hautes sphères 
politiques’. This, along with his fervent commitment to Gaullism, made 
Richon ‘le parfait honorable correspondant’ for Foccart and his right-hand 
man, Maurice Robert, the head of the African branch of SDECE (Bat, 2012, 
pp.173-176).  
 
The connections between members of Foccart’s cellule africaine and the 
white Rhodesian political élite forged in response to the crisis in Katanga 
opened the door for further Franco-Rhodesian collaboration in the early 
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1960s. Of particular note were French-led efforts to establish ‘a small secret 
working organisation’ that would counter the Anglophone African 
dominance of the Organisation of African Unity ahead of its first summit in 
Addis Ababa on 25 May 1963.147 Mauricheau-Beaupré and Richon were at 
the heart of this initiative, travelling to Salisbury in early May 1963. During 
this visit, the two Frenchmen met not only with Welensky’s private 
secretary, Stewart Parker, but also Welensky himself, as is evidenced by a 
personal letter from Mauricheau-Beaupré to Welensky in which he thanks 
Welensky for his kindness during his stay in Rhodesia and twice expresses 
his hope that Lady Welenksy’s health has improved.148 According to a 
secret minute written for the Federal Prime Minister, Mauricheau-Beaupré 
and Richon believed that the time was ‘ripe’ to establish a group that could 
‘canalize’ their existing efforts ‘to disrupt the unity of the Addis Ababa 
Conference’. The note also emphasised Mauricheau-Beaupré and Richon’s 
desire ‘to prepare for a possible broadening into an effective organisation in 
the future’.149 In order to achieve this end, Mauricheau-Beaupré and Richon 
proposed a meeting in Paris between Félix Houphouët-Boigny, President of 
the Ivory Coast, described as ‘pretty much clay in their [the French] hands’, 
Moïse Tshombe and representatives from the white-governments in South 
Africa, Rhodesia and Portuguese-ruled Angola and Mozambique.  
 
Strikingly, the French seem to have been more enthusiastic and overt in 
their advances regarding this proposed organisation than the Rhodesians. In 
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a letter to Parker, Mauricheau-Beaupré unreservedly set out his intentions, 
openly calling upon the Rhodesians to ‘find some competent African to 
“play” with us and our friends and to create a new deal in Central Africa’.150  
Moreover, in contrast to the French proposal that a close associate of 
Welensky, probably Parker, attend the planned meeting of the “club” in 
Paris, the Rhodesians opposed the direct involvement of those close to the 
Federal Prime Minister’s Office in this venture.151 Instead, they suggested 
that Sydney Wynne of Voice and Vision Limited152 attend on behalf of the 
Rhodesians. 153  The Rhodesians also repeatedly raised concerns about 
leakages and the need for the use of secretive channels of communication, 
even going as far as to contact Mauricheau-Beaupré directly to tell him ‘not 
to sign any letters or address them to anyone by name, and generally to take 
greater precautions’ after the Frenchman sent several letters with the names 
of their intended recipients clearly visible and his own name signed at the 
end of each letter.154 Rhodesian concerns about secrecy seem to have been 
justified as plans to establish a counter-pan-African “club” eventually were 
scuppered by a security breach. According to an anonymous note included 
in Welensky’s papers, in the end, ‘nothing more’ came ‘of certain meetings 
which were contemplated… as a result of certain property belonging to 
someone now in Paris falling into wrong hands and of certain other 
                                                
150 Mauricheau-Beaupré to Welensky. (1963, May 9). WP/231/4/21-22. Oxford:RH. 
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152 Voice & Vision were a London-based public relations firm charged by Roy Welensky 
with promoting the political and economic system in the Federation (Cohen, 2009, p.113). 
153 Anonymous  to Mauricheau-Beaupré. (1963, May 10). WP/231/4/14. Oxford:RH.  
Anonymous  to Wynne, Voice & Vision Ltd. (1963, May 10). WP/231/4/13. Oxford:RH.  
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circumstances’. As such, Mauricheau-Beaupré was advised ‘that a short 
period of inactivity would not come amiss’.155  
 
Despite the apparent failure of the “club”, these attempts to establish a 
counter pan-African organisation in 1963 are significant not only as 
evidence of the new connections between Rhodesia and Francophone 
Africa, through the intermediary of France, but also of the new directions in 
which these relations developed in the post-1960 period. Whereas in the late 
1940s and 1950s, contacts between Francophone Africa and Rhodesia had 
been confined to the economic and cultural domains, in the years after the 
independence of France’s colonies in sub-Saharan Africa these relations 
took on a distinctly political flavour. The new political dimension of the 
triangular relations between France, Francophone Africa and Rhodesia is 
also apparent in the Rhodesian “Goodwill Mission” to Francophone Africa, 
which took place at the behest of Welensky and organised by UAT in 
1962.156 A few days prior to the arrival of the Rhodesian delegation in 
Libreville on 20 February 1962, Risterucci, the French Ambassador in 
Gabon, reported that correspondence relating to the visit received by the 
local UAT representative indicated ‘qu’en plus d’une contribution à un 
développement des liens économiques et culturelles entre la Rhodésie et les 
Etats africains d’expression française’, the Rhodesians also saw the mission 
as being useful ‘dans le cas d’une évolution de la situation en Afrique 
Australe’. According to Risterucci, ‘ce qui confirmait indiscutablement le 
                                                
155 Anonymous. (nd). WP/231/4/46. Oxford:RH.   
156 Weiss, UTA Director General for Central Africa, to Cabrol. (nd). Salisbury/4/No.108. 
Nantes:AD. 
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caractère politique, pour partie au moins, de ce voyage’.157 The fact that 
UAT had been active in the region since the departure of Air France in 1956 
underscores the importance of foundations laid under the Fourth Republic 
for the subsequent development and diversification of Franco-Rhodesian 
relations after 1960. 
 
In the years after 1960, the triangular relations between France, 
Francophone Africa and Rhodesia were also increasingly transnational in 
their character, not only in the sense that they crossed national and colonial 
boundaries, but also because they were increasingly informed by the wider 
international context of decolonisation. In the case of the 1962 “Goodwill 
Mission”, this broader setting was the evolving situation in Southern Africa, 
particularly growing opposition to white rule and the subsequent need for 
European settlers to seek alternative allies in the face of their increasing 
isolation on the African continent. Similarly, 1963 efforts to establish a 
‘Pan-African counter-organisation’ were born of a shared Franco-Rhodesian 
affiliation over a crisis beyond the boundaries of both British and French 
Africa, in the formerly Belgian-ruled Congo. The new post-colonial setting 
led, therefore, to the creation of new transnational points of contact between 
France, Francophone Africa and Rhodesia.  
 
The 1962 “Goodwill Mission” and 1963 counter pan-African organisation 
also underline how after 1960, in line with the broader shifts in Franco-
African relations, control of the Franco-Rhodesian connection shifted away 
                                                
157 Risterucci, French Ambassador, Libreville, to MAE. (1962, February 17). 
Afrique/Gabon/15/No.29. Paris:AMAE. 
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from the Quai to the Elysée. The traditional drivers of France’s policy in 
Rhodesia - members of the Afrique-Levant department at the Quai and 
French diplomats on the ground in Anglophone Africa - saw their influence 
eroded during this period. This can be seen by the absence of any evidence 
in the archives of the French Foreign Ministry of the ‘Pan-African counter-
organisation’, implying that the Quai was not only not involved in this 
initiative, but also that it probably had no awareness of these efforts having 
taken place.  
 
Similarly, the declining control of the Quai over Franco-Rhodesian relations 
in the years after 1960 is apparent with regards to the “Goodwill Mission”. 
UAT’s directors were convinced that they had French government approval 
for this mission, seen in the statement from Weiss, the local UAT agent in 
Salisbury, that ‘d’après les renseignements que je possède, les instances 
gouvernementales françaises ont été averties de ce projet’.158  This is despite 
the uncertainty surrounding the mission amongst France’s diplomatic 
representatives in Salisbury. Cabrol, for instance, was unwilling to accept 
the assurances given to him by Weiss that ‘la direction générale de sa 
compagnie a organisé ce voyage en accord avec les administrations 
françaises intéressées’ and decided instead to approach the MAE for 
confirmation instead.159 Although the archives do not contain a reply to this 
note, a report prepared for the attention of De Gaulle on 16 February 1962 
indicates that the Quai did not approve of the mission and attempted to 
make known ‘à tous les représentants de la France dans les capitales 
                                                
158 Weiss to Cabrol. (nd). Salisbury/4/No.108. Nantes:AD.  
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intéressés qu’ils aient à rester à l’écart d’une entreprise qui en tout état de 
cause, devait être considérée comme peu opportune’. 160  It appears, 
therefore, that the UAT’s confidence in the official backing of their mission 
came from a source other than the French Foreign Ministry. The known 
links between Foccart’s African cell and the UAT, notably the personal 
contacts with Richon noted above, make it possible to hypothesise that this 
source of authority was linked to the Elysée. 
 
The participation of representatives of the UAT/ UTA alongside members 
of Foccart’s cellule africaine in the 1962 “Goodwill Mission” and the 1963 
proposed counter-pan-African “club” brings to light another new trend in 
the webs of connections between France, Francophone Africa and Rhodesia 
in the post-1960 period, which also dominated the bilateral relations 
between France and its former colonies: the development of réseaux in 
which the lines between state and private action were increasingly blurred 
(Médard, 2005, p.42; Chafer, 2008, p.39).  These highly complex networks, 
in turn, created the context in which new, secretive channels of 
communications could be established. In the case of the “Goodwill 
Mission”, these covert contacts appear to have taken place via the UAT 
representatives on the ground in Rhodesia and Gabon. Of particular note is 
the importance of Weiss, who informed the French Consulate in Salisbury 
of the Rhodesian plans for the “Goodwill Mission”.161 
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Similarly, efforts to establish a “club” to disrupt OAU unity were 
established through unofficial methods. A letter from Mauricheau-Beaupré 
to Parker, for example, ends with the instruction that replies should be given 
to ‘the bearer’, as opposed to being sent through any diplomatic bag. This 
route permitted Mauricheau-Beaupré to receive replies ‘in Brazzaville the 
same evening’.162 Letters often did not indicate an author or a recipient, 
whilst pseudonyms were frequently used. The name ‘Hyde’, for example, is 
given to one Rhodesian representative who met with Mauricheau-Beaupré 
and Richon in Brazzaville, whilst general terms such as ‘the chief’, ‘the old 
man’ and ‘the doctor’ are often used in place of personal names.163 
Furthermore, a considerable amount of contact between the French, 
Francophone Africans and the Rhodesians is likely to have taken place in 
person, at informal and unofficial meetings, like the one proposed by 
Mauricheau-Beaupré to take place in Paris on 24 May 1963 between 
Houphouët-Boigny, Tshombe and representatives of the Rhodesian, South 
African and Portuguese governments. 164  Another indication of these 
informal, personal meetings having taken place can be found in a letter from 
Mauricheau-Beaupré to Parker, in which the former states:  
If you are passing through Paris, you will be able to 
see the Doctor then and get fresh news about Addis. 
A later date must be chosen, after the meeting in 
Addis, preferably the last few days of the month. 
The Abbe [Fulbert Youlou] will probably be in Paris 
then.165 
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The development of these contacts outside of official channels and 
unnoticed by the official French record, provides evidence of the growing 
opaqueness of Franco-Rhodesian relations, in line with the absence of 
transparency and accountability so frequently associated with Franco-
African relations after 1960 (Médard, 1997, p.26). The increasingly covert 
and underhand nature of Franco-Rhodesian contacts in the years 
immediately following the independence of Francophone sub-Saharan 
Africa, in turn, had significant consequences for relations between France 
and Rhodesia after UDI, as it created new spaces hidden from international 
view in which Franco-Rhodesian interaction could persist despite 
Rhodesia’s illegal status. Moreover, the fact that many of the key French 
players in these networks also participated in Francophone African affairs 
situates Rhodesia directly within the Franco-African réseaux, binding 
France’s relations with this region of Anglophone Africa to its policies in its 
former colonies. Thus, as was also the case in the late colonial period, 
Rhodesia formed part of the strategies to preserve France’s influence in 
Africa after 1960. The particular post-1960 context, however, permitted 
Rhodesia to be directly integrated into the mechanisms used to sustain 
France’s presence on the African continent.  
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Conclusions  
 
In contrast to the existing literature on Franco-African relations in the late 
colonial period, the years after the end of the Second World War witnessed 
an expansion of France’s relations with the British-ruled colony of 
Rhodesia. Although the extent of these contacts was consistently curtailed 
by limited central support, a consequence of Rhodesia’s relatively low 
status on Paris’ foreign policy agenda in the post-war period and the 
territory’s constitutional ties with the UK, the eighteen years between 
September 1947 and November 1965 saw diplomatic, cultural and economic 
ties between France and this region of Anglophone Africa reach new 
heights. The methods employed in Rhodesia, such as the importance of 
infrastructure projects and the prioritising of cultural rayonnement, mirrored 
the policies adopted in France’s colonial empire. Moreover, from the outset, 
French engagement with Rhodesia formed part of a conscious French 
strategy to maintain and extend its influence on the African continent. 
 
The identification of Rhodesia as an arena in which France’s position on the 
African continent could be assured and extended contributed to the 
multiplication and diversification of France’s relations with Rhodesia. The 
French belief that Rhodesia could also enhance the economy of its African 
colonies, in particular, contributed to growing interaction between Rhodesia 
and Francophone Africa, and the subsequent development of new, triangular 
ties between France, the French Empire and Central Southern Anglophone 
Africa. After the independence of Francophone Africa in 1960, Rhodesia 
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continued to be included in French efforts to sustain its African presence 
This contributed to declining Quai influence over France’s involvement in 
Rhodesia and the growing participation of French actors linked to the 
Elysée by way of Foccart’s African cell, as well as the proliferation of the 
three-way contacts between France, certain of France’s best African 
“friends” and Rhodesia. Thus, Franco-Rhodesian interaction not only 
mirrored the patterns of France’s relations with its former colonies. 
Rhodesia was directly included in the Franco-African réseaux. 
 
Although the period after 1960 saw a marked shift in Franco-Rhodesian 
relations – not least the introduction of key players from Foccart’s cellule 
africaine into the fray and Rhodesia’s subsequent participation in the 
réseaux that formed the basis of Franco-African engagement in the post-
colonial era - the precedent for using Rhodesia as a means of securing 
France’s position on the African continent had already been established as 
early as 1947. Franco-Rhodesian interaction in the late colonial period 
provided, therefore, the necessary framework for the development of 
Franco-Rhodesian relations after 1960 and, in particular, the growing 
participation of members of Foccart’s cellule africaine in Franco-Rhodesian 
relations.  
 
This sense of continuity between the Fourth and the Fifth Republics, the 
colonial and the post-colonial periods - divides that are so frequently 
imposed on histories of France’s foreign policies - is also apparent in 
France’s diplomatic, cultural and economic engagement with Rhodesia, 
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where the policies of the late 1950s and early 1960s built directly upon the 
foundations laid during the Fourth Republic epoch. Thus, the case study of 
Rhodesia provides further evidence to support the work of scholars who 
have demonstrated that the foreign policies of the Fifth Republic were 
contingent upon the efforts of its predecessor (Hitchcock, 1998; Wall, 
2001). It also adds further weight to arguments regarding the continuities in 
France’s African policies before and after 1960 (Chafer, 2002a; Keese, 
2007a). The study of French engagement with Rhodesia makes a 
contribution, therefore, to our knowledge of French foreign policy in the 
post-war period. 
 
To return to the Rhodesian case study, it is important to underline three key 
trends in Franco-Rhodesian relations that emerged during this period. Two 
of these trends were established during Fourth Republic period, whilst the 
third did not emerge until after Francophone African independence. The 
first relates to the drivers of France’s presence in the region, who, from the 
outset, were state and non-state “men-on-the spot”. With regards to the 
former, although who these official “men-on-the-spot” were shifted after 
1960, with the introduction of members of Foccart’s cellule africaine as the 
new lynchpins of the Franco-Rhodesian connection, throughout this period 
French representatives on the ground played a pivotal role in the 
development of France’s relations with this British colony. It is also 
interesting to note the part played by certain French companies operating on 
Rhodesian soil, such as UAT (after 1963, UTA), Renault, Peugeot, CFP, 
Alsthom, NEYPRIC and others, in the establishment and expansion of 
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Franco-Rhodesian relations. Secondly, it is necessary to emphasise how this 
period witnessed a growing feeling of friendship towards France amongst 
the white Rhodesian population. Although this built on existing francophilia 
amongst Rhodesia’s settler population, it nevertheless increased due to 
growing Franco-Rhodesian contact after 1947, and especially after 1960, as 
the shift towards majority rule on the African continent created new 
transnational points of convergence between Rhodesia’s settler élite and 
certain key players in the Franco-African connection. Finally, and perhaps 
most significantly, the years after Francophone African independence in 
1960 saw Rhodesia’s inclusion into certain Franco-African réseaux. This, in 
turn, created new spaces, hidden from international view in which Franco-
Rhodesian engagement could take place. As the second part of this thesis 
will now explore, these three trends were to become vital to the shape of 
Franco-Rhodesian relations after 1965.   
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France and Rhodesia after 1965
 155 
Chapter Three 
France and Rhodesia after 1965: the setting  
 
At 11.30am GMT on 11 November 1965, after months of failed 
negotiations, Ian Douglas Smith proclaimed Rhodesia’s Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence from the United Kingdom. This declaration, 
which was intentionally reminiscent of the American Declaration of 
Independence (Evans, 2007, p.181), was an illegal act under both British 
and international law, as, in light of Rhodesia’s status as a British colony, an 
act of the British parliament was required before any change to its 
constitutional status could be made (Brownell, 2010, p.479). However, 
Smith’s proclamation signalled not only a rebellion against Britain, but also 
a challenge to international efforts to end European domination of Africa 
and transform it into a continent of independent, majority-ruled nation 
states. As such, according to Coggins (2006, p.371), ‘UDI caught the 
attention of the world’.  
 
Global opinion was steadfastly opposed to an independent, white-ruled 
Rhodesia. In the immediate aftermath of 11 November, the United States 
publically ‘deplored UDI’,1 whilst there were ‘sharp reactions to Mr Ian 
Smith’s announcement’ ‘from all over the world’, including from New 
Zealand, Japan, Norway, Kenya, Turkey and Singapore. 2  No country 
offered formal recognition to Smith’s regime, and the UN Security Council 
                                                
1 Anonymous. (1965, November 12). No recognition by United States, The Times, p.8. 
2 Anonymous. (1965, November 12). Condemnation by Western and Communist nations, 
The Times, p.8. 
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(UNSC) and UNGA both repeatedly declared UDI as illegal under 
international law (Brownell, 2010, p.480). In spite of this, the white regime 
in Salisbury remained intransigent for nearly a decade and a half, 
consistently imagining itself to be a state and striving to be recognised as 
one by the outside world (Brownell, 2010, pp.479-480), but never fully 
appreciating the fact that an act had to be passed in the UK parliament in 
order for them to gain legal status in front of the international community 
(Wood, 2008, p.3). As such, UDI became ‘a festering sore on the 
international body politic for the next 15 years’ (Watts, 2012, p.2). 
 
As the first part of this thesis has explored, by 1965, France had an 
established network of economic, diplomatic, cultural and personal 
relationships with Rhodesia. This Franco-Rhodesian connection, in turn, 
was founded upon an array of imperatives that combined to create a 
particular French foreign policy mind-set. At the heart of this French 
worldview was the desire to reverse the humiliations and disappointments of 
the Second World War, and to restore France’s status on the international 
stage. In this pursuit, the African continent was vital, as it was seen as a 
privileged arena for the projection of French power overseas and, as such, 
the maintenance of France’s position on the world stage. Closely interlinked 
with French pursuit of international status, was a deeply entrenched hostility 
towards Britain and the United States, and the desire to limit “Anglo-Saxon” 
infiltration, particularly in the African context. The hardening of Cold War 
tensions further heightened these sentiments and prompted a growing 
French conviction in the need for a foreign policy that was not only anti-
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communist but also autonomous from that pursued by the Anglo-American 
partners in the Western Alliance. The establishment of a French Consulate 
in Salisbury in 1947, and the subsequent development of commercial, 
cultural, diplomatic and personal relations with this semi-autonomous 
British colony throughout the 1950s and first half of the 1960s, 
demonstrates how these foreign policy concerns were not only applied in 
the Francophone context. Rather France’s African vision expanded in the 
post-war period to included territories formerly beyond France’s traditional 
sphere of influence. The period prior to Smith’s UDI in 1965 witnessed, 
therefore, a reformulation of France’s approach to the African continent.  
 
In light of the multifaceted policy-making universe that underpinned French 
engagement with Rhodesia prior to 1965, an analysis of France’s position 
towards this British colony after UDI that assumed a uniform French 
acceptance of Rhodesia’s illegal status in the international arena would be 
highly one-dimensional. Rather, a more nuanced understanding of the 
setting in which French policy towards Rhodesia after 1965 was formulated 
is required. It is the aim of this chapter to delve into the intricacies that 
provided the backdrop for French engagement with Rhodesia throughout the 
UDI period, analysing the ways in which assumptions about France’s 
position in the world shaped French perceptions of Rhodesia in the 
aftermath of Ian Smith’s proclamation. It will then assess the wider setting 
for French policy towards Rhodesia after UDI, focusing particularly on the 
following four themes: France’s position towards Southern Africa as a 
whole, the United Nations, Franco-British relations and France’s Cold War 
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strategy. In so doing, it will be possible to acknowledge and analyse the 
multifaceted, and often contradictory, impetuses that informed France’s 
position towards Rhodesia, whilst simultaneously unpicking the 
heterogeneous, and sometimes conflicting, mechanisms involved in the 
formulation of French policy towards Rhodesia after UDI. This, in turn, will 
provide a vital backdrop for the discussion of the implementation of 
France’s Rhodesian policies after November 1965 in Chapter Four.  
 
French perceptions of Rhodesia after UDI  
 
The official French response to Smith’s proclamation of 11 November was 
in keeping with the position adopted by the majority of the international 
community towards the Rhodesian crisis, which was a stance founded on 
the conception of UDI as an illegal act in terms of both UK and 
international law. On 12 November, Maurice Couve de Murville, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs (1958-1968), condemned the action of the Rhodesian 
Front (RF), Rhodesia’s white minority government, stating that France had 
no intention of recognising an independent Rhodesia.3 Three days later this 
stance was reiterated in a telegram circulated to all of France’s overseas 
representations by the Sous-Directeur d’Afrique at the Quai d’Orsay, Jean 
François-Poncet, which stated that ‘le Gouvernement Française désapprouve 
catégoriquement la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance à laquelle il ne 
                                                
3 Couve de Murville to Courcel. (1965, November 11). Ministere des Affaires Etrangères 
(MAE). (2006). Documents Diplomatiques Français (DDF) 1965, vol.2. Bruxelles: P.I.E-
Peter Lang. No.259, p.584. 
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reconnaît aucun validité’.4 This French position was maintained throughout 
the UDI period, seen, for example, in note prepared by the Direction 
d’Afrique at the Quai in December 1970, which asserted that ‘la France a 
désapprouvé la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance des autorités de 
Salisbury’.5 
 
France, like the rest of the international community, viewed Smith’s 
announcement as an affront not only against Britain, but also against global 
efforts to secure self-determination for the African people. A diplomatic 
briefing prepared for De Gaulle on 12 November 1965 described UDI as a 
rebellion ‘non seulement contre l’Angleterre… mais surtout contre la 
conception dominante de l’ordre et de la morale’. This report went on to 
play down the importance of Rhodesia’s illegal breakaway from ‘la mère-
patrie’, emphasising instead the principal objective of UDI ‘pour 
sauvegarder le monopole politique d’une race minoritaire’.6 In a similar 
vein, a report prepared in 1970 for the Centre des Hautes Etudes 
Administratives sur l’Afrique et l’Asie Modernes, by a French diplomat 
formerly based in Salisbury, described UDI as having one objective: ‘se 
débarrasser de la tutelle, fut-elle formelle, de Londres et mettre en place un 
appareil étatique légalisant une stricte ségrégation raciale’.7 The French 
were also critical of Smith’s government’s segregationist tendencies. For 
                                                
4 François-Poncet, Sous-Directeur d’Afrique, MAE. (1965, November 15). 5AG/FPU/428. 
Paris:AN.  
5 Direction des Affaires Africaines et Malgaches (DAM), MAE. (1970, December 19). 
Rhodésie. EU/GB/257. Paris:AMAE. 
6 Anonymous. (1965, 12 November). Situation diplomatique. 5AG1/Ely/642. Paris:AN.  
7 Bellivier, Centre des Hautes Etudes Administratives sur l’Afrique et l’Asie Modernes. 
(1970). Rhodésie: les assies du pouvoir blanc. ONU/Décolonisation/1394. Paris:AMAE.  
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example, the RF was described as ‘un clan des ultras partisans’,8 whilst a 
report prepared by the central administration described the new Rhodesian 
constitution, which was introduced following a referendum in June 1969, as 
‘fondée sur la séparation des races et la suppression de toute perspective 
d’évolution vers un régime de majorité africaine en Rhodésie’.9 In a similar 
vein, Jean Bellivier, Manager of the French Consulate, characterised 
Rhodesia as, 
le bastion blanc d’Afrique Australe qui résiste par 
tous les moyens au "vent du changement" et pratique 
le suffrage censitaire et la discrimination raciale afin 
d’assurer la pérennité de la suprématie politique 
européenne dans ce sub-continent.10  
The public French assessment of Rhodesia was, therefore, in keeping with 
international opinion that opposed UDI as a rebellion against Britain and an 
attempt to maintain white rule in Africa, contrary to the “wind of change” 
blowing across the African continent.  
 
However, in spite of this openly stated position of opposition to the white 
regime and its racial policies, building on perceptions developed in the 
eighteen years prior to UDI, Rhodesia was consistently viewed as land of 
opportunities for France, in which it was possible to pursue France’s main 
foreign policy objectives. In particular, Rhodesia continued to be identified 
as a country in which France could project its commercial and cultural 
influence overseas. This was especially evident in the economic sector, 
                                                
8 Anonymous. (1968). Note résumant la situation générale, politique, économique, et les 
affaires en cours dans les états anglophones de l’Afrique occidentale, orientale, central et 
australe. 5AG/FPU/1374. Paris :AN. 
9 Anonymous. (1969, September). Rhodésie. AL/Rhodésie/1/4. Paris:AMAE.  
10 Bellivier, Manager, French Consulate, Salisbury, to AL. (1969, August 8). 
AL/Rhodésie/1/1/No.282. Paris:AMAE.  
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where Franco-Rhodesian trade was seen as a means of furthering 
metropolitan commerce and industry. The identification of these 
opportunities by the French engaged in Rhodesian affairs can be found in a 
note sent in March 1970 by the Direction des Affaires Economiques et 
Financières to the Direction du Personnel at the Quai, which described 
Rhodesia as an important component in ‘un ensemble économique intégré 
qui englobe toute l’Afrique Australe’ with,  
des richesses minières indispensables pour 
l’industrie européenne et les programmes 
d’équipement qui y sont poursuivre sur une grande 
échelle en font un important marché pour les 
exportations des pays industrielles.11   
Rhodesia also continued to be seen as region in which the French language 
could be promoted as part of a Francophone wider project. This intention is 
evidenced by the visits to Rhodesia organised by the Bureau pour 
l’Enseignement de la Langue et de la Civilisation Française à l’Etranger 
(BELC) in January 1968 and August 1969.12 In a report on the first of these 
trips, the BELC representative concluded that it was ‘essentiel’ to support 
‘le naissant enseignement du français aux Africains de Rhodésie’, 
‘améliorer l’enseignement existant dans les écoles européennes’ and, in so 
doing, ‘toucher un plus nombreux public’.13  
 
Alongside these opportunities to obtain commercial and cultural capital in 
the region, Rhodesia also continued to be viewed as an important region in 
geopolitical and geostrategic terms. As had also been the case before 1965, 
                                                
11 D’Aumale to Personnel. (1970, March 27). AL/Rhodésie/1/1/No.33. Paris:AMAE. 
12 David (BELC) to Bellivier. (1968, September 6). Salisbury/5/No.909. Nantes:AD. 
Bellivier to RC. (1969, May 1). Salisbury/5/No.173. Nantes:AD.  
13 David to Bellivier. (1968, September 6). Salisbury/5/No.909. Nantes:AD. 
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Rhodesia was situated by the French within a new post-colonial “scramble” 
for influence on the African continent. For the French, this struggle was 
especially acute in light of their privileging of the African continent in the 
pursuit of greatness on the international stage. Rhodesia’s close 
geographical proximity to the Indian Ocean is likely to have heightened 
these sentiments. France had a number of key military bases in the region, 
notably at the city of Djibouti in French Somaliland14 on the Horn of Africa 
and at Tananarive, and viewed these regions as crucial to wider French 
strategic ambitions in Africa (Alden, 1996, p.14). There was also Réunion, a 
Départment d’Outre-Mer since 1946. The maintenance of French influence 
over these bases, however, was contingent upon France’s wider regional 
position. For example, according to Alden (1996, p.14), the Cape Route was 
a lifeline to France’s Indian Ocean bases, thus dictating a policy of support 
for the established interests in the region.  
 
Alden applies this theory to the apartheid regime in Pretoria, but it is also 
likely that this vision extended beyond South Africa, to the white rulers of 
Rhodesia. Despite being landlocked and, thus, not directly situated within 
the Indian Ocean littoral zone, Rhodesia was conceived of by the French in 
terms of its geographical location within this broader, oceanic region. We 
have already seen in the first part of this thesis how, in the late colonial 
period, France included Rhodesia in its wider Indian Ocean strategy, 
seeking, for example, to develop the ties between Rhodesia and the French 
dependencies in the region, and including stopovers in Salisbury on wider 
                                                
14 Between 1967 and 1977, French Somaliland was known as the French Territory of the 
Afars and the Issas. After its independence from France in 1977, the country became 
known as the Republic of Djibouti.  
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regional tours. After UDI, Rhodesia continued to be positioned with this 
regional context, seen in a report from 1970 that emphasised the importance 
of Rhodesia and its Southern African neighbours as a means of securing 
access to the Indian Ocean after the Suez expedition fourteen years earlier.15 
Thus, in the post-UDI period, Rhodesia continued to form part of a wider 
strategic vision to use French influence in the Indian Ocean zone to shore up 
France’s broader continental ambitions as part of a wider plan to enhance 
French rang on the world stage. 
 
The continued importance of wider foreign policy concerns in shaping 
French engagement with Rhodesia after UDI is especially evident in the 
discussions concerning the future of France’s diplomatic representation in 
Salisbury following the Rhodesian referendum of June 1969, in which the 
majority of the white electorate voted in favour of declaring Rhodesia a 
Republic. In the aftermath of this resounding “yes” vote, the British 
government acted immediately to ‘break relations with the illegal regime 
completely’ (Brownell, 2010, p.488). The French, however, declined to take 
action straight away, waiting and watching the actions of other Western 
powers in the region before making any decision about the future of their 
Consulate in Salisbury. The conclusion of these observations was that 
France should not terminate its diplomatic ties with Rhodesia whilst other 
foreign representations remained active in the region. In July 1969, for 
example, Pierre Carraud, the Deputy Director at the Quai charged with non-
French speaking territories in Africa, reported how, 
                                                
15 Bellivier. (1970). Rhodésie: les assies du pouvoir blanc. ONU/Décolonisation/1394. 
Paris:AMAE.  
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Il semble que personne ne soit vraiment désireux de 
suivre dans l’immédiat l’exemple de la Grande-
Bretagne. Dans ces conditions, nous ne fermerons 
pas notre consulat à Salisbury.16 
The note concludes by stating that France would only be willing to close its 
post in Salisbury if ‘nos amis réviseraient leurs positions’.17 In November 
1969, the Sous Direction d’Afrique reiterated this stance in a report on 
Consular representation in Salisbury, which described how no other 
Western power - with the exception of Belgium, who closed their Consulate 
General immediately after the referendum for economic reasons - had the 
intention of severing entirely diplomatic ties with the region. This, in turn, 
informed the report’s recommendation ‘de ne pas procéder pour le moment 
à la fermeture totale de notre Consulat Général à Salisbury’. 18  This 
persistent unwillingness to sever French diplomatic ties with Rhodesia 
unless other Western powers also took similar action demonstrates how 
France’s much broader concerns about maintaining influence on the African 
continent – or at least not losing out to other European countries - were 
transferred to the Rhodesian context, This, in turn, situates Rhodesia within 
a wider project to protect France’s interests on the world stage.  
 
The continued identification of opportunities for France in Rhodesia 
stemmed from optimistic French interpretations of the country’s future 
prospects. In the immediate aftermath of UDI, a report summarising 
                                                
16 Carraud, Deputy director of Non-Francophone Africa, MAE, to Bellivier. (1969, July 9). 
AL/Rhodésie/1/1. Paris:AMAE. 
17 Carraud to Bellivier. (1969, July 9). AL/Rhodésie/1/1. Paris:AMAE. 
18 DAM. (1969, November 6). Représentation consulaire à Salisbury. AL/Rhodésie/1/1. 
Paris:AMAE. 
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diplomatic affairs prepared for De Gaulle expressed the belief that ‘la 
Rhodésie a quelques chances de son côté’ as it was, 
assez riche pour supporter quelques privations, assez 
forte pour s’opposer aux entreprises de ses ennemis, 
assez proche enfin de l’Afrique du Sud et du 
Portugal pour compter sur leur aide et envisager 
avec eux la constitution, dans la portion méridionale 
de l’Afrique, d’un vaste ensemble animé par un 
nationalisme inverse de celui qui inspire le reste du 
continent.19  
A report from the Afrique-Levant department at the Quai also highlighted 
the likelihood of white Rhodesia’s survival as a result of its strong financial 
position and the support it received from Lisbon and Pretoria.20  
 
Positive French interpretations of the Rhodesian economy persisted into 
1970s, despite the introduction of UN mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia 
in 1968. In June 1971, for example, a report from the Commercial Advisor 
at the French Embassy in South Africa acknowledged that ‘la Rhodésie a 
accompli, depuis l’UDI, une performance d’autant plus remarquable qu’on 
la rapporte au chiffre de sa population blanche forte’.21 Another cable from 
France’s diplomatic representation in Pretoria sent to Paris in May 1974, 
reported ‘une forte expansion’ in 1973 ‘malgrè les sanctions et une 
mauvaise récolte céréalière’ and predicted ‘une nouvelle bonne année’ in 
1974 with ‘les conditions climatiques laissent prévoir une saison record’ and 
‘le secteur minier… en expansion rapide’.22 In the minds of the French 
observing and operating in this region of Central Southern Africa, 
                                                
19 Anonymous. (1965, November 12). Situation diplomatique. 5AG/1/Ely/642. Paris:AN. 
20 AL. (1965, November 23). 5AG/FPU/297/No.35. Paris:AN 
21 Guy, Commercial Advisor, French Embassy, Pretoria, to EF. (1971, June 8). 
5AG/FPU/2132. Paris:AN. 
22 Legendre, French Ambassador, Pretoria, to Sauvagnargues, French Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. (1974, May 30). Pretoria/90/No.389. Nantes:AD. 
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Rhodesia’s economy continued to flourish. This, in turn, is likely to have 
contributed to the continued identification of commercial possibilities for 
France in Rhodesia.  
 
Perceived opportunities in Rhodesia were also founded upon France’s 
existing economic, diplomatic, cultural and personal ties to the region. The 
potential for French profit as a result of foundations laid prior to UDI was 
highlighted in a letter from Smith to Michel Debré, French Minister of 
Foreign Affairs (1968-1969), which described France’s ‘commerce 
traditionnel avec la Rhodésie depuis nombreuses années’ and recorded 
Smith’s ‘plus grand espoir’ that these links should be ‘non seulement 
maintenus mais renforcés et étendus’.23 Although this statement is from a 
Rhodesian perspective, it nevertheless underlines the ways in which the 
established French presence in Rhodesia, built up in the eighteen years 
following the establishment of a Consulate in Salisbury in 1947, created a 
situation in which France could benefit economically from the region after 
1965.  
 
The French themselves also acknowledged how pre-UDI initiatives 
provided the basis for continued French activity in the region. A document 
housed in De Gaulle’s archive from 1965 or 1966, for example, highlighted 
how French exporters would suffer the loss of the Rhodesian market, 
suggesting a pre-existing French economic presence in the region that 
                                                
23 Smith to Debré, French Minister of Foreign Affairs. (1968, August 22). AL/Rhodésie/4. 
Paris:AMAE. 
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would be damaged by UDI.24 Existing cultural ventures were also seen as 
the springboard for further French rayonnement in region. This is apparent 
with regards to the diffusion of the French language where, according to the 
Direction Générale des Relations Culturelles at the Quai, the ‘excellent 
travail’ of the French Department at the University of Salisbury, ‘non 
seulement en milieu européen mais encore en milieu africain’, produced a 
context in which ‘l’étude de notre langue en Rhodésie et en particulier chez 
les Africains’ could continue. 25  Furthermore, in spite of Rhodesia’s 
increasingly reactionary behaviour, the French engaged in Rhodesian affairs 
maintained their hopes that earlier, more formal patterns of relations could 
soon be re-established. This sentiment is expressed explicitly in a report 
prepared by the Direction du Personnel at the Quai in March 1970, which 
claimed that ‘nous conservons l’espoir qu’une modification de la position de 
la Rhodésie nous permettra de reprendre à l’avenir avec elle des relations 
que nous aurions aimé pouvoir maintenir’.26  
 
In the meantime, the French engaged in Rhodesian affairs at the Quai 
sought to protect French stakes in the region. In the aftermath of the 
Rhodesian referendum of 1969, the Direction d’Afrique emphasised the 
importance of sustaining a French diplomatic presence in Salisbury as ‘une 
condition impérative d’une reprise rapide des échanges commerciales entre 
la France et la Rhodésie lorsqu’aura été réglé le conflit qui oppose la 
                                                
24 Anonymous to le directeur. (nd., 1965-1966). Sanctions à l’égard de la Rhodésie. 
5AG1/Sol/656. Paris:AN.  
25 Laurent (RC) to AL. (1970, April 10). AL/Rhodésie/1/1/No.1226. Paris:AMAE. 
26 Alphand, Personnel to Bellivier. (1970, March 12). EU/GB/257/No.12-13. Paris:AMAE.  
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Grande-Bretagne au territoire rebelle’.27 Following the closure of the French 
Consulate in Salisbury in March 1970, the importance of sustaining sources 
of news on the political and economic circumstances in the region was 
reiterated by the Direction des Affaires Economiques et Financières as a 
means of safeguarding French ‘intérêts économiques, par rapport aux autres 
grands pays occidentaux’.28 In keeping with the weight given to cultural 
ventures in Africa more generally, there was also a consistent desire to 
maintain France’s ‘action culturelle’ in Rhodesia.29 In 1969 and 1970, this 
sentiment led the Direction Générale des Relations Culturelles to promote 
the maintenance of a permanent contact with the University of Salisbury as 
‘indispensable’30 to assure ‘une certaine présence culturelle française en 
Rhodésie’. 31  Furthermore, attention was given to the importance of 
promoting the French language amongst the region’s indigenous population. 
This can be seen in measures proposed to ‘encourage l’étude du français en 
milieu autochtone’, a strategy that was described as ‘lucide et payante à 
moyen terme car un jour ou l’autre le Cabinet de Salisbury devra 
comprendre des Africains et pratiquer la promotion économico-sociale des 
autochtones’.32  
 
These instances offer evidence of the ways in which certain French actors 
sought to limit the damage inflicted upon France’s position in the region as 
a result of Rhodesia’s illegality and their desire to pave the way for a future 
                                                
27 DAM to Remouville, ONU, MAE. (nd). AL/Rhodésie/4. Paris:AMAE. 
28 Bellivier to AL. (1969, August 8). AL/Rhodésie/1/1/No.282. Paris:AMAE.  
29 Bellivier to AL. (1969, August 8). AL/Rhodésie/1/1/No.282. Paris:AMAE. 
30 Laurent to AL. (1969, September 30). AL/Rhodésie/1/1/No.1052. Paris:AMAE.  
31 Laurent to AL. (1970, April 10). AL/Rhodésie/1/1/No.1226. Paris:AMAE.  
32 Bellivier to AL. (1969, August 8). AL/Rhodésie/1/1/No.282. Paris:AMAE. 
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re-establishment of a permanent French presence in the region. 
Nevertheless, the Quai remained acutely aware of the prohibitions on 
French action in the region as a result of UDI. Put simply, whilst Rhodesia’s 
white rulers remained unwilling to introduce majority rule, it was 
impossible to pursue actively French interests in the region. However, these 
circumstances did not prevent interested French officials, both in Paris and 
on the spot in Salisbury, from continuing to identify opportunities for 
France in Rhodesia. There was, therefore, an inherent tension between the 
desire to further France’s foreign policy objectives in the Rhodesian context 
and the RF’s insistence on the maintenance of white rule in the region.  
 
France’s Southern African strategy  
 
One strategy implemented in an attempt to overcome this conflict between, 
on the one hand, the reality of Rhodesia’s international status, and, on the 
other, the desire to protect French stakes in the region, was to make use of 
France’s existing regional presence in Southern Africa. French 
representatives based in newly independent Zambia and Malawi, for 
example, continued to act as commercial antennae in the region, through 
their administrative attachment to the more established French base in 
Nairobi.33 Rhodesia’s former federal partners also provided a means through 
which France could continue to disseminate its language and culture 
amongst the African population in Rhodesia. In April 1970, for example, the 
French Embassy in Malawi was charged with guarding ‘un lien avec 
                                                
33 Salisbury to MAE. (1965, November 13). AL/SEAB/14/No.305/06. Paris:AMAE. 
Courson to Salisbury. (1965, November 15). AL/SEAB/14/No.167. Paris:AMAE.  
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l’Université de Salisbury (gestion du Lecteur français, en particulier) et 
d’assurer la continuité de notre présence culturelle en Rhodésie’. 34 
Furthermore, strategies for the spread of the French language adopted 
elsewhere in Anglophone Africa were implemented in Rhodesia. The use of 
French National Servicemen to perform civilian duties, particularly the 
teaching of the French language, was seen in Rhodesia, Zambia, Malawi, 
Kenya and Tanzania, 35  whilst the visit to Rhodesia from a BELC 
representative in August 1969 was part of a longer stay in Anglophone 
Africa, which also included stopovers in Lusaka and Gaborone, the capital 
of Botswana.36 More generally, in spite of Rhodesia’s distinctive status in 
comparison to these independent African nation states, it continued to be 
conceived of as part of a ‘domaine “Afrique Anglophone” classique’.37 This 
characterisation of Rhodesia alongside other English-speaking territories in 
Africa implies that approaches to Rhodesia formed part of a wider French 
strategy towards majority–ruled Anglophone Africa.  
 
However, it was not only the African-governed countries on Rhodesia’s 
borders, but also the white-ruled territories of South Africa, Mozambique 
and Angola, that formed part of France’s Southern African vision at this 
time. With regards to the latter two Lusophone territories, the French had 
viewed the Portuguese approach to colonial rule in Africa with an 
ambiguous combination of scepticism and admiration since the inter-war 
                                                
34 Laurent to AL. (1970, April 10). AL/Rhodésie/1/1/No.1226. Paris:AMAE.  
35 Fielding, British Embassy, Paris, to FO. (1968, January 8). FCO/36/150/9. London: The 
National Archives (TNA). 
Laurent to AL. (1970, April 10). AL/Rhodésie/1/1/No.1226. Paris:AMAE 
36 Bellivier to RC. (1969, May 1). Salisbury/5/No.173. Nantes:AD. 
37 David to Bellivier. (1968, September 6). Salisbury/5/No.909. Nantes:AD. 
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period (Keese, 2007b, p.289). Later, after the independence of Francophone 
Africa, France became an ally to Portugal in Africa, cooperating with the 
Portuguese Empire in economic, military and, to a lesser extent, political 
spheres (Frappat, 1990, p.215), with the French supporting Portuguese 
interests in the UNSC (Alden, 1996, p.15).  
 
For the purposes of this discussion of the setting for Franco-Rhodesian 
relations in the aftermath of UDI, it is interesting to note that many of the 
French companies that operated in Rhodesia also had a presence on the 
ground in Lusophone Africa. The CFP, for example, was active in both 
Mozambique and Angola, whilst Alsthom also had a Mozambican base. In 
addition, the principal French arms in the service of the Portuguese military 
in Southern Africa were Alouette helicopters (Frappat, 1990, pp.215-218), 
which, as we have already seen in Chapter Two, were also popular amongst 
the RRAF. This, in turn, reveals the considerable overlap of French interests 
in Rhodesia and Portuguese-ruled territories nearby, demonstrating the 
existence of broader French interests across the region. More widely, it is 
also noteworthy that the French emphasis on development and infrastructure 
in Francophone Africa and Rhodesia was also apparent in the Lusophone 
context seen, for example, in the role played by a French business 
consortium in the financing of the Cahora Bassa dam project in 
Mozambique (Alden, 1996, p.15). There was, therefore, a shared French 
approach to Africa that was implemented regardless of the artificial national 
boundaries imposed on the continent by European colonialism.  
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South Africa also formed part of the French Southern African vision, a state 
of affairs that, as Chapter One has explored, had its roots in the seventeenth 
century and developed in the years after the Second World War as part of 
France’s wider efforts to secure foreign policy autonomy. In the 1960s and 
1970s, facilitated by the continued break down of relations between London 
and Pretoria over the question of apartheid, French interaction with South 
Africa continued to grow. For example, according to Wood (2008, p.307), a 
feeling of isolation from Britain prompted South African businessmen to 
turn increasingly to other Western European powers, including France and 
Germany. Thus, according to a study produced in 1975 by the Moniteur 
Officiel du Commerce International (MOCI) to encourage French trade with 
South Africa, 
La combinaison de facteurs historiques, politiques et 
économiques font que la France est sans doute le 
pays aujourd’hui le mieux placé pour développer ses 
relations avec l’Afrique du Sud… la France est 
considérée comme le seul véritable soutien de 
l’Afrique du Sud parmi les grands pays de 
l’Occident. Non seulement elle lui fournit l’essentiel 
des armements nécessaires à sa défense, mais elle 
s’est montrée bienveillante, sinon un allié, dans les 
débats et les votes des organisations 
internationales.38 
 
As such, in the 1960s and 1970s, French arms flowed into South Africa - 4 
billion francs of French military material was sold to South Africa in the 
period between 1960 and 1975 (Bach, 1990, p.178) - a strategy that 
furthered France’s national assertion strategy by reducing French 
dependency on the US dollar; increasing access to South African uranium; 
                                                
38 Moniteur Officiel du Commerce International (MOCI). (1975, June 23). No. 143, p.13. 
Cited in Smouts, 1979, pp.321-322. 
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and creating the context in which the NP granted the Centre National 
d’Etudes Spatiales permission to establish a centre for satellite observation 
at Paardefontein (Bach, 1990). By the 1970s, France was also one of South 
Africa’s most important overseas clients, particularly in the nuclear, 
industrial and military domains, where companies from France were in the 
top ten when it came to the ‘big contracts’ that dominated 45% of these 
sectors (Cuddumbey, 1996, p.71; Darbon, 1990, p.245). Amongst these 
French firms was Alsthom who, in consortium with Framatome and Spië 
Batignolles, fended off US, Dutch and Swiss competition to secure a 
contract for the Koeberg nuclear plant (Cuddumbey, 1996, p.71). This, in 
turn, reveals how, as was also the case in Lusophone Africa, many of the 
same companies operated across Southern Africa, demonstrating the 
existence of a broader French approach to the region. Moreover, this 
instance once again underscores the infrastructure and developmental focus 
of France’s engagement with Southern Africa, mirroring the practices 
implemented in Francophone Africa.  
 
Alongside this economic engagement with South Africa, Paris also provided 
Pretoria with an entrée into certain Francophone African states, notably 
Gabon and the Ivory Coast, facilitating the NP’s ‘dialogue policy’, which 
had the objective of improving South Africa’s relations with the rest of the 
African continent as part of a broader strategy to avoid diplomatic isolation 
(Alden 1996, p.14; Konieczna, 2012, p.94). This French initiative, in turn, 
may have had its roots in the failed French efforts to form a counter-pan-
African “club” in 1963, explored in Chapter Two.  
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France’s strong base in South Africa created the context in which France 
could rely on its diplomatic representatives in Pretoria and Johannesburg for 
information on events taking place in Rhodesia, particularly following the 
closure of the French Consulate in Salisbury in March 1970. Throughout the 
1970s, reports from the French mission in South Africa constituted the 
principal means by which Paris was informed of the evolving situation in 
Rhodesia.39 These reports were often based on the South African press40 as 
well as close personal contacts between the French on the ground in Pretoria 
and high-ranking South African ministers, including the Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs, Brand Fourie.41 France’s strong commercial presence in 
South Africa also represented a potential launch pad from which French 
economic interests in Rhodesia could be protected after UDI. These 
opportunities in Rhodesia as a result of the French position of strength in 
South Africa were highlighted by Smith in a letter to De Gaulle, sent in July 
1968, in which he states that ‘French commercial interests have already 
established strong ties with South Africa and so are particularly well placed 
to fill part of the vacuum in Rhodesia’.42  
 
Rhodesia was inextricably linked to South Africa in the minds of the French 
engaged in Rhodesian affairs. In light of the shared desire of the RF and the 
NP to maintain white rule in Southern Africa, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
                                                
39 See the papers repatriated from France’s Embassy in South Africa: Pretoria 89, 90 & 91. 
Nantes:AD.  
40 For example, a Dépêche d’Actualité from March 1970 recounts responses from South 
African journalists to the declaration of a Republic in Rhodesia and a shared ‘sympathie’ 
for the plight of the settlers in the region. 
French Embassy, Pretoria to AL. (1970, March 13). Pretoria/90/No.14. Nantes:AD.  
41 La Belleissue, French Embassy, Pretoria, to MAE. (1977, August 9). 
Pretoria/89/No.1211. Nantes:AD.  
42 Smith to De Gaulle. (1968, July 2). 5AG1/Ély/775. Paris:AN. 
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apartheid South Africa frequently provided a point of reference in French 
descriptions of Rhodesia. A 1968 note summarising the situation in 
Anglophone Africa, for example, likened the segregationist polices 
introduced by Smith’s government to apartheid.43 More specifically, the 
Rhodesian Land Tenure Act of 1969, which reinforced the division of land 
between whites and blacks, was claimed to ‘ouvre la voie à l’Apartheid’ in 
Rhodesia. 44  In this context, the close relations between Salisbury and 
Pretoria were acknowledged, seen in the description of Rhodesia after UDI 
as ‘un état libre aligné sur l’Afrique du Sud’45 and a report about how 
Rhodesia was passing away from ‘l’ombrelle britannique à celle de 
l’Afrique du Sud’.46 The NP was also described as a ‘voisin amical’47 and a 
‘“grand-frère”’48 to Smith’s regime, which held ‘dans ses mains le destin de 
la minorité blanche’ in Rhodesia.49 
 
However, the connections between South Africa and Rhodesia in the minds 
of the French went beyond a mere acknowledgment of the similarities and 
close relations between Pretoria and Salisbury. The factors propelling 
French action in both countries were the same. According to Konieczna 
(2009, p.338), the introduction of a policy of apartheid in South Africa 
weakened British pre-eminence in the region, prompting an intensification 
                                                
43 Anonymous. (1968). Note résumant la situation générale, politique, économique, et les 
affaires en cours dans les états anglophones de l’Afrique occidentale, orientale, central et 
australe. 5AG/FPU/1374. Paris :AN. 
44 DAM. (1970, December 19). EU/GB/257. Paris:AMAE.  
45 Anonymous. (1968). Note résumant la situation générale, politique, économique, et les 
affaires en cours dans les états anglophones de l’Afrique occidentale, orientale, central et 
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46 Bellivier to AL. (1970, January 20). Salisbury/9/No.15. Nantes:AD.   
47 De Luze, French Ambassador, Pretoria, to AL. (1969, June 24). Pretoria/90/No.393. 
Nantes:AD.  
48 Legendre to DAM. (1973, August 30). Pretoria/90/No.647. Nantes:AD.  
49 Legendre to DAM. (1974, June 21). Pretoria/90/No.468. Nantes:AD.  
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of French efforts to raise its modest position in the country and ‘rattraper le 
retard qu’elle a pris par rapport aux autres puissances occidentales’. This 
closely echoes the motivations that underpinned enthusiasm in certain 
quarters for the development of Franco-Rhodesian relations. We have 
already seen, in Chapter Two, how certain French actors, notably those 
linked to the Elysée, relished the growing possibilities for France in 
Rhodesia as a result of Britain’s declining position in its colony. Similarly, 
as has been explored above and in the first half of this thesis, concerns about 
being outdone or left behind by other Western powers were also present 
amongst the French engaged in Rhodesian affairs. Furthermore, these 
shared imperatives make it possible to situate France’s approaches to 
minority-ruled Southern Africa within the broader framework of Franco-
African relations, where the maintenance of French influence was a crucial 
component in a wider project to assure France’s standing on the 
international stage.  
 
France and the question of Rhodesia in the United Nations 
 
The desire to safeguard France’s privileged position in Africa was at the 
heart of De Gaulle’s preference for bilateral relations with African states 
over multilateral contacts. Such sentiments were directed especially towards 
the UN, perceived to be an “Anglo-Saxon” Trojan horse that might damage 
French interests on the world stage. This sentiment, in turn, contributed to 
French suspicion of the involvement of this international organisation in 
colonial affairs (Smouts, 1979, p.252). This French conception of the UN is 
best summarised in the words of Smouts (1979, p.274),  
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Manouevrée par les superpuissances, versatile et 
irresponsable, inutile et genante pour les grands 
dessins de la France, moins l’Organisation des 
Nations Unies interviendrait dans les affaires des 
Etats, meilleure elle serait aux yeux du 
gouvernement français. 
 
France’s commitment to the principle of “non-interference” over the 
question of Rhodesia 
 
This commitment to the principle of “non-interference” is evident in the 
French responses when the question of Rhodesia was raised in the UN. Prior 
to UDI, the French delegation to the UN declared that Rhodesia ‘outrepasse 
les pouvoirs du Conseil de Sécurité’.50 As such, the French consistently 
abstained in all debates concerning Rhodesia, such as in October 1963, in a 
vote for a resolution put forward by 38 delegations, principally from the 
Afro-Asian bloc, which reaffirmed the right of the African majority in 
Southern Rhodesia to self-determination and called upon Britain to take 
action to bring about independence in the region.51 A similar position was 
set out in a note from the Foreign Ministry in April 1965 that instructed 
France’s delegation at the UN to abstain ‘dans l’hypothèse où le Conseil 
aurait à se prononcer sur l’envoi d’émissaires à Londres’ on the grounds that 
‘la situation dans ce pays ne constitue bien évidemment pas une menace 
contre la paix et la sécurité internationales’. 52  
 
                                                
50 ONU, MAE. (1963, September 17). ONU/Decolonisation/1077/No.078. Paris:AMAE.  
51 Seydoux, France’s Permanent Representative to the UN, New York, to MAE. (1963, 
October 17). ONU/Decolonisation/1077/No.2365. Paris:AMAE. 
Seydoux to MAE. (1963, October 18). ONU/Decolonisation/1077/No.2395. Paris:AMAE. 
52 Lacharriere, MAE, to French Representation at UN, New York. (1965, April 28). 
5AG/FPU/428. Paris:AN.  
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In the aftermath of UDI, and in spite of France’s public position of 
opposition to the RF, the principle of “non-interference” continued to be 
applied when Rhodesia was discussed at the UN. On 12 November 1965 
France’s representative in the UN abstained in a Security Council vote for 
the adoption of Resolution 216 that condemned the Rhodesian UDI, on the 
grounds that ‘le conflit entre le Royaume Uni et la Rhodésie du Sud n’est 
donc pas de nature internationale’.53 This attitude was reiterated just a few 
days later in a despatch from Paris to New York that described ‘l’affaire 
rhodésienne’ as ‘un problème intérieur britannique’ and, as such, ‘le Conseil 
de Sécurité n’a pas à statuer à son sujet’.54  France also abstained in votes 
for the adoption of Resolutions 217 (1965), 221 (1966) and 232 (1966).55 
France was, therefore, the sole country not to oppose UDI in the Security 
Council in the immediate aftermath of Smith’s Declaration as well as the 
only power not to vote in favour of a resolution declaring that the situation 
in Rhodesia was a threat to international peace and calling upon states to 
break economic relations with Rhodesia (Smouts, 1979, p.333).  
 
In light of what we already know about France’s desire to halt the spread of 
British and American influence in Africa and, to this end, prevent UN 
involvement in African affairs, it is possible to interpret ‘l’attitude 
indépendante’56 of France towards the Rhodesian question in the UN as a 
continuation of a wider French anti-“Anglo-Saxon” strategy. However, it is 
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important not to overlook France’s deeply rooted legal traditions with 
regards to this matter, which existed alongside the Gaullist hostility towards 
Anglo-American dominance of the UN. According to this view, the UN had 
no jurisdiction in the internal affairs of a state. This judicial approach led the 
French delegation at the UN to maintain throughout the Algerian War of 
National Liberation (1954-1962) that, in spite of the increasingly 
internationalist activities of the Algerian nationalist movement, Algeria was 
an internal French concern and, thus, one in which the UN had no right to 
intervene (Evans, 2012, p.193). This opposition to UN involvement in 
internal affairs was also employed with regards to independent territories, 
seen, for example, in April 1960 when the French delegation vetoed 
Resolution 134 that called upon Pretoria to abandon its racial policies 
(Konieczna, 2009, p.336).  
 
Many of the policy-makers, bureaucrats and diplomats who formulated 
French policy towards Rhodesia in the UN had received legal training prior 
to their postings in the Central Administration or overseas. Roger Seydoux, 
for example, France’s Permanent Representative at the UN (1962-1967), 
who was responsible for many of the French interventions on Rhodesia in 
this context, studied law and political economy at the University of Paris.57 
More generally, Keiger (2001, p.27) has emphasised how graduates of 
Sciences-Po and the Ecole Nationale d’Administration dominated the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This legal background, in turn, is likely to have 
informed the position set forth by the French delegation at the UN that the 
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constitutional links between Great Britain and Rhodesia created an obstacle 
to any external intervention in the crisis, including that directed by the UN. 
The strength of these traditions had led Smouts (1979, p.333) to conclude 
that the French position towards Rhodesia in the UN was, 
purement juridique. Sur le plan politique, la France 
adopte une attitude qui est fréquemment la sienne: 
ne pas voter une résolution mais faire une 
déclaration acceptant le contenu de cette résolution. 
This judicial framework, therefore, provides an important explanation for 
France’s refusal to oppose UDI in the UN in the immediate aftermath of 
Smith’s declaration.  
 
In 1968, however, France’s steadfast application of the principle of “non-
interference” to the Rhodesian case appears to have come to an abrupt end. 
In May, following the Rhodesian Court of Appeal ruling in March that the 
RF was permitted to carry out executions against murderers convicted and 
sentenced prior to UDI, France participated for the first time in a UN vote 
on Rhodesia, supporting the extension of mandatory UN sanctions on all 
goods, including oil, under Resolution 253.58 The decision to discard the 
French tradition of abstaining and vote in favour of Resolution 253 was 
justified by ‘le souci de tenir compte de l’émotion soulevée en Afrique par 
l’évolution de la situation en Rhodésie’.59 However, the French maintained 
that this move ‘n’impliquait aucune modification de nos positions de 
principe… le règlement de cette affaire relève de la compétence interne de 
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la Grande-Brétagne’.60  The fact that the text of Resolution 253 affirmed the 
primary responsibility of Britain for the resolution of the Rhodesian crisis 
reinforces the fact that it was possible for France to vote in favour of this 
resolution, without undermining its legal traditions.61  
 
In the years that followed, the French continued to openly express their 
‘réserve traditionnelle à l’égard de l’intervention des Nations Unies dans 
une affaire qui nous paraît ressortir à la compétence exclusive de la Grande-
Bretagne’, even after the announcement in June 1969 of the new Rhodesian 
constitution and the plans for a Republic. 62  A clear statement of the 
persistence of this outlook came on 24 June of the same year when the 
French delegation abstained in a vote for an Afro-Asian resolution that 
demanded UN members sever all relations with Rhodesia.63 In the minds of 
the policy-makers defining France’s position towards Rhodesia in New 
York, this commitment to the principle of “non-interference” could not be 
altered unless ‘la situation en Rhodésie menaçait la paix ou la sécurité 
internationale ou si le régime de M. Smith commettait un acte d’agression 
contre les Etats voisins’.64 Thus, in cases where Rhodesia was perceived to 
threaten international peace, notably acts of aggression and provocation 
towards Zambia (Resolution 326),65 Botswana (Resolution 403 and 406)66 
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and the People’s Republic of Mozambique (Resolution 411),67 France voted 
in favour of the relevant Resolution. 
 
UK responses to France’s position towards Rhodesia in the UN 
 
The fact that France’s consistent commitment to the principle of “non-
interference” was the result not simply of anti-“Anglo-Saxon” sentiments 
but also an ingrained legal tradition is underscored by British responses to 
France’s position towards Rhodesia in the UN. In spite of France’s 
unwillingness to support the British line in the UN if it meant a departure 
from the French judicial framework, for the most part, the British authorities 
did not view the French stance in a negative light. In fact, in 1966, the FO 
characterised the French position that the Rhodesian problem was 
‘exclusively a United Kingdom’ responsibility as a ‘very correct attitude’.68 
Moreover, the French attitude towards Rhodesia in the UN was described in 
a 1973 briefing from the British Embassy in Paris as ‘generally helpful’ to 
the UK government’s Rhodesian policy.69 France’s legal stance that it was 
the sole ‘right of the colonial power to determine the conditions in which 
any overseas territory comes to independence’ appeared, therefore, to align 
with the British authorities desire to resolve the crisis through bilateral talks 
with the Rhodesians.70  
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The French were often encouraged to abstain so as to help the British 
government maintain this stance. In November 1971, for example, nervous 
about African opposition to an agreement between Smith and Alex Douglas-
Home, UK Foreign Secretary (1970-1974), on a proposed Anglo-Rhodesian 
settlement, Martin Le Quesne, the Deputy Under-Secretary of State at the 
FCO (1971-1974), made a request to the Geoffroy Chodron de Courcel, 
French Ambassador to the UK (1962-1972), that the French delegation 
abstain on any vote opposing the proposed settlement tabled by the Africans 
in the UNSC. 71  This instance serves to emphasise how France’s 
commitment to “non-interference” was sometimes interpreted as supportive 
of the British cause, thus countering the suggestion that the French position 
in the UN was motivated solely by hostility towards the “Anglo-Saxon” 
powers. 
 
Despite sometimes adopting the same stance, the British and French legal 
positions towards Rhodesia in the context of the UN remained substantially 
distinct. In 1973, for example, the UK vetoed a resolution tabled in the UN 
Security Council Sanctions Committee (UNSCSC) calling for the extension 
of the Beira Patrol to Lourenço Marquês (Maputo, Mozambique). In this 
instance, the British found the French abstention frustrating, calling upon 
Paris to take a more proactive stance on resolutions that the British believed 
must also be unacceptable to the French.72 The French delegation, however, 
                                                
71 Le Quesne, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, FCO, to Fingland, FCO. (1971, November 
29). FCO/36/795/21. London:TNA.  
72Byatt, Rhodesia Department, to Le Quesne. (1973, May 22). FCO/36/1401/7. 
London:TNA. 
 184 
maintained their position that Rhodesia was beyond the competency of the 
UN and abstained.  
 
The legal impasse between Britain and France over the question of 
Rhodesia is also evident when the question of a possible reversal of the 
trade embargo was raised following the Smith-Home agreement of 
November 1971. The FCO hoped to be able to end sanctions against 
Rhodesia immediately that the proposed settlement came into effect. The 
Quai, by contrast, insisted that, in light of Resolution 253, the UN must 
revoke sanctions before the embargo could be lifted. The British Embassy in 
Paris were aware of the strength of France’s commitment to this principle, 
emphasising in a note to the Rhodesia Department of the FCO the 
anticipated ‘difficulty’ of getting the Quai to change its position with 
regards to this matter, concluding that there was ‘little point’ in ‘trying to 
convince them at the moment’. The Embassy did, however, highlight the 
possibility that ‘bilateral talks between legal advisors’ ‘at a later stage’ 
might yield more positive results,73 an approach that was backed by the 
Rhodesia Department.74 This impasse with regards to the judicial aspects of 
the Rhodesian crisis did not, however, alter British perceptions of the Quai 
as being ‘well-disposed’ towards the proposed Anglo-Rhodesian 
settlement.75 Britain’s continued representation of France’s position towards 
Rhodesia in the UN in a positive light, as well as the British tendency to 
emphasise the different legal traditions in the multilateral setting as a 
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justification for the Anglo-French divide, underscores the entrenched legal 
position motivating the French approach to Rhodesia in the UN.  
 
Rhodesia and French efforts to prevent Anglophone dominance of the 
UN 
 
That is not to say, however, that fears about Anglo-Saxon dominance were 
entirely absent from French policies towards Rhodesia in the UN. 
Throughout the UDI period, policy-makers and diplomats involved in 
Rhodesian affairs raised their concerns about UK and US control over the 
UNSCSC in contrast to the relative weakness of France and other Western 
European powers. In 1970, for example, the department at the Quai 
responsible for the UN and other international organisations criticised the 
replacement of Algeria with Sierra Leone on the UNSCSC on the grounds 
that the replacement of a Francophone representative with an Anglophone 
one reinforced ‘la neutralité bienvaillante’ of the committee, a state of 
affairs that benefited ‘les entreprises anglo-saxonnes au sein du Comité’. By 
contrast, the shift was allegedly detrimental to French companies.76  
 
The French also resented the ways in which Anglo-American companies, 
perceived to be the main Western culprits when it came to sanctions 
busting, successfully evaded criticism in the UN. This resentment was 
especially acute in light of the frequent naming of ‘les sociétés d’autres 
nationalités’ by Britain and the US in the Sanctions Committee, ‘lorsque le 
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même type d’infraction peut être relevé à l’encontre des dénonciateurs’.77 
This was evident in the case of petrol sales to Rhodesia, where French 
companies were frequently denounced in very public settings for continuing 
to supply oil to refineries in Mozambique which re-exported supplies to 
Rhodesia, despite the belief held by the Quai that Anglo-American 
companies – including Mobil, Caltex and Shell - based in Lourenço 
Marquês accounted for 80% of petrol supplies arriving in Rhodesia from 
Mozambique,78 ‘en violation flagrante tant de l’ordre en conseil britannique 
que de la résolution du conseil de sécurite du 16 decembre 1966’.79  
 
Moreover, France’s commitment to the principle of “non-interference” was 
sometimes framed, most notably by those linked to the Elysée, in terms of a 
wider hostility towards the “Anglo-Saxon” powers. A report housed in the 
archives of the Secretariat of African and Malagasy Affairs, for example, 
criticised the decision to associate France with the petrol embargo against 
Rhodesia in December 1965 as ‘contradictoire avec la position prise 
précédemment (notamment a l’ONU) laquelle consistait à considérer 
l’affaire comme une affaire intérieure entre les Rhodésiens et les Anglais’. 
Beyond this contradiction, the note also highlighted the risks created for 
France in adopting this stance. The French decision was reported as having 
been represented by London and Washington as evidence that, 
la France semblait renoncer à la position privilégiée 
qui est la sienne en Rhodésie, comme en Afrique du 
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Sud. (Au moment où Anglais et Américains sont 
considérés comme des ennemis).80 
The implication, therefore, was that France should adopt a position towards 
the petrol embargo that demonstrated its commitment to the principle of 
“non-inference” not only for the sakes of consistency and adherence to legal 
traditions, but also to maintain France’s upper-hand in Rhodesia and its 
neighbours, an opportunity that was especially appealing due to perceptions 
of Britain’s weakening position in Southern Africa discussed in Chapter 
Two. 
 
It is possible to detect, therefore, the existence of Gaullist concerns about 
the spread of “Anglo-Saxon” influence in Africa alongside, and intertwined 
with, the highly centralised and inflexible French judicial approach that 
provided the framework for France’s position towards Rhodesia in the UN. 
This, in turn, reveals the two main strands of the French approach to 
Rhodesia after UDI. On the one hand was the position advanced by the Quai 
d’Orsay, a stance that was, for the most part, cooperative with the British 
over the question of Rhodesia, albeit within the boundaries imposed by 
French legal traditions. On the other hand, we see a parallel official 
position, more hostile to the United Kingdom and its ally, the United States, 
which situated the French commitment to the principle of “non-
interference” within a wider anti-“Anglo-Saxon” agenda. These two stances 
were not mutually exclusive and there was sometimes overlap between the 
two, as we have seen above in concerns within the Quai about Anglophone 
dominance of the UN and the Elysée’s adoption of French legal traditions to 
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reinforce a position founded on hostility towards Britain and the United 
States. Yet, it is important, nevertheless, to explore in further detail the 
existence of these two opposing positions towards Britain and the United 
States when it came to the Rhodesian question. 
 
Franco-British relations in the Rhodesian context 
 
An entente in Anglophone Africa?: Franco-British cooperation and the 
Rhodesian crisis 
 
As was also the case in a multilateral context, and in keeping with the 
publically friendly state of Anglo-French relations in the 1960s, bilateral 
relations between Britain and France concerning Rhodesia were officially 
founded upon cooperation and alliance. The Quai articulated the French 
position of collaboration with Britain’s Rhodesian policy in the immediate 
aftermath of UDI. On 12 November 1965, following a meeting between 
Patrick Reilly, British Ambassador to France (1965-1968), and Michel 
Habib-Deloncle, French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1962-1966), 
during which Reilly set out the UK government’s position that UDI was an 
act of rebellion, the French Minister made it known to the British 
Ambassador that ‘le gouvernement français condamnait le comportement 
des autorités de Salisbury, ne saurait reconnaître la situation créée par la 
déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance’.81  
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Across the Channel, the British authorities looked to France as an important 
ally over the Rhodesian question. The FO, and after its merger with the 
CRO in 1968, the FCO, kept their counterparts at the Quai well informed of 
the evolving situation in Rhodesia, with Rhodesia featuring on the agenda in 
Anglo-French talks on Africa throughout the UDI period, such as at the 
meetings that took place in Paris in May 197382 and June 1976.83 Informal 
discussions also took place between Britain and France over the Rhodesian 
problem on a frequent basis. In 1969, for example, Leslie Fielding and 
Michael Simpson-Orlebar from the British Embassy in Paris regularly met 
with members of the Department for non-Francophone African territories at 
the Quai to discuss Rhodesia.84 
 
In the documents reporting upon these bilateral discussions, individual 
French diplomats and policy-makers were often described in favourable 
terms, such as Fielding’s characterisation of Jean Guerey, Deputy Director 
for Anglophone Africa at the MAE, as ‘very co-operative and friendly’.85 
This, in turn, demonstrates the existence of positive relations between 
certain members of the British and French Foreign Ministries with regards 
to Rhodesia. These feelings of Anglo-French friendship extended beyond 
the personal, with France repeatedly represented as Britain’s ally over the 
Rhodesian problem and in Africa in general. For instance, in January and 
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June 1967, during two separate tête-à-têtes between the British Prime 
Minister and the French President, Wilson emphasised to De Gaulle Britain 
and France’s ‘intérêts communs’ on the African continent. 86  These 
sentiments continued into the 1970s and were also held by less senior 
members of the British government seen, for example, in May 1973, when 
Le Quesne claimed, during Anglo-French talks on Africa, that ‘British and 
French interests in Africa were important and by and large the same’.87 
 
In the early 1970s, this alleged convergence of interests in Africa was 
situated within wider British efforts to secure friendly Anglo-French 
relations as a foundation for the UK’s entry into the EEC. In November 
1971, following a visit to London from Maurice Schumann, French Minister 
of Foreign Affairs (1969-1973), during which Schumann met with Douglas-
Home and discussed, amongst other things, the question of Rhodesia, a 
public statement was issued by the FCO describing ‘the long and deep-
rooted friendship between the French and the British peoples’ and 
expressing the ‘great satisfaction that this historic friendship will be 
reinforced by Britain’s entry into the European Community’. 88  The 
statement also made references to other nodes of Anglo-French cooperation, 
in particular technical alliances over the Concorde Project and the Channel 
Tunnel.89 This, in turn, reveals Britain’s desire to maintain friendly Anglo-
French relations over Rhodesia to assure the UK entry into Europe. 
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These feelings of friendship and affiliation provided the context in which 
Britain looked to France for support over its Rhodesian policy. French 
cooperation was, according to Gywn Morgan, Labour Party Overseas 
Secretary (1965-1969), ‘essential to the success of economic sanctions’, the 
principal means by the British government hoped to end the Rhodesian 
rebellion.90 This sentiment prompted British efforts to try and get the French 
government to take action against French companies active in Rhodesia 
after UDI. In April 1966, for example, the FO, via the British Embassy in 
Paris, asked the French authorities to warn the Compagnie Française des 
Transactions Internationales against purchasing Rhodesian sugar. 91 
Requests were also made for French help in cutting off oil supplies to the 
breakaway colony. In April 1966, during a conversation between George 
Brown, British Foreign Secretary (1966-1968), and Courcel, the French 
Ambassador in London, requests were made that the CFP follow the lead of 
other companies by operating a petrol-rationing scheme in Mozambique, to 
prevent supplies being re-exported to Rhodesia.92 Higher-level appeals were 
also made to the French regarding oil sales to Rhodesia, with the issue 
raised during talks between Wilson and De Gaulle in June 1967.93 Away 
from the question of the petrol embargo, France was also called upon to use 
its influence beyond the metropole with regards to sanctions-busters, seen 
for example by the request that France speak to Hendrik Verwoerd, Prime 
Minister of South Africa (1958-1966), on Britain’s behalf and impress to 
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him ‘les dangers de l’attitude du gouvernement sud-africain qui peut 
permettre à M. Smith de neutraliser l’effet des sanctions économiques, 
notamment dans le domaine pétrolier’,94 a notable British acknowledgement 
of France’s increasing ability to punch above its weight in the previously 
Anglophone-dominated South Africa.   
 
The British also looked to the French for support in their efforts to find a 
settlement in Rhodesia. In June and July 1971, for example, in an effort to 
avoid too much ‘drama’ over Rhodesia in the UN, Christopher Soames, 
British Ambassador to France (1968-1972), advised Whitehall that a 
forthcoming meeting at the Quai d’Orsay could provide an opportunity, 
to remind the French of our common interest in 
keeping the international temperature as low as 
possible over Southern African affairs and that with 
Kosciusko [Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet, France’s 
permanent representative at the UN (1970-1972)] in 
the chair at New York, the French government could 
have rather a special responsibility over the next few 
weeks.95 
The French responded favourably, with Bruno de Leusse, Director of 
African and Malagasy Affairs at the Quai (1970-1971), agreeing to send 
instructions to Kosciusko to keep in touch with the UK mission in New 
York and consenting for the French to do everything that they could to help 
Britain in the UN, in particular by trying to hold back the Africans, over 
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whom they had considerable sway, if they tried to stir up a debate on 
Rhodesia.96  
 
This significance attributed to French support was especially great 
following the Smith-Home agreement on a proposed Anglo-Rhodesian 
settlement in November 1971. France’s approval of the proposed settlement, 
as well as the close ties between France and its former African colonies, led 
the FCO to express their hopes that France would ‘undertake not to vote 
against’ Britain if the settlement received a hostile response in the UN. This, 
it was hoped, would provide a model for the Francophone African countries, 
whose backing was viewed by the British as ‘vital’ in securing international 
support for the proposed settlement.97 Once again, the Quai’s response to 
this request was favourable, seen by the expression of willingness to send 
instructions to French Ambassadors in Francophone Africa and a 
confirmation from de Leusse that Britain could ‘count on French support 
and assistance’.98 
 
British efforts to secure French backing for the proposed Anglo-Rhodesian 
settlement were not only applied to the French Foreign Ministry. In a sign of 
their awareness of the Presidential Palace’s control over French African 
policy, representatives of the FCO also approached the Elysée. In November 
1971, for example, Soames met with Michel Jobert, the Secretary General at 
the Elysée, to discuss the situation in Rhodesia, requesting that the 
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Presidential Palace use its influence over African leaders, such as the Ivory 
Coast’s Félix Houphouët-Boigny and Senegal’s Léopold Senghor, to get 
them to give the Anglo-Rhodesian settlement, and the arrangements for 
testing its acceptability, careful consideration before ‘jumping into ill-
considered attitudes’. In response, Jobert expressed the French willingness 
to ‘do what they could with the Africans’.99  
 
The British also went to the very top of the Franco-African pyramid, 
Jacques Foccart. In December 1971, for example, Christopher Ewart-Biggs 
met with Foccart and, after presenting “Monsieur Afrique” with substantial 
documentary evidence concerning British policy in Rhodesia, requested that 
Foccart use his influence over French-speaking African leaders ‘to get them 
to approach the question reasonably and to keep the temperature down’. In 
response, Foccart confirmed that ‘he was constantly in touch with the 
francophone African leaders and was on close terms with them’ and that, in 
line with Jobert’s response, as well as the position advanced by the Quai on 
the matter, he would ‘do what he could to help’.100 
 
‘Un test de leur [Britain’s] influence mondiale’:101 French perceptions 
of the UK government’s Rhodesian policy  
 
These requests demonstrate the significance of France, in the minds of the 
British, to the successful resolution of the crisis in Rhodesia, a substantial 
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domestic and international problem facing successive British governments 
in the late 1960s and 1970s. At home, there were tensions between the 
sympathisers of the white Rhodesian community – generally members of 
the Conservative Party, who viewed the white settlers as their “kith and kin” 
(Dowden, 2008, p.132)102 – and more liberal elements in society who 
supported the African nationalist cause – most notably, Barbara Castle, 
described by Hyam (2006, p.370) as ‘Wilson’s fiercest critic on Rhodesia’, 
who constantly pressed the Labour Prime Minister to take firmer action in 
Rhodesia (Childs, 2001, p.110), and the archbishop of Canterbury, the Most 
Reverend Michael Ramsey, who privately advised the British Prime 
Minister that ‘morality demanded the use of force if all else failed’ (Hyam, 
2006, p.367). Overseas, the British government faced great reproach in the 
Commonwealth, especially from new African member states who ‘became 
increasingly vociferous’ in their ‘condemnation of the Rhodesian Front and 
Wilson’s handling of the deepening Rhodesian crisis’ (Watts, 2012, p.87). 
The Commonwealth African states also called upon the British government 
to use force to end the Rhodesian rebellion, with Ghanaian President, 
Kwame Nkrumah, going as far as to suggest that a unified African armed 
force should be deployed in Rhodesia if Britain refused to intervene 
militarily (Coggins, 2006, p.370).  As such, Watts (2012, p.85) has claimed 
that the Rhodesian problem ‘threatened to tear the Commonwealth apart’.  
 
The French perceived of UDI as a crisis of monumental proportions for 
Britain. Both the Quai and the Elysée acknowledged, for example, the 
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negative consequences for the British economy as a result of the 
implementation of an international trade embargo against Rhodesia, not 
least ‘le coût exhorbitant [sic] du pont aérien pour alimenter la Zambie en 
essence’,103 a measure introduced to prevent the severance of Zambia’s oil 
supplies via land from Rhodesia damaging the Zambian copper industry, on 
which Britain, the United States, France and other Western powers were 
highly reliant. A report synthesising the diplomatic situation in December 
1966 prepared for De Gaulle described the dual pressures on Wilson at 
home, as many Conservatives ‘trouvent excessive la sévérité du 
gouvernement à l’égard des rebelles’, whilst ‘la gauche travailliste estime 
les décisions de M. Wilson encore trop timides’.104 Moreover, Wilson’s 
Rhodesian policy was represented as ‘un grave échec politique’ as it 
provided the Conservative Party with an opportunity to attack the Labour 
government.105 
 
The French observing the situation in Rhodesia also acknowledged the 
international problems created for Britain by the crisis. A report following 
the seventeenth Commonwealth Prime Minister’s Conference in January 
1969 described how ‘M. Wilson a fait front à une majorité écrasante de 
nations exigeant une ligne dure’, demonstrating the French awareness of the 
growing opposition Britain faced amongst its former colonies with regards 
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to its handling of the Rhodesian problem. 106  More generally, the 
decolonisation of Rhodesia was represented as, 
particulièrement complexe car il s’agit d’une 
épreuve de force triangulaire où chacun lutte sur 
deux fronts: M. Smith contre la Grande-Bretagne ou 
le movement “Zimbabwe”; Whitehall contre le 
Cabinet rebelle et la politique tout ou rien de MM. 
Nkomo et Sithole; enfin, les africains cherchent 
simultanément à démanteler le regime européen et à 
se dégager de la tutelle britannique.107 
 
Assessments from the Elysée Palace were frequently more damning than 
those emanating from the Quai. A note housed in Foccart’s archive, for 
example, described the Labour government’s policy towards Rhodesia as 
‘incohérente’, the negative consequences of which would, according to the 
author, be added to ‘la déjà trop longue liste de ses échecs africains qu’il 
s’agisse de l’Afrique du Sud, de la Tanzanie, de la Rhodésie, du Nigeria et, 
enfin, du Ghana’.108 In a similar vein, a report from 1966, also kept with 
Foccart’s papers, emphasised Wilson’s ‘échecs africains’. 109  These 
pessimistic interpretations, in contrast to the more neutral and descriptive 
language adopted by the Quai, underscore not only the division between the 
Foreign Ministry and Presidential Palace over Rhodesian affairs, but also 
the persistence of anti-British sentiments alongside France’s position of 
support for Britain’s Rhodesian policy.  
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The pursuit of a French alternative to a bipolar political 
system in the context of Rhodesia  
 
As we have already seen, in the post-war age of bipolarity, this oscillation 
between cooperation and conflict characterised relations not only between 
France and Britain, but also those between France and Britain’s principal 
ally, the United States. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the 
realities of defeat and reconstruction contributed to the French movement 
firmly into the Western “camp”. In spite of this, the French position towards 
the Cold War remained highly ambiguous, with France’s historic suspicion 
of the British and growing anti-Americanism impinging upon France’s role 
in the Western Alliance (Jenkins & Chafer, 1996, p.2). In the context of 
Rhodesia in the post-UDI period, it is possible to identify a microcosm of 
this French approach to the Cold War, which Bozo (2010, p.159) has 
characterised as ‘distinctive’, ‘complex’, and founded upon a ‘paradoxical 
combination of accommodation and dissatisfaction with the status quo’.  
 
The Communist threat in Rhodesia  
 
As Metz (1984, p.518) has argued, ‘cold war considerations and the global 
containment of communism’ were ‘undoubtedly the most important’ factors 
shaping US attitudes towards the decolonisation of Africa. These American 
concerns are clearly apparent in the Rhodesian context. From as early as 
1963, the US increasingly viewed Rhodesia as “the new African time 
bomb”, at risk of Soviet infiltration or, worse still, a potential partner to 
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South Africa and Portugal in ‘an unholy alliance against Black Africa’ 
(Butler, 2000, p.144). In 1964 and 1965, as Rhodesian discrimination 
against Africans increased and violence became more widespread, 
American fears that Rhodesia would create an obstacle to their wider 
strategy of containment on the African continent began to spiral (Watts, 
2012, pp.161-165). According to Horne (2001, p.11), the Cold War context 
remained central to US interpretations of and actions towards Rhodesia in 
the years that followed UDI.  
 
The existence of similar concerns amongst the French observing the 
situation in Rhodesia demonstrates France’s position within the Western 
“camp”. Rhodesia was described by Bellivier, for example, as ‘un "point 
chaud" du globe’, demonstrating how certain French actors perceived of 
Rhodesia as a region vulnerable to infiltration by the East-West conflict.110 
These sentiments are explicitly stated in a 1970 report, also by Bellivier but 
not prepared until after his return to the central administration in Paris 
following the closure of the French post in Salisbury in March 1970, that 
concluded by noting how Rhodesia will have ‘un rôle certain dans l’issue du 
conflit Est-Ouest’.111  
 
France’s situation in the Western “camp” is also apparent in its 
interpretations of the Zimbabwean nationalist movement. In the immediate 
aftermath of the Second World War, French officials feared a ‘Communist 
conspiracy’ in sub-Saharan Africa (Keese, 2007a, p.136), suspecting, for 
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example, that the Rassemblement Démocratique Africaine (RDA) in the 
AOF territories was ‘a Communist satellite organisation’ (Chafer, 2002b, 
pp.104-105) with links to the leadership of the Parti Communist Français in 
Paris, as well as to Moscow (Keese, 2007a, pp.135). In a similar vein, Evans 
(2012, p.160) has described how ‘international anti-communism’ informed 
French approaches to Algeria, with this North African country conceived of 
as ‘another cold-war front’, thus prompting suspicions that the Algerian 
Communist Party was manipulating the Front de Libération National (FLN), 
even if the FLN itself was not Communist. Moreover, perceptions of the 
Communist threat informed the French understanding of non-Francophone 
territories. For instance, Egypt’s major arms deal with the Czechoslovakia 
in September 1955 was viewed as proof that ‘Even if Nasser was not a 
Communist, he was being infiltrated and controlled by the Soviet Union’ 
(Evans, 2012, p.160). Similarly, British West Africa was viewed through 
this Cold War lens, fuelling French anxiety that the Communists would use 
Anglophone Africa as a springboard into the AOF, as part of a major, global 
Communist offensive (Keese, 2007a, p.137). Although, according to Keese 
(2007a, p.138), this Communist threat was more imagined than real, ‘it 
clearly was the point of reference for the activities of the French 
administration’ and contributed to the creation of ‘a real “culture of panic”’.   
 
This ‘point of reference’ was also present in the minds of the French 
operating and observing in the Rhodesian setting, particularly amongst 
certain far-right elements in French society, such as the Comité France-
Rhodésie. Established in January 1966 by right-wing writer and former Nazi 
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collaborator, Marc Augier (also known by the pseudonym Saint-Loup), 112  
this organisation set about informing ‘the French public of the background 
to the Rhodesian problem and other racial problems in Africa’.113 In order to 
achieve this end, the society organised information meetings about 
Rhodesia, such as one held at the Musée Social on 18 March 1966, with 
guest speaker, François d’Orcival, a former OAS supporter and author of 
Rhodésie: pays des lions fidèles (1966),114 a rather one-sided, right-wing 
account of Rhodesia’s history up until and including UDI, with a preface 
written by Smith himself (pp.9-12). In February 1966, the group’s secretary, 
Jean-Pierre Maire, travelled to Salisbury, carrying with him a ‘bidon 
symbolique d’essence’.115 In a televised interview during his visit, Maire 
spoke of his admiration for Rhodesia’s courage to stand up in the world 
struggle against communism.116 It is clear, therefore, that certain far right 
French activists identified with white Rhodesia’s ‘world struggle’ ideology, 
that viewed UDI as a heroic stand for Western civilisation in Africa (Evans, 
2007, pp.180-181) and a defence against ‘Western decrepitude and 
communist encroachment’ (Meredith, 1979, p.44). 
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It is also possible to detect more subtle versions of these fears amongst a 
broader section of French society in the descriptions of African nationalists 
in Rhodesia after UDI. Reports from French “men-on-the-spot” in Salisbury 
frequently remarked upon the links between Zimbabwean nationalists and 
Communist organisations overseas, seen for example in a despatch from 
Bellivier in December 1965 that recorded the influence of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) over ZAPU exiles based in Lusaka, Nairobi and 
Dar-es-Salaam, particularly through dissemination of the Peking Review.117 
Similarly, an account of guerrilla activity in Rhodesia in October 1966 
highlighted Soviet military material being used by the nationalist forces,118 
whilst the aforementioned report prepared for the Centre des Hautes Etudes 
Administratives sur l’Afrique et l’Asie Modernes in 1970 recorded 
Zimbabwean nationalists receiving training in China, Cuba, Russia and 
Algeria.119  
 
Away from the French diplomatic service, the Cold War also provided the 
backdrop for Elysée interpretations of Rhodesia’s native population.  A note 
summarising the situation in Anglophone Africa in 1968, for example, 
emphasised the links between nationalist guerrilla activity in Rhodesia and 
the Communist parties in the USSR, the PRC, Egypt, Cuba and Tanzania.120 
These concerns were also present amongst French intelligence officers 
linked to the Presidential Palace, seen in a 1969 SDECE report 
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concentrating on students with Rhodesian nationality studying in the 
Eastern bloc, which included a detailed statistical breakdown by discipline 
and country. 121  Such attention to detail reveals the persistent French 
preoccupation with Communist infiltration of the African continent and how 
these Cold War concerns informed French interpretations of the 
Zimbabwean nationalist movement.  
 
Preventing “Anglo-Saxon” dominance and maintaining France’s 
foreign policy autonomy 
 
Yet, in spite of French fears of Communist infiltration in Africa, anxiety 
about “Anglo-Saxon” dominance remained an important factor shaping 
French approaches to the continent. As has already been discussed above, 
these concerns manifested themselves particularly in the context of the UN, 
where the French resented a perceived Anglophone dominance of the 
UNSCSC and the subsequent ability of “Anglo-Saxon” companies to escape 
judgement for continuing to trade with Rhodesia, in contrast to the criticism 
targeted against French and other Western individuals and businesses.122 
British and American pre-eminence in the Sanctions Committee was 
conceived of as the result of Britain’s long-standing presence in the region 
and, in particular, its ‘réseau de renseignements très actif’ on the ground in 
Rhodesia, which allowed the collection of extensive information about 
companies and individuals involved in sanctions busting, in contrast to the 
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Quai’s relative ignorance of such matters.123 These obstacles to obtaining 
the full picture of sanctions busting activities in Rhodesia left France 
vulnerable to criticism in the UN, as they often found themselves surprised 
by the information presented to the UNSCSC. This, in turn, led the 
Direction des Affaires Economiques et Financières to conclude that ‘les 
délégations ainsi informées se trouvent mieux armées pour faire justice, 
auprès de l’Organisation des Nations-Unies, des accusations portées souvent 
à tort contre leurs nationaux’.124 Furthermore, Anglo-American control over 
information gathering in Rhodesia, particularly in the economic domain, 
and their subsequent ability to avoid criticism in the UN, was conceived of 
both as a symptom and a cause of “Anglo-Saxon” dominance of ‘cette zone, 
où les sociétés et les investissements anglo-saxons sont prééminents’.125 
British and American strength stood in contrast with France’s relative 
weakness in the region, a position that was made all the more acute in light 
of the perceived opportunities for French economic expansion in Rhodesia 
identified above. 
 
Reports housed in the archives of the Secretariat for African and Malagasy 
Affairs reveal that these sentiments also informed the Presidential Palace’s 
understanding of events taking place in Rhodesia. In 1965, for example, the 
Elysée raised concerns about the introduction of sanctions against Rhodesia 
providing ‘le prétexte d’une intrusion massive des Etats-Unis dans cette 
région’.126 These fears were founded upon American and Canadian military 
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aviation control over the air transportation of oil between Léopoldville and 
Lusaka, a measure that was intended to limit the impact of economic 
sanctions against Rhodesia in its landlocked neighbour, Zambia. According 
to this French report, it was possible that ‘cette affaire de pont aérien serve à 
installer des moyens permettant par la suite une opération militaire 
américaine ou onusienne contre Salisbury’.127 The fact that this position was 
being advanced at the very same time that Washington was orchestrating the 
rise of Mobutu to power in the former Belgian Congo is likely to have 
augmented France’s concerns about “Anglo-Saxon” dominance in the 
Rhodesian context. According to Schraeder (2000, pp.399-400), Foccart 
believed that the US’s close ties to the new Congolese President facilitated 
“Anglo-Saxon” penetration of the largest Francophone country on the 
continent and, as such, represented a clear victory for the US over France in 
Africa. This defeat is likely to have brought the memory of Fashoda to the 
forefront of French minds and reinforced the desire in certain French 
quarters to act in Rhodesia to prevent the region succumbing to the same 
fate.  
 
Fears of an “Anglo-Saxon” conspiracy subsequently informed Elysée 
opposition in March 1966 to British aircraft being sent to Majunga 
(Mahajanga) in the Malagasy Republic128 to assist with the Royal Navy's 
Beira patrol, ‘a maritime-intercept operation’ whereby the RAF and Royal 
Navy (RN) monitored shipping in the Mozambique Channel in an attempt to 
prevent oil reaching Rhodesia from the port of Beira in Mozambique 
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(Mobley, 2002, p.63). After claiming that ‘l’installation de la RAF à 
Majunga n’aurait de sens véritable que dans le cas d’une intervention 
militaire contre Salisbury’, an anonymous report kept with Foccart’s private 
archive asserts that Britain’s motivations for the establishment of a base on 
this former French dependency were uniquely political in their nature.129 In 
particular, emphasis was placed on what was perceived to be Britain’s 
‘utilité ultérieure de Majunga’ : its potential as a base for the British to use 
in the eventuality that they launched a military offensive against the 
rebellious Rhodesians. According to this note, Nairobi and Entebbe 
(Uganda) had been ruled out as potential transit sites through which six 
battalions of Ghurkha soldiers could be deployed from the British military 
base in the Red Sea to the Rhodesian capital, on the grounds that ‘il y a 
encore trop d’amis de l’Afrique du Sud et de la Rhodésie sur ces deux 
aéroports et il est probable qu’ainsi l’effet de surprise sur lequel compte M. 
Wilson, en serait perdu’. In light of this, the author believed that Wilson 
identified Majunga as ‘un aéroport inutilisé et désert’ suitable for the 
establishment of a base that could act ‘comme relais entre Aden et 
Salisbury, s’ils se décident à lancer l’opération militaire’.130 The author of 
the report did not view such an overt attempt to establish a British military 
base in a former French colony favourably. Rather this operation was seen 
as an attempt ‘à irriter gratuitement Paris’ and ‘compromettre les 
francophones’. It was suspected, therefore, that this British initiative was 
not simply an attempt to resolve the Rhodesian crisis. It was also part of a 
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wider strategy by Britain and its ‘Global-masters américains’ to infiltrate 
Francophone Africa and, thus, undermine France’s standing on the world 
stage.131 The Cold War, therefore, provided a crucial backdrop against 
which French interpretations of Rhodesia were formulated, heightening 
fears of “Anglo-Saxon” infiltration of the region and Africa more widely.  
 
Conclusions 
 
In the years after 1965, the setting for French engagement with Rhodesia 
was comprised of an intricate intertwining of the particularities of the 
Rhodesian context with France’s broader foreign policy concerns. The 
settler rebellion against Britain and the white minority’s efforts to stall the 
introduction of majority rule to this region of Central Southern Africa meant 
that it was impossible for France to directly pursue diplomatic, economic or 
cultural relations with the RF. However, for the French engaged in 
Rhodesian affairs, it was not a simple case of severing entirely France’s ties 
with the region. For one, France’s existing presence in the region, alongside 
the perception of Rhodesia as an important node in a wider French strategic 
vision and an awareness of Rhodesia’s economic prosperity and potential, 
contributed to the continued identification of commercial, cultural and 
geopolitical opportunities for France in this British colony. There was also 
the question of the French judicial framework, which viewed Rhodesia as an 
internal British problem whilst constitutional ties existed between Rhodesia 
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and the UK. This, in turn, influenced the French decision not to oppose the 
RF in the UN in the immediate aftermath of UDI.   
 
The French approach to Rhodesia after 1965 was further complicated by the 
overlapping, and occasionally opposing, imperatives that informed French 
foreign policy in the second half of the 1960s and 1970s. This is especially 
evident with regards to France’s relations with Rhodesia’s colonial ruler, the 
UK, and its closest ally, the USA. On the one hand, France was an 
important supporter of British efforts to resolve the Rhodesian crisis and 
friendly, cooperative contacts characterised Quai-FCO exchanges with 
regards to the situation in the region. On the other hand, certain French 
actors, particularly those linked to the Elysée, were highly cynical about 
British policy in Rhodesia and in Africa more generally, indicating that the 
stance of cooperation as advanced by the French Foreign Ministry may not 
have been so staunchly supported by certain members of Foccart’s cellule 
africaine. Similarly, looking to the Cold War context more broadly, anti-
communism and fears about Soviet or Chinese infiltration of the African 
continent conditioned French understanding of the situation in the region. 
Yet, hostility towards the “les Anglo-Saxons” and concerns about Anglo-
American dominance on the African continent and in the UN fuelled an 
alternative strand in the French approach to Rhodesia. It is possible to 
identify in the Rhodesian case study, therefore, France’s wider foreign 
policy objectives on a micro-scale, albeit sometimes disguised or distorted 
by the reality of Rhodesia’s illegal standing on the international stage. Thus, 
as had also been the case before 1965, French policy in Rhodesia after UDI 
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was intertwined with and dependent upon France’s broader foreign policy 
objectives.  
 
Concerns about communist or “Anglo-Saxon” infiltration were not uniquely 
present amongst those in the Presidential Palace. Certain French diplomats 
and policy-makers based in the central administration at the Quai expressed 
their reservations about the spread of British and American influence in 
Southern Africa and beyond. Yet, the ability of representatives of the 
French Foreign Ministry to act upon these imperatives was limited by the 
strict, diplomatic parameters resulting from Rhodesia’s illegal status. By 
contrast, on the basis of what we know about Elysée pre-eminence over 
African affairs in the post-colonial period and the consequent development 
of an alternative, opaque system of relations with France’s former African 
colonies – a network in which, as we have already seen in Chapter Two, 
certain Rhodesians participated - it is possible to hypothesise that there were 
certain private and state actors linked to Foccart’s cellule africaine more 
willing to contemplate continued Franco-Rhodesian engagement so as to 
further a wider, Gaullist foreign policy agenda. It is interesting to note, by 
way of a provisional response to this hypothesis, that concerns about 
Communist and “Anglo-Saxon” infiltration of Rhodesia appeared to be 
heightened in reports emanating from those operating within or on behalf of 
the Presidential Palace. This can be seen in the detailed enquiries into 
Communist links with Zimbabwean nationalists and explicit statements of 
concern about US and UK infiltration of Southern Africa discussed above. 
The extent to which this theory can be usefully applied to the Rhodesian 
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context will be explored at length in Chapter Four. For the purposes of this 
chapter’s discussion of the setting for French policy making in Rhodesia 
after UDI, it is important to stress how, after UDI, France’s position towards 
this British colony was increasingly divided between that advanced by the 
Quai and an alternative, para-official stance as set out by the Elysée and its 
African operatives. This was a split that not only mirrored the patterns of 
France’s relations with its former dependencies in West and Equatorial 
Africa, but also built on precedents in Franco-Rhodesian relations 
established in the early 1960s and explored in Chapter Two. In the context 
of post-UDI Rhodesia, this division was to become crucial to the shape of 
French engagement with this breakaway British colony.  
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Chapter Four 
France and Rhodesia after 1965: implementing policy  
 
Chapter Three of this thesis set out the foreign policy landscape that 
underpinned French policies towards and perceptions of Rhodesia in the 
years that followed Ian Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
from Britain on 11 November 1965. Some factors shaping the backdrop 
were specific to the Anglophone African setting, notably Rhodesia’s pariah 
status on the international stage and France’s relations with Rhodesia’s 
minority and majority-ruled neighbours. Yet other elements were common 
to French foreign policy more generally. An established French judicial 
framework, for example, was an important factor in shaping France’s 
position towards Rhodesia after UDI. In addition, the persistent desire to 
maintain France’s position on the African continent; relations, both friendly 
and hostile, with Britain and the United States; and France’s Cold War 
strategy all continued to contribute to the multifaceted framework within 
which French actors engaged in Rhodesian affairs approached this 
breakaway British colony. Thus, the logic of France’s policies towards 
Rhodesia after UDI, as had also been the case after 1965, was 
interconnected to, and dependent upon, a wider French foreign policy 
universe. The resilience of the French foreign policy mind-set in the 
Anglophone African setting, in the face of Rhodesia’s illegal status, adds 
further weight to the argument set out in the first part of this thesis, that 
France’s post-colonial relations with Africa were not as exceptional as 
hitherto has been presented by scholars.  
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In addition, the discussion of these different imperatives brought to light the 
increasing fragmentation of France’s approach to Rhodesia in the aftermath 
of UDI, between an official stance as adopted by the Quai, which publically 
opposed the Smith regime and sought, within the limitations of the existing 
French judicial framework, to support Britain’s Rhodesian policy, and a 
parallel, quasi-official position associated with the Elysée, which placed 
much greater stress on French hostility towards the “Anglo-Saxon” powers 
in Southern Africa. Although, as the previous chapter identified, these 
positions were not mutually exclusive, this separation builds on patterns 
established in Franco-Rhodesian relations in the years immediately 
preceding UDI, whilst also pointing to a wider continuity with French 
relations towards its former sub-Saharan African colonies, whereby African 
affairs were the domaine réservé of the Presidential Palace, in contrast to 
the limited influence exercised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Chafer, 
2008, pp.39-40, Médard, 2005, p.40). This, in turn, adds further weight to a 
central argument of this thesis that the modes of French interaction with its 
former sub-Saharan colonies were not unique, but reproduced in French 
engagement with the British colony of Rhodesia.    
 
It is the objective of this chapter to unpick this argument in more detail by 
analysing how the foreign policy-making landscape set out in Chapter Three 
operated in practice in the post-UDI Rhodesian context. Taking as its 
starting point the divide between the Quai and the Elysée with regards to 
African affairs, a bifurcation that also manifested itself through French 
perceptions of Rhodesia after UDI, this chapter will explore official French 
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policy towards Rhodesia, as formulated and implemented by bureaucrats 
and diplomats from the Foreign Ministry, as distinct from the parallel, 
quasi-official strategies pursued by those linked to the Presidential Palace. 
The first section will investigate the former, unpicking in detail the public 
face of France’s Rhodesian policy in the aftermath of UDI. Although 
Franco-African relations in the post-colonial period were dominated by the 
President and his cellule africaine - an argument that this chapter hopes to 
reinforce through the Rhodesian case study - it is nevertheless important to 
give consideration to the official French position advanced by the Quai in 
bilateral relations with Britain and in multilateral arenas, including at the 
UN. Furthermore, as the previous chapter revealed, many French 
bureaucrats and diplomats viewed the situation in Rhodesia through the 
same foreign policy lens as those state and private actors linked to the 
Elysée, but found themselves limited by diplomatic conventions resulting 
from Rhodesia’s illegal status and legalistic responses to Rhodesia’s 
constitutional ties with the UK government. Thus, it is important not to 
discount entirely the Quai perspective and its participation in France’s 
Rhodesian policies after UDI.  
 
The remainder of the chapter will be dedicated to the exploration of 
France’s quasi-official Rhodesian policy and how this policy was 
implemented through state and private actors, metropolitan French 
companies and Francophone Africans. This discussion will be broken down 
into three sections. The first will concentrate on the involvement of 
members of the Elysée’s cellule africaine in Rhodesia after UDI. Chapter 
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Two of this thesis revealed the initial contacts between Rhodesian settlers 
and certain representatives of Foccart’s African cell in the immediate 
aftermath of Francophone African decolonisation. This chapter will explore 
the development of these relations following UDI, focusing especially on 
how the particular nature of the Presidential Palace’s participation in 
French-speaking sub-Saharan African provided the motivation, the model 
and the means for French engagement with Rhodesia’s white rulers.  
 
The final two parts will explore how this parallel French policy was 
implemented through actors outside of the French state. According to 
Médard (1997), the close links between France and Africa were founded 
upon the instrumentalisation of patrimonialism and the subsequent 
confusion between the public and private spheres (p.23). This system, 
‘where business is blithely mixed with politics’ contributed to the 
‘intrinsically corrupt nature’ of Franco-African relations (p.26). This view 
has been substantiated in works on the Franco-African réseaux, including 
Glaser and Smith’s (1992) investigation into Ces Messieurs Afrique which 
describes how ‘Gaullists, freemasons, intelligence agents, adventurers, 
advisors of all sorts, and spooks (barbouzes)’ (Bourmaud, 2012, p.213), 
under the direction of Foccart and his cellule africaine, implemented 
France’s African policy. This section will analyse the role played by private 
French individuals and companies, operating principally in the economic 
and military domain, analysing more broadly how the blurring of the lines 
between private and public action created opportunities for the continued 
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pursuit of French relations with Rhodesia’s European settlers alongside 
France’s official condemnation of white rule on the African continent.  
 
Another central feature emphasised in the scholarly analysis of Franco-
African post-colonial relations is the pivotal role played by Francophone 
Africans in the cultivation and maintenance of the close ties between France 
and Africa. Médard (1997, p.33) has applied models of clientelism to 
Franco-African relations, stressing how African clients were more than 
mere puppets of their French patrons. More specifically, Charbonneau 
(2008, p.2) has argued that security policy was the product of relations 
between French and African transnational élites, and their mutual interest in 
sustaining and reproducing the status quo, and was, as such, ‘Franco-
African’ rather than purely ‘French’. In light of these arguments, the final 
part of this chapter will investigate the involvement of Francophone 
Africans in the Franco-Rhodesian connection after UDI, analysing how the 
majority leaders of independent French-speaking Africa interacted with the 
white-minority rulers of Anglophone Africa. It is the aim of this chapter, 
therefore, to unpick the official and quasi-official dimensions of French 
policy towards Rhodesia after 1965 and investigate the ways in which 
existing patterns for Franco-African relations were applied, adapted and 
distorted in the unique setting of a breakaway, white minority-ruled 
Anglophone territory.  
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Official relations between the French state and Rhodesia  
 
France’s official position of opposition to UDI and its condemnation of the 
actions of the Rhodesian Front, a stance that was set out clearly in a 
statement by Couve de Murville on 12 November1 and explored in further 
detail in Chapter Three, had a number of practical consequences. Firstly, it 
informed the progressive severance of formal French diplomatic ties with 
the white government in Salisbury, commencing with the almost immediate 
recall of Desparmet, the French Consul in Rhodesia, who returned to Paris 
on 19 November 1965.2 The Commercial Attaché to the French post was 
also withdrawn from Salisbury.3 Thereafter, there remained at the French-
run office in the Rhodesian capital a skeleton diplomatic operation, 
managed by Jean Bellivier, the Consul-in-Charge, who had ‘residual 
functions’ rather than the responsibilities of a fully-fledged Consular 
Officer,4 and was assisted by Mrs A. Foster, head of the intermediary 
chancellery, Mr J. L. Duclion, who oversaw press and information, Frank de 
St. Jorre, a British national who had been associated with the commercial 
post since the late 1950s and who continued to act as Commercial Secretary 
after UDI, and a typist.5 In addition, a French office remained open in 
Bulawayo, a post that had been supervised on behalf of France by a British 
                                                
1 Couve de Murville to Courcel. (1965, November 11). MAE. (2003). DDF 1965. Vol.2. 
No.259, p.584. 
2 Limairac, Personnel, to Desparmet. (1965, November 12). AL/SEAB/14/No.166. 
Paris:AMAE. 
Desparmet to MAE. (1965, November 15). AL/SEAB/14/No.307. Paris:AMAE.  
3 Courson to Dalberto, Commercial Attaché, French Consulate, Salisbury. (1965, 
November 15). AL/SEAB/14/No/167. Paris:AMAE.  
4 Mansfield to Bottomley, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Southern Africa & 
Rhodesia, FCO. (1969, October 20). FCO/36/589/19. London:TNA. 
5 Desparmet to MAE. (1965, November 19). AL/SEAB/14/No.319. Paris:AMAE.  
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national named James Gilchrist since its establishment in 1953.6 A French 
diplomatic representation of this order remained until Smith’s declaration of 
a Republic on 11 March 1970 ‘rend inévitable la suspension des activités’ of 
the French post in Salisbury.7 Eleven days later, on 22 March, this decision 
was put into effect and the doors of the French Consulate in Century House 
East on Baker Avenue were closed, marking the formal end to France’s 
twenty-two and a half year diplomatic presence in the region.8  This state of 
affairs remained unchanged until Rhodesia’s independence as Zimbabwe in 
1980, when a French Embassy was opened in Harare.  
 
Official economic relations between France and Rhodesia followed a 
similar pattern of gradual lessening, leading ultimately to the termination of 
formal commercial ties. This process mirrored and responded to the 
gradualist approach to economic sanctions adopted by the British Labour 
government. Immediately after UDI, alongside a range of other measures 
aimed to financially weaken the Rhodesian regime, the British government 
banned imports of Rhodesian tobacco and sugar to the UK, and prohibited 
the export of arms to Rhodesia (Minter & Schmidt, 1988, p.212). The Quai 
responded almost straight away, pledging that France would no longer 
purchase Rhodesian tobacco and openly affirming its commitment to the 
prevention of French arms exports, in particular helicopters, to Rhodesia.9  
                                                
6 Personnel to AL. (1954, January 1). AL/SEAB/2/No.1. Paris:AMAE. 
Ministry of External Affairs, Rhodesia. (1970, March 1). The Diplomatic and Consular List.  
AL/Rhodésie/1. Paris:AMAE.  
7 Alphand to Salisbury. (1970, March 12). EU/GB/257/No.12-13. Paris:AMAE. 
8 Alphand to Salisbury. (1970, March 12). EU/GB/257/No.12-13. Paris:AMAE.  
9 Couve de Murville to Courcel. (1965, November 11). MAE. (2003). DDF 1965. Vol.2. 
No.259, p.584. 
François-Poncet. (1965, November 15). 5AG/FPU/428. Paris:AN. 
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Further products were added to the embargo list by the UK government in 
early December, including asbestos, chrome, steel and beef, leaving just five 
per cent of Rhodesia’s previous exports to Britain outside of the trade 
embargo (Minter & Schmidt, 1988, p.212). In the months that followed, the 
French government confirmed its cooperation with this programme of 
sanctions by introducing an embargo on sugar purchases, suspending export 
credits to Rhodesia and advising French industrialists to find new suppliers 
of chrome and asbestos.10 Moreover, in December 1965, in response to 
Wilson’s announcement that oil imports into Rhodesia were banned 
(Meredith, 1979, p.57), the French government called upon ‘toutes les 
principales Sociétés françaises engagées dans le commerce international du 
pétrole et des produits pétroliers à cesser toute livraison à la Rhodésie’ and 
declared its intention to refuse export licences for Rhodesia on any petrol 
products from French-owned refineries.11 Official French policy towards 
Rhodesia after UDI was characterised, therefore, by a progressive severance 
to relations and, ultimately, an end to formal French ties with this 
breakaway British colony, in support of UK policy. 
 
However, behind this public policy of opposition, there is a more complex 
picture of relations between the French state and white Rhodesia, which 
corresponds to the continued identification of opportunities for France in the 
region after UDI explored in Chapter Three. In the first instance, state-led 
cultural initiatives continued after UDI, albeit on a relatively small scale and 
often linked to wider French regional strategies. In November 1967, the 
                                                
10 AL. (1966, April 28). La France et l’Afrique du Sud devant la crise rhodésienne. 
AL/SEAB/1966/13. Paris:AMAE. 
11 Jordan. (1965, December 20). 5AG/FPU/297/No.234. Paris:AN. 
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British government received reports of French National Servicemen 
performing civilian duties in Rhodesia and receiving payment from Ian 
Smith’s regime.12 The Quai denied these allegations, claiming that France 
did not recognise Rhodesia and that the supply of National Servicemen and 
technical assistance to the breakaway state was, therefore, impossible.13 Yet, 
a report from April 1970 from the Direction Générale des Relations 
Culturelles at the central administration suggests that, to the contrary, ‘un 
Volontaire du Service National Actif’ was posted as a lecturer in the 
department of French at the University of Salisbury.14  Other state-led 
cultural ventures included visits to Rhodesia organised by BELC in January 
1968 and August 1969;15 plans for a television-based French-language 
teaching programme in Rhodesian schools;16 the allocation of 3000 francs to 
the French consulate in Salisbury for the purchase of French-language 
books in 1969;17 and the continued operation of the Alliance Française in 
Salisbury.18 The branch remained open throughout the UDI period to the 
present day, celebrating its sixtieth anniversary in 2011.19 Although these 
ventures were relatively minor in their outreach, they represent a continued 
official effort to maintain a French cultural presence in Rhodesia after UDI, 
despite the end of formal relations with this British colony. This, in turn, is 
                                                
12 Davidson, MP for Aberdeenshire West, to Thomson, Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Affairs. (1967, December 20). FCO/36/150/1. London:TNA. 
13 Fielding to FO. (1968, January 8). FCO/36/150/9. London:TNA. 
14 Laurent to AL. (1970, April 10). AL/Rhodésie/1/1/No.1226. Paris:AMAE 
15 David to Bellivier. (1968, September 6). Salisbury/5/No.909. Nantes:AD. 
Bellivier to RC. (1969, May 1). Salisbury/5/No.173. Nantes:AD.  
16 MAE to Salisbury. (1968, December 12). Salisbury/5/No.1219. Nantes:AD. 
17 MAE to Salisbury. (1969, March 17). Salisbury/5/No.1295. Nantes:AD.  
18 David to Bellivier. (1968, September 6). Salisbury/5/No.909. Nantes:AD. 
19 Ambassade de France à Harare. (2011, 1 November). L’Alliance Française de Harare 
fête ses 60 ans! Retrieved July 24, 2013, from http://www.ambafrance-zw.org/L-Alliance-
Francaise-de-Harare.  
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in keeping with the wider privileging of cultural action as a means of 
preserving French influence in Africa.  
 
These official efforts to maintain links with Rhodesia were not confined to 
the cultural sphere. Certain members of the central administration also 
remained in direct contact with members of Rhodesia’s settler government, 
including P. K. van der Byl, a close ally of Smith who frequently 
represented the RF overseas under the code name 001(R), in his roles as 
Deputy Minister for Information (1964-1968), Minister of Information, 
Immigration and Tourism (1968-1974, 1977-1979), and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs (1974-1979). In 1966, van der Byl recorded attending a luncheon in 
Paris, hosted by Ernest-Antoine Seillière, who was based in the Direction 
des Affaires Economiques et Financières. Also present was Jean François-
Poncet, who, in his capacity as Deputy Director for Africa at the Quai 
(1963-1965) travelled to Salisbury on a number of occasions prior to UDI, 
including a visit in 1963,20 and was, according to van der Byl, ‘quite well 
disposed’ to the Rhodesian cause. 21  These patterns were replicated 
elsewhere in French government, seen, for example, in the meeting that is 
reported to have taken place in 1966 between van der Byl and Charles de 
Chambrun, Secretary of State for External Commerce (1966-1967), 
ostensibly in public view at the Ministry. During this encounter, the 
Minister for External Commerce is alleged to have agreed to do nothing to 
inhibit the development of Franco-Rhodesian commerce and requested that 
                                                
20 Desparmet to Paris. (1963, June 24). AL/SEAB/19/No.51. Paris:AMAE. 
21 Van der Byl. (1966). Smith Collection (SC)/9/TS4/11. Grahamstown:CL. 
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van der Byl provide him with a list of trading requirements that France 
might be able to help with Rhodesia with.22  
 
Certain representatives of the French legislature also travelled to Rhodesia 
after UDI. In 1966, Ian Smith invited Franck Cazenave, the RD deputy for 
Gironde, and a founding member of the France-Rhodésie parliamentary 
friendship group, to visit Salisbury. Four other deputes, two of whom were 
amongst the original members of the Groupe France-Rhodésie, 23  also 
received invitations from the Rhodesian Prime Minister: Lucien Neuwirth 
(Union pour la nouvelle République, Loire; parliamentary administrator 
(questeur)) Jean Montalat (Socialiste, Corrèze), Michel d’Aillières 
(Républicains indépendants, Sarthe), and Jean Valentin (non inscrit, 
Charente).24 The latter four declined this invitation.25 By contrast, despite 
being strongly advised against travelling to Salisbury by Guerey, the Deputy 
Director for Anglophone Africa at the Quai,26 Cazenave set about making 
plans for ‘une “mission de bonne volonté non-officielle”’ to Rhodesia.27 
During his week long stay, which took place between 27 February and 5 
                                                
22 Van der Byl. (1966). SC/9/TS4/11. Grahamstown:CL.  
23 D’Aillières and Valentin were amongst the original members of the Groupe France-
Rhodésie, formed a meeting on 25 October 1963, where d’Aillières was nominated as one 
of the group’s Vice Presidents.  
Assemblée Nationale. (1963, October 25). Procès-verbal de la reunion constitutive du 
Groupe France-Rhodésie. AL/SEAB/27. Paris:AMAE. 
24  Afrique. (1966, February 1). AL/SEAB1966/13. Paris:AMAE.  
AN. (nd). Base de données des deputes français depuis 1798. Retrieved July 24, 2013, from 
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/sycomore/index.asp 
25 Alphand, AL, to French Embassy, London. (1966, February 19). 
AL/SEAB1966/13/No.369/70. Paris:AMAE.  
26 Afrique. (1966, February 16). Projet de voyage en Rhodésie de M. Cazenave. Deputé à 
l’Assemblée Nationale. AL/SEAB1966/13. Paris:AMAE.   
27 Afrique. (1966, February 16). Projet de voyage en Rhodésie de M. Cazenave. 
AL/SEAB1966/13. Paris:AMAE.  
Paris to London. (1966, February 20). Londres/1506/369/70. Nantes:AD 
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March 1966,28 Cazenave is reported in the Rhodesian Press as having met 
with Ian Smith, Bruce Mussett, Minister of Commerce and Industry, James 
Graham, Marquess of Graham, Minister of External Affairs, and ‘a cross-
section of industrialists and businessmen’ from Salisbury, Bulawayo, the 
Lowerveld, Kariba and the Umtali region.29  
 
Cazenave’s visit reveals the desire of certain French government 
representatives to continue to cultivate Franco-Rhodesian economic ties, 
despite official French adherence to British, and later UN, sanctions 
legislation. The type of contacts that Cazenave made, as well as his visits to 
key commercial and industrial hubs, suggests that economic motivations lay 
at the heart of his visit. The fact that Cazenave is also quoted as having said 
“I believe Rhodesia is a country with a great future” reinforces this point.30 
Moreover, there is a sense in which this interest in the expansion of French 
commerce in Rhodesia went beyond the individual level. Although 
Cazenave’s visit was not carried out under official auspices,31 during his 
stay, the Assemblée Nationale député represented his mission as part of a 
wider French national project in Rhodesia. For example, he is recorded as 
having asserted that ‘the general attitude in France was one of sympathy 
towards Rhodesia’, claiming that he would report back to the Franco-
                                                
28 Alphand to French Embassy, Salisbury. (1966, February 19). AL/SEAB/1966/13/No.15. 
Paris:AMAE.  
29 Anonymous. (1966, March 1). ‘Sad error’ on Rhodesia, says Deputy. The Rhodesia 
Herald. 
30 Anonymous. (1966, March 1). ‘Sad error’ on Rhodesia, says Deputy. The Rhodesia 
Herald. 
Bellivier to MAE. (1966, March 9). Londres/1506/No.39410/13. Nantes:AD.  
31 Alphand to French Embassy, London. (1966, February 19). 
AL/SEAB1966/13/No.369/70. Paris:AMAE. 
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Rhodesian Parliamentary Committee and the Minister of Foreign Affairs on 
his visit.32  
 
 
Figure 1: Franck Cazenave.33 
 
British and Rhodesian archival material indicates that there was, in fact, 
some central support for the growth of Franco-Rhodesian trade after UDI. 
According to a note housed in Ian Smith’s archives, an official French 
bulletin published in January 1966 contained an announcement that brought 
to ‘the attention of French exporters… the quarrel which presently exists 
                                                
32 Anonymous. (1966, March 1). ‘Sad error’ on Rhodesia, says Deputy. The Rhodesia 
Herald.  
33 AN. (nd). Base de données des deputes français depuis 1798. Retrieved July 24, 2013, 
from http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/sycomore/index.asp 
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between the Governments of Britain and Rhodesia.’ The statement went 
further, stating that ‘the cessation of trade between these two countries 
[Britain and Rhodesia]… represents a unique opportunity for French 
exporters’.34 The existence of this announcement is verified in a telegram 
from the British Embassy in Paris to the FO that reported how a British 
Minister in Paris ‘protested orally [to the Quai] about a notice in the official 
trade journal encouraging French exporters to supplant us in Rhodesia’.35 
The British government certainly seemed to believe that the French 
government was directly involved, seen by the reply from Whitehall, 
instructing the British Embassy to bring to the attention of the French the 
potential consequences if they continued ‘actively to encourage their 
businessmen to replace us in the Rhodesian market’.36  
 
Moreover, despite France’s rhetoric of support for the trade embargo against 
Rhodesia, manifest in Quai inter-departmental correspondence, bilateral 
exchanges with the FCO, and the French delegation at the UN’s vote in 
favour of Resolution 253 implementing UN mandatory sanctions against 
Rhodesia in 1968, these practices appear to have continued into the 1970s. 
In 1971, according to one Rhodesian source, the Quai gave its approval, 
‘although admittedly couched in guarded terms’, for the sale of Rhodesian 
ferro-chrome and lithium into France.37 Although this report cannot be 
                                                
34 Van der Byl. (1966). SC/9/TS4/7. Grahamstown:CL. 
35 Paris to FO. (1966, March 11). FO371/188007/4. London:TNA. 
36 FO to Paris. (1966, March 16). FO371/188007/4. London:TNA. 
37 Carberry, Rhodesia Department, FCO, to FCO. (1976, April 8). FCO/36/1907/9. 
London:TNA. 
Henderson, British Embassy, Paris, to FCO. (1976, May 13). FCO/36/1907/13. 
London:TNA.   
Van der Byl to Smith. (1971, March 8). SC/15(TS3)/8. Grahamstown:CL. 
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verified directly by French archival material, reports of ferro-chrome and 
lithium being imported by France provide evidence of this approval leading 
to action.38  
 
This Rhodesian description of the Quai’s response to efforts to expand 
Franco-Rhodesian commerce as being ‘guarded’ is also interesting because 
it re-emphasises the persistent tension between the identification of 
opportunities for France in this region of central Southern Anglophone 
Africa, especially in the economic domain, and the inherent limits to French 
official action in Rhodesia created by UDI. This was a tension that many in 
the Quai acknowledged could not be resolved whilst the white minority’s 
rebellion against Britain continued. Diplomatic conventions, UN sanctions 
legislation and France’s public alliance with Britain all combined to make it 
impossible for any substantial, direct economic or political relations to 
develop between the French state and the RF. Put simply, despite the efforts 
of certain representatives of the Quai, other French ministries and the 
French legislature to cultivate relations with Rhodesia, the constraints on 
official French action in Rhodesia after UDI were too great for this to 
translate into a formalised Franco-Rhodesian friendship. 
 
  
                                                
38 Reilly, British Embassy, Paris, to FO. (1966, April 13). FO/371/188007/11. London:TNA. 
Callaghan, UK Foreign Secretary, to British Embassy, Paris (1975, July 21). 
FCO/36/1907/14. London:TNA  
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Parallel official relations between France and Rhodesia 
 
At the top of the French Executive, however, the restrictions placed on 
French interaction with Rhodesia appear to have been less constraining. In 
particular, relations existed between those engaged in African affairs at the 
Elysée and high-ranking Rhodesians, who, after UDI, travelled to Paris, and 
other European capitals, in an attempt to expand Rhodesia’s overseas 
commerce and garner support for their cause. 39  These Rhodesian 
representatives included van der Byl; H. R. T. (Harry) Oxley, an assistant 
secretary at the Ministry of External Affairs; W. C. Hawes, a trade 
commissioner at the Rhodesian High Commission, Rhodesia House, in 
London, who was also part of the CAF delegation that visited Paris in 
January 1963;40 and Geoffroy Follows, a former member of the FISB and 
close advisor on intelligence matters to Roy Welensky, who after the 
Federation’s dissolution in 1963, continued to operate in an advisory 
capacity for the RF,41 and was also involved in Franco-Rhodesian efforts to 
form a counter-pan-African club discussed in Chapter Two.42  
 
Of particular note on the French side of the Franco-Rhodesian connection 
was the involvement of Jean Mauricheau-Beaupré, who, as we have already 
seen, first became embroiled in Rhodesian affairs in the early 1960s.43 After 
UDI, Mauricheau-Beaupré remained in touch with his Rhodesian associates, 
                                                
39 Van der Byl. (1966). SC/9/TS4/11. Grahamstown:CL. 
40 Courcel to MAE. (1962, December 28). AL/SEAB/17/No.5056. Paris:AMAE.  
41 Anonymous. (nd). Sir Geoffry Follows. 5AG/FPU/302. Paris:AN. 
42 Anonymous. (nd). WP/231/4/46. Oxford:RH. 
43 Anonymous  to Welensky. (1963, May 7). WP/231/4/No.6. Oxford:RH. 
Mauricheau-Beaupré to Welensky. (1963, May 9). WP/231/4/No.21-22. Oxford:RH. 
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personally meeting with van der Byl in Paris on at least two occasions that 
we know of, in 1969 and 1971.44 It is possible that direct contacts also took 
place between Mauricheau-Beaupré and Ian Smith, evidenced by a 
handwritten comment on the top of a letter from Smith to Georges 
Pompidou, President of France (1969-1974), housed in Foccart’s private 
archives that records ‘A R verbalement par M. Mauricheau’,45 implying that 
Mauricheau-Beaupré corresponded personally with the RF leader. The 
existence of this note within the archive of the Secretariat Général pour les 
Affaires Africaines et Malgaches also suggests not only that Mauricheau-
Beaupré was at the forefront of Elysée-Rhodesian relations after UDI, but 
also that these contacts took place outside of the traditional decision-making 
mechanisms.  
 
The Rhodesians were also in contact with Philippe Lettéron, a long-standing 
member of the cellule africaine, sent to Côte d’Ivoire by Foccart in 1968 to 
act as personal advisor to President Félix Houphouët-Boigny (Bat, 2012, 
pp.280, 300). On 14 April 1966, Lettéron met with van der Byl, Oxley and 
Hawes in Paris. In his account of this meeting, van der Byl described how 
Lettéron, 
placed himself at my disposal and was able 
unofficially to find answers to the queries that we 
had and also unofficially act as a channel for advice 
to come from to use from the authorities.46 
Lettéron was also designated ‘Sir Geoffrey Follows’ principal link at the 
Elysée’, underlining the extent of Lettéron’s involvement with Rhodesia’s 
                                                
44 Van der Byl to Smith. (1971, March 8). SC/15(TS3)/8. Grahamstown:CL. 
45 Smith to Pompidou. (1969, June 27). 5AG/FPR/302. Paris:AN.  
46 Van der Byl. (1966). SC/9/TS4/11. Grahamstown:CL. 
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white settlers.47 Moreover, Lettéron was alongside Mauricheau-Beaupré at 
his later meeting with van der Byl in Paris in 1971.48  
 
The emphasis on “unofficial” action highlighted in van der Byl’s 1966 
report, like Mauricheau-Beaupré’s verbal contacts with the Rhodesians 
noted above, brings to the fore how, after UDI, relations between France 
and Rhodesia were conducted through alternative mechanisms, separate 
from the directors of French foreign policy at the Quai and France’s official 
stance towards Rhodesia but, nevertheless, controlled by actors linked to the 
French state. These contacts built on patterns of Franco-Rhodesian relations 
established in the early 1960s, explored in Chapter Two, whilst 
simultaneously mirroring French interaction with its former sub-Saharan 
African dependencies after their independence in 1960. The links between 
France’s Francophone African policies and its engagement with Rhodesia 
are further underscored by the participation of certain actors – such as 
Mauricheau-Beaupré and Lettéron – in both enterprises. 
 
The existence of this parallel, quasi-official apparatus for the pursuit of 
Franco-Rhodesian contacts, outside of the traditional state policy-making 
machinery, is further demonstrated by the persistent failure of the Quai to 
clamp down on Rhodesian activity in France after UDI. This is evidenced 
especially in the contacts that took place in Paris in 1966 between van der 
Byl and Zinovy Petchkoff,49 a Gaullist general and diplomat, of Russian 
origin, who served in the French Foreign Legion and represented France on 
                                                
47 Van der Byl. (1966). SC/9/TS4/11. Grahamstown:CL. 
48 Van der Byl to Smith. (1971, March 8). SC/15(TS3)/8. Grahamstown:CL. 
49 Petchkoff is also sometimes spelt as Peshkov, Pechkov and Pechkoff.  
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diverse overseas missions, including as De Gaulle’s chief representative in 
Taiwan between 1944 and 1946 (Xiang, 2011, p.73). In late March 1966, 
the Direction d’Afrique-Levant were informed, after the event, of a meeting 
that had taken place between van der Byl and Petchkoff earlier in the year, 
at which van der Byl had shared the Rhodesian desire to send ‘une mission 
officielle de bonne volonté à Paris’ so as to develop and formalise the ties 
between France and Rhodesia. In response to this report, a representative of 
the Quai contacted Petchkoff by telephone to reaffirm France’s official 
position towards Rhodesia - its opposition to UDI and its unwillingness to 
conduct official relations with the RF - presumably in an attempt to dissuade 
Petchkoff from pursuing any further contacts with van der Byl.50 Yet, this 
démarche appeared to have no effect as, less than a month later, van der Byl 
returned to Paris and was again received by Petchkoff. Moreover, according 
to van der Byl, this second meeting with Petchkoff on 19 April was more 
positive than the first, with Petchkoff ‘very strongly and sympathetically 
disposed towards’ the Rhodesian cause, something van der Byl attributed to 
‘contact with De Gaulle, or people close to him, to find out what the official 
attitude was’ in the interim period between these two encounters.51 It is 
clear, therefore, that in continuing to pursue relations with van der Byl, 
Petchkoff was acting under the auspices of a French authority separate from 
the Quai. Petchkoff’s Gaullist sympathies and known close personal 
relations with De Gaulle mean that it possible to believe van der Byl’s 
assumption that this was someone in the Elysée, perhaps even the French 
President himself.  
                                                
50 AL to Soutou. (1966, March 24). AL/SEAB1966/13. Paris:AMAE. 
51 Van der Byl. (1966). SC/9/TS4/11. Grahamstown:CL. 
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Rhodesia’s links to the Elysée may even have gone as has high up as the 
French President himself. In the period between November 1965 and April 
1969, Smith wrote at least five personal letters to De Gaulle, in which he 
openly expressed white Rhodesia’s fraternal feelings towards France, as 
well its hopes for further French support.52 The archives do not contain any 
responses from De Gaulle. Yet, a handwritten note recording that ‘le 
Général fait dire qu’il a bien reçu’,53 as well as words of appreciation for De 
Gaulle’s reply in the opening of a letter written by Smith in February 1966, 
suggest that De Gaulle himself was certainly aware of Rhodesian 
expectations and personally replied on at least one occasion.54 Although this 
argument is somewhat speculative, in the context of what we know about 
De Gaulle’s direct involvement in Franco-African relations (Chafer, 2008, 
pp.39-40), as well as the role played by some of his key African operatives 
in Rhodesia, it is possible to suggest that De Gaulle might have responded 
to Smith’s letters via one of the informal channels established by 
Mauricheau-Beaupré, Lettéron or another member of the cellule africaine.  
  
Another instance of this parallel, Elysée-centred mechanism for pursuit of 
Franco-Rhodesian relations after UDI can be found in the Rhodesian 
Information Office (RIO). Established in 1968, the RIO’s official remit was 
‘the dissemination of tourist and cultural news’ as well as the development 
cultural links between France and Rhodesia. This allowed the directors of 
                                                
52 Smith to De Gaulle. (1965, December 24; 1966, February 11; 1967, February 17; 1967, 
August 14; 1968, July 2). 5AG/FPR/302. Paris:AN. 
53 Smith to De Gaulle. (1965, December 24). 5AG/FPR/302. Paris:AN. 
54 Smith to De Gaulle. (1966, February 11). 5AG/FPR/302. Paris:AN. 
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the office to claim that the organisation was ‘entirely within the law’.55 Yet, 
it was evident from the outset that there was a substantial commercial 
dimension to the Rhodesian operation in Paris. For one, the RIO’s office at 
110 Rue de la Boétie in the 8th arrondissement, was based at an address 
formerly occupied by the Société Syndicat d’Etudes pour le Développement 
des Echanges Economiques entre la France et l’Afrique, an organisation 
established by Harry Oxley in 1967 with the explicit aim of developing 
Franco-Rhodesian trade, in conjunction with a Frenchman, Charles Pollet.56 
In August 1968, following the re-registration of the commercial bureau as a 
tourist office on 13 July 1968,57 Pollet remained at the office, suggesting a 
continuity of its earlier remit, and was joined by Brian Reavill, a UK 
national born in 1931, who emigrated to Rhodesia following the completion 
of his university education.58 According to a British source, Reavill was sent 
to the French capital with the ‘mission of promoting tourism and trade and 
conducting information activities’, and using the office on Rue de la Boétie 
as a base from which to visit neighbouring European countries.59 The 
commercial activities of the bureau are confirmed in a report from the 
British Embassy in Paris, as well an oral history interview conducted with a 
Rhodesian civil servant in 2011, which both emphasise how the RIO 
provided access to markets for the export of Rhodesian tobacco as well as 
contacts with the French tobacco industry.60 Moreover, the use of a tourist 
                                                
55 Isolani, Rhodesia Department, FCO. (1969, May 19). FCO36/589/7. London:TNA. 
56 Rhodesia Department, FCO to Cairns Committee. (1969, November 3). FCO/36/589/21. 
London:TNA. 
57 Isolani. (1969, May 19). FCO36/589/7. London:TNA. 
58 Anonymous. (nd). FCO/36/589/5. London:TNA. 
Reavill to Warson. (2011, April 18). Personal communication.   
59 Anonymous. (nd). FCO/36/589/5. London:TNA. 
60 Simpson-Orlebar to Allison. (1969, May 21). FCO/36/589/7. London:TNA.  
Van der Syde (2011, March 28). Interview by Joanna Warson. Bournemouth: UK. 
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or travel agency as cover for a commercial venture is consistent with the 
suggestion made to van der Byl by Willem Dirkse Van Schalkwyk, South 
African Ambassador to France (1964-1969), that such an approach was a 
means of maintaining Franco-Rhodesian economic relations in a way that 
‘might be more acceptable to the French government’.61 
 
The Quai were aware of the existence of the RIO from its establishment. 
However, Guerey claimed in discussions with Simpson-Orlebar from the 
British Embassy in Paris in June 1969 that there was nothing ‘legally 
objectionable about the Information Office’s statutes’, so the French 
government could not take action against it under the UNSC Resolution.62 
Thus, the RIO remained active for much of the 1970s, evidenced by reports 
in December 1975 that Pollet was using the office as a base from which to 
produce and circulate an official French-language bulletin about Rhodesia.63 
It was not until January 1977 that the bureau was ordered to close (Bach, 
1990, p.185).64 However, the power of the French authorities to enforce this 
closure was not confirmed until after the adoption of UN Resolution 409 on 
27 May 1977,65 which stated that, 
all Member States shall prohibit the use or transfer 
of any funds in their territories by the illegal regime, 
including any office or agent thereof, or by other 
persons or bodies within Southern Rhodesia, for the 
purposes of any office or agency of the illegal 
regime that is established within their territories 
                                                
61 Van der Byl. (1966). SC/9/TS4/11. Grahamstown:CL. 
62 Simpson-Orlebar to Allison. (1969, June 25). FCO/36/589/9. London:TNA.  
63 Langridge, FCO, to Colvin, British Embassy, Paris. (1975, December 29). 
FCO36//1907/1. London:TNA.  
64 DAM. (1977, February 22). La France et l’Afrique Australe. 5AG/3/1107. Paris:AN 
65 Harrison, Rhodesia Department, FCO, to Graham. (1977, August 5). FCO/36/2013/21. 
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other than an office or agency so established 
exclusively for pensions purposes.66  
Here again, therefore, the Quai was bound by legal and diplomatic 
conventions, limiting its ability to control Rhodesian action, even within the 
“Hexagone”.  
 
By contrast, the alternative arm of the French state involved in Rhodesian 
affairs linked to the Elysée appeared to be directly involved in the 
establishment and maintenance of this bureau, thus facilitating illegal 
Rhodesian activity overseas. In April 1966, when van der Byl and his 
associates visited Paris with the objective of establishing a commercial 
representation in the capital, they met with Lettéron to discuss their plans 
and ‘again cleared with him that what were doing was acceptable, 
unofficially, to the French government’.67 This statement suggests that a 
seal of approval was given to this Rhodesian venture by this quasi-official 
branch of French policy-making in Africa. Further evidence of this backing 
can be found in a SDECE report from January 1970, which records how 
Oxley received ‘l’autorisation de créer à Paris une société destinée à 
promouvoir le commerce entre les deux pays’ as a result of the growing 
importance of Franco-Rhodesian economic relations.68 This note implies 
that the RIO operated with the permission of the French authorities. The fact 
that this is recorded in a document prepared by SDECE suggests that those 
granting this approval were most likely linked to the Elysée Palace. The 
assertion made by Péan (1983, p.86) that Max Dumas, a member of the 
                                                
66 UN. (1977, May 27). Resolution 409 (1977).  
67 Van der Byl. (1966). SC/9/TS4/11. Grahamstown:CL. 
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Rhodesian Secret Services based at the RIO, operated in Paris with the 
support of the Renseignements Généraux (intelligence service of the French 
Police) and SDECE, whilst not backed up by archival evidence, is 
consistent with this growing picture of a mechanism, beyond the remit of 
vast swathes of the French state, and helps explain why this office was able 
to remain in action for the best part of a decade. Ken Flower, Head of 
Rhodesia’s Central Intelligence Agency, also supports this view, describing 
in his memoirs how his opposite number at SDECE was ‘always anxious to 
help’, providing the RF with access to SDECE’s ‘best offices’ to aid its 
efforts to break diplomatic and economic isolation (1987, pp.74, 206). 
 
The instance of the RIO also reveals the persistent inability of the Quai to 
prevent Rhodesians from entering France throughout the UDI period. In 
November 1968, the Afrique-Levant department actively sought to prevent 
van der Byl from returning to Paris in light of his status on Britain’s black 
list of Rhodesian personalities and France’s vote in favour of UNSC 
Resolution 253, which called upon all member states ‘to prevent entry into 
their territories, save on exceptional humanitarian grounds, of any person 
travelling on a Southern Rhodesian passport’.69 Yet, these efforts appeared 
to be to no avail, with van der Byl entering France in 1969, 1970 and 1971, 
and possibly on several other occasions not recorded in archival evidence.70 
Similarly, Collie Hill, a representative of the Rhodesian sugar industry who 
                                                
69 Anonymous. (1968, November 6). Demande d’audience du Ministre rhodésien 
d’Information. AL/Rhodesie/4. Paris:AMAE. 
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was blacklisted by the British government, records in his memoirs (2001, 
p.120) how a member of the French Police de l’Air escorted him through 
French customs on his regular visits to Paris in the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
The case of Brian Reavill, the UK-born Rhodesian based at the RIO, 
provides us with a similar example. Reavill was admitted to France in 
August 1968 on a British passport, although it later emerged that the expiry 
date on the passport had been falsified. In line with standard border 
procedures, he was issued with a three month tourist permit, and later 
received a temporary resident’s permit valid until August 1969.71 The 
British Embassy in Paris, anxious to put a stop to Reavill’s activities in 
Europe, approached Guerey at the Quai, expressing their hopes that Reavill 
would be prevented from re-entering France or that he would be denied an 
extension for his resident’s permit.72 In keeping with the friendly and 
cooperative relations that existed between the French Foreign Ministry and 
the British Embassy in Paris with regards to Rhodesian affairs, the Quai 
complied with this request. Thus, when Reavill left France on 24 July 1969 
for six weeks leave to Rhodesia, the Quai appealed to the Ministry of the 
Interior to take steps to prevent his re-entry into France.73 Yet, by October, 
Reavill was back at the RIO, having successfully re-entered France, the 
cause of which, according to Simpson-Orlebar could have been ‘the 
Ministry of Interior’s inefficiency, or because they decline to comply with 
the Quai’s request, or because of second thoughts by the Quai itself’.74  
                                                
71 Simpson-Orlebar to Allison. (1969, June 20). FCO/36/589/8. London:TNA. 
72 Simpson-Orlebar to Allison. (1969, June 25). FCO/36/589/9. London:TNA. 
73 Simpson-Orlebar to Allison. (1969, August 19). FCO/36/589/15. London:TNA. 
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The latter is perhaps the least likely of these suggestions, given the 
department’s open statements of compliance with British requests, seen for 
example in discussions between Claude Lebel, Director of African and 
Malagasy Affairs at the Quai (1966-1969), 75  and James Bottomley, 
Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Southern Africa and Rhodesia at the 
FCO (1968-1970), in October 1969, during which the Frenchman claimed 
that despite being ‘slow’ and ‘cumbersome’, the ‘machinery’ was ‘in 
operation against Mr Reavill’.76 Although not substantiated by archival 
evidence, a more plausible explanation could be that French state 
representatives, linked to the Elysée, were intervening to allow Reavill to 
enter France freely. 
 
The Quai’s inability to stop Rhodesians entering France, therefore, provides 
further evidence of the existence of an alternative French decision-making 
mechanism that was beyond the control of traditional policy apparatus, 
including the Quai and the French legislature, a practice that both mirrored 
and was directly connected to France’s engagement with Francophone 
Africa after 1960. This separate strand in the French approach to the 
Rhodesia after UDI contradicted the official stance of opposition to the RF 
set forth by the French government, and led to policies that enabled the 
white Rhodesians to continue to operate on the international stage. The 
French authorities were, therefore, officially opposing white Rhodesia, 
whilst another, unaccountable arm of the French state was simultaneously 
providing it with covert support.  
                                                
75 It is interesting to note that Lebel had previously participated in Rhodesian affairs during 
his posting at the French Embassy in London in the 1950s.  
76 Bottomley to Mansfield. (1969, October 21). FCO/36/589/21. London:TNA.  
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Private French individuals and groups in Rhodesia 
 
As has already been noted above, the principal means by which the UK 
government sought to bring the Rhodesian rebels to heel was through a 
range of economic sanctions. However, the impact of these sanctions was, 
according to the Quai, ‘négligeable, du moins minime’. 77  The Elysée 
advanced a similar view, claiming that ‘la Rhodésie ne sera pas asphyxiée, 
car les sanctions économiques n’ont que des effets très limitées’.78 The 
failure of Britain’s sanctions programme was the result of the willingness of 
various individuals and groups to trade with the rebellious regime in 
Salisbury. The RF’s biggest international lifeline came from Rhodesia’s 
white-ruled neighbours, the apartheid regime in South Africa and, up until 
its independence in 1975, Portuguese-ruled Mozambique, where state 
backing was given to commercial ventures that might aid Smith’s illegal 
regime (Stephenson, 1975, p.377; Minter & Schmidt, 1988, pp.213-214). 
Pretoria, in particular, had a vested interest in ensuring that the trade 
embargo against Rhodesia failed to reduce the prospect that a similar 
strategy might be used against South Africa (Meredith, 1979, pp.58-59, 
145).  
 
Businesses based in other Western countries, including the United 
Kingdom, the United States, Japan, West Germany and France, also 
breached the international trade embargo (Meredith, 1979, p.59; Wood, 
2008). In the immediate aftermath of UDI, French trade with Rhodesia 
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actually increased, seen for example in the first three months of 1967 when 
France imported 200% more Rhodesian merchandise than it had done in the 
same period in 1966,79 including a 106% rise in purchases of unembargoed 
commodities such as diamonds and precious stones.80 After UDI, French 
businessmen remained a common sight in Salisbury,81 accounting for a high 
proportion of the growing ‘colonie française’ in Rhodesia.82 From importers 
of Rhodesian tobacco,83 sugar,84 and metals, 85 to exporters of French oil,86 
arms87 and automobiles,88 allegations were made against French companies 
throughout the UDI period, in French and British official diplomatic and 
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government correspondence, as well as more publically in notes to the UN 
Sanctions Committee89 and in the international press.90  
 
French companies were neither the most prolific nor the most significant of 
the Western sanctions busters in Rhodesia. US companies were, for 
example, ‘heavily involved’ in Rhodesia after UDI, with reports of US-
Rhodesia trade tripling in the period between 1965 and early 1974 (Horne, 
2001, p.178). Moreover, of the 593 companies accused of sanctions 
breaching in the UN in 1978 only one French company – Total – was 
named, in contrast to the 444 British companies and 92 American 
companies denounced in this context (Bach, 1990, p.186). Furthermore, 
other Western governments are alleged to have provided support – or at 
least turned a blind eye – to the activities of companies from their country in 
Rhodesia. According to Horne (2001, pp.181-182), American firms with big 
stakes in Rhodesia, such as Union Carbide (UC), who had been active in 
Rhodesia since 1923 and by the time of UDI had invested $17 million in 
chrome in Rhodesia, had ‘heavy influence’ over the White House and the 
State Department, guaranteeing that the US ‘would be viewed widely as a 
significant supporter of Salisbury’. This was especially true following the 
election of President Nixon in 1969.  
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However, as this chapter will now demonstrate, sanctions busting by French 
companies stands apart because of the particular nature of state complicity. 
In the case of France, it was not just about a powerful business lobby 
influencing a conservative government. Rather, as was also the case in 
Francophone Africa, the interests of private French companies intersected 
with those of the influential cellule africaine, who directed France’s African 
policies with little accountability to the vast majority of the French 
government. Although the increasingly blurred lines between state and non-
state action, as well as the inherently opaque nature of sanctions busting, 
make this story difficult to unravel, it is possible to detect the role of an 
autonomous policy mechanism, linked to the Elysée Palace, in various 
different breaches of the international trade embargo by private French 
individuals and companies.  
 
Sugar, tobacco and air transportation: French economic engagement 
with Rhodesia after UDI 
 
The blurring of the lines between state and private action in Rhodesia is 
evident with regards to purchases of Rhodesian tobacco. According to 
Rhodesian sources, in the immediate aftermath of UDI, Henry Dhavernas,91 
President-Director of a powerful French financial group, the Compagnie 
Française de Transactions Internationales (TRANSACO), approached 
representatives of Smith’s government during a visit to Paris and indicated 
the company’s interest in importing large quantities of Rhodesian tobacco 
                                                
91 Dhavernas (Henry). Who’s who in France, p.543. 
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via South Africa and Portugal and then re-exporting their produce to France. 
TRANSACO claimed that they were acting with the approval of the French 
authorities, which had allegedly given them, 
a clear confidential undertaking that they could do as 
much trade as they liked with Rhodesia provided the 
business was invoiced to a S. African or Portuguese 
subsidiary or something along these lines.92  
Although this permission was obviously not granted by the arm of the 
French state that supported the embargo on imports of Rhodesian tobacco – 
that is to say, the Quai and other executive ministries outside of the 
Presidential Palace – there are a number of different factors that indicate 
that this backing was secured from another source in government. Firstly, 
the representative who visited Rhodesia on behalf of TRANSACO in 
February 1966 was Charles Pollet, the same Charles Pollet who was based 
at the RIO, a bureau that, as we have already seen, operated with support 
from some official source, probably the Elysée.93 The fact that this “state”-
sanctioned office also allegedly provided Rhodesia with access to markets 
for its tobacco and contacts with the French tobacco industry points to the 
involvement of certain actors in the Presidential Palace in the illegal import 
of Rhodesian tobacco into France.94 Additional links between the Elysée 
and Rhodesian tobacco purchases can be found in a note from van der Byl 
to Smith from 1971 that reports a planned deal for the purchase of 16,000 
tons of Rhodesian tobacco, valued at US$16 million, by the French tobacco 
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monopoly, with 15% of the profits going to the Gaullist party.95 The fact 
that throughout the UDI period there were ‘rumeurs persistantes’ in the 
UNSCSC about Rhodesian tobacco being purchased by the French state 
further reinforces this argument.96 
 
The case of sugar imports is perhaps even more revealing as it implicates 
specific French actors with known links to the Elysée’s cellule africaine. In 
March 1966, the British Embassy in Paris reported a planned purchase of 
Rhodesian sugar by a French company, Sucres et Denrées (SUCDEN), 
registered at 55 Avenue Kléber in the 16th arrondissement in Paris.97 
Following an approach from the French authorities, at the behest of the UK 
Foreign Office, SUCDEN allegedly agreed not to conclude this deal.98 
However, the principal partner of SUCDEN, Maurice Varsano, known as 
the “roi de sucre”, also owned another firm based out of Geneva, 
Compafino, which had, in the past, been used by Varsano ‘for some of his 
less reputable deals when they appeared to have run foul of the French 
authorities’. This, in turn, led Rodgers from the British Embassy in Paris to 
hypothesise that there was ‘a pretty good bet that this firm… may have 
taken the deal up’.99  
 
Rodgers’ suspicions are confirmed in the memoirs of Collie Hill (2001), a 
representative of the Rhodesian sugar industry, who later went to work with 
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SUCDEN in Paris.100 Hill first made personal contact with Varsano at an 
international sugar convention held in Geneva in the autumn of 1965 
(pp.70-1), just a few weeks before UDI was declared. Shortly after Smith’s 
proclamation, Hill travelled to Paris to visit Varsano at the SUCDEN 
headquarters and a deal was concluded for SUCDEN to take up a contract 
for the purchase of 90,000 tons of sugar a year, for a period of three years. 
According to Hill, this was ‘the beginning of a long and successful business 
relationship with the Rhodesian sugar industry’ (p.78), which involved 
finding destinations for raw Rhodesian sugar exported in cargos of about 
12,000 tons from the bulk loading terminal at Lourenço Marquês (p.109), an 
operation that Hill personally oversaw from Paris following his relocation 
there, with his wife, in January 1978 (p.154). 
 
To return to the question of quasi-French official involvement in Rhodesian 
sanctions busting, it is interesting to note that Maurice Varsano’s son, who 
took control of SUCDEN after his father’s death, was Serge Varsano, a key 
player in France’s African presence in the 1980s and 1990s. In their 
investigation into the réseaux franco-africains, Glaser and Smith (1992, 
pp.185-207) describe Serge as ‘le négociant’ in ‘le Paris-Village du 
continent noir’, tying these deals for the purchase of Rhodesian sugar, by 
familial link, to the apparatus for the implementation of the Elysée’s African 
policy. Moreover, Glaser and Smith quote Houphouët-Boigny speaking of 
his dealings with Varsano the elder, indicating that Maurice, like his son 
Serge, was part of the Franco-African network (p.185). SUCDEN’s 
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Rhodesian connections appear, therefore, to have been bound up with the 
réseaux that formed the foundation for the maintenance of French influence 
in West and Equatorial Africa after the formal transfer of power to the 
indigenous majority. This is underscored by the fact that SUCDEN also 
operated in Francophone Africa (Glaser & Smith, 1992, pp.185-207).  
 
The blurred lines between state and private action in Rhodesia, as well as 
the integration of this British colony into the Franco-African réseaux, is also 
apparent in the case of the UTA. As we have already seen in the first part of 
this thesis, UTA had been active in Rhodesia since the early 1950s, when its 
predecessor, UAT, took over Air France’s operations in the region.101 After 
UDI, UTA continued to operate in Rhodesia, despite the termination of the 
UTA’s commercial flights to the country in January 1966,102 a measure that 
was later enforced by UNSC Resolution 253,103 which prohibited airline 
companies from operating flights to or from Rhodesia (Minter & Schmidt, 
1988, p.213). According to a representative of the department responsible 
for the UN at the central administration of the Quai, this move meant that 
‘aucun moyen de transport officiel ou subventionné par l’Etat français 
n’existe à destination ou en provenance de la Rhodésie du Sud’.104  Yet, a 
UTA office was maintained in both Bulawayo and Salisbury, 105  and 
representatives of the airline met with van der Byl in Paris in 1971.106 UTA 
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was also at the forefront of various initiatives to promote Rhodesian trade 
and tourism overseas, seen for example in inter-office correspondence 
highlighting the advantages of allowing Rhodesian passengers to enter 
France, promoting student tours to Europe for Rhodesian students, and 
advocating the ‘possibilités immenses’ of cooperation between UTA and 
Air Rhodesia.107  
 
Furthermore, in 1971, when the Smith-Heath agreement raised hopes of a 
settlement to the Rhodesian crisis, UTA were quick to endorse the prompt 
re-establishment of an air link between Rhodesia and metropolitan France. 
A UTA mission to Rhodesia in October and November 1971 set out a 
number of possible routes, including one that would link Salisbury to Nice 
and Paris via Libreville. 108  A note from the Rhodesian local UTA 
representative to the head office in Paris called for the resumption of flights 
between Salisbury and the French metropole ‘as soon as practically and 
politically acceptable’.109 The Rhodesians shared this enthusiasm, as can be 
seen in a personal letter from Follows to Richon in which the establishment 
of a cargo service is described, repeatedly, as ‘absolutely imperative’, even 
‘if the cargo aircraft comes in surreptitiously in the middle of the night to 
load up’. Plans for a passenger service ‘to start directly the [Anglo-
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Rhodesian] settlement has been regularised’ were also discussed in this 
letter.110  
 
In the event, the 1971 proposals for a settlement failed to bring an end to the 
Rhodesian rebellion, scuppering UTA plans to officially re-launch either a 
cargo or a passenger service between Salisbury and Paris. Yet, this French 
airline’s continued participation in Rhodesian affairs after UDI is significant 
for the purposes of this discussion into the ties between the Elysée and 
Rhodesia, as well as between France’s Francophone African and Rhodesian 
policies, because UTA were also active in Francophone Africa after 1960  
(Bat, 2012, pp.173-176). As part of the growing embroilment of UTA in the 
activities of Foccart’s cellule africaine in Francophone Africa after 1960, 
this French airline’s Rhodesian business simultaneously became 
interconnected with the wider French African project, seen most notably in 
the context of French-led efforts in 1963 to establish a counter pan-African 
organisation, discussed in Chapter Two, where Richon was beside 
Mauricheau-Beaupré’s side in negotiations with the Rhodesians.111  
 
The ties between the UTA’s Rhodesian activities and the Elysée continued 
into the 1970s. A 1971 note written by Richon on the importance of the 
Rhodesian market is housed in Foccart’s archives, with a cover note 
signalling that the document was meant for Foccart’s personal attention.112 
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Similarly, a comment handwritten on Richon’s business card attached to the 
front of a letter from Richon to Follows indicates that Richon 
communicated the contents of this correspondence to Foccart for his 
information and opinion.113 Richon’s direct channels of communication to 
the Secretary General for African Affairs are also explicitly noted in a letter 
from Jean Ribo, French Ambassador to Gabon (1972-1975), to Foccart that 
records how Richon sent a letter to Foccart regarding the possible risks 
facing UTA action in Rhodesia due to its exposure in the South African and 
Rhodesian press.114 The inclusion of various other papers relating to the 
UTA-Rhodesia connection in archives of the Secrétariat Général pour les 
Affaires Africaines et Malgaches underscores the links between the airline 
and Foccart’s cellule africaine.115  
 
Furthermore, the discourse used by the UTA to frame and justify their 
action in Rhodesia echoed many of the preoccupations closely associated 
with the French African project, in particular the importance of protecting 
France’s status in the face of opposition from other Western powers, 
including Britain. For example, when arguing for the swift resumption of 
the UTA air link between Paris and Salisbury in October 1971, Richon 
declared that,  
il devient donc indispensable que la position 
française soit autant que faire de doute et, si l’on ne 
veut pas que les intérêts anglais, allemands, italiens, 
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néerlandais ou grecs prennent définitivement le pas 
sur les affaires françaises.116   
In a similar vein, UTA proposals for a scheme to transport Rhodesian beef 
to France via South Africa were calculated with reference to a ‘compétition 
avec nombre de compagnies aériennes internationales qui maintiennent 
contact et pression’. The note concluded that ‘il serait dommage que cette 
compagnie [UTA] soit à la fois frustrée d’un marché utile à l’économie 
française et de la position privilégiée que ne manquerait pas de lui acquérir 
le transport de la viande’. 117 These two instances demonstrate how private 
companies and individuals also shared national concerns about securing 
France’s interests and preventing the infiltration of other Western powers. 
This, in turn, reveals not only the application to the Rhodesian setting of the 
ideological imperatives most frequently used to justify French action in 
Africa, but also the increasing overlap between state interests and those of 
nominally private actors.  
 
Southern African intermediaries in the Franco-Rhodesian connection  
 
A common theme in the discussions above concerning Elysée participation 
in Rhodesian tobacco and sugar purchases, as well as in the case of UTA, is 
the importance of France’s Southern African intermediaries in the 
maintenance of post-UDI Franco-Rhodesian connections. In the examples 
of tobacco and sugar imports explored in the previous section, these goods 
were transported to France and onto French clients overseas via Rhodesia’s 
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white-ruled neighbours, South Africa and Mozambique. South Africa was 
also important in UTA strategies in Rhodesia. Proposals for the export of 
Rhodesian beef to France, for example, centred on South Africa as a crucial 
intermediary, whilst South Africa’s largest international airport at 
Johannesburg was suggested as the point of departure for the proposed, re-
established UTA air link between Salisbury and Paris in 1971.118  More 
generally, the UTA’s wider operations in Southern Africa provided the 
foundations for the company’s efforts to maintain their stakes in Rhodesia, 
with the airline’s representatives in Johannesburg also operating in 
Salisbury, seen for example by the 48 hour stopover in the Rhodesian 
capital by Philippe Doumenc, UTA General Manager for Southern Africa, 
in November 1971.119 South Africa also provided the base from which the 
UTA could fly their planes into Rhodesia, seen for example in November 
1971 when forty French businessmen and industrialists were flown into 
Salisbury from Johannesburg on a UTA French Airlines jet.120 Although 
this example of UTA planes flying from Johannesburg to Salisbury in itself 
is perhaps not anything surprising, given South African sympathy for the 
settlers across the border and the NP’s willingness to provide the RF with 
economic and military support despite their officially neutral position 
towards UDI (Meredith, 1979, pp.145-150), this instance does underline the 
pivotal importance of the other white-ruled states in Southern Africa for 
French engagement with Rhodesia after UDI. This, in turn, is in keeping 
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with the broader French strategy in Southern Africa outlined in Chapter 
Three.   
 
France’s bases elsewhere in Southern Africa, particularly in South Africa, 
but also, up until its independence from Portugal in 1975, in Mozambique, 
were also crucial to the continued flow of French exports into Rhodesia 
throughout the UDI period. As reference back to the first part of this thesis 
will show, most of the French products that continued to reach Rhodesia 
after 1965 via these Southern African intermediaries were goods that had 
been fundamental to the establishment of a French economic presence in the 
region under the Fourth Republic and were controlled by some of the first 
French private and state-owned companies active in Rhodesia. One such 
example is Alsthom,121 a French power generation and transportation firm 
that had operated in the Rhodesian setting since the late 1950s,122 and were 
also active in Mozambique (Frappat, 1990, p.216) and South Africa 
(Cuddumbey, 1996, p.71). After UDI, when it was no longer possible to 
deal directly with the Rhodesians, Alsthom made use of its existing regional 
presence to maintain ties with Rhodesia through indirect routes. In the early 
1970s, for instance, Alsthom, in collaboration with Chantiers de 
l’Atlantique, a shipyard in Saint-Nazaire that, interestingly, was taken over 
by Alsthom in 1984, sold diesel motors and electrical components to a 
Portuguese firm, where they were allegedly used to build locomotives 
destined for Rhodesia. 123 Here, therefore, Franco-Portuguese links in the 
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Southern African context provided a vital backdrop for the continued 
presence of French goods in Rhodesia.   
 
Another French product reaching Rhodesia from its white-ruled neighbours 
was oil. Following the introduction of an oil embargo against Rhodesia in 
December 1965, all oil plants in Rhodesia owned by foreign companies 
were requisitioned, including those run by the CFP. The Rhodesian 
government then entrusted the monopoly over oil purchases to a state-
controlled holding company, GENTA124 (Nyangoni, 1985, p.127).125 In an 
attempt to cut off GENTA’s supplies, the British government blockaded the 
port of Beira, in Mozambique. Yet, oil companies continued to send oil to 
Rhodesia through alternative land routes in Southern Africa throughout the 
UDI period (Meredith, 1979, p.58). According to Britain, in the immediate 
aftermath of the introduction of the oil embargo, a significant proportion of 
petroleum products reaching Rhodesia by rail originated from refineries in 
Lourenço Marquês, Mozambique, property of the Portuguese-owned 
Sociedade Nacional de Refinação de Petróleos (SONAREP),126 but supplied 
exclusively by CFP.127 Although the CFP supplies were technically destined 
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for the Mozambican market,128 substantial quantities of oil were allegedly 
transported over land to the Rhodesian refinery at Umtali (Maputo).129 
Rhodesia’s other principal supplier of oil, especially after Mozambique’s 
independence from Portugal in 1975, was South Africa, a region in which 
Total also had a strong base.130 
 
The CFP categorically refuted all accusations made against them, claiming 
that they were complying with international directives prohibiting the 
supply, either directly or indirectly, of petrol to Rhodesia. In a press release 
on 22 March 1968, the company also emphasised that, since UDI, Total 
Rhodésie, like the Rhodesian subsidiaries of all other international oil 
companies, had been placed under a regime of requisition by the Rhodesian 
administration.131 This did not, however, quell suspicions of Total activity 
in Rhodesia. A report carried out by the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace in 1973, for example, concluded that ‘Total semble être 
la marque d’essence la plus répandue’,132 whilst Kenneth Kaunda, Zambian 
President, denounced, in 1977, the role played by Total in the provision of 
petrol to Rhodesia.133 Moreover, a 1977 report from the French Commercial 
Advisor in Johannesburg affirms Total’s continued involvement in the 
purchasing and distribution of petrol via GENTA in Rhodesia.134 It is 
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apparent, therefore, that this French-owned oil company was active in 
Rhodesia, through indirect channels elsewhere in Southern Africa, 
throughout the UDI period.  
 
Another visible French presence in Rhodesia after 1965 was to be found on 
Rhodesian roads. Automobiles were some of the first French goods 
exported to Rhodesia under the Fourth Republic, a trade that grew during 
the 1950s and first half of the 1960s.135 After 1965, and in spite of the trade 
embargo, Renault and Peugeot dominated the Rhodesian automobile 
market, a state of affairs that is noted in the aforementioned Carnegie 
Report.136 This position of strength was maintained throughout the UDI 
period, with these two French car manufacturers retaining a fifty per cent 
share of the Rhodesian automobile market and a good image in the region in 
1979, leading the French Vice Consul in Johannesburg to conclude that 
Renault and Peugeot were well placed to maintain their position in the 
region after independence.137 More anecdotally, in her memoirs of her 
childhood in Rhodesia, Alexandra Fuller (2003, p.104) recalls being driven 
around the country in an ‘avocado-green Peugeot’, whilst during a visit to 
Paris in 1976, Joshua Nkomo, leader and founder of ZAPU, claimed that 
seventy per cent of all motor cars in Rhodesia were French.138 Peugeot and 
Renault’s ability to maintain this position of dominance was contingent 
upon the neighbouring apartheid regime, with automobiles in kit form, spare 
parts and whole vehicles exported via South Africa to Rhodesia, where they 
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were then assembled at plants owned by the French car manufacturers.139 
Webs of Southern African contacts provided, therefore, the basis for the 
continued presence of French automobiles on Rhodesian roads.   
 
The same is also true with regards to French arms exports to Rhodesia 
following UDI. French arms, like automobiles, were first exported to this 
British colony during the Federal period. After UDI, and most notably 
following the outbreak in 1972 of a seven-year long guerrilla war, French 
military equipment was crucial to the RF’s physical defence of white rule on 
the African continent. In particular, French-manufactured Alouettes were 
the favoured helicopter used by the Rhodesian Air Force (RhAF).140 Precise 
figures of the number of Alouettes in the service of the RhAF vary, with 
French reports ranging from 23 to 55.141 More recently, Wood (1996) has 
estimated that the Rhodesians had access to at least 50 Alouettes in the 
period between 1965 and 1980. In addition to these helicopters, the 1970s 
also saw the expansion of the use of other French-manufactured military 
equipment by the RhAF, including Cessna aircraft (Klare & Prokosch, 
1979, pp.45), 142 Mirage FI planes143 and Matra Rocket Launchers.144 As a 
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result, a report in the Zambian Press from 1977 claimed that 22% of all 
military material used by the RhAF was “de type français”.145 
 
The central administration of the Quai and French representatives posted 
overseas alike maintained throughout that France was not involved in arms 
trading with Rhodesia. According to Lieutenant Colonel F. Blanuet, the 
Attaché to the Armed Forces at the French Embassy in Pretoria, ‘la France 
n’a jamais vendu d’hélicoptères à la Rhodésie depuis la decision des 
sanctions par l’O.N.U’.146 Instead, it was asserted on numerous occasions 
throughout the 1970s that many of the Alouettes being used by the 
Rhodesians were quite old and likely to have been exported to Rhodesia 
prior to UDI.147  It was also argued that various countries seeking to 
modernise their military might have sold French-manufactured Alouettes to 
Rhodesia, a process that was ‘pas trop difficile’ due to the existence of ‘un 
marché de l’occasion’.148 Newer material in the service of the RhAF was 
reported to have been constructed in South Africa under licence, then 
supplied to Rhodesia ‘en entier ou sous forme de pièces de rechange’.149 
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France adopted similar excuses when accusations were made against the 
French regarding state involvement in automobile exports150 and oil sales.151 
The blame was always placed firmly on the shoulders of the South African 
intermediary.  
 
The innocence of the French state in these operation, however, is far from 
certain. The Rhodesians certainly pinned their hopes of continued Franco-
Rhodesian trade on these indirect channels. In the aftermath of the adoption 
of mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia by the UN in May 1968, Smith 
wrote to De Gaulle expressing his hope that the French vote in favour of 
Resolution 253 would ‘not restrict the activities of French commercial 
interests to a degree that would make the continuation of trade with us 
through third countries impossible’.152 This direct approach to the French 
President was followed, just over a month later, by a personal letter to 
Michel Debré, in which Smith described how Rhodesian external commerce 
could now only continue ‘par des voies qui ne sont peut-être pas 
orthodoxes’, appealing to the French Foreign Minister to permit the 
‘commerce traditionnel’ between France and Rhodesia to continue through 
these alternative routes.153 
 
Moreover, various allegations were made against the French state during the 
UDI period. The Rhodesia Department at the FCO, for one, was far from 
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convinced of French state innocence. In a note from 1976, the office 
responsible for Rhodesian affairs claimed that, 
it is simply not true that the French have a good 
record on sanctions. They are… substantial suppliers 
of arms to Rhodesia, and in this role are acting 
consciously and not as the innocent victims of South 
African re-exports.154  
Suspicions were also raised about French state involvement in oil supplies 
to Rhodesia, with Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, asserting during 
discussions with De Gaulle in 1967 that ‘les Rhodésiens comptent sur la 
France pour augmenter les livraisons si elles sont coupées par ailleurs’.155 In 
addition, Rhodesian sources attest to French state involvement in 
automobile exports, seen in the claim made by van der Byl in 1971 that ‘the 
steadily increasing’ supply of motor car assembly kits, in particular the 
assembly of Renault cars, ‘means that the French Government is directly 
involved in this because they have the major holding interest in the Renault 
Company’.156 
 
The strong ties between Paris, Pretoria and Lisbon under the Fifth Republic, 
links that for the most part were controlled by the Elysée (Bach, 1990; 
Stanley, 2004; Moukambi, 2008; Konieczna, 2009) provide us with grounds 
to support these assertions. After 1960, French ambitions to play a ‘truly 
continental role’ (Alden, 1996, p.12) on the African continent led them to 
pursue strategies that might increase their influence in Anglophone and 
Lusophone territories. As Chapter Two of this thesis has shown, Rhodesia 
was integral to this post-colonial French strategy, as can be seen by its 
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inclusion in French-led efforts in 1963 to collaborate with the white-ruled 
territories in Southern Africa to oppose an Anglophone-dominated pan-
African organisation,157 but also more generally in France’s continued and 
expanding engagement with this British colony in the five years leading up 
to UDI. This, combined with what we know about the nature of France’s 
dealings with South Africa and Mozambique, in particular the focus on arms 
and oil, and the established regional presence of companies such as Total, 
Peugeot, Renault and Alsthom, make it possible to hypothesise that the 
‘réseaux franco-sud-africains’ (Bach, 1990, p.74), along with the French 
networks in Mozambique, may have facilitated the continued flow of 
French goods into Rhodesia after UDI. Although this argument is difficult 
to definitively prove, the inherently opaque nature of France’s relations with 
Africa in the post-colonial period mean that it is possible to believe this 
hypothesis that Rhodesia was integrated into France’s wider Southern 
African réseaux.  
 
The importance of French “men-on-the-spot”  
 
As we have already seen in Part One of this thesis, France’s “men-on-the-
spot” were vital in the establishment and development of a French presence 
in Rhodesia. In the years immediately following the independence of 
Francophone Africa, new “men-on-the-spot” entered the fray, in particular, 
those linked to Foccart’s cellule africaine. After UDI, this state of affairs 
continued, evidenced in the economic relations discussed above. French 
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“men-on-the-spot” also remained active in Rhodesia in the military domain, 
with French mercenaries alleged to have fought on the side of the RF in its 
guerrilla war with the African nationalists. Violence characterised UDI from 
the outset. However, it was only in 1972 that a full-scale civil war broke 
out. In the seven-years of conflict that followed, 30,000 lives were lost, 
275,000 were wounded and 1.5 million were made refugees (Evans, 2007, 
p.176). As archival evidence relating to the Rhodesian Bush War is 
relatively minimal – although catalogued, the Rhodesian Army Archive is 
currently inaccessible to researchers and the nature of mercenary action 
means that documentary evidence is notoriously scant - the purpose of this 
brief discussion is to situate the limited British, French and Rhodesian 
government source material relating to this topic which has been uncovered 
during the course of this research project within the secondary literature and 
personal accounts of the role played by French mercenaries in Rhodesia.  
 
French mercenaries first came into contact with the Rhodesians in the 
Belgian Congo, with both fighting on the side of the Katangese 
secessionists, along with mercenaries from Britain and South Africa 
(Williams, 2011, p.44).158  The French contingent comprised of former 
French counter-guerrilla specialists who had fought in Indochina and 
Algeria, such as Colonel Roger Faulques and Roger Trinquier, and private 
soldiers, such as Bob Denard (Williams, 2011, pp. 45, 163-165), the 
‘archétype’ of a new generation of French mercenaries brought together by 
Mauricheau-Beaupré in the early 1960s to pursue French interests in the 
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Belgian Congo (Bat & Geneste, 2010, p.94). Franco-Rhodesian military 
contacts in this context are attested to in surviving Rhodesian Government 
Cabinet Minutes, which describe how an injured Bob Denard spent several 
weeks convalescing in a hospital in Kariba in 1967. 159  French and 
Rhodesian mercenaries are also reported to have fought on the side of the 
Biafran secessionists during the Nigerian civil war (Péan, 1982, p.80), 
underlining the growing interconnections between these private soldiers in 
the 1960s. 
 
Following the escalation of the Rhodesian Bush War in 1972, French 
mercenaries are reported to have fought alongside the Rhodesian Light 
Infantry (RLI). One noted instance is the 7 Independent Company or ‘7 
Indep.Coy’, which was a cover for a unit of French recruits, which included 
veterans of the Foreign Legion, in the Rhodesian forces (Moorcraft & 
McLaughin, 2009, p.53). This is verified in both British and French archival 
material. In 1977, a note prepared by the Rhodesia Department at the FCO 
reported the arrival in Southern Africa of a party of French mercenary 
soldiers, recruited in Paris by a Rhodesian emissary, whilst the papers 
repatriated from France’s Embassy in Pretoria include a series of personal 
letters from one of these French recruits, Gilles Boucher, to Michel Jorion, 
the French Consul General in Johannesburg.160 In his letters, Boucher 
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described how he was offered substantial financial reward to guard 
Rhodesian farms. This incentive led Boucher to sign a three-year contract 
with the RLI, even though he, and many of his fellow recruits, did not speak 
English. Upon arrival in Salisbury in late November 1977, however, 
Boucher found himself fighting in a French battalion within the Rhodesian 
army. According to the French Consul General in Johannesburg, Jean-Paul 
Schricke, approximately one hundred young Frenchmen were recruited in a 
similar way to fight on behalf of the Rhodesians. In charge of recruitment in 
France was Stéphane Frachet, a former agent of the Service d’Action 
Civique (SAC), indicating some possible ties to Elysée. Frachet’s French 
contacts on the ground included three Majors - Laviola, de l’Assomption 
and Bessy – and Captain Toumi.161  
 
This case study reveals the diversity of French actors and the different 
incentives that led them to participate in Rhodesia after UDI. For some, at 
the heart of their endeavour was a French nationalist, perhaps Gaullist, 
agenda, albeit interpreted at an individual level. For others, the motivation 
was less complex - the desire for personal profit and glory. This diversity of 
interests and agendas had been present from the beginning of the French 
presence in this region of Central Southern Anglophone Africa under the 
Fourth Republic, as diplomats on the ground clashed with bureaucrats in 
Paris over the direction of France’s policy in the region and the relative 
attention that it required, due to their respective, alternating interpretations 
of the French foreign-policy mind-set. Later, after the independence of 
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Francophone Africa, the introduction of new French actors and agendas 
augmented the fragmentation of the French approach to Rhodesia. After 
1965, as we have seen, this fragmentation became even more pronounced, 
with an official French policy of opposition to UDI standing in stark 
contrast to the continued engagement of certain French state and non-state 
actors in this rebellious British colony.  
 
This mirrors, in many ways, the French experience in Africa throughout the 
colonial period. From the outset, France’s presence on the continent was 
shaped by “men-on-the-spot”: military men, missionaries, explorers, 
administrators, settlers, traders, fortune hunters and adventurers of all 
descriptions. Thus, according to Evans (2004, p.2), France’s Empire was 
acquired ‘in a haphazard manner’ by ‘a motely array’ of “men-on-the-spot”, 
seeking glory, wealth or to convert the heathen, and ‘largely acting upon 
their own initiative to the indifference of governments and public opinion’. 
 
The importance of “men-on-the-spot” was carried over into post-colonial 
period, as individuals, linked to the Elysée, but often simultaneously acting 
upon independent imperatives, became the principal agents of France’s 
African strategies. Here, Mauricheau-Beaupré is a case in point. In his 
interviews with Philippe Gaillard, Jacques Foccart describes Mauricheau-
Beaupré as an ‘entrepreneur’ (1995, p.213) and a ‘homme d’ombre’ (1997, 
p.217). Yet, Bat (2012, p.220) has described how Foccart delegated 
responsibility to Mauricheau-Beaupré. According to Bat and Geneste 
(2010), Mauricheau-Beaupré was, therefore, ‘la cheville ouvrière de la 
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politique gaulliste en Afrique noire’ (p.87), ‘l’archétype des hommes qui, 
sur le terrain, développèrent et défendirent ardemment le concept de 
Communauté franco-africaine, de pré carré que la France gaullienne rêvait 
de façonner à son image’ (p.100). French “men-on-the-spot”, therefore, 
drove France’s post-colonial African policy. The fact that these agents also 
acted in the Rhodesian context binds France’s involvement in its former 
West and Equatorial colonies to Anglophone, minority-governed regions in 
ways that previously have been neglected by scholars.  
 
The triangular relations between France, Francophone 
Africa and Rhodesia 
 
French engagement with Rhodesia, therefore, was closely intertwined with 
France’s post-colonial relations with its former sub-Saharan dependencies. 
This interconnection went beyond the involvement of the same individuals 
and companies in both French and English-speaking regions. Rather, certain 
Francophone African states were directly bound up in Franco-Rhodesian 
relations after UDI. The foundations for these triangular relations between 
France, Francophone Africa and minority-ruled Southern Africa were laid in 
the first half of the 1960s, as has been explored in the first half of this thesis. 
After UDI, this complex web of interconnection between France, 
Francophone Africa and Rhodesia continued to develop and diversify. 
 
It is true that certain Francophone African states strongly opposed 
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after UDI, a report prepared for De Gaulle recorded the ‘vives réactions’ 
from Francophone Africans to the white rebellion.162 Three days later, 
another report on the ‘Réactions en Afrique noire francophone après 
l’indépendance de la Rhodésie’ described how all French-speaking Africans 
were united in their opposition to UDI. The most vehement criticisms came 
from the more radical of the Francophone states – Senegal, Mali, Guinea 
and Mauritania.163 Also vocal in his opposition to Ian Smith’s regime was 
Alphonse Messemba-Debat, the President of Congo-Brazzaville (1963-
1968), who described UDI as an “affront à l’Afrique”, criticised the 
“complicité de l’Angleterre”, and called upon the British government to use 
force to stamp out the rebellion.164 A statement from l’Agence Congolaise 
d’information reiterated this view, claiming that “la Grande-Bretagne est 
aujourd’hui au bord de la rupture avec l’Afrique africaine”.165  
 
However, it appears that Francophone Africa was not as united in its 
opposition to Rhodesia as it initially appeared. In fact, according to the 
aforementioned 1973 Carnegie Report, there was an ‘attitude hésitante’ 
amongst certain Francophone West Africans towards white-ruled Africa.166 
The response to Rhodesia was most explicitly mixed amongst France’s best 
African “friends” – Félix Houphouët-Boigny, President of the Ivory Coast, 
and Omar Bongo, President of Gabon. Both Gabon and the Ivory Coast 
publically opposed Smith’s regime in the late 1960s, evidenced by their vote 
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in favour of UN Resolution 253 and the statement given by the Gabonese 
Foreign Minister in 1967, which affirmed Gabon’s application of sanctions 
against Rhodesia (Péan, 1983, p.80). Yet, in spite of this, according to 
sources in the Rhodesian and French archives, Bongo is said to have 
claimed that ‘le Gabon a toujours fait preuve d’une très grande discrétion à 
l’égard du problème rhodésien’,167 going on to assert that, in the context of 
the Anglo-Rhodesian struggle, ‘Gabon is on the side of Rhodesia’.168  
 
France lay at the heart of this friendly stance amongst certain Francophone 
African leaders towards the white reactionary regime in Rhodesia. After 
UDI, building on the foundations laid in the first half of the 1960s and 
explored in Chapter Two of this thesis, certain French actors linked to 
Foccart’s cellule africaine sought to pursue their interests in Rhodesia 
through their Francophone African “friends”. The implementation of this 
strategy was facilitated by Rhodesia and Gabon’s shared scepticism about 
British approaches to Africa and to the question of decolonisation, in 
contrast to their praise of France’s methods on the continent.  
 
The Rhodesian Front’s ‘world-struggle ideology’ attributed the rapid 
changes taking place in Africa to the spread of international communism, a 
process that was blamed on the Western policy of appeasement and, in 
particular, the leadership of ‘an effete and decadent post-imperial Britain’ 
(Evans, 2007, p.181). The Rhodesians expressed these sentiments openly to 
the French, contrasting them with their more positive interpretations of 
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French action in Africa. In a note to De Gaulle, Smith openly deplored the 
decolonisation of British Africa as a ‘failure’, evidenced by falling living 
standards amongst the African masses and the drift towards anarchy in 
Britain’s former colonies in the period following independence. By contrast, 
Smith asserted that De Gaulle had ‘succeeded in effecting decolonisation of 
former French Africa and in maintaining it as an economic entity’.169 Van 
der Byl paints a similar picture, claiming that ‘the fabric of the French 
empire will remain long after the British influence has disappeared and that, 
by and large, French will be the most widely used language in Africa’. The 
Rhodesian goes on to describe Paris as ‘the centre of the world and 
civilization rather in the way that Roman citizens in the most distant 
provinces of the Roman Empire looked to Rome’, further underlining his 
admiration for France in contrast to the discontent with Britain’s imperial 
project manifest in the Rhodesian rebellion.170 Lower-ranking Rhodesian 
officials also held a similar view. In a 2011 interview, Derek van der Syde, 
a former Rhodesian Civil Servant, described his impression that the French 
had arranged a ‘much neater and tidier’ and ‘smooth’ transfer of power in 
West Africa, that allowed France to ‘in effect’ continue running the newly 
independent countries, in contrast to the ‘untidiness’ and ‘piecemeal’ nature 
of British decolonisation in Africa. Van der Syde went on to claim that the 
French were ‘better diplomats’ than the British, emphasising in particular 
the fact that,  
the French ambassadors on the whole were 
somehow better liked in their own sphere than the 
British ambassadors were in theirs, I couldn’t tell 
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you why it is, but the French, and for that matter the 
Portuguese, were better colonists because they 
didn’t have so much prejudice with them when they 
came, they didn’t treat the locals… any [sic]… as an 
inferior person… British were rather aloof.171  
Interestingly, the Gabonese President offered a similar assessment, claiming 
that, 
l’Angleterre, contrairement à la France, n’a pas 
compris ce qu’était la décolonisation réelle. Elle va 
d’ailleurs d’échecs en échecs (Irlande, Moyen-
Orient, Rhodésie…)172 
 
The Nigerian civil war (1967-1970) created a context in which these shared 
sentiments could be transformed into something more concrete. Like the 
crisis in Katanga earlier in the decade, the conflict in Britain’s former West 
African colony provided a point of convergence between France, Gabon, the 
Ivory Coast and Rhodesia, with all four supporting the Biafran secessionists 
in their struggle against the British-backed Nigerian Federal authorities. The 
Francophone African states did so publically, as two of only a handful of 
developing countries that offered formal recognition to the breakaway 
Biafran Republic (De St. Jorre, 1972, pp.179-201; Melville, 1979). Despite 
stopping short of providing full diplomatic backing to Biafra, France openly 
declared its support for Biafran self-determination in a communiqué given 
by Joel Le Theule, the French Secretary of State for Information, on 31 July 
1968,173 and henceforth provided Biafra with moral, diplomatic and military 
support (Stremlau, 1977, pp.230-231; Bat & Geneste, 2010, pp.96-97). 
Although Rhodesia’s own international predicament limited the support it 
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could accord to Biafra, it did not prevent the Rhodesians from openly 
expressing their sympathy for the Biafran cause. In a letter to Debré, for 
example, Smith claimed that, 
Nous, en Rhodésie, sommes naturellement intéressés 
par la situation au Biafra, parce qu’elle a quelques 
similitudes avec la nôtre… Pour plusieurs raisons, il 
est très avantageux pour nous que le Biafra réussisse 
à maintenir son indépendance.174  
 
This sense of affiliation over the crisis in Biafra permitted the nascent 
triangular relations between Rhodesia, France and the Francophone 
territories of Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon established during the early 1960s to 
begin to flourish after UDI. On the Rhodesian side, it contributed to a 
growing admiration for France, seen in Smith’s description of his ‘grande 
satisfaction’ at ‘la récente déclaration du gouvernement français sur le fait 
qu’un règlement ne peut être obtenu que sur la base de 
l’autodétermination’.175 For Bongo, the shared position over Biafra meant 
that Rhodesia, Gabon and the Ivory Coast, and by implication France as 
well, belonged to ‘the same family’.176 The importance of the Nigerian civil 
war in the development of relations between Rhodesia and Francophone 
Africa is also underscored in a note from Maurice Delauney, the French 
Ambassador in Libreville (1965-1972), which described how the conflict 
led Gabon to pursue relations with a variety of different countries, including 
Rhodesia.177 
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A clear indication of these blossoming relations came in March 1969, when 
Bongo personally received van der Byl at the Presidential Palace in 
Libreville. Matters discussed included aid to Biafra, the situation in 
Rhodesia and possible avenues for future Gabonese-Rhodesian cooperation. 
Rhodesia and Gabon’s ‘mutual French friends’, in collaboration with 
Houphouët-Boigny, are alleged to have arranged this meeting.178 Here, the 
‘French friends’ in question were members of Foccart’s cellule africaine, in 
particular Philippe Lettéron, who was in Libreville at the same time as the 
Rhodesian delegation and travelled back to Paris with van der Byl. Lettéron 
was also responsible for giving Houphouët-Boigny ‘an account’ of the 
meeting between Bongo and van der Byl, 179  underscoring the 
interconnection between France’s African réseaux and Rhodesia.  
 
Henceforth, certain French actors linked to the Elysée actively promoted the 
expansion of ties between Rhodesia and Francophone Africa. Immediately 
following his first encounter with Bongo in Libreville, van der Byl reported 
how, 
the French made it very clear to me, and to use their 
own words, that they had given us a field to cultivate 
and that we should do so with the least possible 
delay; and that if we did it properly, before the seeds 
had sprouted, other fields would present themselves 
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– obviously indicating the Ivory Coast and possible 
[sic] Senegal.180 
This encouragement went beyond the general to specific, with the French 
proposing that the Rhodesians take advantage of the meat shortages in 
Gabon by establishing a charter air service to transport Rhodesian meat to 
Libreville. The French also allegedly proposed Jack Malloch – a South 
African-born former RAF pilot and lifelong friend of Ian Smith,181 due to 
their contact in Europe during the Second World War (Smith, 1997, p.13) - 
as a suitable candidate for overseeing this operation.182 
 
These plans came into fruition almost immediately. In May 1969, an official 
Rhodesian economic mission, comprising of van der Byl, Balcon, Director 
of Rhodesian Airways, Freeman, a tobacco specialist, and Stoen, a meat 
expert, arrived in Libreville. During their week long visit to the Gabonese 
capital, the Rhodesian delegation was personally received by President 
Bongo, proposing a number of avenues for Rhodesian-Gabonese 
collaboration, including plans to export Rhodesian meat by air to 
Libreville.183 Soon after, on 15 October 1969, the first delivery of meat, 
provided by Rhodesia’s main supplier, the CSC (Mlambo, 1996), landed in 
Libreville, on a plane owned by the Compagnie gabonaise d’affrètement 
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aériens, or Affretair.184 This marked the beginning of a commercial venture 
that saw substantial quantities of Rhodesian meat entering the Gabonese 
marketplace. According to Delauney, in the period up until the end of 1971, 
3,600 tonnes of meat were delivered to Gabon on aircraft flown by 
Affretair.185 More anecdotally, an article in The Rhodesia Herald in March 
1972 reported how ‘Rhodesian aircraft are flying in thousands of kilos of 
meat, fruit and vegetables every week.’ This, in turn, permitted ‘a typical 
meal’ ‘in a restaurant’ in the Gabonese capital to comprise of ‘avocado 
imported from Rhodesia, followed by a Matabeleland186 fillet steak and 
Cape peaches’.187 Rhodesian meat was also re-exported from Libreville to 
European capitals,188 whilst employing the same aircraft used to transport 
meat to carry out charter work on behalf of other airlines, including Air 
France, generated additional income for the Rhodesians.189  
 
This operation is frequently represented as ‘the brain child’ of Jack 
Malloch.190 Yet, as we have seen, the original idea for this operation came 
from Rhodesia’s French ‘friends’, who Malloch had first encountered in the 
context of Katanga in the early 1960s (Bat, 2012, p.220). Furthermore, the 
development and maintenance of this illegal trading network, and ties 
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between Rhodesia and Gabon more generally, was contingent upon various 
individuals and groups linked to the French state. At a quasi-official level, 
there was Mauricheau-Beaupré, Lettéron and Pierre de la Houssaye, a 
SDECE informant stationed in Libreville (Bat & Geneste, 2010, p.97), who 
travelled to Rhodesia in 1970 to negotiate a loan of one million Rhodesian 
dollars to the Gabonese government.191 Allegations have also been made 
against French state institutions, such as the suggestion made by French 
investigative journalist Pierre Péan (1983, p.86) that the Renseignements 
Généraux and SDECE offered support to Affretair operatives active in 
Paris, and oral history testimony that records the presence of the Direction 
de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST) on the ground in Libreville 
overseeing the arrival of the Affretair planes, containing Rhodesian meat.192   
 
Various private individuals and groups operated alongside, and in 
conjunction with, these official or quasi-official actors. Claude Milan, for 
example, a long-standing Rhodesian contact based in Paris who arranged 
meetings for the Rhodesians with high-ranking government representatives 
and businessmen,193 acted as ‘l’antenne parisienne d’Affretair’ (Péan, 1983, 
p.89).194 French businesses were also of vital importance to the success of 
this operation, seen for example by the involvement of SODUCO, the 
French agent of Guinness Overseas, in the distribution of meat in Gabon,195 
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and the role of the Société Commerciale d’Affrètements et de Combustibles 
(SCAC) in providing Affretair with its ‘European base in Paris’ and, thus, 
facilitating the ‘circuits officieux qui permettraient au Gabon de violer les 
sanctions’.196 UTA was another crucial linchpin in this trading network, 
acting as ‘agents de liaison entre les divers éléments de la Société 
[Affretair]’197 and servicing the planes used transport Rhodesian beef to 
Gabon throughout the 1970s.198  
 
Underpinning this illegal trading complex, therefore, was a complex 
network of French individuals and groups that provided the means, and the 
motivation, for an independent, Francophone African nation-state to help 
prop up a reactionary white regime in Southern Central Anglophone Africa. 
This case provides evidence, therefore, of how certain French actors linked 
to the Elysée used their allies in Francophone Africa as proxies for the 
pursuit of a wider strategy to maintain French interests in Rhodesia after 
UDI. That is not to say, however, that Francophone Africans were mere 
puppets of a metropolitan-directed strategy. Rather, in keeping with the role 
played by Africans in shaping the nature of France’s relations with its 
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former sub-Saharan colonies after their independence (Charbonneau, 2008, 
p.2; Médard, 1997, p.33), Francophone Africans were crucial in developing 
and maintaining the networks that permitted the exportation of Rhodesian 
meat to Gabon.  
 
This operation simply would not have been possible without the cooperation 
of Omar Bongo, who was willing to overlook the international trade 
embargo against Rhodesia – Bongo is reported to have stated explicitly to 
van der Byl that ‘the problem of the blockade and sanctions is of no 
importance’199 - welcoming the Rhodesians to the Gabonese Presidential 
Palace and offering them use of a site in the centre of Libreville.200 
Moreover, Bongo influenced the shape of Gabonese-Rhodesian interaction. 
This is especially evident in the case of the Rhodesian loan to Gabon, where 
negotiations were initially held up by the Gabonese President’s reluctance to 
let the Rhodesians have too much control over the uses of the funds.201 
Moreover, it was Bongo who nominated de la Houssaye to travel to 
Salisbury to finalise the arrangements for the loan due to his participation in 
earlier loan negotiations.202  
 
Houphouët-Boigny was also crucial in the development of the trading 
relations between Rhodesia and Gabon, although there is less concrete 
archival evidence to support this view. A footnote at the bottom of a report 
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repatriated from Libreville, for example, states that Bongo received van der 
Byl and the Rhodesian delegation at the request of the Ivorian President.203 
His participation is further reinforced in van der Byl’s own account of his 
visit to Gabon in which he reported, 
It was also clear that Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory 
Coast was following his normal procedure in using 
either Bongo or Tsiranana, President of Malagasy, to 
act as the vanguard before he was prepared to 
expose himself. Bongo made it clear that Houphouët 
knew all about the visit and was anxious for it to be 
a success and that the two of them would act in close 
collusion with regard to any results which might 
flow and any questions which we had to make.204 
The existence of direct personal contacts between the Ivorian President and 
the Rhodesians is underlined by van der Byl’s reference to the ‘answers to 
various messages and letters which I [van der Byl] passed to him 
[Houphouët-Boigny] through the French’. 205  Francophone Africans, 
therefore, were crucial in the development of economic ties between 
Rhodesia and Gabon, as well as to the fashioning of France’s post-UDI 
contacts with Rhodesia.  
 
Building on patterns established prior to UDI, the Rhodesians themselves 
were also important participants in these networks, with high-ranking 
members of government, such as Smith and van der Byl, enthusiastically 
pursuing the development of Rhodesian trade in Gabon. Following the 
conclusion of the Rhodesian loan to Gabon, for example, Smith wrote to 
Bongo expressing his, 
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earnest hope that this loan will help to cement the 
good relations which already exist between our two 
governments… I look forward to the day when the 
political climate will become sufficiently favourable 
for the relationship to become even closer.206  
There are also lesser known Rhodesian figures who were crucial to the 
establishment and maintenance of Rhodesia’s trading links with Gabon, 
such as Max Dumas, of the Rhodesian Information Office in Paris, who was 
described by the FCO as an ‘important Affretair contact’207 and Derek van 
der Syde, a Rhodesian Civil Servant posted in Libreville to oversee arrival 
of Rhodesian meat. 208  In addition, there was Rodney Davies, a CSC 
employee, with fluent French language skills and a French-speaking wife, 
who was tasked with finding markets to sell Rhodesian beef. In this role, he 
made regular trips to Libreville to supervise the arrival of Rhodesian meat 
and was also stationed in Abidjan for seventeen months commencing in 
1973.209  
 
The relationship between the Rhodesians and the French was not always a 
smooth one. Despite French enthusiasm, initial exchanges between 
Rhodesia and Gabon were limited to a ‘un modeste courant commercial’210 
due to the difficulty of finding sufficient return freight to ensure the 
profitability of the venture.211 In light of this, the French expressed to the 
Rhodesians their disappointment that they were ‘not moving quicker in 
Gabon’, prompting van der Byl to propose to Smith that an intervention on 
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their part was required. 212  Paradoxically, Rhodesian enthusiasm also 
occasionally led to clashes with the French. In 1971, for example, 
Mauricheau-Beaupré reprimanded the Rhodesians for planning a visit to 
Gabon from the Minister and Secretary of Foreign Affairs, on the grounds 
that it was ‘premature and prejudicial to the continued success of his and 
our relationship with that country.’ Mauricheau-Beaupré was further 
incensed by an attempt made by a member of the Rhodesian Ministry to 
Foreign Affairs to enter the Ivory Coast, describing Rhodesian actions as 
‘acutely embarrassing to the West Coast [of Africa] and to him 
personally’.213 Van der Byl attempted to dissuade Mauricheau-Beaupré 
from ‘using his influence to stop the visit’, but was unsuccessful. Although 
the Rhodesians quickly set about arranging another mission to Libreville, 
this exchange reveals Rhodesia’s reliance on those linked to the Elysée for 
its contacts in Gabon and the need ‘to do things their [the French] way’ in 
order to ensure the success of Rhodesian ventures in Francophone Africa.214 
 
The Affretair operation, and relations between Rhodesia and Francophone 
Africa more broadly, were, therefore, the product of a complex, and 
sometimes uneven, réseau of private and public individuals and groups 
from France, Francophone Africa and Rhodesia. Although not the sole 
determinants of this web of contacts, French actors linked to the Elysée 
embroiled in these networks were vital in providing the impetus behind this 
trading operation. The networks that formed the foundation of the contacts 
between France and Rhodesia took as their model the patterns of relations 
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established by the French for the maintenance of French influence in its 
former sub-Saharan dependencies. Furthermore, more than just providing a 
model for interaction, Rhodesia was directly integrated into the Franco-
African réseaux, giving French interaction with the African continent a 
particular triangular dimension and prompting the creation of networks that 
transcended racial, linguistic, colonial and national boundaries.    
 
By contrast, despite having knowledge of the connections between 
Salisbury and Libreville, as well as the alleged involvement of French 
individuals and businesses in the operations of Affretair, the Quai appeared 
to have little control over the Gabonese-Rhodesian relations. France’s 
representatives at the UN denied all French state involvement and, in 
keeping with the wider French public stance of cooperation with 
international sanctions, asserted that the French authorities were conducting 
enquiries into the allegations against French companies and individuals 
named in press reports.215 The Quai also sought to deflect attention away 
from France, claiming that the Gabonese authorities should ‘répondre aux 
démarches du Secrétariat Général des Nations Unies’.216 By their own 
admission, however, the French Foreign Ministry’s control over French 
nationals involved in the Affretair trading complex was limited. In response 
to accusations that a French national was operating on behalf of Affretair in 
Gabon, for example, the Sous-Direction d’Afrique at the MAE claimed that 
‘ses activités en territoire gabonaise échapperaient au contrôle des autorités 
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françaises’.217 Furthermore, the Quai maintained that the company ‘n’est 
pas une société française et que par conséquent nous ne sommes pas 
compétents’.218 This could be interpreted as intransigence. More likely, 
however, is that the French Foreign Ministry did not know about the 
involvement of French state actors in the connection and, even if they did, 
they could do nothing to prevent it. Thus, in line with the divergence 
between the Quai and the Elysée in France’s relations with its former 
colonies in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as elsewhere in France’s 
engagement with Rhodesia, a split between the official policy as 
implemented by the French Foreign Ministry and the para-official strategies 
pursued by those linked to Foccart’s African cell is clearly visible in this 
case. This, in turn, represents continuity and connection across the 
geographical space separating Francophone and Anglophone Africa.  
 
Conclusions 
 
In the aftermath of UDI, in line with the bifurcation of France’s approach to 
its relations with its former African colonies, French engagement with 
Rhodesia was divided between an official position, as advanced by the Quai 
d’Orsay, and a quasi-official stance, linked to the Elysée Palace. The former 
was in keeping with France’s status as an ally of the United Kingdom and 
Rhodesia’s illegal status on the international stage, and saw the French 
government actively opposing UDI and supporting international sanctions 
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against this breakaway British colony. The latter stood in stark contrast to 
the position adopted by the majority of the French government, as certain 
actors linked to the Elysée actively pursued relations with the reactionary 
regime in Rhodesia, both directly and through intermediaries from the 
French metropole, white-ruled Southern Africa and Francophone Africa.  
 
This fragmentation took place in response to Rhodesia’s shifting position on 
the international stage in the wake of UDI. However, it also built directly 
upon patterns established in Franco-Rhodesian contacts before 1965. The 
importance of “men-on-the-spot” in driving forward French relations with 
Rhodesia, for example, was a practice established during the Fourth 
Republic. The foundations laid in the immediate aftermath of Francophone 
African independence in 1960 – in particular the growing participation of 
members of Foccart’s cellule africaine and Rhodesia’s integration into the 
Franco-African réseaux - were also pivotal in creating the context in which 
an official stance of opposition towards UDI could coexist alongside the 
complicity of certain French actors in the propping up of Smith’s illegal 
regime. In the aftermath of UDI, therefore, Rhodesia was further integrated 
into the mechanisms for the maintenance of French influence on the African 
continent, creating complex réseaux that crossed racial, linguistic, national 
and colonial boundaries. After 1965, Rhodesia became an integral part of 
French engagement with the African continent in the post-colonial period. 
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Chapter Five 
France and Rhodesia after 1965: impact  
 
The picture that emerges from the previous two chapters is one of a 
complex and conflicted French policy towards Rhodesia after UDI. As 
Chapter Three explored, France’s position towards this British colony in the 
aftermath of UDI was founded upon the French foreign policy mind-set 
overlapping and intersecting with numerous individuals and groups’ own 
interests, transposed in the setting of post-1965 Rhodesia. In Chapter Four, 
we saw how this fragmented approach operated in practice, identifying the 
varying degrees of French involvement with Rhodesia after UDI and 
emphasising, in particular, the importance of the réseaux of French and 
Francophone African “men-on-the-spot”, along with a diverse array of 
private individuals and groups, in driving forward France’s continued 
involvement with Rhodesia after UDI. Thus, France’s policies towards 
Rhodesia after UDI not only built upon an eighteen-year French presence in 
this region of Central Southern Anglophone Africa, but were also tied to 
wider French activities on the African continent and to France’s broader 
international practices.  
 
The purpose of this final chapter is to elucidate the significance of the 
findings of Chapters Three and Four, as well as the themes developed 
throughout the thesis more broadly, by assessing the impact of French 
engagement with Rhodesia after Smith’s proclamation of UDI. It will first 
analyse the importance of French policy for the situation on the ground in 
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this British colony, where the settlers maintained their defiant position 
towards the metropolitan authorities for well over a decade. What, therefore, 
were the consequences of the French approach to the Rhodesia during this 
period and, in particular, the continued involvement of certain French actors 
in the region, in contrast to France’s public opposition to the RF?  
 
In light of the connections and continuities between French practices in 
Rhodesia and its activities elsewhere in Africa, this chapter will also analyse 
the impact of French involvement in Rhodesia on French strategies in other 
corners of the continent. As Chapter Three demonstrated, French 
engagement with Rhodesia was situated within France’s broader presence in 
neighbouring territories in Southern Africa. It is likely, therefore, that the 
French position towards Rhodesia after UDI fed back into France’s wider 
regional activities. This chapter will test this hypothesis and consider how 
far France’s position in Southern Africa after 1965 was shaped by French 
relations with Rhodesia during the same period. Another recurring theme in 
the previous two chapters has been the interconnection – in terms of 
motives, methods and men – between France’s engagement with Rhodesia 
and its relations with its former colonies in West and Equatorial Africa, 
especially its best African “friends”. Thus, it will also be necessary for this 
section to investigate the consequences of France’s involvement in 
Rhodesia for France’s relations with Francophone Africa and France’s 
wider continental presence in the post-1965 epoch. 
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Broadening the perspective further, and in light of Rhodesia’s status as a 
British colony throughout the period in question – albeit contrary to the 
white regime’s best efforts to gain recognition for Rhodesia as an 
independent state – this chapter will analyse the impact of UDI, and the 
diverse array of French responses to this crisis, on Anglo-French relations. 
It will explore both the opportunities for cooperation between the FCO and 
their counterparts at the Quai, and the possibilities for conflict and hostility, 
as the persistent participation of certain French actors in Rhodesia after UDI 
collided with the deeply rooted Franco-British rivalry on the African 
continent. Finally, this chapter with assess the consequences of French 
policy towards Rhodesia on France’s strategies in the international age of 
bipolarity. As Chapter Three demonstrated, France viewed Rhodesia 
through a Cold War lens. To what extent, therefore, did involvement with 
Rhodesia after UDI influence France’s approach to its allies in the Western 
Alliance, as well as its staunch anti-communism, and what opportunities for 
the development of France’s strategy of foreign policy autonomy were 
created in the Rhodesian context? In analysing the impact of French policy 
towards Rhodesia on these varying elements of France’s international 
activities, this chapter will reveal the significance of studying French 
engagement with Rhodesia after UDI as a means of enhancing our 
understanding not only of the decolonisation process in this British colony, 
but also of France’s post-colonial African strategies and its wider foreign 
policies.  
 
 284 
The impact of French policy on the course of Rhodesian 
decolonisation  
 
Despite British hopes that their disagreements with the Rhodesian settlers 
would be resolved in ‘a matter of weeks rather than months’ (Wood, 2008), 
UDI was not revoked until 21 December 1979, more than fourteen years 
after Smith’s proclamation of 11 November 1965. Under the London 
Agreement, which was signed following three months of talks between 
Smith and the African nationalist leaders at Lancaster House, all parties 
agreed to a ceasefire and a brief return to British rule, prior to elections and 
full independence in the spring of 1980 (Meredith, 2006, pp.325-328). On 
April 18 1980, at a midnight ceremony attended by Prince Charles and Bob 
Marley, the red, green, black and gold flag of Zimbabwe rose for the first 
time.1 It was, therefore, two decades after the independence of Francophone 
Africa that white minority-governed Rhodesia, ‘the last outpost of the 
British Empire in Africa and the last colony in the continent’, was 
transformed into majority-ruled Zimbabwe.2 
 
Explanations for Rhodesia’s delayed decolonisation often focus on the 
strength and tenacity of the white settler population in contrast to the 
weakness and factionalism of the Zimbabwean nationalist movement. 
Ethnic, linguistic and ideological differences plagued the Zimbabwean 
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nationalist movement, with the Ndebele-dominated ZAPU led by Joshua 
Nkomo, seeking international recognition for the nationalist cause, in 
opposition to supporters of an armed struggle, who included Ndabaningi 
Sithole, Robert Mugabe and other members of ZANU, the party of the 
Shona people (Evans, 2007, p.178; Dowden, 2008, pp.138-139). There were 
also intra-organisational rivalries that further accentuated the weaknesses of 
the nationalist movement, seen most notably in ZANU, where Sithole’s 
leadership position was undermined by a group of ZANU detainees who 
appointed Mugabe as the new leader of the party (Mtisi, Nyakudya & 
Barnes, 2009, p.145).  
 
By contrast, the white population, although demographically weak in the 
face of a rapidly expanding African population, remained remarkably united 
and committed to the maintenance of white rule in Rhodesia throughout the 
period in question. This unity was founded upon a shared ‘world struggle 
ideology’ that justified UDI on the grounds that it was an act necessary to 
prevent the spread of communism and protect Western civilisation in Africa 
(Evans, 2007, pp.180-182). White strength and cohesion was also facilitated 
by the maintenance of the prosperous ‘Rhodesian way of life’ (Godwin & 
Hancock, 1993) for much of the UDI period in spite of international 
sanctions and guerrilla war. The ability to sustain this privileged, yet insular, 
lifestyle is frequently attributed to the support provided by Rhodesia’s 
white-ruled neighbours, Mozambique and South Africa, as well as the 
willingness of foreign companies to continue to trade with Rhodesia in 
contravention of the international trade embargo (Mtisi, Nyakudya & 
 286 
Barnes, 2009, p.144). The emphasis is most often placed on the former, with 
arguments for the eventual collapse of Rhodesia focusing on the 
independence of Mozambique in 1975, which severed key Rhodesian 
supply routes and left Rhodesia’s 764-mile eastern border vulnerable to 
attack from ZANU guerrillas operating in the former Portuguese-ruled 
territory, whilst simultaneously reducing the importance of Rhodesia to 
South Africa as a white buffer state (Meredith, 2006, p.321; Mtisi, 
Nyakudya & Barnes, 2009, pp.144-145).  
 
Although not wishing to diminish the significance of the support from 
Pretoria and Lisbon in the maintenance of white rule, this thesis contends 
that the picture of external backing for the white regime is more complex 
than has been presented in the existing literature on the process of 
Rhodesian decolonisation, and that France was an important source of 
strength for the white regime. Certainly, it is important to acknowledge the 
limitations of French support for Rhodesia. As we have already seen, 
French companies were not unique in their willingness to breach the trade 
embargo and, in the grand scheme of things, French direct trade with 
Rhodesia was relative modest (Bach, 1990, p.186). The impact of direct 
French involvement in the Rhodesian military is also questionable. 
Although details are sketchy, we know that French mercenaries fought 
alongside the Rhodesians, forming the separate 7 Independent Company 
within the RLI. Yet, the participation of these private French soldiers’ in the 
Rhodesian military was not without its difficulties, as is evidenced in the 
case of Gilles Boucher, explored in Chapter Four. According to Boucher’s 
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testimony, a French recruitment agent tricked him into fighting with the 
RLI, leading him to believe that he would receive handsome remuneration 
in exchange for guarding Rhodesian farms. After his arrival in Salisbury and 
the realisation that his actual task in Rhodesia was to fight on behalf of the 
settlers, Boucher clashed with his French military superiors, notably 
following his interception and destruction of a letter from Frachet, the 
French recruiting agent, to the French commander of his company, Major 
Bessy. This, in turn, led to his Boucher’s incarceration in the RLI prison in 
Salisbury.3 This clash between a private French soldier and his superiors 
reveals the tensions amongst the French military contingent operating 
within the Rhodesian armed forces, tensions that are likely to have reduced 
the efficiency of the French unit within the RLI. The problematic role 
played by the French in the Rhodesian military is also noted in the 
secondary literature, with Moorcraft and McLaughin (2009, pp.53-54) 
describing how the independent company of French mercenaries were not 
successful in Rhodesian conditions, prompting the unit’s disbandment. The 
operational impact of French mercenaries in the Rhodesian armed forces is 
likely, therefore, to have been relatively meagre.  
 
However, whilst direct French participants in Rhodesia may have made only 
a minor contribution to Rhodesia’s economic and military strength in the 
years between 1965 and 1980, the same cannot be said for France’s indirect 
involvement in this breakaway British colony. Rather, French commercial 
and military participation through intermediaries elsewhere in Africa had 
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substantial consequences for the course of UDI.  For one, as we have seen in 
Chapter Four, Portuguese and especially South African involvement in 
Rhodesia, which is underlined by scholars as crucial both to Rhodesia’s 
continued economic vitality and its war effort, relied on the continuous 
supply of goods from French sources that could later be re-exported to 
Rhodesia. It is possible to hypothesise, therefore, that without the existence 
of well-established French commercial, military and diplomatic ties to 
South Africa and Mozambique, the support provided by Rhodesia’s white-
ruled neighbours might not have been as extensive. Moreover, Rhodesian 
goods, such as sugar, tobacco, metals and minerals, were purchased by 
French companies and exported via Rhodesia’s white-ruled neighbours to 
the French metropole and onto French clients overseas. Although the 
intrinsically opaque nature of these contacts makes it difficult to quantify 
the full extent of this trade, it is nevertheless likely that persistent French 
indirect commercial engagement in the region provided the Rhodesians with 
significant material support vital to the maintenance of their privileged ‘way 
of life’ and, thus, UDI.    
 
A further indirect French influence on the material wellbeing of white 
Rhodesia came in the form of public and private participation in the 
operations of Affretair, which oversaw the transportation of Rhodesian meat 
around the globe, especially to the former French colony of Gabon.4 The 
airline also generated additional income for the Rhodesians by carrying out 
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charter work on behalf of other airlines, including Air France.5 The impact 
of these ventures was substantial, something that two FCO reports from 
March 1976 attest to. The first, prepared by the Rhodesia Department, 
reported ‘the major importance of Affretair as a foreign currency earner for 
the illegal regime’.6 Ten days later, in a similar vein, a despatch authored by 
the Foreign Secretary described ‘the activities of Affretair’ as, 
vital to the illegal regime in Salisbury, since by its 
considerable exports of Rhodesian meat and by its 
charter activities for other airlines, Affretair is a 
major earner of foreign currency which the illegal 
regime need in order to pay for their clandestine 
imports.7  
Affretair continued to provide vital financial resources to the white regime 
right up until the eve of independence, seen by a UK government report 
from January 1979 that described the airline’s operations as ‘without doubt 
a major earner of foreign currency for the Rhodesian government’.8  
 
The Rhodesians themselves also viewed Affretair as important to their 
ability to defy the international trade embargo. According to Ken Flower 
(1987, p.76), Head of Rhodesia’s Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Malloch 
and his aeroplanes contributed more than any other single factor to the 
defeat of economic sanctions’. More recently, in a 2011 interview, Derek 
van der Syde described Libreville as a ‘great big hole’ in the sanctions net, 
which contributed to the ineffectiveness of the trade embargo imposed on 
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Rhodesia.9 French participation in this illegal commercial network had, 
therefore, a significant influence over the ability of Rhodesia’s settlers to 
sustain white rule throughout the 1970s. Thus, it is apparent that French 
indirect commercial involvement with Rhodesia after UDI had substantial, 
perhaps even transformative, consequences for the course of Rhodesian 
decolonisation as it provided the white Rhodesians with a lifeline crucial to 
their efforts to prevent the introduction of majority rule in the region.  
 
However, the most important aspect of French direct and indirect 
involvement in Rhodesia after UDI was not its material effects, but rather its 
psychological impact amongst the white Rhodesians themselves. 
Throughout the UDI period, and in spite of France’s public denunciations of 
the RF, Rhodesia’s white settlers remained convinced that they had French 
backing. A letter to the editor of The Rhodesia Herald from February 1966, 
for example, called upon the Rhodesian government to make an appeal to 
De Gaulle for more formal support, a move that the author believed ‘would 
stop Harold Wilson in his tracks’.10 The extent of this Rhodesian optimism 
was also recorded in the UK press, seen in an article in The Guardian from 
March 1966, which reported how many Rhodesians believed France would 
offer diplomatic support to Smith’s regime11 
 
                                                
9 Van der Syde (2011, March 28). Interview by Joanna Warson. Bournemouth: UK. 
10 McCourt. (1966, February 5). ‘Rhodesian appeal to De Gaulle would stop Wilson in his 
tracks’. The Rhodesia Herald. 
11 Franklin. (1966, March, 3). ‘Rhodesia at War’. The Guardian. 
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Downing Street dismissed such reports as a consequence of ‘Rhodesians 
whistling to keep their spirits up’,12 a view that was recapitulated by 
Whitehall, who concluded such rumours were merely ‘wishful thinking on 
the part of the Rhodesians’.13  And, it is certainly true that the presence of 
these sentiments amongst ordinary white Rhodesians, a highly insulated and 
inward looking population (Godwin & Hancock, 1993), is likely to have 
derived from reports in the highly censored Rhodesian press (Windrich, 
1979). An article in the state-controlled Rhodesia Herald recording the 
aforementioned tour of Rhodesia by the French deputy, Franck Cazenave, in 
February and March 1966, for example, contrasted Cazenave’s assertion 
that Britain had made a “sad error” in the region with his claim that ‘the 
general attitude in France was one of sympathy towards Rhodesia’.14 
Similarly, reports of a letter written by the right-wing Comité France-
Rhodésie to the British Prime Minister were represented in the Rhodesian 
press in February 1966 as proof that ‘French society opposes Wilson’.15 
These reports, in turn, are likely to have fuelled the conviction held by 
Rhodesia’s settlers that they had French backing.  
 
Yet, the Rhodesian perception of French support should not be discounted 
entirely as a consequence of settler delusion resulting from state media 
censorship. For one, it was not just ordinary Rhodesians who viewed France 
as an ally. High-ranking, well-travelled and subsequently better-informed 
members of the RF also consistently saw France as a potential source of 
                                                
12 Palliser. (1966, November 1). PREM/13/1154. London:TNA.  
13 FO to Palliser. (1966, November 9). PREM/13/1154. London:TNA.  
14 Anonymous. (1966, March 1). ‘Sad error’ on Rhodesia, says Deputy. The Rhodesia 
Herald.  
15 Anonymous. (1966, February 7). French Society Opposes Wilson. The Rhodesia Herald. 
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strength in the Rhodesian struggle. This is especially true of van der Byl, 
white Rhodesia’s principal representative overseas, who, as earlier chapters 
of this thesis have demonstrated, had direct, personal contact with various 
French officials both before and after 1965. This, in turn, fuelled van der 
Byl’s belief that ‘France will therefore, within the limits of her own self-
interest, be prepared to do whatever she can to further trade and harmonious 
relations provided open confrontation is avoided at this stage’.16 Similarly, 
in 1969, van der Byl interpreted the French promotion of Rhodesian 
contacts in West Africa as a symbol of hope for a future ‘improvement of 
our status in France and, in due course, one hopes to final recognition’.17 
Prime Minister Smith appears to have been equally convinced of French 
backing, demonstrated by the personal letters he wrote to De Gaulle in the 
period between November 1965 and April 1969, in which he openly 
expressed white Rhodesia’s fraternal feelings towards France, as well its 
hopes for further French support.18 After De Gaulle’s resignation, Smith 
also wrote to Pompidou on at least one occasion, calling for ‘the resumption 
of normal relations between France and Rhodesia’ and ‘an extension of 
French interests’ in the region.19  
 
The Rhodesian tendency to look to France for support in its struggle to 
maintain white rule continued throughout the UDI period, seen in October 
1978 when the French Presidential Palace received a request from Smith 
                                                
16 Van der Byl. (1966). SC/9/TS4/11. Grahamstown:CL. 
17 Van der Byl. (1969, April).. Report on visit to Gabon: an account on resulting 
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18 Smith to De Gaulle. (1965, December 24; 1966, February 11; 1967, February 17; 1967, 
August 14; 1968, July 2). 5AG/FPR/302. Paris:AN. 
19 Smith to Pompidou. (1969, June 27). 5AG/FPR/302. Paris:AN. 
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that a French information mission be sent to Rhodesia.20 Similarly, in a note 
sent to the French President and Minister of Foreign Affairs in January 
1979, allegedly on behalf Ian Smith, van der Byl called upon the French ‘to 
take a positive line over the Rhodesian question’. In particular, the 
Rhodesian appealed to France to support the internal settlement agreement 
signed by Smith, Sithole, Abel Muzorewa, leader of the United African 
National Council (UANC), and Jeremiah Chirau, leader of the Zimbabwe 
United People’s Organisation (ZUPO) on 3 March 1978 (Meredith, 1979, 
p.331) and the first free elections in April.21 These elections resulted in the 
end of Smith’s fifteen-year tenure as Prime Minister on 31 May 1979 and 
his replacement by Muzorewa (Meredith, 2006, pp.324-325). This message, 
sent at a moment when the handover of power to the African majority was 
imminent, demonstrates the persistent Rhodesian perception that France was 
willing to help the white Rhodesian cause and was in a position to influence 
the outcome of events in the region, even when the only option left open to 
the settlers was to concede to some version of majority rule. It was hoped, 
therefore, that France might help preserve white influence in this new order. 
 
The small number of oral history interviews conducted with former settlers 
during the course of this PhD project reveal the strength of the Rhodesian 
memory of French support. In 2011, Derek van der Syde claimed that ‘in 
one way and another the French were helping in a quiet way’, describing 
how ‘merely the fact that we felt ourselves that we had outside support’ was 
                                                
20 Robin, Technical Advisor to Secretary General of the President, to Wahl, Secretary 
General of the President of the Republic. (1978, October 25). 5AG3/1058. Paris:AN. 
21 Van der Byl. (1979, January 3). 5AG3/1058. Paris:AN.  
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highly influential.22 Similarly, in another interview conducted in 2011, 
Benjamin Davies, who was born in Rhodesia in the early 1970s and whose 
father worked for the CSC, remembered how the Rhodesians received ‘a lot 
of help’ from the French, particularly in the context of their struggle with 
the African nationalist guerrillas.23 In his memoirs, Collie Hill (2001) also 
recalls at length the French involvement in the purchase of Rhodesian sugar 
after UDI and remembers the French, both at an individual and national 
level, in extremely fond terms.24  
 
The resilience of these memories of French support, and in particular, the 
continued representation of France as a friend to Rhodesia, demonstrates the 
long-lasting psychological impact of French involvement in the region. 
During the UDI period, the perception of French support is likely to have 
had a considerable influence on white confidence, hardening the Rhodesian 
resolve to maintain the rebellion against the colonial metropole, and thus 
delaying the transfer of power to the African majority. As such, it is 
possible to conclude that the lengthy process of Rhodesian decolonisation 
was, at least in part, the consequence of the moral support, both real and 
imagined, that the Rhodesians received from France. France made, 
therefore, a significant contribution to the longevity of UDI and the late 
transformation of this British colony into the independent nation-state of 
Zimbabwe.  
 
                                                
22 Van der Syde. (2011, March 28). Interview by Joanna Warson. Bournemouth: UK. 
23 Davies. (2011, July 23). Interview by Joanna Warson. London:UK.  
24 C. & S. Hill. (2012, February 6). Interview by Joanna Warson. Banstead, Surrey: UK. 
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The impact of French policy in Rhodesia on France’s 
Southern African strategy  
 
France’s policies towards Rhodesia throughout the UDI period – both the 
official position of opposition to the RF and the quasi-official stance of 
support for the Rhodesians, albeit within the limits of individual and 
national self-interest – had substantial consequences for France’s regional 
position in Southern Africa. On the one hand, new opportunities arose for 
France in apartheid South Africa as a result of the French response to events 
taking place in Rhodesia. France’s initial neutrality over the Rhodesian 
question in the UN was viewed positively by Pretoria, as proof that the 
French would support the application of sanctions against the apartheid 
regime. According to the Afrique-Levant department at the Quai, this 
‘attitude indépendante’, alongside the French position towards apartheid and 
‘l’autorité incontestable du Général de Gaulle dans l’opinion politique sud-
africaine’, left France in a stronger position in the region that the financially 
vulnerable British government.25 This shifting balance of power was also 
acknowledged by the FCO, who reported how the French increasingly had 
an advantage over the British in the region as the South Africans were 
‘uncertain where H. M. G. stood in relation to economic action against 
South Africa’ whilst the French response to Rhodesia made Pretoria ‘more 
confident that the French government would not join in’.26 This, in turn, 
created opportunities for the expansion of France’s commercial presence in 
the region, such as through the construction of a new refinery in South 
                                                
25 AL. (1966, April 21). AL/SEAB16/13. Paris:AMAE 
26 Anonymous. (nd). South Africa and Portugal. pp.4-6. FCO/25/325/25. London:TNA. 
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Africa by the CFP,27 a reverse scenario of how France’s strong position in 
South Africa created possibilities for France in Rhodesia. It is possible to 
argue, therefore, that the particular French approach to UDI reinforced 
France’s existing position of strength in Pretoria.  
 
On the other hand, and somewhat paradoxically in light of French 
involvement in propping up Ian Smith’s regime, the French also 
successfully maintained positive ties with African nationalists in 
neighbouring regions in Southern Africa throughout the UDI period. This is 
especially true in the former British colony of Zambia. Franco-Zambian 
contacts were not entirely new in this period. During the Federal period, as 
the first half of this thesis has demonstrated, France’s economic, diplomatic 
and cultural relations with Northern Rhodesia grew as a result of the French 
base in Salisbury. As Zambian independence neared, the Zambians 
reciprocated these advances, seen by a request in early 1964 from soon to be 
President, Kenneth Kaunda, for the development of commercial relations 
between France and Northern Rhodesia,28 and Kaunda’s decision to include 
Paris in his European tour of May 1964. 29  However, after 1965, the 
opportunities for France in Zambia increased, as British inaction in 
Rhodesia left many Zambians convinced that their ex-ruler was ‘a toothless 
bulldog’ (Hyam, 2006, p.369). Declining confidence in Britain led Kaunda 
to approach France for diplomatic, military and financial assistance. The 
French President responded to Zambian advances with the claim that France 
                                                
27 Anonymous. (nd). South Africa and Portugal. pp.4-6. FCO/25/325/25. London:TNA. 
28 De Bourdeille, French Ambassador, Tanzania, to MAE. (1964, February 4). 
AL/SEAB/27/No.88. Paris:AMAE.  
29 AL to Personnel. (1964, April 15). AL/SEAB/14/No.29. Paris:AMAE. 
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hoped to develop ‘entre nos deux pays une amitié dont les hasards de 
l’histoire avaient retardé la manifestation’.30 A little over six months later 
France’s friendship with Zambia appeared to be cemented when The Daily 
Telegraph reported that a ‘France-Zambia Cooper Deal [was] Foreseen.’31 
The second half of the late 1960s saw other new possibilities for the French 
in Zambia, including opportunities for the Compagnie de Construction 
Internationale Française (Grands Travaux Marseille) to participate in the 
construction of a new dam on the Kafue River and the development of a 
UTA air link between Libreville, Lusaka and Johannesburg.32 Interest in 
these infrastructure projects echoes the patterns of French engagement with 
Rhodesia in the 1950s explored in Chapter Two, as well as mirroring the 
French approach to Francophone Africa more broadly in both the late 
colonial and post-colonial periods. This, in turn, reinforces the argument 
that France’s African vision was not uniquely Francophone in its focus, but 
constantly evolving and expanding in response to the new opportunities 
created as a result of events taking place on the ground in Africa, including 
the crisis in Rhodesia.  
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The impact of French policy in Rhodesia on France’s African 
policy  
 
France, Francophone Africa and white Rhodesia  
 
The ability of the French to balance these paradoxical alliances with both 
white rulers and African nationalists in Southern Africa was reproduced in 
the broader context of Franco-African relations, with certain French actors 
successfully maintaining ties with the white minority governments of South 
Africa and Rhodesia alongside close personal friendships with Francophone 
African nationalists, and even going as far as to promote relations between 
the two.  
 
Certainly, new tensions were created in France’s relations with its former 
colonies in West and Equatorial Africa as a result of French policy towards 
Rhodesia, seen especially in the context of the UN, where the French 
delegation’s initial abstentions in votes concerning Rhodesia in the Security 
Council provoked African hostility. In the month before UDI, for instance, 
the French delegation abstained in a vote for the adoption of a resolution 
regarding Rhodesia put forward by Guinea. According to a diplomatic 
synthesis in the French Presidential archive, this decision, 
semble avoir été mal comprise par les pays du tiers-
monde, bien que notre représentant ait clairement 
expliqué que nous n’étions pas favorables à la 
politique de discrimination raciale pratiquée par le 
gouvernement rhodésien.33  
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Further criticism of the French came later in October from the Organisation 
Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM), who voiced their opposition to 
the creation in Southern Africa of ‘un vaste ensemble raciste dont la seule 
présence constituerait un danger pour l’évolution du continent tout entier’, 
and indicated a move towards the adoption of the OAU stance that Rhodesia 
was ‘d’une affaire internationale relevant la compétence de l’ONU’. The 
OCAM also highlighted the delicate situation created for France in Africa, 
particularly vis-à-vis the more revolutionary states, by its continued 
insistence that Rhodesia was not an international problem, emphasising how 
it would be difficult for members of the organisation to respond to 
accusations against France if the Rhodesian question was raised in the 
UNSC, a likely outcome in anticipation of UDI.34 This can be interpreted as 
a warning from France’s former African colonies that, if France did not alter 
its stance in the event of UDI, it risked losing Francophone African support.  
 
After UDI, the impasse between France and Africa over the application of 
the principle of “non-interference” continued. In 1967, for example, the 
Brazzaville Group again voted in opposition to the French on a vote 
concerning Rhodesia (Alden, 1996, pp.15-16). There were also an 
increasing number of reports of growing hostility towards France across 
Africa more broadly, evidenced in an article from The Guardian’s 
Commonwealth Correspondent, Patrick Keatley, published on 20 December 
                                                
34 Anonymous to De Gaulle. (1965, October 25). 5AG/FPU/297. Paris:AN. 
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1967, which claimed that certain African nations were ‘ready to act against 
France’.35  
 
However, the bifurcation of the French approach to Africa, along with the 
fact that France’s best “friends” – Bongo and Houphouët-Boigny - were not 
amongst the African critics of France’s policy in the Rhodesia, but were 
instead complicit in supporting the white regime in Rhodesia, is likely to 
have meant that the principal directors of France’s African policy were 
largely unaffected by this criticism. The fragmentation of France’s approach 
to the African continent between the Quai and the Elysée also permitted an 
official French stance of opposition to the RF to co-exist alongside the 
continued direct and indirect engagement in Rhodesia by certain private and 
state-linked actors. Moreover, the development of highly personalised 
relations between the directors of France’s African policy at the Elysée 
Palace and their closest allies in Francophone Africa provided the setting in 
which key players in the Franco-African connection, including Mauricheau-
Beaupré, Lettéron and de la Houssaye, could introduce their best 
Francophone African “friends” to the rulers of white Rhodesia. The 
particular nature of Franco-African relations in the post-colonial period, 
therefore, facilitated the co-existence of these two opposing French 
approaches to Rhodesian affairs. 
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In the post-UDI period, as part of this strategy driven by certain 
representatives of Foccart’s cellule africaine to permit the continuance of 
French ties with Rhodesia alongside France’s public position of opposition 
to the RF, this white-ruled British colony became part of the wider French 
webs of African contacts. The example of Gabonese-Rhodesian links 
described in Chapter Four is just one example of the ways in which the 
directors of France’s African policies integrated Rhodesia into a continent-
wide Franco-African network. The 1970s also saw the continued 
development of Rhodesia’s relations with Madagascar. Rhodesia’s links 
with this Francophone island extended back to the earliest days of France’s 
participation in this British colony, as France’s “men-on-the-spot” actively 
promoted the expansion of economic and cultural ties between the two 
dependent territories. In the immediate aftermath of UDI, these relations 
appear to have subsided and there are no references to contacts between 
Rhodesia and Madagascar during this period in the archives.  
 
However, a visit to Tananarive by Oxley, an assistant secretary at the 
Rhodesian Ministry of External Affairs, in December 1969 suggests a 
renewal of contacts. According to the reports on this Rhodesian mission, 
during a secret meeting with a high-ranking member of the Malgache 
Foreign Ministry, Oxley expressed Rhodesia’s interest in establishing 
tourist and commercial relations with Madagascar. President Tsiranana is 
alleged to have welcomed these proposals on the condition that discretion 
was maintained.36 Oxley returned on an official visit to Madagascar in June 
                                                
36 SDECE. (1970, January 13). 5AG/FPU/2151/4051IIN. Paris:AN.  
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1970.37 Papers in Ian Smith’s archive underscore the Rhodesian desire to 
expand relations with Madagascar, and the role played by France and 
certain of their Francophone African “friends” in the furtherance of these 
interests. For example, in addition to arranging a meeting between van der 
Byl and Houphouët-Boigny, Bongo is alleged to have put the Rhodesian 
Minister in contact with Tsiranana.38 Van der Byl also personally recorded 
how support from the Foccart organisation was crucial to the furtherance of 
Rhodesian interests in Madagascar.39 
 
Alongside providing Rhodesia’s settler élite with an entrée into 
Francophone Africa, the French also appear to have put the Rhodesians in 
touch with certain Anglophone African leaders. A letter from van der Byl to 
Smith reports extensive links between Mauricheau-Beaupré and Kofi 
Abrefa Busia, Prime Minister of Ghana (1969-1972). According to van der 
Byl,  
Beaupré and his people played some part in the 
accession of Busia to the premiership of Ghana after 
the military junta had overthrown Nkrumah and 
returned the country to civil government. Busia was 
harboured in Paris for some time by Beaupré’s 
organisation.40  
It was in this context that Beaupré introduced van der Byl to Busia, 
prompting van der Byl’s hope for further contact with the Ghanaian 
leader.41 In 1971, van der Byl records again the ‘friendly connections’ 
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41 Van der Byl to Smith. (1971, March 8). SC/15(TS3)/8. Grahamstown:CL. 
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between ‘our French friends’, presumably Mauricheau-Beaupré and his 
associates, and the Prime Minister of Ghana.42  
 
It appears, therefore, that Foccart and his network had African “friends” not 
only in territories that once formed part of the French African Empire but 
also in countries beyond the Francophone fold. This situation is summarised 
by van der Byl in a letter to Smith written in 1971, in which he describes the 
‘predominant interest’ of Foccart and his organisation in, 
the maintenance of the French influence in Africa, 
principally in the ex French colonies, but not 
entirely, as is indicated by the part the organisation 
played in assisting Biafra in the Nigerian war and 
the extensive liaison that M. Beaupré maintains with 
various African Heads of State, again not confined 
to French ones, but including such people as Busia, 
the new Prime Minister of Ghana, as well as Mr 
Vorster and yourself [Smith].43 
Foccart’s African réseaux were not, therefore, a uniquely Francophone 
entity, but an extensive network that transcended traditional racial, colonial 
and linguistic lines. Thus, French involvement in Rhodesia in the period 
between 1965 and 1980 can be identified as a both a symptom and a cause 
of the widening of France’s African vision. The seeds of this process were 
sown in the immediate post-war period and began to sprout in the years 
following the independence of Francophone Africa in 1960. However, it 
was not until after UDI that this new French approach really began to 
flourish. 
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Franco-Zimbabwean relations in the late 1970s 
 
As this thesis has demonstrated throughout, Rhodesia was consistently 
viewed as a land of economic opportunity and geopolitical importance for 
France, as well as a region in which France’s wider foreign policy 
objectives could be achieved. Although, as we have already seen, certain 
members of Foccart’s cellule africaine, along with various private 
individuals and companies, were willing to overlook Rhodesia’s illegal 
status in pursuit of these aims, the majority of French policy-makers, 
diplomats and bureaucrats were unable to participate in Rhodesia whilst it 
remained under white rule.  
 
The growing momentum towards independence in the region in 1978 and 
1979 altered the situation and contributed to the reduction of restrictions on 
international engagement with Rhodesia. In response, and in an attempt to 
preserve these French interests that had been present throughout the crisis 
but unattainable due to Rhodesia’s illegal status, the Quai reformulated its 
approach to Rhodesia. These new French strategies centred on the 
cultivation of ties with the rising Zimbabwean nationalist élite. In early 
1979, Muzorewa wrote to Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, President of France 
(1974-1981), inviting a French delegation to Rhodesia to observe the 
elections in April of that year.44 The Quai initially expressed hesitancy 
towards Muzorewa’s request, on the grounds that France must follow the 
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Western line with regards to the Rhodesian affair,45 a response that it is in 
keeping with the Foreign Ministry’s approach to the region throughout the 
UDI period. Muzorewa was advised, therefore, that it would not be possible 
for France to comply with his requests. In spite of this French hesitancy, the 
tone of the French response, which was written by Gabriel Robin, a 
technical advisor in the Elysée, was extremely positive and openly 
expressed the French wish that ‘une démocratie respectuese de l’égalitie 
raciale et de la dignité de chaque homme’ be introduced in the region.46 
Moreover, in contrast to the initial claim that no French representatives 
would travel to Rhodesia during the elections, a small French group of 
deputies from the Assemblée Nationale were, in fact, permitted to go to 
Rhodesia to observe the elections in April 1979.47 France’s friendly feelings 
towards the Zimbabwean nationalists are also apparent in the government’s 
willingness to receive Muzorewa in Paris in July 1979.48  
 
In November 1979, with the Lancaster House conference taking place in 
London, the French were free, for the first time since UDI, to openly send 
an official representative to the region. This mission, carried out by Alain le 
Seac’h, the French Vice Consul in Johannesburg, was represented as having 
a humanitarian purpose, but was also intended as an opportunity to assess 
first hand the internal economic and political situation.49 Le Seac’h’s report 
of his visit was extremely optimistic about France’s future prospects in a 
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newly independent Zimbabwe, citing opportunities for construction 
contracts in Wankie, continued Peugeot and Renault dominance of the 
automobile market, the chance for French arms manufacturers to replace 
out-dated military equipment - which, it was acknowledged, was mostly of 
French origin - and the possibility that UTA would be the first airline to 
reconnect Salisbury to Europe. Moreover, politicians and civil servants in 
the territory were extremely positive about the presence of French 
companies in their country and were ‘bien disposés à l’égard de la France’. 
This, in turn, prompted le Seac’h to call for rapid French action and, in 
particular, the establishment of a French commercial post in Salisbury as 
soon as possible.50 Bernard Dorin, the French Ambassador in Pretoria 
(1978-1981), was equally enthused by the possibilities for France in the 
region, calling for DREE to establish ‘un programme d’intervention 
immédiate en Zimbabwe/Rhodésie, qui pourrait être mis en œuvre aussitôt 
après la levée éventuelle des sanctions’, placing particular emphasis on the 
need for ‘l’ouverture rapide à Salisbury d’une antenne commerciale légère 
placée sous l’autorité du poste d’expansion économique’.51 Thus, as they 
had done since the establishment of the French Consulate in Salisbury in 
1947, France’s “men-on-the-spot” led the way in enthusiastically 
championing a French presence in Rhodesia as part of a wider, Southern 
African strategy.  
 
In Paris, following the territory’s brief return to British colonial rule in 
December 1979, plans were laid for the development of more French formal 
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ties with Zimbabwe after power was officially transferred to the African 
majority. The MAE responded favourably to the enthusiasm of the French 
in Pretoria and backed the establishment of a French Commercial Office in 
Rhodesia as soon as the circumstances permitted.52 A concerted central 
effort to turn this rhetoric into action came in early 1980 with the 
establishment of an inter-ministerial committee on Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.53 
The record of the first meeting of the committee, which took place on 11 
January 1980, records the instruction from Raymond Barre, French Prime 
Minister (1976-1981), that a French presence in Salisbury should be assured 
without any further delay, stressing, in particular, the importance of re-
establishing a French Consul in the capital and the need for DREE to send 
an agent to the region charged with economic expansion. In addition, plans 
were discussed to increase automobile assembly in the region, French 
involvement in Wankie and the possibility of according a loan to the 
Zimbabwean treasury.54  
 
It is interesting to note the participation in this inter-ministerial committee 
of Jean François-Poncet, French Foreign Minister (1978-1981), who, as has 
been noted above been, was involved in Rhodesian affairs from the early 
1960s. This, in turn, reveals the presence in French government of actors 
who consistently viewed Rhodesia as a region of possibilities for France. In 
the late 1970s, François-Poncet’s position as the Minister of Foreign 
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Affairs, as well as the shift towards majority rule in Rhodesia, would have 
made the pursuit of these interests via white Rhodesians both unviable and 
unfruitful. Thus, François-Poncet’s attentions were re-directed towards the 
Zimbabwean nationalists in an attempt to preserve and extend French 
interests in the region. Throughout the period in question, therefore, 
Rhodesia formed part of France’s African vision.  
 
The impact of French policy in Rhodesia on Franco-British 
relations 
 
Anglo-French cooperation over the Rhodesian problem  
 
In addition to the positioning of Rhodesia within a wider French agenda to 
use the African continent as an arena in which to secure French greatness on 
the world stage, this British colony was also a crucial component in Franco-
British relations in the years after 1965. As we have seen in Chapter Three, 
throughout the UDI period, the UK government consistently viewed France 
as a vital ally over the Rhodesian question. This state of affairs continued 
right up until Zimbabwean independence in April 1980 and, if anything, 
was heightened in the latter years of the 1970s when hopes were high that a 
settlement to the crisis finally could be attained. Although Rhodesia had 
regularly featured on the agenda in Anglo-French bilateral talks since 
Smith’s declaration in 1965, it was an especially dominant theme in both 
high and low-level discussions between the British and French governments 
in 1979 and, even more so, after the commencement of talks between Smith 
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and the Zimbabwean nationalists at Lancaster House in the autumn of that 
year. The question of Rhodesia was raised, for example, at Anglo-French 
talks on Africa which took place in London in January 1979.55 It was also 
discussed at various informal meetings between British FCO officials and 
their counterparts in Paris, such consultations between Fell, from the 
Southern African Department at Whitehall, and De la Tour du Pin, 
responsible for Afrique Australe at the Quai, in May.56 Similarly, in both 
June and October, Renwick from the Rhodesia Department, met with 
Georgy, the Director for Africa in the French Foreign Ministry, as well as 
representatives from the Presidential Palace, including Journiac, Giscard’s 
advisor on Africa, Levitte, a diplomatic advisor at the Elysée, and Robin.57 
High-level Franco-British exchanges on Rhodesia also took place in the 
final months prior to Zimbabwean independence, including at a meeting 
between Britain and France’s respective Foreign Ministers, Carrington and 
Francois-Poncet,58 as well as during talks between Prime Minister Thatcher 
and President Giscard d’Estaing, both of which took place during the French 
President’s visit to London in November 1979.59 At the highest level of all, 
Queen Elizabeth II is alleged to have raised the issue of Rhodesia personally 
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with the French President at a dinner in October 1979.60 In this context, the 
FCO repeatedly described French support over the final resolution of the 
Rhodesian problem as ‘indispensible’61 and ‘essential’, 62 and expressed 
their desire that France and Britain could ‘continue to see eye to eye on the 
problem of Southern Africa’.63 In particular, the British called upon its 
"vrais amis" to help them garner support for the settlement amongst African 
states as well with certain Western governments, including Denmark and 
the Netherlands.64  
 
These intensive British efforts to secure French backing in 1979 underline 
not only the importance that the British attributed to securing the transition 
to majority rule in Rhodesia, but also how France was perceived to play a 
decisive role in the achievement of this aim. This, in turn, reveals the ways 
in which France continued to be viewed by the British as an important ally 
in Africa, and on the international stage more widely, throughout this 
period. The French were aware of their perceived, pivotal position in the 
success of Britain’s African policy, seen in an observation by Jean 
Sauvagnargues, the French Ambassador to the UK (1977-1981), in July 
1979 that, 
Mme. Thatcher continuait de considérer que les 
intérêts de la France et du Royaume-Uni en Afrique 
étaient très proches et que les deux pays devaient 
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continuer de s’épauler dans toute mesure du 
possible.65  
 
Moreover, the Quai appeared to view the successful resolution of the 
Rhodesian problem as important for France’s position in Africa, evidenced 
by François-Poncet’s assertion in talks with Carrington that France’s 
problems in Africa ‘would be aggravated by a British failure in Rhodesia’. 
In light of this, the French Foreign Minister pledged to back a British bid to 
the EEC for financial help for Rhodesian refugees. This support, however, 
was contingent upon the British government backing Community assistance 
in Chad.66 In this instance, therefore, the French used Britain’s reliance on 
them in the Rhodesian context as a means of furthering their own aims in 
the wider African context. As such, Anglo-French interaction with regards 
to Rhodesia must be understood as a part of a wider strategy that existed in 
both Britain and France to secure the success of their respective African 
policies. This, in turn, meant that Anglo-French relations concerning 
Rhodesia had the effect of drawing Britain and France closer together over 
African affairs in the latter years of the 1970s.  
 
Thus, publically at least, relations between the Quai and the FCO with 
regards to the Rhodesian problem remained positive right up until the eve of 
Zimbabwean independence, with the French continuing to offer their 
support for the UK line over Rhodesia, 67  contributing to the FCO’s 
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perception that the French were ‘generally helpful’ when it came to 
Rhodesian affairs.68 This constructive atmosphere, in turn, created new 
opportunities for France in Anglophone Africa, seen, for example, just a few 
weeks after ZANU’s electoral success in March 1980, when the British 
authorities actively encouraged the French government to make early 
contact with the new government in Zimbabwe and offer them assistance.69 
Thus, the crisis in Rhodesia not only created a new arena for friendly 
Anglo-French relations, but also had the secondary effect of aiding France’s 
wider ambitions to become a continental player in Africa.  
 
These positive and cooperatives exchanges, however, were not the sole 
consequence for Franco-British relations of French policy towards Rhodesia 
after UDI. For one, French support for Britain’s Rhodesian policy was 
consistently constrained by France’s own African interests. In November 
1979, for example, during the course of the Lancaster House talks, the 
Director of African Affairs at the Quai, although openly stating that 
‘Londres compte bien sur notre soutien et nous l’a fait savoir’, admitted that 
future support would have to take into account ‘l’opinion des pays africains 
amis de la France’.70 The FCO also acknowledged the limitations to French 
backing over the Rhodesian question and, in particular, the French desire to 
avoid jeopardising ‘their position in Africa by giving the UK strong support 
should a confrontation with the OAU develop’.71 In a similar vein, the 
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British Embassy in Paris noted how ‘they obviously have their eye very 
much on their own African clients’.72 
 
Additional restrictions were placed on cooperation by contrasting Anglo-
French legal traditions, apparent not only in the UN, as explored in Chapter 
Three, but also in the judicial obstacles that initially prevented the French 
from lifting sanctions against Rhodesia as it neared independence. A 
provision in the Fifth Republic’s Constitution concerning the direct 
application of international obligations meant that sanctions were not 
imposed by a law passed in Parliament, but rather by a Presidential Decree 
based directly and exclusively on UN Resolution 253, which mandated the 
international trade embargo. This prevented the French from immediately 
lifting sanctions against Rhodesia, in line with British wishes, unless the UN 
Resolution was also reversed, as international obligations were still binding 
on France as a matter of international law.73 Even when a ceasefire was 
agreed at Lancaster House in December 1979, and in spite of the fact that a 
draft decree annulling French sanctions legislation had already been 
prepared,74 the Quai were unable to issue a decree lifting sanctions until 
after the British had sent a letter to the President of the Security Council and 
sufficient time had passed to ensure that there were no negative responses to 
this letter from members of the UNSC.75  
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The FCO were aware and largely sympathetic to the restrictions placed on 
the Quai by French legal customs, so this issue did not create any direct 
problems in relations between the UK government and France. And, when 
France finally announced on 20 December 1979 its decision to lift the 
economic sanctions against Rhodesia, this move was received as ‘a clear 
expression of support for the Lancaster House agreement’.76 However, in 
the same way that France’s legalistic approach to UN intervention in 
colonial affairs created an obstacle to the complete convergence of the 
Anglo-French positions towards Rhodesia in the immediate aftermath of 
UDI, the Constitution of the Fifth Republic and the Quai d’Orsay’s strict 
adherence to France’s judicial traditions acted as an impediment to the 
creation of a fully united Anglo-French front over the question of ending 
sanctions and Rhodesia’s return to legality. The case study of Rhodesia, 
therefore, brings to light the complex barriers that existed to Anglo-French 
cooperation in the African setting.  
 
The limits of the “new relationship”77   
 
By far the greatest impediment to comprehensive Franco-British 
collaboration over the question of Rhodesia, however, was the continued 
involvement of French individuals and groups, both directly and indirectly, 
in Rhodesian sanctions busting throughout the UDI period. This fuelled 
discussion within the FCO about whether or not French companies accused 
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of breaching the trade embargo should be named by the British in the 
UNSCSC. In 1971, in an attempt to avoid upsetting France and the other 
Western European powers, and jeopardising Britain’s application to the 
EEC, British ministers took the decision not to name members of the 
Community in notes to the Sanctions Committee.78 This willingness to 
prioritise Britain’s application to join the EEC over its successful resolution 
of the Rhodesian problems reveals the importance that the UK government 
placed on securing Britain’s position in Europe at this time.  
 
Following Britain’s successful entry to the Community, the naming of EEC 
member states accused of sanctions legislation infractions by the British at 
the UN was officially resumed.79 However, the question of whether or not 
French companies should be named by the British in the UNSCSC 
prompted considerable debate within Whitehall and between British 
officials based in London and in Paris. Diplomats at the British Embassy in 
Paris favoured direct discussions with the French rather than action in a 
multilateral context, warning that the Quai would ‘react badly’ if French 
companies were named publically prior to bilateral discussions.80 Hibbert, 
the Assistant Under-Secretary of State for the FCO (1976-1979), echoed 
these sentiments, claiming that there was ‘no point in annoying the French 
on this issue’.81 This caution is especially evident with regards to the supply 
of French arms to Rhodesia via South Africa, a question that was described 
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as one of ‘extreme sensitivity’.82 The Western European Department in 
Whitehall acknowledged that the problem of arms supply was more 
important than commercial imports, in light of which the former should be 
prioritised.83 Furthermore, it was argued that ‘hitting them [the French] hard 
on commercial imports from Rhodesia… would not be an effective way of 
getting them to reappraise their policy on the supply of arms’.84  
 
On the one hand, this statement reveals the desire to maintain cooperative 
Anglo-French relations over Rhodesia, but also more broadly. In November 
1969, the British Embassy in Paris advised the FCO against raising the issue 
of sanctions with the French on the grounds that the ‘African side of the 
Quai will be even less likely to want to be helpful to us over Nigeria if they 
feel we are being unhelpful to them over Rhodesia’.85 This desire to avoid 
disagreements over Rhodesia creating an obstacle to positive Franco-British 
contacts in Africa more generally is further underscored by a request in June 
1976 from the Western European Department of the FCO to delay any 
action over sanctions until after Giscard d’Estaing’s state visit to the UK, 
during which he was expected to announce his desire for closer Anglo-
French collaboration in Africa.86 This approach, in turn, is in keeping with 
the new phase in Franco-British relations ushered in by De Gaulle’s 
departure from office and, later, by Britain’s successful application to join 
the EEC in 1973.  
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On the other hand, concerns about jeopardising French cooperation over 
arms sales by raising the issue of commercial imports could be interpreted 
as an indication of British uncertainty about the possible French reaction to 
such advance and, in particular, a worry that it might prompt the French to 
carry out further action in opposition to British interests in Rhodesia. Fears 
of French volatility were openly expressed in a handwritten comment on the 
edge of the aforementioned note advising against ‘annoying the French’ by 
naming them in notes to the Sanctions Committee, which stated, 
The trouble about not annoying the French is that it 
does not prevent them from annoying us – indeed, I 
sometimes think it may encourage them to ignore 
our interests.87 
 
Not all members of the FCO were convinced, therefore, that France should 
be allowed to escape criticism in the UN simply because the British 
government ‘did not wish to upset them’.88 This hostility and suspicion was 
most acute amongst members of the Rhodesia Department of the FCO, 
probably because these officials had the greatest vested interest in the swift 
resolution of the Rhodesian crisis. A report from 1976, for example, 
attributes France’s ‘comparatively good record on ordinary commercial 
imports from Rhodesia’ to the fact that the French ‘are simply better at 
covering their tracks than, say, the Germans or the Swiss’, indicating the 
extent of British distrust of the French in some quarters.89  
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Apparent French inaction over the persistent involvement of French 
companies in Rhodesia served to reinforce these sentiments. Another note 
from the Rhodesia Department of the FCO launched a tirade of criticism 
against the French, with the author asserting, 
I am not convinced that the “new relationship” 
which has been established on sanctions matters is 
really meaningful. Apart from banning a couple of 
sporting visits there is no evidence that the French 
have taken any effective action as a result of our 
bilateral approaches.90 
The note concludes by accusing the French of having been ‘singularly 
unhelpful to us vis-à-vis the third world’ and, as such, Britain ‘have no good 
reason to be particularly helpful to them’.91 Continued French involvement 
in Rhodesia had the consequence, therefore, of fuelling British hostility and 
suspicion towards the French in Africa, sentiments that were only enhanced 
by the importance that the British attributed to French support in Rhodesia 
and Africa more widely.  
 
After 1965, Rhodesia was, therefore, an important component in Anglo-
French relations, as an opportunity for collaboration and friendship, but also 
as a source of tensions and grievances. With regards to the latter, French 
policy towards Rhodesia, in particular persistent sanctions busting by 
French companies, and the British perception of French state involvement in 
this operation, was the source of considerable strain in Anglo-French 
relations throughout the UDI period. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
tensions with regards to this matter existed alongside many other 
disagreements, ranging from clashes over the EEC to disagreements over 
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transatlantic relations to the Nigerian civil war (Young, 2006, pp.165-168; 
Chafer & Cumming, 2010a, p.1131). In the 1970s, despite De Gaulle’s 
departure from the French Presidency, Britain’s membership to the EEC and 
officially friendly Franco-British relations, Rhodesia remained a point of 
conflict. Tensions over Rhodesia in the late 1970s, therefore, brought to the 
fore the long-standing Anglo-French rivalry in Africa, an intense 
competition that had its roots at Fashoda and which persisted into the post-
colonial, post-Cold War era. French involvement in Rhodesia compounded 
these existing tensions, making a complete entente cordiale impossible.  
 
Moreover, it could be argued that the existence of these hostilities so late in 
the 1970s, in opposition to friendly Franco-British relations over other 
questions, contributed to the persistence of Anglo-French competition on 
the African continent for much of the rest of the twentieth century, seen 
most notably in the 1990s with Britain and France standing on opposite 
sides over the Rwandan genocide and the question of intervention in Zaire92 
(Chafer & Cumming, 2010a, p.1131). Therefore, the study of French 
involvement in Rhodesia, British responses to French action and inaction in 
this region of Anglophone Africa, and Anglo-French relations with regards 
to this crisis provides us with the opportunity to attain a more complete 
picture of Franco-British relations in Africa. In particular, it draws to our 
attention the persistent obstacles to Anglo-French cooperation in Africa, 
especially the way in which a national agenda - or at least different 
individuals and groups’ interpretations of these interests - triumphed over 
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Britain and France’s shared objectives on the continent. It is apparent, 
therefore, that the memory of Fashoda continued to loom large on both sides 
of the Channel.  
 
The impact of French policy in Rhodesia on France’s Cold 
War strategy  
 
French policy towards Rhodesia also provides us with an insight into 
France’s Cold War strategy. Chapter Three explored how the Cold War, and 
in particular the co-existence of anti-communism and hostility towards the 
“Anglo-Saxons” in the French psych, conditioned French perceptions of 
Rhodesia in the UDI period and provided the backdrop for the formulation 
of French policy towards the region, whilst Chapter Four considered how 
these imperatives operated in practice and informed the decisions of the 
French engaged in Rhodesia affairs after UDI. It is the purpose of this final 
section to consider this scenario in reverse and assess the extent to which 
France’s involvement in Rhodesia influenced its wider Cold War strategies.  
 
According to Menon (1995, p.21), ‘the Cold War and the accompanying 
bipolar international order, although vilified in French rhetoric, provided the 
ideal setting for the exercise of national independence’. Throughout the 
post-war era, therefore, French foreign policy was driven by the desire to 
maintain an alternative, autonomous foreign policy. In the context of the 
1960s and 1970s, this commitment to independence of action on the world 
stage influenced the prioritisation of the development of an independent 
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French nuclear deterrent, or force de frappe; informed De Gaulle’s decision 
to withdraw from the NATO military high command in 1966 and influenced 
his Vive Quebec Libre speech in 1967; shaped France’s desire to lead the 
EEC and to reject Britain’s application for membership for a second time in 
1967; and provided the backdrop for the development of Franco-German 
relations. It also contributed to French efforts to woo non-aligned and newly 
independent states, seen most notably by French recognition of the People’s 
Republic of China in 1964; De Gaulle’s visits to Latin America in 1964 and 
1965, and to Cambodia in 1966; French condemnation of US policy in 
Vietnam; and France’s increasing movement away from the Israeli alliance 
(Conklin, Fishman & Zaretsky, 2011, pp.286-8; Cumming, 2001, p.360). 
 
In the context of post-UDI Rhodesia, France found a number of new 
opportunities to further their broader efforts at foreign policy autonomy. 
This can be seen especially in the way in which many viewed France as key 
to the resolution of the crisis. As we have seen, the white Rhodesians looked 
to the French for backing throughout the crisis, juxtaposing negative 
interpretations of British decolonisation with their favourable impressions of 
France and its African policies, and calling upon the French to play a 
defining role in the region, initially by helping the white settlers to maintain 
minority rule and, as this scenario became increasingly unlikely in the latter 
years of the 1970s, helping secure a settlement that was most favourable to 
the outgoing European administration in Rhodesia. It is interesting to note 
that, in order to achieve this aim, the Rhodesians regularly appealed to 
France’s sensibilities about the Cold War, especially its deeply rooted anti-
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communism, a strategy that can be viewed as an attempt to present UDI as 
being aligned with France’s broader international concerns. For instance, in 
a letter to De Gaulle written in February 1966, just a month before France’s 
withdraw from the NATO military integrated command, Smith called upon 
NATO, focusing especially on the French by implication of the fact that this 
statement was personally directed towards De Gaulle, to prohibit the 
withdrawal of a British division from the Rhine Army so that ‘the British 
government would not have the means to mount an operation on the scale 
required’ to put down the Rhodesian rebellion. In an attempt to gain French 
support for this measure, Smith described the potentially ‘disastrous’ 
consequences of the use of force against Rhodesia, in particular, ‘the 
prospect of a large area of Central and Southern Africa laid waste by war’, a 
scenario that Smith claimed ‘could afford satisfaction to no-one except the 
Communists’.93  
 
Such efforts to exploit France’s ingrained anti-communism continued 
throughout the 1970s, as can be seen in an interview with Smith published 
in Le Figaro in January 1977, in which the leader of the RF presented UDI 
as a struggle to prevent Communist infiltration of the African continent and 
called upon the Western powers to intervene should ‘les ennemis du monde 
libre’ become involved.94 Similarly, in 1979, when the Rhodesians called 
for French encouragement of the internal settlement, they justified the 
agreement as a necessary measure to prevent the country being taken ‘for 
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the Marxists through the barrel of their guns’.95 Thus, the crisis in Rhodesia 
presented France with an opportunity to play a leading role in halting the 
spread of communism in Africa. 
 
In the early 1970s, the Rhodesians presented the French with a chance to go 
one step further, with an opportunity to stop the spread of communism not 
only in Rhodesia, but also across the African continent. In 1971, in a note 
on the growing Chinese presence in Africa, van der Byl proposed holding, 
conversations with our friends in Black Africa 
[Gabon, the Ivory Coast and Congo-Kinshasa] and 
to, again with the assistance of our French friends, 
penetrate others as quickly as possible with a view 
to forming, even though it might be unofficial, a 
general understanding and so-to-speak a league of 
those countries who oppose Chinese infiltration and, 
secondly, those who are well disposed towards 
Taiwan.96  
Rhodesia’s positioning of its French ‘friends’ as crucial to this venture is 
striking, not only as proof of the extent of the triangular relations between 
certain French and Francophone Africans actors and the Smith regime, but 
also because of the way in which it underscores how the white regime 
viewed France as a suitable partner in their struggle to prevent Communist 
encroachment on the African continent.  
 
Moreover, the fact that the Rhodesians looked to France to help halt this 
growing Chinese presence in Africa indicates their disillusion with “Anglo-
Saxon”-led efforts to stave off a Communist takeover of the continent. The 
solution proposed by the Rhodesians to help stop the spread of communism 
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in Africa echoed very closely, therefore, with France’s wider Cold War 
strategies, especially its unease with the bipolar world order. In the African 
context, France opposed the spread of communism, but it also resisted the 
“Anglo-Saxon” alternative, seen for example in the case of French policy 
towards the Katanga crisis in the 1960s, discussed in Part One of this thesis. 
Therefore, van der Byl’s proposed anti-Chinese grouping provides an 
example of an opportunity created for France, as a result of the relations 
between certain French actors linked to the Elysée and white Rhodesian 
settlers, to pursue a policy to stop the spread of communism that was 
autonomous from the Western Alliance. Whether or not this Rhodesian 
initiative came into being is unclear from the archival record. However, the 
continued engagement in Rhodesia by members of the cellule africaine 
throughout the UDI period means that it is possible to hypothesise that 
certain French actors engaged in Rhodesian affairs might have viewed this 
proposal in a favourable light. Furthermore, the persistent, covert French 
participation in Rhodesia after 1965, both directly and through 
intermediaries in France’s former West African colonies and in Southern 
Africa, suggests that certain French individuals and groups did, in fact, 
identify Rhodesia as an arena in which to challenge “Anglo-Saxon” 
dominance by actively opposing British and American policy towards the 
region.  
 
Somewhat paradoxically in light of the above, France also successfully 
maintained its image ‘le pionnier de la décolonisation en Afrique et le 
 325 
champion de l’égalité entre les races’,97 and was subsequently identified by 
Anglophone African nationalists as an important player in the quest to 
secure the introduction of majority rule in Rhodesia. This was especially 
true in the case of Zambian President, Kenneth Kaunda, who directed 
several emotive appeals for support towards the French during the late 
1960s and 1970s. In spite of the Zambian President’s denunciations of the 
activities of French companies in Rhodesia throughout the UDI period,98 as 
well as Zambian concerns about French ties with South Africa,99 Kaunda 
perceived of France as a potential driver of change in Rhodesia, appealing 
to France’s carefully crafted self-image as the champion of African 
decolonisation. In 1968, the President of Zambia wrote to De Gaulle 
expressing his hope that the French government could,  
help to do something to avert this tragedy from 
developing into something even worse. Your 
contribution would help the cause of human 
development and would improve tremendously the 
prospects of international co-operation regardless of 
race, colour or nationality.100  
A similar appeal was made to Pompidou in 1973. After thanking France for 
its stand over the Zambia-Rhodesia border issue in the UNSC and recalling 
the ‘cordial and frank’ Franco-Zambian discussions in Paris in 1970, 
Kaunda conveyed his belief that ‘we can now work together even more 
effectively to help shape Southern Africa into a peaceful area where 
democracy will thrive on freedom and justice for all without regard to any 
distinction’, calling upon the French ‘Government and the French people as 
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a whole to understand our case and to join with us in our struggle to make 
non-racialism a practical reality, not only in Zambia but elsewhere in 
Southern Africa’.101  
 
This perception of France as having an important role to play in bringing 
about Rhodesian decolonisation, as well as in securing stability across 
Southern Africa, continued amongst the Zambians throughout the UDI 
period, as is evidenced in June 1979 when Kaunda made a request to 
Giscard d’Estaing, via a French diplomat based in Lusaka, for France to 
back Britain to ensure the peaceful resolution of the Rhodesian problem.102 
The Zambians may have viewed certain French activity in Rhodesia with 
suspicion, but they still acknowledged France’s pivotal role on the African 
continent, which by this time extended beyond the Francophone sphere. The 
crisis in Rhodesia, therefore, created the opportunity for France to enhance 
its position of strength on the African continent, by acting beyond its 
traditional sphere of influence. This, in turn, contributed to wider French 
efforts to demonstrate their prowess in Africa, independent from the other 
members of the Western Alliance.  
 
The possibilities for France to act upon this imperative publically increased 
as the Rhodesian crisis began to draw to a close in the latter years of the 
1970s. As has been noted above, following the internal settlement between 
Smith and the African nationalist leaders in March 1978, a group of 
deputies from the Assemblée Nationale travelled to Rhodesia to oversee the 
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first, democratic elections in the country. This mission alone does not 
represent an independent French strategy, as it was not unusual for foreign 
nationals to observe African elections to ensure their democratic credentials. 
The report on the mission given to Robin by Maurice Tissandier, one of the 
participants in this venture, however, is remarkably revealing. In his account 
of his time spent in Rhodesia, Tissandier observed the ‘rancune’ and 
‘méfiance’ directed against the British by the white and black populations 
alike. By contrast, ‘la France jouit d’un préjugé très favorable’ and there 
was hope amongst the Zimbabweans that France would be the first external 
power to recognise the results of the election.103 France was, therefore, not 
only viewed as a suitable candidate to oversee the transition to 
independence in the region, but was also identified as a future source of 
strength for a majority-ruled Zimbabwe. Moreover, the fact that France was 
seen in a favourable light in contrast to the territory’s colonial ruler 
underlines how, in this British colony, France successfully achieved its Cold 
War ambition to use the African arena to demonstrate its strength on the 
international stage and, in so doing, exercise foreign policy autonomy from 
“les Anglo-Saxons”.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The consequences of France’s complex and often contradictory policy 
towards Rhodesia in the UDI period were numerous. Firstly, the willingness 
of certain French individuals and groups to act in opposition to France’s 
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official denunciation of UDI by providing the white regime in Salisbury 
with economic and military support contributed to the length of the crisis in 
the region. Although France’s direct engagement with Rhodesia after UDI 
was relatively minor, French companies, traders and mercenaries 
nevertheless contributed to the material prosperity of white Rhodesia, whilst 
simultaneously aiding the settlers’ physical defence of white rule in the 
region. More significant was France’s indirect participation in Rhodesia, 
through intermediaries in Southern Africa and its best African “friends” in 
West and Equatorial Africa. The intrinsically opaque nature of this indirect 
trade makes it is difficult to quantify its full extent. However, we know that 
French arms, automobiles and oil exported to Rhodesia via Mozambique 
and South Africa were of substantial importance to white efforts to maintain 
their rebellion against Britain. Similarly, the Rhodesian tobacco, sugar and 
meat exported through South Africa and Gabon and purchased by French 
companies, both for consumption in France and for re-export to French 
clients overseas, provided the white Rhodesians with an important supply of 
capital, which was vital for their efforts to preserve white rule in the region. 
This, in turn, contributed to the slow-paced transition to majority rule in 
Rhodesia. 
 
The most significant element of French support to Rhodesia after UDI is 
less tangible. Throughout the UDI period, and in spite of France’s public 
denunciations of the RF, the European settlers in Rhodesia consistently 
viewed France as a supporter of their struggle with Britain and in their 
efforts to secure an alternative future for the white race on the African 
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continent. Certainly some of this support was more imagined than it was 
real. Yet, this does not detract from the fact that France was widely 
perceived of as an ally, something that is likely to have contributed to settler 
confidence that they could remain independent from Britain. As such, 
French involvement in Rhodesia after UDI and, in particular, the way in 
which it prompted Rhodesian conviction in French moral backing, can be 
viewed as an important factor delaying the transition to majority rule in 
Rhodesia. The fact that the memory of French support stands out in the 
recollections of former settlers further reinforces this view.  
  
French engagement with this rebellious region of British Africa had an 
impact beyond the Rhodesian setting, with wide reaching consequences for 
France’s African policies. UDI, and French responses to it, created 
opportunities for the development of France’s friendships in regions of the 
African continent outside of France’s traditional sphere of African 
influence, in particular in South Africa and Zambia. Thus, the process of the 
expansion of France’s African vision that had begun in the immediate post-
war period was heightened in the context of the late 1960s and 1970s, as 
new opportunities arose for France to develop its ties with former colonies 
of other European powers. This period also saw the diversification of 
France’s ties beyond Francophone Africa, as Rhodesia, along with other 
Anglophone and Lusophone territories, were integrated into existing 
Franco-African réseaux. The result was the creation of an extended network 
of French “friends” in Africa, which transcended racial, linguistic, national 
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and colonial boundaries, and through which France’s wider foreign policy 
objectives could be achieved.  
  
French engagement with Rhodesia after UDI also had important 
consequences for Anglo-French relations. This crisis in Rhodesia provided a 
focal point for Anglo-French cooperation in Africa, with Britain frequently 
looking to France as an important ally in its efforts to draw a final line under 
its African imperial venture. Moreover, as Zimbabwean independence 
neared in the late 1970s, Britain actively encouraged France to engage with 
the new African administration, a consequence perhaps of Britain’s desire to 
finally be rid of its colonial ties. This, in turn, can be viewed as a precursor 
for Britain’s post-colonial disengagement with Zimbabwe due to its 
increasing lack of leverage in the region (Taylor & Williams, 2002, pp.547-
565). 
 
Yet, despite this official Anglo-French cooperation over Rhodesia and the 
largely friendly relations between the Quai and the FCO, French policy 
towards the region remained a sore point in Franco-British relations up until 
the territory’s independence as Zimbabwe in 1980. Rhodesia brought to 
light the acute differences in Britain and France’s approaches to Africa, 
something that served to increase the Anglo-French décalage when it came 
to African affairs. More disruptive to friendly UK-France relations, 
however, was the persistent involvement of certain French state actors in 
propping up the white regime in Rhodesia. Particularly in the 1970s, when 
relations between the British and French governments over so many other 
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issues were positive, Rhodesia created an obstacle to the full realisation of 
an Anglo-French alliance in Africa. This, in turn, may have contributed to 
the persistence of Anglo-French competition on the African continent 
throughout the remainder of the twentieth century. 
 
Finally, Rhodesia created new opportunities for the pursuit of France’s Cold 
War objectives, providing France with the chance to play a leading role in 
the resolution of a global crisis of monumental proportions. Furthermore, in 
this region of Central Southern Africa, it was possible for France to help 
stave off the spread of communism on the African continent, whilst 
simultaneously achieving this end separately from Britain and the United 
States. The extent to which this policy could be put into practice, for the 
most part, was limited by Rhodesia’s illegal status, although as we have 
seen this was not an obstacle for all French actors in the African arena, 
particularly those linked to Foccart’s African cell. However, as Rhodesia 
moved towards becoming Zimbabwe, these barriers gradually began to 
diminish and France found in this region an opportunity to act as a strong, 
global power and, in so doing, assure its standing as an important player on 
the world stage. Moreover, France successfully positioned itself in Rhodesia 
and beyond as an alternative to the “Anglo-Saxon” powers. This, in turn, 
would have legacies for Zimbabwe’s relations with the outside world after 
its independence in 1980, whilst simultaneously influencing the shape of 
France’s future presence on the African continent.  
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Conclusions 
 
France and Rhodesia: an Anglophone dimension to Franco-
African relations 
 
Hitherto, the historiography of Franco-African relations has concentrated on 
the uniqueness of France’s policies towards its former colonies in West and 
Equatorial Africa, largely neglecting French engagement with territories that 
once formed part of other European powers’ colonial empires. In recent 
decades, certain scholars, such as Alden (1999), Bach (1980; 1982; 1990), 
Chafer (2002; 2005), Cumming (2005b) Konieczna (2012) and Martin 
(1995) have begun to break free of this Francophone focus, examining the 
expansion of France’s ties with Anglophone and Lusophone Africa, and 
South Africa, in the years that followed the independence of AOF and AEF, 
with a small number of historians even looking to the late colonial period 
for the roots of this French interest in non-French speaking Africa (Keese, 
2007b; Konieczna, 2009; Moukambi, 2008; Stanley, 2004). Nevertheless, 
the dominant discourse remains one in which France’s African policies are 
exceptional and uniquely Francophone in their focus. In fact, a response that 
I often receive when explaining my research, is an expression of perplexity 
or confusion, or an indication that the person in question thinks that they 
might have misheard me! Put simply, French participation in non-French 
speaking Africa is not yet an integral part of the historical narrative of 
Franco-African relations.    
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Through analysis of French policies towards and perceptions of Rhodesia – 
a region far removed from the Francophone African sphere and in which 
France had few historical, cultural or geographical ties - this thesis has 
demonstrated that it is necessary to reconfigure our understanding of 
Franco-African relations. In contrast to the majority of the existing 
revisionist work in this field that indicates a post-colonial or post-Cold War 
departure from France’s singular focus on its former African colonies, this 
study has shown how interest in areas of Africa outside of the traditional 
French pré carré first appeared amongst certain policy-makers, diplomats, 
bureaucrats and businessmen in the immediate aftermath of the Second 
World War. In the case of Rhodesia, this initial interest in the post-war 
period laid the foundations for France’s continued engagement with this 
British colony not only after the independence of Francophone Africa in 
1960, but also after Ian Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
1965, which left the white settler regime as an outcast on the international 
stage. As such, in order to understand France’s relations with regions of the 
continent traditionally dominated by the British, the Portuguese or the 
Afrikaners after 1960 or 1989, it is necessary to first look to the immediate 
post-war period in order to permit a more complete understanding of the 
nature and motivations behind French engagement with non-Francophone 
Africa to be attained. 
 
As this thesis has demonstrated, from the outset France’s engagement with 
Rhodesia formed part of a broader strategy in Southern Africa. It was 
informed by existing patterns of relations with this part of the continent, 
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principally, but not exclusively, the Union of South Africa, a region in 
which France had long-standing ties, which expanded considerably in the 
years after 1948. Although France’s relations with Rhodesia never reached 
the extent seen in its white-ruled neighbour, French engagement with these 
two minority-governed regions did have much in common, not least the 
potential in both regions to capitalise on Britain’s declining position. In 
addition, the commercial foundations laid in the South African context 
provided the French with a stepping stone into the Rhodesian market, a 
route that was to prove crucial after direct contact with Salisbury was 
severed in the aftermath of UDI. Similarly, France’s relations with the 
Portuguese-rulers of Angola and Mozambique provided an important point 
of entry into Rhodesia, especially after 1965 when, as in South Africa, 
Portuguese sympathy for the white regime in Salisbury created a pathway 
for certain French actors to continue to engage with Rhodesia indirectly. 
Moreover, in the years following the independence of AOF and AEF, 
Rhodesia became part of a wider French African strategy that sought to 
bring together its “friends” in Francophone Africa and the white rulers of 
Southern Africa, in a broader attempt to stave off Communist and “Anglo-
Saxon” expansionism on the continent.  
 
Somewhat paradoxically, French relations with the settler government in 
Salisbury also provided the foundations for France’s growing engagement 
with majority-ruled territories outside of its traditional domain. In the 1950s, 
the French base in Salisbury led to the creation of Consular agencies in 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, France’s first diplomatic engagement 
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with these British colonies, and the subsequent development of commercial 
and cultural ties across Central Southern Anglophone Africa. These early 
relations were to provide the basis for France’s presence in these territories 
following their independence from the UK in 1964. After 1965, the official 
French stance of opposition to UDI contributed to France’s growing image 
in Anglophone Africa as the advocate of the African people, thus prompting 
increased opportunities for France to operate beyond its traditional sphere of 
influence. As such, French engagement with Rhodesia was both a symptom 
and a cause of the expansion of France’s African vision throughout the post-
war period.  
 
Leading scholars in the study of France’s relations with Southern Africa, 
such as Alden (1996) and Bach (1990), have emphasised the particularities 
of French engagement with Southern Africa as opposed to France’s policies 
towards its former sub-Saharan dependencies. According to this view, 
France’s strategies in Southern Africa were distinct from those pursued in 
Francophone Africa, with their own economic and political rationale. This 
‘système autonome de relations’ (Bach, 1990), in turn, helped overcome the 
contradictions between these two arms in French African policy and meant 
that the open cultivation of ties with reactionary, white settler regimes did 
not damage France’s relations with the majority rulers of French Black 
Africa. This thesis has challenged this view, demonstrating throughout that 
French engagement with Rhodesia was anything but autonomous from 
France’s relations with the French-speaking territories in West and 
Equatorial Africa. Rather, France’s approaches to Rhodesia and 
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Francophone sub-Saharan Africa were intertwined from the earliest days of 
France’s presence on the ground in this British colony.  
  
Firstly, France’s expanding relations with Rhodesia in the post-war period 
were founded upon the same mind-set that informed French policy not only 
in Africa, but also more widely. In particular, the desire to restore, and later 
sustain, France’s status as a world power, propelled certain French policy-
makers, diplomats and bureaucrats to identify and exploit opportunities in 
the Rhodesian setting. On the one hand, involvement in Rhodesia was 
viewed by some as a potential antidote to the disconnect between the 
perceived importance of retaining an African Empire and the reality of 
France’s weakened position on the continent (Chafer, 2002, p.48). Rhodesia 
provided, therefore, the opportunity to overcome the paradox between the 
fact that France’s African Empire was at once the backbone and the Achilles 
heel of France’s position on the world stage. The possibility that interaction 
with Rhodesia might contribute directly to French efforts to secure grandeur 
on the world stage was also a key driving force behind French interest in 
Rhodesia, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War.  
 
In addition, the legacies of France’s “Fashoda Syndrome” informed French 
activity towards Rhodesia, in much the same way that it shaped France’s 
strategies in Francophone Africa. The Anglophone context distorted this key 
foreign policy imperative. It was, for example, impossible to prevent 
“Anglo-Saxon” infiltration in a territory ruled over by Britain and in which 
the United States had privileged access as a result of the Anglo-American 
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“special relationship”, leading to much adaptation and improvisation. In 
addition, the varying contexts and experiences of the numerous different 
actors engaged in Rhodesian affairs served to influence interpretations of 
this broader French foreign policy mind-set, whilst simultaneously creating 
new incentives for French action in this British colony. Nevertheless, there 
remained a shared worldview that shaped French interaction with Rhodesia 
and binds it to France’s wider African strategies during this period.  
 
In addition to these shared motivations, there were many common 
characteristics of the strategies implemented by the French in Rhodesia and 
in West and Equatorial Africa. The particular emphasis on cultural activities 
and the diffusion of the French language, for example, was seen in both the 
Francophone and Anglophone African settings. Economic policies that 
prioritised the development of infrastructure were also apparent in both 
contexts. Moreover, and especially after the independence of AOF and AEF 
in 1960, the private and public individuals and companies vital to the 
maintenance of France’s influence in its former colonial sphere, were also 
active in Rhodesia. Thus, in terms of motivations, methods and men, 
France’s policies towards Rhodesia were bound to its relations with 
Francophone sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Finally, and as this thesis has demonstrated, the connections between 
France’s policies in Francophone Africa and Rhodesia went beyond these 
shared aims, approaches and actors. Rhodesia was integrated into the very 
mechanisms for the maintenance of France’s influence on the African 
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continent. This was especially true after 1960, when the transfer of power to 
the majority in Francophone Africa led to the creation of complex réseaux 
involving state and non-state individuals and businesses, in which Rhodesia 
participated. However, the inclusion of Rhodesia in these networks was 
founded upon the identification of this British colony by certain French 
policy-makers, diplomats and bureaucrats as an arena in which France’s 
position on the African continent could be cemented and protected in the 
immediate aftermath of the Second World War. As such, the case study of 
Franco-Rhodesian relations serves to underline the importance of the Fourth 
Republic foundations for the foreign policies of the Fifth Republic. The 
nature of French activity in Rhodesia, alongside the continued participation 
of certain French companies in Rhodesia throughout the period in question, 
serves to further underscore this view. The case study of Rhodesia provides 
evidence, therefore, of an Anglophone dimension to Franco-African 
relations, which was established in the late 1940s, began to expand in the 
immediate aftermath of AOF and AEF independence, before proliferating in 
the years that followed Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence. 
 
A return to Fashoda or entente cordiale renewed? France’s 
relations with “les Anglo-Saxons” in the Rhodesian context 
and beyond  
 
In the twentieth century, France’s relations with the “Anglo-Saxon” powers 
on the African continent were informed by two opposing imperatives. On 
the one hand, the memory of events that took place at Fashoda in 1898, 
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alongside fears about American infiltration of France’s African Empire, 
particularly in the aftermath of the Second World War, served to fuel 
French suspicion of the UK and the US in Africa. This prompted the 
adoption of various policies by the French that aimed to combat the spread 
of “Anglo-Saxon” influence on the continent. On the other hand, the 
Entente Cordiale signed between Britain and France in 1904; the shared 
Anglo-French dilemma in the post-war period about how to preserve their 
status as enlightened colonial rulers, worthy of an important role in a world 
dominated by superpower rivalry; the French reliance on American financial 
aid in order to rebuild both colony and metropole after the humiliation of 
defeat in 1940; and France’s position within the Western “camp” in the 
Cold War, all served to bring France and “les Anglo-Saxons” closer 
together. 
 
As this thesis has shown, these paradoxical imperatives were clearly present 
in the Rhodesian setting throughout the period in question. In order to 
operate publically in Rhodesia, France was required to seek assurances from 
the territory’s colonial ruler, Britain. Rhodesia also formed part of wider 
Anglo-French efforts to cooperate in Africa, particularly in the late 1950s as 
Britain and France looked to each other in an attempt to preserve their 
influence on the African continent. Moreover, France’s fears about 
Communist infiltration were explicitly manifest in the context of Rhodesia, 
providing additional evidence of France’s position within the Western 
“camp”. Yet, Rhodesia also presented France with an opportunity to act 
independently from the “Anglo-Saxon” powers, whilst simultaneously 
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combatting Anglophone dominance of the region. After 1965, these 
possibilities were increasingly restricted, as Rhodesia’s illegal status made 
public engagement with the white regime impossible. However, certain 
French actors acknowledged that the post-UDI context created particular 
opportunities for France to capitalise as a result of declining Anglo-
Rhodesian relations, with some individuals and groups willing to ignore 
international convention so as to continue to undermine “Anglo-Saxon” pre-
eminence in the region. As such, the case study of Rhodesia provides us 
with a microcosm of France’s relations with the “Anglo-Saxon” powers in 
the Cold War epoch.  
 
Looking to Anglo-French relations specifically, on the basis of analysis of 
French policy towards Rhodesia, and Britain and France’s respective 
responses to each others’ Rhodesian policies, this thesis has argued that 
Rhodesia was an important component in Anglo-French relations, 
particularly after 1965. Archival records of the bilateral discussions that 
took place between Britain and France in the late 1960s and 1970s, as well 
as the correspondence between different departments of both country’s 
political and diplomatic apparatus, reveal Rhodesia was an issue over which 
Britain and France cooperated during this period, particularly at the level of 
their respective foreign ministries, mirroring earlier Anglo-French efforts at 
collaboration in the West African setting. However, the persistent 
involvement of certain French actors in Rhodesia after UDI meant that, in 
the latter half of the 1960s, Rhodesia existed as a bone of contention 
alongside other thorns in the side of the tumultuous Franco-British 
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friendship, in particular clashes over Britain’s application to the EEC, 
disagreements over Cold War alliances, and French support for the Biafran 
separatists during the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970). The end of the 
Nigerian civil war in 1970, the Cold War détente, and the accession of the 
UK to the EEC in 1973 removed some of these obstacles to Anglo-French 
relations. Yet, the situation in Rhodesia remained a source of antagonism 
and suspicion on both sides of the Channel throughout the 1970s. The 
exploration of Anglo-French diplomacy regarding the Rhodesian crisis in 
this thesis reveals, therefore, new facets of Franco-British cooperation and 
conflict that are crucial to our understanding of the complex relations 
between these two long-standing rivals and friends, in Africa and beyond. 
 
Analysis of the “mirror” (Keese, 2007b) of French perceptions of British 
policy in Rhodesia and Africa more widely has also provided insight into 
France’s strategies in its own sphere of African influence. It has highlighted, 
for example, the resilience of the memory of Fashoda in shaping French 
calculations towards Africa, not only in the aftermath of the Second World 
War, when tensions were high as a result of French perceptions that the UK 
and the US had let them down in 1940, but also in the 1960s and even into 
the 1970s, when relations were officially cordial and based on cooperation. 
Moreover, French impressions of Britain’s African policies, particularly as 
Britain’s problems in Rhodesia grew, underscore France’s growing 
confidence in its own methods in Africa, with Britain’s Rhodesian troubles 
providing a useful counterpoint to justify France’s relations with the African 
continent. As such, this study of French perceptions of Britain’s Rhodesian 
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policies has enhanced our understanding of France’s ambitions in and 
approaches to the African continent. Thus, this thesis demonstrates the 
utility of applying Keese’s concept of the “mirror” not only to colonial 
rulers with similar ideologies and practices, such as the French and the 
Portuguese (Keese, 2007b, p.48), but also to European powers who had 
alternative visions for the African continent, such as France and Britain.  
 
Une histoire croisée: France, Francophone Africa and the end 
of empire in Rhodesia   
 
The study of Franco-Rhodesian relations in the years between 1947 and 
1980 is not only significant for our understanding of French foreign policy 
in the post-war period. It is also an important strand in the history of 
Rhodesian decolonisation and the creation of an independent Zimbabwe. As 
this thesis has argued, in the aftermath of UDI, French support for Rhodesia, 
both real and imagined, was vital to the preservation of white rule in the 
region. Whilst not wishing to diminish the importance of other sources of 
Rhodesian support, most notably that received from South Africa and 
Portuguese-ruled Mozambique prior to its independence, it is vital 
nevertheless to acknowledge the other external and transnational forces that 
shaped the transition to majority rule in this region of Anglophone Africa.  
 
Through analysis of the triangular relations between France, France’s best 
“friends” in Francophone Africa and the white rulers of Rhodesia, this thesis 
has shown how an argument about the transnational forces shaping 
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Rhodesian decolonisation can be taken in two further directions. Firstly, it 
was the particular nature of the decolonisation process in Francophone 
Africa, and the subsequent form of Franco-African post-colonial relations, 
that provided not only the impetus but also the mechanisms for France, the 
self-styled champion of decolonisation, and majority-ruled Francophone 
Africa to offer support, albeit covertly, to Rhodesia’s reactionary white 
rulers. This, in turn, influenced the slow-paced transition to independence in 
Rhodesia. Thus, the decolonisation processes in Francophone and 
Anglophone Africa were intertwined in ways that hitherto have been 
neglected by historians.  
 
Moreover, transnational forces shaped the three-way ties between France, 
Francophone Africa and Rhodesia. This unconventional, triangular alliance 
was rooted in events taking place elsewhere in Africa, beyond the borders of 
both France’s former African colonies and Rhodesia. Of particular note was 
the shared support for an independent Katanga, a common stance that 
brought certain members of the Elysée’s cellule africaine into direct, 
personal contact with members of the white Rhodesian élite. Later in the 
1960s, the Nigerian civil war was to prove pivotal in transforming the seeds 
sown as a result of the crisis in the Congo into a flourishing economic 
relationship between Rhodesia and Gabon, with France at its heart. As we 
have seen, the financial resources gained from this trading complex were 
amongst the most important sources of strength to the settlers’ efforts to 
maintain white rule in Rhodesia. There was also a common concern 
amongst the French, certain Francophone Africans and the Rhodesians 
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about the spread of communism in Africa, which intersected with a growing 
disillusion about Anglophone initiatives to counter this trend, evidenced in 
the abortive pan-African organisation of 1963 and the Rhodesian proposal 
for a grouping to combat Chinese infiltration of the African continent in 
1971. Thus, the transnational points of interconnection that brought together 
France, Francophone Africa and Rhodesia had far reaching consequences 
for the decolonisation of this British colony.  
 
Furthermore, and although there has not been space within this thesis to 
explore this argument at any length, the impact of these transnational 
relations went beyond the Rhodesian setting. In the early 1960s, France’s 
expanding ties with the Rhodesian settler élite provided the French with 
access to the Federation’s 2000-mile long border with the Belgian Congo 
and, thus, a vital springboard from which to launch its strategies of support 
for the Katangese separatists in the early 1960s (Williams, 2011, p.164). As 
such, France’s expanding relations with Rhodesia influenced its wider Cold 
War strategies on the African continent. It could also be argued that, in 
facilitating France’s access to Katanga, the Franco-Rhodesian alliance 
shaped the course of events taking place in the former Belgian Congo, 
although this point would warrant further investigation.  
 
Similarly, shared support for Biafra not only brought France, Francophone 
Africa and Rhodesia closer together. It also had an impact on the Nigerian 
civil war, as Rhodesia’s connections with France, and later Gabon and Côte 
d’Ivoire, had the effect of increasing Rhodesian support for the Biafran 
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cause. In August 1968, after the initial French statement in favour of Biafra, 
Smith wrote to Debré claiming that, 
le fait que la France ait montré, elle-même, sa 
sympathie pour la cause du Biafra a changé la 
situation et nous examinons, à présent, dans quelle 
mesure nous pouvons les aider, au mieux de nos 
possibilités et en fonction des difficultés pratiques 
d’acheminement de matériels de la Rhodésie au 
Biafra.1  
It is clear that Rhodesia did, in fact, increase its aid to Biafra, as is 
evidenced by van der Byl’s claim during a meeting with Bongo in March 
1969 that Rhodesia was ‘aiding the Biafran cause’.2 Furthermore, as a result 
of this encounter with the Gabonese President, Rhodesian support for Biafra 
grew even further, with the Rhodesians sending clothes, medicine and 
tobacco to the secessionist state, all via the intermediary of the Gabonese 
government.3 This, in turn, may have contributed to the defiance of the 
Biafran leadership and its persistent desire to maintain separation from the 
Nigerian Federal authorities, elongating the war and the suffering of the 
Biafran people. The transnational connections between France, 
Francophone Africa and Rhodesia can be seen, therefore, to have had 
transnational consequences.  
 
Thus, as this study of Franco-Rhodesian relations has shown, the history of 
Rhodesian decolonisation is, in many different senses, une histoire croisée. 
This, in turn, adds further weight to support the calls from scholars, such as 
Colley (2006) and Burbank and Cooper (2010), for imperial history to be 
                                                
1 Smith to Debré. (1968, August 22). AL/Rhodésie/4. Paris:AMAE. 
2 Van der Byl. (1969, March 14). Meeting between Bongo and Van der Byl. SC/12/TS(3)/68. 
Grahamstown:CL. 
3 Anonymous. (nd). Rhodésie et Gabon. Libreville/101. Nantes:AD. 
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studied from a broader, global standpoint. Moreover, this thesis has 
demonstrated the particular resonance of adopting such an approach to the 
history of the end of empire in Africa, underlining the importance of 
analysing not only the trans-continental and global forces that shaped the 
course of African decolonisation, but also how certain actors and groups 
linked to one Western country crossed boundaries to influence the transition 
to majority rule in a different European power’s colonial empire, as well as 
the ways in which the alliances that permitted this process to take place both 
shaped, and were shaped by, transnational forces.  
 
This thesis, therefore, has made a contribution to the development of 
connected, global history methodologies, underlining the need to combine 
the study of transnational interconnections on a micro-scale with a macro, 
global history perspective. Although this approach has been applied by 
historians of early European colonial expansion, such as Colley (2002), who 
combines ‘the large-scale, panoramic and global, with the small-scale, the 
individual and the particular’ (p.12) in her study of captives in the British 
Empire, and Ogborn (2008), who uses individual biographies to analyse the 
spread of British imperial rule across the globe between 1550 and 1800, it 
has rarely been employed extensively by historians of decolonisation. This 
thesis has demonstrated the utility of such an approach for the study of the 
end of European colonial rule in Africa and, thus, has hopefully paved the 
way for further work on the global interconnections between empires and 
settler societies in the period following the end of Second World War.   
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The connected, global history methodology employed in this thesis has also 
been useful in unpicking ‘the richness and complexity of the foreign policy 
universe’ (Hill, 2003, p.xx) and breaking the decision-making process down 
into its constituent parts: ‘agents’, ‘structures’ and ‘responsibility’ (Hill, 
2003, pp.20-21). When it came to policy formulation in Rhodesia, France 
was not a monolithic entity but comprised of numerous actors, operating in 
different contexts, with overlapping agendas and loyalties, along with 
diverging interpretations of shared aims and allegiances. Although the 
practice of looking at the multiple components involved in making foreign 
policy is becoming more commonplace amongst historians, this study has 
demonstrated the particular benefits of employing a connected, global 
history approach to draw out these complexities.  
 
Areas for future research 
 
This study of French policies towards and perceptions of the British colony 
of Rhodesia has shed new light on France’s engagement with the African 
continent, France’s relations with the “Anglo-Saxon” powers and the history 
of Rhodesian decolonisation. This analysis could, however, be enhanced 
with reference to the various archival sources currently inaccessible to 
researchers, particularly the papers housed in the Série: Afrique, Sous-Série: 
Rhodésie-Zimbabwe (1971-1980) at the Archives du Ministère des Affaires 
Etrangères, which might provide additional insight into France’s position 
towards Rhodesia in the 1970s and more information regarding the Quai’s 
interaction with Britain over the crisis in Rhodesia. It would also be 
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interesting to explore the Fonds Philippe Lettéron, which were not identified 
as a potential resource until relatively late on in this research project and 
were then unfortunately inaccessible due to their transfer to the new 
Archives Nationales site at Pierrefitte-sur-Seine. Consultation of the 
Rhodesian Army Association Archive could also give this study additional 
depth, particularly with regards to the military dimensions of France’s 
engagement with Rhodesia after UDI, whilst a more comprehensive oral 
history approach, where interviews are conducted with former French and 
British officials, could contribute to a more detailed understanding of how 
Anglo-French relations were affected by the Rhodesian crisis.  
 
The existence of ties between France and Rhodesia during the colonial 
period, as explored in this thesis, also raises questions about France’s 
relations with the region following its independence as Zimbabwe in 1980. 
The existing literature contains some brief references to this subject. 
Charbonneau (2008, pp.61-2), for example, has noted the signing of a 
military agreement between France and Zimbabwe in 1992, whilst 
Compagnon (2011, pp.228-9) and Majumdar (2007, p.242) record some 
French political gestures towards this former British colony, in particular 
Chirac’s decision to receive Robert Mugabe in Paris in 2001 and 
Zimbabwe’s invitation to the Franco-African summit in 2003, in spite of the 
introduction of economic sanctions against Zimbabwe and the travel ban 
imposed on Mugabe by the EU, the Commonwealth and the UN. Recent 
research by Chafer and Cumming (2010b, p.8) has revealed how the UK 
was forced to accept this move in order to secure French backing of the 
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extension of sanctions against Zimbabwe after the summit. The French did 
not invite Mugabe to the 2007 Franco-African summit in Cannes, but only 
did so after Britain agreed not to block Mugabe’s attendance at the Africa-
EU Summit in Lisbon. There remains, however, no systematic analysis of 
Franco-Zimbabwean post-colonial relations, which would further contribute 
to our understanding of the significance of France’s involvement in this 
region of Anglophone Africa prior to its independence, as well as to our 
knowledge of France’s relations with non-Francophone territories on the 
African continent in the more recent past. Such a study might also enhance 
our understanding of the state of Zimbabwe today.   
 
Finally, and looking more widely, it is vital that research into France’s 
relations with regions of Africa beyond the Francophone fold continues. 
This thesis has revealed the importance of investigating France’s relations 
outside of its traditional sphere of influence, both before and after the 
independence of Francophone Africa, and, in so doing, hopefully has 
contributed to opening up this new avenue for research into Franco-African 
relations. However, there is much more work to be done by historians in this 
field.  
 
Two possible avenues for further research have emerged during the course 
of this study. The first is the Anglophone West African Federation of 
Nigeria. As has been noted above, France’s relations with this former 
British colony after its independence, particularly in the context of the 
Nigerian civil war, have been the subject of some scholarly analysis. 
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However, newly released archival evidence, particularly from official 
French archives, could be used to enhance these existing works, whilst 
situating this analysis within a broader context, which also considers 
France’s relations with this region of British Africa prior to its 
independence in 1960, would further enhance our understanding of France’s 
role in Nigeria. Also noted briefly in this thesis are the contacts between 
members of Foccart’s cellule africaine and Kofi Abrefa Busia, Prime 
Minister of Ghana (1969-1972), which, according to Rhodesian sources, 
permitted France to participate in the overthrow of Nkrumah and his 
eventual replacement by Busia. In spite of the potential significance of this 
alleged episode for the history of Ghana in the post-colonial period, as well 
as France’s known hostility towards Nkrumah, there is no scholarly analysis 
of these relations, or the roots of these contacts before Ghanaian 
independence in 1957. These are just two aspects of France’s relations with 
non-Francophone Africa that warrant further exploration by scholars. It is 
vital to conclude, therefore, by saying that we must challenge notions of 
exceptionality, cross national and colonial boundaries, and escape the 
restrictions of a uniquely Francophone focus on Franco-African relations in 
order to fully comprehend France’s presence on the African continent. 
 351 
Bibliography  
 
 
 
Primary sources 
 
a) Unpublished archival material 
France 
Archives Diplomatiques, Nantes (AD) 
Archives des postes  
Abidjan - Archives de l’ambassade de France à Abidjan, 1962-1980 
Londres - Archives de l’ambassade de France à Londres, 1948-1969 
Libreville - Archives de l’ambassade de France à Libreville, 1969-1984 
Pretoria – Archives de l’ambassade de France à Pretoria, 1969-1980  
Salisbury - Archives du consulat de France à Salisbury, 1947-1973 
 
Representations de la France dans les organisations et les commissions 
internationales 
ONU - Archives de la représentation permanente de la France à l’ONU, 
1966-1967 
 
Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (AMAE)  
Série file: Afrique 
Sous-série file: Cote d’Ivoire, 1960-1969 
Sous-série file: Gabon, 1960-1969 
 
Série file: Afrique-Levant (AL) 
Sous-série file: Possessions britanniques (PB), 1944-1952 
Sous-série file: Sud-est africain britannique (SEAB), 1953-1959 
Sous-série file: Sud-est africain britannique, 1960-1965 
Sous-série file: Sud-est africain britannique, 1966 
Sous-série file: Rhodésie, 1967-1970 
 
Série file: EU-Europe (EU) 
Sous-série file: Grande Bretagne (GB), 1960-1969 
Sous-série file: Grande Bretagne (GB), 1970-1976 
 
  
 352 
Série file: Nations Unies et Organisations internationales (ONU) 
Sous-série file: Décolonisation, 1960-1969 
Sous-série file: Décolonisation, 1970-1973 
 
Archives Nationales, Paris (AN) 
Archives de la Présidence de la République du général de Gaulle, 1959-
1969 
5 AG 1/ Ély - Fonds Élysée 
5 AG 1/ Sol - Fonds Solférino 
 
Archives de la Présidence de la République, 1958-1974 
5 AG 5/ FPU – Fonds du Secrétariat général pour les Affaires africaines et 
malgaches 
5 AG 5/ FPR – Fonds « privés » Foccart 
 
Archives de la Présidence de la République, 1974 - 1981  
5 AG 3 – Fonds Giscard d’Estaing  
 
Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence (ANOM) 
Fonds territoriaux/ Madagascar (MAD)/ Gouvernement Général de 
Madagascar (GGM) 
Série D (Politique et administration général) : 6D  (Dossiers divers de la 
Direction des affaires politiques) 
 
Fonds ministériels (FM)/ Deuxième colonial empire/ Ministère des colonies/ 
Administration Centrale  
1AFFPOL : Direction des affaires politiques 
 
Great Britain  
The National Archives (TNA)  
Foreign Office 
FO 371 – Foreign Office General Correspondence 
 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and predecessors 
FCO 25 - West and Central African Department 
FCO 35 - Rhodesia Economic Department 
 353 
FCO 36 - Rhodesia Political Department 
FCO 65 – West Africa Department 
 
Premier’s Office 
PREM 13 - Prime Minister's Office: Correspondence and Papers, 1964-1970 
 
Bodleian Library, Oxford (BL) 
Conservative Party Archives (CPA) 
CCO – Conservative Central Office 
LCC – Leader’s Consultative Committee  
Harold Wilson Papers  
A3. Prime Minister’s Case Files 
A4. Subject Files, 1952-1974 
 
Bodleian Library of African and Commonwealth Studies, Rhodes 
House, Oxford (RH) 
Papers of the Rt. Hon. Sir Roy Welensky (WP)  
231/14 – Pan African counter-organisation (1963)  
 
British Parliamentary Debates  
Available online at http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/ 
House of Commons Debates (HC) 
House of Lords Debates (HL) 
 
South Africa 
Cory Library, Rhodes University, Grahamstown (CL) 
Rhodesian Government Cabinet Minutes (RGCM) (deposited by Ian Smith)  
Smith Collection (SC) (deposited by Mrs Tholet in 2010)  
 
b) Oral history interviews 
Interview with Mrs Michelle & Mr Benjamin Davies (wife & son of Mr 
Rodney Davies, former employee of the Rhodesian Cold Storage 
Commission), London: UK (2011, July 23) 
  
 354 
Interview with Mr Collie & Mrs Stella Hill (former representative of 
Rhodesian sugar industry and his wife), Banstead, Surrey: UK 
(2012, February 6). 
Interview with Mrs Dinah Townsend (daughter of Hardwicke Holderness, a 
liberal politician in Southern Rhodesia during Sir Garfield Todd’s 
premiership (1953-1958)), Portsmouth: UK (2011, June 6). 
Interview with Mr Derek van der Syde (former Rhodesian Civil Servant, 
Bournemouth: UK (2011, March 28) 
 
c) Published primary sources  
Memoirs and other published primary sources 
Couve de Murville, M. N. L. (1971). Une politique étrangère, 1958-1969. Paris: 
Plon. 
Flower, K. E. N. (1987). Serving secretly: an intelligence chief on record; Rhodesia 
into Zimbabwe, 1964 to 1981. London: John Murray. 
Foccart, J., & Gaillard, P. (1995). Foccart parle: entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard 
(Vol. 1). Paris: Fayard; Jeune Afrique. 
Foccart, J., & Gaillard, P. (1997). Foccart parle: entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard 
(Vol. 2). Paris: Fayard; Jeune Afrique. 
Fuller, A. (2003). Don't lets go to the dogs tonight: an African childhood. London: 
Picador.  
Fuller, A. (2011). Cocktail hour under the tree of forgetfulness. London: Simon & 
Schuster. 
Gaulle, C. de. (1989). Mémoires d’espoir (Vol. 2). Paris: Presse Pocket. 
Godwin, P. (1996). Mukiwa: a white boy in Africa. London: Picador. 
Hill, C. (2001). "It just occurred to me...": Collie Hill (privately published). 
Huet, P. & Sailly, J. de. (1969). La politique économique de la Grande-Bretagne 
depuis 1945. Paris: Armand Colin. 
Orcival, F. o. d. (1966). Rhodésie : pays des lions fidèles. Paris: La Table Ronde. 
Sailly, J. de. (1957). La zone sterling. Paris: Colin. 
Siegfried, A. (1949). Afrique du Sud : notes de voyage. Paris: A. Colin. 
Smith, I. D. (1997). The great betrayal : the memoirs of Ian Douglas Smith. 
London: Blake. 
Stewart, M. (1980). Life and Labour: an autobiography. London: Sidgwick 
& Jackson. 
 355 
Wilson, H. (1971). The Labour government, 1964-70: a personal record. 
London: Michael Joseph. 
 
Newspapers and periodicals  
The Daily Mail (Rhodesia) 
The Daily Mirror 
Le Figaro  
The Guardian 
The New York Times 
The Rhodesia Herald 
The Sunday Mail 
The Sunday Times 
The Times 
The Telegraph 
Who's who in France: 1969-1970. (1969). (9th ed.). Paris: J. Lafitte. 
 
Online resources  
Ambassade de France à Harare, http://www.ambafrance-zw.org  
Assemblée Nationale. Base de données des deputes français depuis 1798, 
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/sycomore/index.asp 
UN. Resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council since 
1946. http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/index.shtml 
The United Nations, http://www.un.org 
 
Published document collections 
Ashton, S. R., & Louis, W. R. (2004). British Documents on the End of 
Empire : East of Suez and the Commonwealth 1964-1971: part II: 
Europe, Rhodesia, Commonwealth: The Stationery Office. 
Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (MAE). Commission de publication des 
documents diplomatiques, f. a. (2002 et seq.). Documents 
Diplomatiques Français (DDF) 1964-1986. Bruxelles: P.I.E-Peter 
Lang. 
 
 356 
Secondary Sources  
 
a) Published books, articles and chapters in books  
Ageron, C. R., & Michel, M. (Eds.). (1995). L' ère des décolonisations. Paris: 
Karthala. 
Alden, C. (1996). From policy autonomy to policy integration: the evolution of 
France's role in Africa. In C. Alden & J.-P. Daloz (Eds.), Paris, Pretoria 
and the African continent: the international relations of states and societies 
in transition. Basingstoke; New York: Macmillan Press ; St. Martin's Press. 
Aldrich, R. (1996). Greater France: a short history of French overseas expansion. 
Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Alexander, M. S., & Philpott, W. J. (Eds.). (2002). Anglo-French defence relations 
between the wars. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: 
Palgrave. 
Alexander, P. (2006). A tale of two Smiths: the transformation of Commonwealth 
policy, 1964-1970. Contemporary British History, 20(3), 303-321. 
Andereggen, A. (1994). France's relationship with Subsaharan Africa. Westport, 
CT: Praeger. 
Bach, D. (1980). Le Général de Gaulle et la guerre civile au Nigeria. In D. G. 
Lavroff (Ed.), La politique africaine du général de Gaulle (1958-1969): 
actes du colloque organisé par le Centre bordelais d'études africaines le 
Centre d'étude d'Afrique noire et l'Institut Charles de Gaulle, Bordeaux, 19-
20 octobre 1979 (pp. 330-345). Paris: Éditions A. Pedone. 
Bach, D. (1982). Dynamique et contradictions dans la politique africaine de la 
France: les rapports avec le Nigeria (1960-1981). Politique africaine 5, 47-
74. 
Bach, D. (1986). France’s involvement in sub-Saharan Africa: a necessary 
condition to middle power status in the international system. In A. Sesay 
(Ed.), Africa and Europe: from partition to interdependence or 
dependence? (pp. 75-85). London: Croom Helm. 
Bach, D. (1990). Un système autonome de relations: la France et l'Afrique du Sud, 
1963-1977. In D. Bach (Ed.), La France et l'Afrique du Sud: histoire, 
mythes et enjeux contemporains (pp. 173-202). Paris: Credu : Karthala. 
Barber, J. P. (1967). Rhodesia: the road to rebellion. London; New York: OUP 
Barr, J. (2011). A line in the sand : Britain, France and the struggle that shaped the 
Middle East. London: Simon & Schuster. 
Bat, J.-P. (2010). Le rôle de la France àpres les indépendences: Jacques Foccart et 
la pax gallica. Afrique contemporaine, 235, 43-52. 
  
 357 
Bat, J.-P. (2012). Le syndrome Foccart: la politique française en Afrique de 1959 à 
nos jours. Paris: Éditions Gallimard. 
Bat, J.-P., & Geneste, P. (2010). Jean Mauricheau-Beaupré: de fontaine à Mathurin, 
JMB au service du Général. Relations internationales, 142, 87-100. 
Bayly, C. A. (2004). The birth of the modern world, 1780-1914: global connections 
and comparisons. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Bell, P. (1992). Origins of the Great War. In P. M. Hayes (Ed.), Themes in modern 
European history (pp. 106-128). London: Routledge. 
Betts, R. F. (1991). France and decolonisation. London: Macmillan. 
Bourgi, R. (1980). Le Général de Gaulle et L'Afrique noire 1940-1969. Paris: 
Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence. 
Bourmaud, D. (2000). French political culture and African policy: from consensus 
to dissensus. Monograph No. 50, Franco-South African dialogue: 
sustainable security in Africa Retrieved June 6, 2010, from 
http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No50/Chap5.htm 
Bourmaud, D. (2003). France and Africa: the constant striving for exceptionalism. 
In C. Alden & G. Martin (Eds.), France and South Africa: towards a new 
engagement with Africa. Pretoria: Protea Book House. 
Bourmaud, D. (2012). Clientelism and patrimonialism in international relations: the 
case of France's African policy. In D. Bach & M. Gazibo (Eds.), 
Neopatrimonialism in Africa and beyond (pp. 208-220). New York: 
Routledge. 
Bozo, F. (2010). France, "Gaullism" and the Cold War. In M. P. Leffler & O. A. 
Westad (Eds.), The Cambridge history of the Cold War (Vol. 2, pp. 158-
178). Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Brownell, J. (2010). 'A sordid tussle on the Strand': Rhodesia House during the UDI 
rebellion (1965-1980). Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 
38(3), 471-499. 
Bull, T. (1967). Rhodesian perspective. London: Joseph. 
Burbank, J., & Cooper, F. (2010). Empires in world history: power and the politics 
of difference. Princeton, N.J.; Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Butler, L. J. (2000). Britain, the United States and the demise of the Central African 
Federation, 1959-63. Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 
28(3), 131-151. 
Callamard, A. (1999). French Policy in Rwanda. In H. Adelman & A. Suhrke 
(Eds.), The path of a genocide: the Rwandan crisis from Uganda to Zaire 
(pp. 157-184). New Brunswick: Transaction. 
Cefkin, J. L. (1968). The Rhodesian question at the United Nations. International 
Organisation, 22(3), 649-669. 
 358 
Chabal, E. (2013). The rise of the Anglo-Saxon: French perceptions of the Anglo-
American world in the long twentieth century. French Politics, Culture & 
Society, 31(1), 24-46. 
Chafer, T. (1992). French African policy: towards change. African Affairs, 91(362), 
37-51. 
Chafer, T. (2002a). Franco-African relations: no longer exceptional? African 
Affairs, 101(404), 343-363. 
Chafer, T. (2002b). The end of empire in French West Africa : France's successful 
decolonization? Oxford; New York: Berg. 
Chafer, T. (2005). Chirac and ‘la Françafrique’: no longer a family affair. Modern 
and Contemporary France, 13(1), 7-23. 
Chafer, T. (2008). From Confidence to Confusion: Franco-African Relations in the 
Era of Globalisation. In M. Maclean & J. Szarka (Eds.), France on the 
World Stage: Nation State Strategies in the Global Era. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Chafer, T. (2011). Friend or foe? Competing visions of empire in French West 
Africa in the run-up to independence. In M. Thomas (Ed.), The French 
Colonial Mind. Volume 1: Mental maps of empire and colonial 
encounters (pp. 275-298). Lincoln, NE; London: University of Nebraska 
Press. 
Chafer, T., & Cumming, G. (2010a). Beyond Fashoda: Anglo-French security 
cooperation in Africa since Saint-Malo. International Affairs, 86(5), 1129-
1147. 
Chafer, T., & Cumming, G. (Eds.) (2011). From rivalry to partnership?: new 
approaches to the challenges of Africa. Farnham: Ashgate. 
Chafer, T., & Jenkins, B. (1996). Introduction. In T. Chafer & B. Jenkins (Eds.), 
France: from the Cold War to the new world order (pp. 1-14). Basingstoke: 
Macmillan. 
Chafer, T., & Sackur, A. (Eds.). (2001). Promoting the colonial idea: Propaganda 
and visions of empire in France. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Charbonneau, B. (2008). France and the new imperialism: security policy in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Aldershot; London: Ashgate; Pluto Press. 
Charlton, M. (1990). Last colony in Africa: diplomacy and the independence of 
Rhodesia. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Childs, D. (2001). Britain since 1945: a political history (5th ed.). London; New 
York: Routledge. 
Clayton, A. (1994). The wars of French decolonization. London: Longman. 
Coggins, R. (2006). Wilson and Rhodesia: UDI and British Policy Towards Africa. 
Contemporary British History, 20(3), 363-381. 
 359 
Cohen, A. (2009). "Voice and Vision" - The Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland's Public Relations Campaign in Britain: 1960-1963. Historia, 
54(2), 113-132. 
Colley, L. (2002). Captives. New York: Pantheon Books. 
Colley, L. (2006). The difficulties of empire: present, past and future. Historical 
Research, 79(205), 367-382. 
Collins, M. (2013). Decolonisation and the "Federal Moment". Diplomacy & 
Statecraft, 24(1), 21-40. 
Compagnon, D. (2011). A predictable tragedy: Robert Mugabe and the collapse of 
Zimbabwe. Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Conklin, A. L. (1997). A mission to civilize: the republican idea of empire in 
France and West Africa, 1895-1930. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University 
Press. 
Conklin, A. L., Fishman, S., & Zaretsky, R. (2011). France and its empire since 
1870. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Connelly, M. (2003). A diplomatic revolution: Algeria's fight for independence and 
the origins of the post-Cold War era. New York, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Cooper, F. (2005). Colonialism in question : theory, knowledge, history. Berkeley, 
Calif. ; London: University of California Press. 
Cooper, F., & Stoler, A. L. (1997). Between metropole and colony: rethinking a 
research agenda. In F. Cooper & A. L. Stoler (Eds.), Tensions of empire: 
colonial cultures in a bourgeois world (pp. 1-56). Berkeley; London: 
University of California Press. 
Corbett, E. M. (1972). The French presence in Black Africa (1st ed.): Washington, 
Black Orpheus Press. 
Couve de Murville, M. (1995). La France et l’ONU entre 1958 à 1969. In A. Lewin 
& A. Juppé (Eds.), La France et l'ONU : 1945-1995 (pp. 350 p). Condé-sur-
Noireau (France): Arléa-Corlet. 
Crowder, M. (1964). Indirect rule – French and British style. Africa, 34(3), 197-
205. 
Cuddumbey, C. (1996). France and South Africa. In C. Alden & J.-P. Daloz (Eds.), 
Paris, Pretoria and the African continent : the international relations of 
states and societies in transition. Basingstoke: New York: Macmillan Press 
; St. Martin's Press. 
Cumming, G. (1995). French Development Assistance to Africa - Towards a New 
Agenda. African Affairs, 94(376), 383-398. 
Cumming, G. (1996). British aid to Africa: A changing agenda? Third World 
Quarterly, 17(3), 487-501. 
 360 
Cumming, G. (2001). Aid to Africa: French and British policies from the Cold War 
to the new millennium. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Cumming, G. (2005a). From realpolitik to the third way: British African policy in 
the new world order. In U. Engel & G. Olsen, R. (Eds.), Africa and the 
north: between globalization and marginalization (pp. 55-73). Oxon; New 
York: Routledge. 
Cumming, G. (2005b). Transposing the ‘Republican’ Model? A Critical Appraisal 
of France’s Historic Mission in Africa. Journal of Contemporary African 
Studies, 23(2), 233-252. 
Cumming, G. (2013). Nicolas Sarkozy's Africa policy: Change, continuity or 
confusion? French Politics, 11(1), 24-47. 
Darbon, D. (1990). Les rapports franco-sud-africains depuis 1977. In D. Bach (Ed.), 
La France et l'Afrique du Sud: histoire, mythes et enjeux contemporains (pp. 
233-258). Paris: Credu; Karthala. 
Darwin, J. (2008). After Tamerlane: the global history of empire since 1405. New 
York: Bloomsbury. 
Darwin, J. (2009). The empire project: the rise and fall of the British world-system, 
1830-1970. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Day, J. (1967). International nationalism: the extraterritorial relations of Southern 
Rhodesian African nationalists. London; New York: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul; Humanities Press. 
De St. Jorre, J. (1972). The Nigerian civil war. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 
DeRoche, A. (2000). Black, white and chrome: the United States and Zimbabwe, 
1953 to 1998. Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press. 
DeRoche, A. (2009). Non-alignment on the Racial Frontier: Zambia and the USA, 
1964–68. In S. Onslow (Ed.), Cold war in Southern Africa: white power, 
black liberation. London ; New York: Routledge. 
Dimier, V. (2004). Le gouvernement des colonies, regards croisés franco-
britanniques. Bruxelles: Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles. 
Douki, C., & Minard, P. (2007). Histoire globale, histoire connectées: un 
changement d'échelle historiographie? Introduction. Revue d'Histoire 
Moderne et Contemporaine, 5(54-5), 7-21. 
Dowden, R.. (2008). Africa : altered states, ordinary miracles. London: Portobello. 
Drake, H. (2004). France in free fall? French perspectives on the Astérix complex. 
French Politics(2), 221-233. 
Echenberg, M. (1985). 'Morts pour la France': the African soldier in France during 
the Second World War. Journal of African History, 26(4), 363-380. 
  
 361 
Evans, M. (2004). Culture and empire, 1830-1962: an overview. In M. Evans (Ed.), 
Empire and culture: the French experience, 1830-1940 (pp. 1-23). 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Evans, M. (2012). Algeria: France's undeclared war. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Evans, Michael. (2007). The wretched of the empire: politics, ideology and 
counterinsurgency in Rhodesia, 1965-80. Small Wars and Insurgencies, 
18(2), 175-195. 
Evans, R. J. (1997). In defence of history. London: Granta. 
Foster, E. A. (2013). Faith in empire: religion, politics, and colonial rule in French 
Senegal, 1880-1940. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 
Frappat, S. (1990). Le choc de la décolonisation portugaise en Afrique centre-
australe. In D. Bach (Ed.), La France et l'Afrique du Sud: histoire, mythes et 
enjeux contemporains (pp. 215-232). Paris: Credu; Kathala. 
Ginio, R. (2006). French colonialism unmasked: the Vichy years in French West 
Africa. Lincoln; London: University of Nebraska Press. 
Glaser, A., & Smith, S. (1992). Ces messieurs Afrique: le Paris-village du continent 
noir. Paris: Calmann-Lévy. 
Godin, E., & Chafer, T. (2004). The French exception. New York; Oxford: 
Berghahn Books. 
Godwin, P., & Hancock, I. (1993). 'Rhodesians never die': the impact of war and 
political change on White Rhodesia c. 1970-1980. Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Golan, T. (1981). A certain mystery: how can France do everything that it does in 
Africa - and get away with it? African Affairs, 80(318), 3-11. 
Gordon, P. H. (1993). A certain idea of France: French security policy and the 
Gaullist legacy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Gowlland-Debbas, V. (1990). Collective responses to illegal acts in international 
law: United Nations action in the question of Southern Rhodesia. 
Dordrecht: Nijhoff. 
Grosser, A. (1989). Affaires extérieures : la politique de la France, 1944-1989. 
Paris: Flammarion. 
Hargreaves, J. (1995). Decolonisation: French and British Styles. In A. Kirk-
Greene, D. (Ed.), State and Society in Francophone Africa since 
Independence. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Hargreaves, J. D. (1996). Decolonization in Africa (2nd ed ed.). London: Longman. 
  
 362 
Hewlett, N. (2004). France and exceptionalism. In T. Chafer & E. Godin (Eds.), 
The French exception (pp. 3-15). New York; Oxford: Bergahan Books. 
Hill, C. (2003). The changing politics of foreign policy. Basingstoke; New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan. 
Hitchcock, W. I. (1998). France restored: Cold War diplomacy and the quest for 
leadership in Europe, 1944-1954. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press. 
Holderness, H. (1985). Lost Chance: South Rhodesia 1945-58. Harare: Zimbabwe 
Publishing House. 
Holmes, T. (1990). Missionnaires francçais et traités britanniques en afrique 
australe, 1830-1900. In D. Bach (Ed.), La France et l'Afrique du Sud: 
histoire, mythes et enjeux contemporains (pp. 85-109). Paris: Credu; 
Karthala. 
Horne, G. (2001). From the barrel of a gun: the United States and the war against 
Zimbabwe, 1965-1980. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
Huliaras, A. C. (1998). The 'Anglosaxon Conspiracy': French perceptions of the 
Great Lakes crisis. Journal of Modern African Studies, 36(4), 593-609. 
Hyam, R. (1987). The geopolitical origins of the Central African Federation: 
Britain, Rhodesia and South Africa, 1948-1953. The Historical Journal, 
30(1), 145-172. 
Hyam, R. (2006). Britain's declining empire: the road to decolonisation, 1918-
1968. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hyam, R. (2010). Understanding the British Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Iliffe, J. (2007). Africans: the history of a continent (2nd ed.). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Jackson, J. (2003). The fall of France: the Nazi invasion of 1940. Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Jacques, F. (2006). The decolonization of French-speaking territories in Africa as 
reflected in the South African press: a case study of Algeria and the Belgian 
Congo. Journal of European Studies, 36(1), 31-41. 
Jardim, J. (1979). Sanctions double-cross: oil to Rhodesia. Bulawayo: Books of 
Rhodesia. 
Jenkins, K.. (2003). Re-thinking history (New ed.). London: Routledge. 
Johnman, L., & Lynch, F. M. B. (2002). A treaty too far? Britain, France and 
Concorde, 1961-1964. Twentieth Century British History, 13(3), 253-276. 
  
 363 
Joll, J. (1968). 1914: the unspoken assumptions. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.  
Kahler, M. (1984). Decolonization in Britain and France: the domestic 
consequences of international relations. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press. 
Kapungu, L. T. (1973). The United Nations and economic sanctions against 
Rhodesia. Lexington, MA; Farnborough: D.C. Heath. 
Keese, A. (2007a). First lessons in neo-colonialism: the personalistion of relations 
between African politicians and French officials in sub-Saharan Africa, 
1956-66. Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 35(4), 593-613. 
Keese, A. (2007b). Living with ambiguity: integrating an African elite in French 
and Portuguese Africa, 1930-61. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner. 
Keese, A. (2011). Rigged elections? Democracy and Manipulation in the Late 
Colonial State in French West Africa and Togo, 1944-1958. In M. Thomas 
(Ed.), The French Colonial Mind. Volume 1: Mental maps of empire and 
colonial encounters (pp. 324-346). Lincoln,NE; London: University of 
Nebraska Press. 
Keiger, J. F. V. (2001). France and the world since 1870. London: Arnold. 
Kelly, C. (1991). History and postmodernism. Past and Present(133), 209-213. 
Kent, J. (1992). Internationalization of colonialism: Britain, France and black 
Africa, 1939-56. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kessler, M.-C. (1999). La politique étrangère de la France: acteurs et processus. 
Paris: Presses de sciences po. 
Kiwanuka, S. M. (1970). Colonial policies and administrations in Africa: the myth 
of the contrasts. African Historical Studies, 3(2), 295-315. 
Klare, M., & Prokosch, E. (1979). Evading the Embargo: How the US Arms South 
Africa and Rhodesia. A Journal of Opinion, 9, 42-46. 
Konieczna, A. (2009). La coopération militaire entre la France et l'Afrique du Sud 
(1948-1960). Revue d'histoire diplomatique, 4, 319-339. 
Konieczna, A. (2012). Les relations des parlementaires française avec l'Afrique du 
Sud (1960-1974). Parlement[s], Revue d'histoire politique(17), 93-108. 
Majumdar, M. A. (2007). Postcoloniality: the French dimension. New York: 
Berghahn Books. 
Marshall, D. B. (1973). The French colonial myth and constitution-making in the 
Fourth Republic. New Haven; London: Yale University Press. 
Martin, G. (1985). The historical, economic and political bases of France's African 
policy. Journal of Modern African Studies, 23(2), 189-208. 
Martin, G. (1995). Continuity and change in Franco-African relations. Journal of 
Modern African Studies, 33(1), 1-20. 
 364 
Massigli, R. (1957). New conceptions of French policy in Tropical Africa. 
International Affairs, 33(4), 403-415. 
Maubrey, M. (1990). Les Français et le veau d'or: la question sud-africaine, 1896-
1902. In D. Bach (Ed.), La France et l'Afrique du Sud: histoire, mythes et 
enjeux contemporains (pp. 37-66). Paris: Credu; Karthala. 
McNamara, F. T. (1989). France in Black Africa. Washington, D.C.: National 
Defense University. 
McNeill, J. R., & McNeill, W. H. (2003). The human web: a bird's-eye view of 
world history (1st ed.). New York: W.W. Norton. 
Melville, K. (1979). The involvement of France and Francophone West Africa in 
the Nigerian civil war. Perth: African Studies Seminar, School of Human 
Communication, Murdoch University. 
Menon, A. (1995). From independence to cooperation: France, NATO and 
European security. International Affairs, 71(1), 25-32. 
Meredith, M. (1979). The past is another country: Rhodesia 1890-1979. London: 
A. Deutsch. 
Meredith, M. (2005). The state of Africa: a history of fifty years of independence 
(New ed.). London: Free Press. 
Metz, S. (2000). Refining American Strategy in Africa. Carlisle, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute. 
Michel, M. (1983). La coopération intercoloniale en Afrique noire, 1942-1950: un 
néo-colonialisme éclairé? Relations internationales, 34, 155-171. 
Michel, M. (1993). Décolonisations et émergence du tiers monde. Paris: Hachette 
Livre. 
Michel, M. (1999). The decolonization of French Africa and the United States and 
Great Britain, 1945-1958. In R. Bridges (Ed.), Imperialism, decolonization 
and Africa : studies presented to John Hargreaves (pp. 153-177). 
Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Minter, W., & Schmidt, E. (1988). When sanctions worked: the case of Rhodesia 
reexamined. African Affairs, 87(347), 207-237. 
Mlambo, A. S. (1996). The Cold Storage Commission: a colonial parastatal 1938-
1963. Zambezia, 23(1), 53-72. 
Mobley, R. (2002). The Beira patrol: Britain's broken blockade against Rhodesia. 
Naval War College Review, 4(1), 63-84. 
Moorcraft, P. L., & McLaughlin, P. (2008). The Rhodesian War: a military history 
(Rev. and upd. ed.). Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military. 
  
 365 
Msindo, E. (2009). 'Winning hearts and minds': crisis and propaganda in colonial 
Zimbabwe, 1962-1970. Journal of Southern African Studies, 35(3), 663-
681. 
Mtisi, J., Nyakudya, M., & Barnes, T. (2009). Social and economic developments 
during the UDI period. In B. Raftopoulos & A. S. Mlambo (Eds.), Becoming 
Zimbabwe: a history from the pre-colonial period to 2008 (pp.115-140). 
Harare: Johannesburg: Weaver Press ; Jacana Media. 
Murphy, P. (2006). ‘An intricate and distasteful Subject’: British planning for the 
use of force against European Settlers of Central Africa, 1952-1965’. 
English Historical Review, 121(492), 746-777. 
Médard, J.-F. (1997). France-Africa: within the family. In D. Della Porta & Y. 
Mény (Eds.), Democracy and corruption in Europe (pp. 22-34). London: 
Pinter. 
Médard, J.-F. (1999). Les avatars du messianisme français en Afrique. L’Afrique 
politique, 17-34. 
Médard, J.-F. (2005). France and sub-Saharan Africa: a privileged relationship. In 
U. Engel & G. R. Olsen (Eds.), Africa and the north: between globalization 
and marginalization (pp. 38-54). Oxon; New York: Routledge. 
Newbury, C. W., & Kanya-Forstner, A. S. (1969). French policy and the origins of 
the scramble for West Africa. Journal of African History, 10(2), 253-276. 
Nünlist, C., Locher, A., & Martin, G. (2010). Globalizing de Gaulle: international 
perspectives on French foreign policies, 1958-1969. Lanham, Md.: 
Rowman & Littlefield. 
Nyangoni, W. W. (1985). Africa in the United Nations system. Rutherford [N.J.]: 
London ; East Brunswick. 
O'Brien, P. (2006). Historiographical traditions and modern imperatives for the 
restoration of global history. Journal of Global History, 1(1), 3-39. 
Ogborn, M. (2008). Global lives : Britain and the world, 1550-1800. Cambridge, 
UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Onslow, S. (Ed.). (2009). Cold war in Southern Africa: white power, black 
liberation. London ; New York: Routledge. 
Onslow, S., & Berry, A. (2010, October). Why did you fight? Narratives of 
Rhodesian identity during the insurgency 1972-1980 Bristol: University of 
the West of England. 
Passmore, K. (2003). Poststructuralism and history. In S. Berger, H. Feldner & K. 
Passmore (Eds.), Writing history: theory and practice (pp. 118-140). 
London: Hodder Arnold. 
Péan, P. (1983). Affaires africaines. Paris: Fayard. 
  
 366 
Pedley, A. (1996). As mighty as the sword. A study in the writing of Charles de 
Gaulle. Exeter: Elm Bank Publications.  
Pelissier, R. (1990). Des étrangers dans les colonies étrangères: voyageurs, 
missionnaires et commerçants en Afrique centrale-australe portugaise, 
1830-1914. In D. Bach (Ed.), La France et l'Afrique du Sud: histoire, 
mythes et enjeux contemporains (pp. 67-84). Paris: Credu; Karthala. 
Perrot, C.-H. (1990). Les missionnaires français et la construction d'un Etat: le 
Lesotho au temps d'Eugène Casalis, 1833-1855. In D. Bach (Ed.), La 
France et l'Afrique du Sud: histoire, mythes et enjeux contemporains (pp. 
111-132). Paris: Credu; Karthala. 
Porter, A. N. (2004). Religion versus empire?: British protestant missionaries and 
overseas expansion, 1700-1914. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Reid, R. J. (2009). A history of modern Africa: 1800 to the present. Chichester, 
U.K. ; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Rioux, J.-P. (1987). The Fourth Republic, 1944-1958 (1st paperback ed.). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Sanderson, G. N. (1985). The European partition of Africa: origins and dynamics. 
In R. Oliver & G. N. Sanderson (Eds.), The Cambridge history of Africa. 
Volume 6: 1870-1905 (pp. 96-158). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Schraeder, P. (2000). Cold war to cold peace: explaining U.S.-French competition 
in Francophone Africa. Political Science Quarterly, 115(3), 395-419. 
Scott, P. (1952). The tobacco industry of Southern Rhodesia. Economic Geography, 
28(3), 189-206. 
Shepard, T. (2006). The invention of decolonization : the Algerian War and the 
remaking of France. Ithaca, N.Y.; London: Cornell University Press. 
Shepard, T. (2011). Algeria, France, Mexico, UNESCO: a transnational history of 
anti-racism and decolonization, 1932-1962. Journal of Global History, 6(2), 
273-297. 
Shipway, M. (2008a). Decolonization and its impact : a comparative approach to 
the end of the colonial empires. Malden, MA; Oxford: Blackwell Pub. 
Shipway, M. (2008b). 'Transfer of destinies', or business as usual? Republican 
invented tradition and the problem of 'independence' at the end of the 
French empire. The Round Table, 97(398), 747-759. 
Shutt, A. K., & King, T. (2005). Imperial Rhodesians: The 1953 Rhodes Centenary 
Exhibition in Southern Rhodesia. Journal of Southern African Studies, 
31(2), 356-378. 
Sluga, G. (2011). Editorial for transnational cluster. Journal of Global History, 
6(2), 219-222. 
 367 
Smith, T. (1978). A comparative study of French and British decolonization. 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 20(01), 70-102. 
Smouts, M.-C. (1979). La France à l'ONU: premiers rôles & second rang. Paris: 
Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques. 
Soubeyrol, J. (1981). La politique africaine du Général de Gaulle et le 
système des nations unies. In La politique africaine du général de 
Gaulle (1958-1969): actes du colloque organisé par le Centre 
bordelais d'études africaines le Centre d'étude d'Afrique noire et 
l'Institut Charles de Gaulle, Bordeaux, 19-20 octobre 1979. Paris: 
Éditions A. Pedone. 
Stephenson, G. V. (1975). The impact of international economic sanctions on the 
internal viability of Rhodesia. Geographical Review, 65(3), 377-389. 
Stone, L. (1992). History and postmodernism. Past and Present(135), 189-194. 
Strack, H. R. (1978). Sanctions: the case of Rhodesia. Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse 
University Press. 
Stremlau, J. J. (1977). The international politics of the Nigerian civil war, 1967-
1970. Princeton; Guildford: Princeton University Press. 
Taylor, I., & Williams, P. (2002). The limits of engagement: British foreign policy 
and the crisis in Zimbabwe. International Affairs, 78(3), 547-565. 
Thomas, M. (2000). The French North African crisis: colonial breakdown and 
Anglo-French relations, 1945-62. Basingstoke, Hants: New York: 
Macmillan; St. Martin's Press. 
Thomas, M. (2005). The French empire between the wars: imperialism, politics 
and society. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Thomas, M. (2011a). Introduction. In M. Thomas (Ed.), The French colonial mind. 
Volume 1: Mental maps of empire and colonial encounters. Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press. 
Thomas, M. (2011b). The French colonial mind. Volume 1: Mental maps of empire 
and colonial encounters. Lincoln, NE; London: University of Nebraska 
Press. 
Thomas, M. (2011c). The French colonial mind. Volume 2: Violence, military 
encounters and colonialism. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 
Thomas, M., Moore, B., & Butler, L. J. (2008). Crises of empire : decolonization 
and Europe's imperial states, 1918-1975. London: Hodder Education. 
Tombs, R., & Tombs, I. (2006). That sweet enemy : the French and the English 
from the Sun King to the present. London: William Heinemann. 
Torrent, M. (2009). Bilingualism and double-talk: language and diplomacy in the 
Cameroons (1959-1962). Journal of Modern Language Studies, 45(4), 361-
377. 
 368 
Torrent, M. l. (2012). Diplomacy and nation-building in Africa: Franco-British 
relations and Cameroon at the end of empire. London: I.B. Tauris. 
Utley, R. (2002). 'Not to do less but to do better...': French military policy in Africa. 
International Affairs, 78(1), 129-146. 
Vaïsse, M. (1998). La grandeur: politique étrangère du général de Gaulle, 1958-
1969. Paris: Fayard. 
Verrier, A. (1986). The road to Zimbabwe,1890-1980. London: Cape. 
Verschave, F. o.-X. (1998). La Françafrique: le plus long scandale de la 
République. Paris: Stock. 
Vigne, R. (1990). L'intérgration des Huguenots français de la Colonie du Cap. In D. 
Bach (Ed.), La France et l'Afrique du Sud: histoire, mythes et enjeux 
contemporains (pp. 17-36). Paris: Credu; Karthala. 
Wall, I. M. (2001). France, the United States, and the Algerian War. Berkeley, 
Calif. ; London: University of California Press. 
Watts, C. P. (2005). Killing kith and kin: the viability of British military 
intervention in Rhodesia, 1964-65. Twentieth Century British History, 
16(4). 
Watts, C. P. (2006). The United States, Britain, and the problem of Rhodesian 
independence, 1964-65. Diplomatic History, 30(3), 439-470. 
Watts, C. P. (2007). Dilemmas of intra-Commonwealth representation during the 
Rhodesian problem, 1964-65. Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History, 45(3), 323-344. 
Watts, C. P. (2008). Britain, the Old Commonwealth and the problem of Rhodesian 
independence, 1964-65. Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 
36(1), 75-99. 
Watts, C. P. (2012). Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence: an 
international history (1st ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Wauthier, C. (1972). France and Africa: long live neo-colonialism. A Journal of 
Opinion, 2(1), 23-26. 
Wauthier, C. (1995). Quatre présidents et l'Afrique: De Gaulle, Pompidou, Giscard 
d'Estaing, Mitterrand : quarante ans de politique africaine. Paris: Seuil. 
Williams, A. S. (2011). Who killed Hammarskjöld?: the UN, the Cold War and 
white supremacy in Africa. London: C. Hurst & Co Publishers. 
Windrich, E. (1979). Rhodesian censorship: the role of the media in the making of 
the one-party state. African Affairs, 78(313), 523-534. 
Windrich, E. (1981). The mass media in the struggle for Zimbabwe: censorship and 
propaganda under Rhodesian Front rule. Gwelo, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press. 
  
 369 
Winter, J. M., & Prost, A. (2005). The Great War in history: debates and 
controversies, 1914 to the present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Wood, J. R. T. (1996). Fire Force: Helicopter Warfare in Rhodesia: 1962-1980.   
Retrieved May 17, 2012, from http://www.jrtwood.com/article_fireforce.asp 
Wood, J. R. T. (2005). So far and no further! : Rhodesia's bid for independence 
during her retreat from empire 1959-1965. Johannesburg: 30 Degrees South 
Publishers. 
Wood, J. R. T. (2008). A matter of weeks rather than months : the impasse between 
Harold Wilson and Ian Smith : sanctions, aborted settlements and war, 
1965-1969. Victoria, B.C.: Trafford. 
Wood, J. R. T. (2009). Counter-strike from the sky: the Rhodesian all-arms 
fireforce in the war in the bush 1974- 1980. Johannesburg: 30° South 
Publishers. 
Wood, R. S. (1973). France in the World Community. Leyden: Sijthoff. 
Xiang, L. (2011). De Gaulle and the "Eternal China". In B. M. Rowland (Ed.), 
Charles de Gaulle's legacy of ideas (pp. 71-84). Lanham, MD; Plymouth: 
Lexington Books. 
Young, J. W. (1998). The Wilson government and the debate over arms to South 
Africa in 1964. Contemporary British History, 12(3), 62-86. 
Young, J. W. (2006). Franco-British relations during the Wilson Years. In A. Capet 
(Ed.), Britain, France and the Entente Cordiale since 1904 (pp. 162-183). 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Zacklin, R. (1974). The United Nations and Rhodesia: a study in international law. 
New York: Praeger. 
Zorn, J.-F. (2012). When French Protestants replaced British Missionaries in the 
Pacific and Indian Oceans; or, how to avoid the colonial trap. In O. White & 
J. P. Daughton (Eds.), In God's empire: French missionaries in the modern 
world (pp. 215-232). New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
b) Unpublished PhD theses, conference papers and reports 
 
Coggins, R. (2002). The Rhodesian UDI and the search for a settlement. 
Unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Oxford, Oxford. 
Moukambi, V. (2008). Relations between France and South Africa with special 
reference to military matters. Unpublished doctoral thesis, Stellenbosch 
University, Stellenbosch, South Africa.  
Murambiwa, I. M. (2008). The Zimbabwe Archive. Paper presented at the 
‘Expatriate Archives in Museums’ Workshop.  
 370 
Sakade, T. (2012). Trapped in a loveless marriage: the Anglo-French Concorde 
crisis of 1974. Paper presented at the 1st joint European Business History 
Association-Business History Society of Japan Annual Conference: 
Business enterprises and the tensions between local and global.  
Stanley, E. J. A. (2004). France and South Africa, 1945-1985. Unpublished 
doctoral thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of 
London, London. 
Warson, J. (2009). Britain, France and the Nigerian civil war, 1967 – 1970. 
Unpublished undergraduate dissertation, London School of 
Economics and Political Science, London.  
 
c) Reports 
Chafer, T., & Cumming, G. (2010b). Punching below their weight? Critical 
refections on Anglo-French cooperation in Africa. London: Chatham 
House. 
  
 371 
Annex: Ethical approval  
 
Attached: 
Letter from University of Portsmouth Ethics Committee  
UPR16 Research ethics review checklist 
 372 
 
 
 
 
Joanna Warson 
PhD Student 
School of Languages and Area Studies 
University of Portsmouth 
 
 
 
REC reference number: 11/12:28 
Please quote this number on all correspondence. 
 
13th May 2013 
 
Dear Joanna, 
 
Full Title of Study:            France in Anglophone Africa: French Policy and Perceptions for 
Decolonisation to the Postcolonial Era 
 
 
 
Documents reviewed: 
Consent Form 
Invitation Letter 
Participant Information Sheet 
Recording Agreements 
 
 
Further to our recent correspondence, this proposal was reviewed by The Research Ethics 
Committee of The Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences. 
 
I am pleased to tell you that the proposal was awarded a favourable ethical opinion by the 
committee. 
 
Kind regards, 
 
FHSS FREC Chair 
David Carpenter 
  
 
Members participating in the review: 
 
 David Carpenter 
 Richard Hitchcock 
 Jane Winstone 
 
 373 
 
 374 
 
 
UPR 16 (2011) – August 2011                                                                      
 
Student Statement: 
 
 
I have considered the ethical dimensions of the above named research project, and have successfully 
obtained the necessary ethical approval(s) 
 
 
Ethical review number(s) from Faculty Ethics Committee (or from 
NRES/SCREC): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Signed: 
(Student) 
 
Date: 
 
If you have not submitted  your  work  for  ethical  review,  and/or  you  have  answered  ‘No’ to one or more of 
questions a) to e), please explain why this is so: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Signed: 
(Student) 
 
Date: 
 
 
 
11/12:28
30/09/2013
